

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SPECULATIVE PHILOSOPHY.

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PROFESSOR FRASER'S BERKELEY.*

By James Hutchison Stirling.

The occasion of this paper, as its title indicates, is the appearance at the hands of Professor Fraser of what we may assume to be, if not the terminal, at least the determinative edition of the "Works and Life" of Berkeley. This is indeed an *édition de luxe.* Issuing from the Clarendon Press, these four volumes are in binding, paper, type, all that the most fastidious eye can require, whether for its pleasure or its comfort. A step nearer, and we see an excellent portrait, besides diagrams and various plates in illustration. Then all that can be done for the reader's assistance—whether by Preface or by Note, by Index or by Table of Contents—is done. Lastly, not only has every scrap of unpublished writing, known anywhere to exist, of Berkeley's, been, with whatever difficulty, recovered, but, with infinite pains and conscientiousness, every tittle of possible information bearing on any circumstance or on any person connected with the life and labors of Berkeley, has been traced, and tracked, and made to show itself. *Complete*, then, is the characterizing word that may be safely written on these superb four volumes. Complete—perhaps indeed almost *over*-complete! For it is certain that the most excellent and irreproachable

* *The Works of George Berkeley*, &c., &c. By A. C. Fraser, Professor of Logic and Metaphysics in the University of Edinburgh. Oxford: At the Clarendon Press, 1871.

of mortals do write at times what, for colorness and insipidity, is not much more than a blank and nil. (Witness, for example, the prose writings of the dear, good, super-benevolent Shelley.) And it is to be feared that the blameless Berkeley is often hardly visible for the very innocence of the bland mucilage, as it were, that seems not rarely to constitute the element of those Letters, Journals, Sermons, &c. It is quite possible, alas! that not only the "Life," but even the "Works," of Berkeley may be removed in the end—and with perfect scientific satisfaction—from a quartet of volumes to a duet of pages.

Be that as it may, the diligence, the love, the faith of Professor Fraser as an Editor are, to our belief, quite unsurpassed in philosophical literature. Had we but—to say nothing of the rest—a Hume, a Kant, and a Hegel, in such perfection of detail as a like untiringness of labor and research might extend them to us! For into this labor an earnest endeavor at explanation enters as no inconsiderable constituent; and explanation, however it be with the simple position of Berkeley, is certainly a necessity for these his fellows or, at all events, followers. Candor, too, is a very pleasing element in the explanations of Professor Fraser. If love carries him every now and then beyond the limit of reality, and into issues to which Berkeley is, at once and from the very nature of the case, strange,—candor, for its part, is not long of resuming him again into the region of fact.

The curious example of this is what concerns universals. These—thanks to the Germans!—have been seen lately to be so absolutely indispensable to philosophy that Professor Fraser cannot resist insinuating even this praise for his Berkeley also. "Universalization" of what holds of sense seems again and again to be mentioned as an original constituent of Berkeley's machinery proper, and considerable weight in the same reference is placed upon "relations." Now Berkeley, though verbally assigning to his "notions" not only mental operations but relations as well, will be found generally somewhat uneasy with these latter, as several passages in the *Commonplace Book* will assist to show; and, as for universals, up till *Siris* and some nine years previous to his death, an utter rejection of these was the precise and distinc-

tive hinge on which his philosophy turned. Though we can readily understand, then, why Professor Fraser should please himself by a frequent reference to universals, this reference does seem curious in connection with Berkeley. Professor Fraser himself, indeed, ever and anon avows as much; and candor, as we say, is never slow to resume him again into the region of fact.

Denizen, in truth, of this region, Professor Fraser must, on the whole, be pronounced always; and this not more by his candor and by his faithfulness than by the reality of his intellectual gifts and intellectual acquirements. Professor Fraser has not only laboriously pieced together all that belongs whether to the philosophical thought of Hamilton or of Berkeley, but he has read widely in philosophy generally, and is at this moment as much Philosophy's votary as any man that may be named. There is in Professor Fraser, too, a certain peculiar deep-thoughtedness, clothed moreover in no unworthy style. For, whatever may be capable of being said to the contrary, it is only justice to allow Professor Fraser the praise of literary accomplishment. Despite, so to speak, an occasional phrase *Gladstonian*, Prof. Fraser is a good writer, a clear writer—even a powerful writer. In short, Prof. Fraser was precisely the ideal workman for the work in question; and this latter, consequently, has finally and definitively issued in all the perfection and completeness of which it was susceptible. Nay, there is, perhaps, a certain sadness in this triumph of an accomplished end. The last touch that finishes does not always turn out of hand *for*, but often out of hand *from*, use; and it is just possible that this perfect edition of the *works* of Berkeley appears precisely at the moment that the *work* of Berkeley ceases to function anywhere —orbis terrarum anywhere. The course of Berkleianism has been this. It functioned historically according to power, in its own day, upon a few; but was soon almost entirely neglected. The revival of poetry in England gradually restored in every larger heart the feeling of religion, and, where this feeling could not at the same time reconcile itself with all the elements of positive religion, Berkeleianism was felt to supply an intellectual want. Such want, though with considerable modification of form, it may be said, to some extent, still

to supply. But, side by side with it, as equal companion of the nurture, this want must now be content to accept its own opposite; for the entire matter with which Messrs. Mill and Bain seek to indoctrinate their readers at present is to be found in the earliest writings of Berkeley, and especially in his very first, the *New Theory of Vision*. All that literal acceptance of sensation and denial of any mental operation but association—all that literal acceptance of the arbitrariness of custom and denial of any necessity in human thought, that the pious Berkeley believed indispensable for the establishment of a God that directly and constantly *spoke* to us, has been bodily appropriated by the gentlemen named, and diverted by them into a very different and mostly quite opposite service. Strange! what was brought forward to buttress theology and idealism, is now the express bulwark of non-theology and materialism. This can only be so for a moment now however. Definitive philosophy, with whatever imperfection, has at length reached England, and Berkeleianism, whether rightly on either side, or wrongly on both, wanes to its disappearance. This gives a melancholy interest to Prof. Fraser's labors, and perhaps Prof. Fraser himself is not unaware of it. At all events this is certain, that, as intimated already, let love raise what superfetation it may, this superfetation is ever admitted in the end, directly or indirectly, to be one of desire merely, and candor returns, with the severity of a judge, to exact appreciation as well of the man as of the work. This, in both respects, the reader of these volumes will have no difficulty in realizing.

Professor Fraser tells us (I. vii.) that "his own love for philosophy was first engaged by Berkeley in the morning of life," and that he "regards his writings as among the best in English literature for a refined education of the heart and the intellect." We remark that, while the first phrase will be readily seen to illustrate and confirm some portions of what has been already said, the second is assuredly not saying too much for Berkeley. Apart from his peculiar philosophical principle, and in themselves, his writings are to be valued for the simple pure heart that is everywhere present in them—present in their very style indeed. Berkeley's "philosophy" rather than his literature, however, is still the

pertinent interest, and will constitute, naturally, our main consideration here. It is in its regard that Prof. Fraser says (ibidem) "Berkeley has suffered more than perhaps any other great modern philosopher from misunderstanding." Now, as to that, it would be difficult, of course, accurately to appraise the misunderstandings to which modern philosophers have been submitted, but we are disposed to admit less misunderstanding for Berkeley than almost for any other. The misunderstandings in the case of such men as Hume, as Kant and Hegel, have always been complex; whereas, in the case of Berkeley, they have been, as invariably, at least simple. Berkeleians themselves, in fact, have often *made* the misunderstanding; on which then, in the eyes of the groundlings, they have, with much delectation to themselves, done battle. In short, all misunderstanding concerning Berkeley is limited, perhaps, to the word *matter*, and one half of it has only a spurious existence in the ineptitude of men who *will* maintain, as against a sole allegation in objection, that Berkeley did *not* deny matter. These men seem to fancy that this denial of Berkeley's denial (of matter) will strike all mankind not Berkeleian with astonishment as the very reverse of what they have always been led to suppose, and that, accordingly, it will boundlessly disconcert. This is the so-called "*double-entendre*," and as a mere fiction of fence possible only to ineptitude, it is certainly quite unworthy of any substantial Berkeleian. The vulgar misunderstanding of Berkeley is to be seen, not in the allegation of a denial of matter, for Berkeley *did* deny matter, but in the imputation to his doctrine of irrelevant consequences. Berkeley denied an absolute matter, beside and independent of consciousness; but he did not deny (who could?) the sequence of material phenomena as experienced in consciousness. The question of Berkeley was of the absolute *nature* and *place* of matter *on occasion of* these ordinary material phenomena. These, then, not being denied, any such imputation of false consequences as that of Swift, "Walk through that shut door," was simply beside the point. It is quite right for all that to join issue with Berkeley, as Ueberweg does, by asserting absolute matter to exist; for Berkeley's main position undeniably is that absolute matter does

not exist. Now as Ueberweg views the question, all others—in its conditions, that is, possibly not in his conclusion—all others metaphysically inclined, since Hegel, have also viewed it. Ueberweg asserts himself able to establish by legitimate inference an actual outer independent matter, what Professor Fraser calls *abstract* matter; and herein the Berkeleians believe Ueberweg only blind to the fallacy of his own procedure. His inferences, we may suppose them to say, are only from position to position, but on each position he had never *abstract* but only *concrete* matter before him—always only matter *with* consciousness, never matter *without* consciousness. The probability is that Ueberweg's philosophy would require to be more idealistic before it could reach the position of catholic truth. Still there is no doubt but he is right so far; and despite the objection, "always *with* and never *without* consciousness," an absolute external system of things actually does exist, and quite independent whether of any human mind or of any human body. Now, *Berkeleianism as Berkeleianism is involved in that single allegation.* On the whole, then, be the imputation of consequences what it may, the misunderstanding of Berkeley has been simple and innocent compared with the monstrous and complicated misunderstandings we have witnessed in regard to other modern philosophers. Prof. Fraser himself (vol. I. p. x) describes the outcome of "the pure philosophical works" of Berkeley only to be as follows:

"They contain his *reductio ad absurdum* of Abstract Matter, and his reasoned exposition of the merely phenomenal nature of the real material world, in opposition to skepticism, and especially to the materialistic denial that Active Intelligence is of the essence of things. The dependent, *sui generis*, existence of space and the sensible world, in which we nevertheless become aware of what is external to our own subjective personality, is with Berkeley a datum of intuitive experience; the independent or absolute existence of Matter is, on the contrary, an unintelligible hypothesis. He was the first in modern times to attack the root of what has been called Cosmothetic Idealism, and to lay the foundation, however indistinctly, of a reasoned Natural Realism—by discarding representative images in sense, and accepting instead what he believed to be the facts of consciousness. He maintains accordingly the certainty of sense perception, in oppo-

sition to ancient and to modern skeptics, who dispute the possibility of any ascertainable agreement between our perceptions and reality; and, however defectively, in opposition also to a merely subjective idealism, like Fichte's, which refers the orderly succession of sensible changes to the laws of the individual mind in which they are perceived."

And a declaration still more summary is this (p. viii):

"Is an unknowing and unknown something called Matter, or is Intelligence the supreme reality; and are men the transient results of material organization, or are they immortal beings?"

"This," says Prof. Fraser, "is Berkeley's implied question." Yes, we say, this is Berkeley's implied question, and, seeing that what concerns "intelligence," the "results of material organization," "immortal beings," &c., belongs not to the *theme* of Berkeley, but constitutes only its *corollary*, we may say that the first phrase, "Is an unknowing and unknown something, called Matter, the supreme reality?" is Berkeley's implied question. Nay, the predicates "unknowing and unknown" being but *assumed consequences* of the Berkeleian operation, it evidently is our right in the first place to leave them out, and the Berkeleian question stands, "Is a something called Matter the supreme reality?" But by this reduction it is manifest that, imputed consequences apart, there has been no misunderstanding of the theme of Berkeley even as understood by Prof. Fraser. Uninitiated human beings, when they speak of "matter," understand by it "abstract matter." This they understood Berkeley to deny; and they were right in so understanding him. They were wrong only so far as, like Swift, they fell into the fallacy of imputed consequences, and asked Berkeley to hold himself independent of the material *phenomena* that he never denied, could not deny, and never thought of denying, and make his way through shut doors, fling himself from precipices, or knock his head against lamp-posts. Even that, however, can hardly be called a misunderstanding, for it is a misunderstanding only popular; it is not a misunderstanding of Kant, of Hegel, of Ueberweg, or of any British writer who has been to school to the Germans. As said, indeed, so far as misunderstanding is concerned, the Berkeleians themselves have to blame themselves with fully one half of it in every case, and with actually the

whole of it in the case of later writers. To correct the *popular* error that drew illegitimate consequences, namely, they asserted Berkeley *not* to deny matter as ordinarily understood, but, on the contrary, to affirm matter as ordinarily understood. In this way they made confusion only worse confounded, for they reduced the dispute to a mere babble of two voices that moved parallel to each other. This is the *double-entendre*, and Berkeley himself, who originated it, must forever bear the odium of it. In this reference, however, Prof. Fraser, so far as we have seen, is perfectly blameless; he has disdained the double-entendre. If other Berkeleians imitated him in this, it would perhaps be good for themselves. Meantime, it is amusing to watch now the inept innocent craft, and now the more inept innocent conviction in which they would, to their own beliefs, thunderstrike an Ueberweg with "but Berkeley did not deny matter," or confute his (to them) necessarily fundamental, or only possible, mistake in holding to a matter which consciousness never reached. In this Berkeleian aspect there is a serenity of innocent self-belief, the underlying ineptitude of which ought to amuse and not to vex. But the good Ueberweg is now alike beyond such vexation in himself and such ineptitude in others.

In discussing this question of misunderstanding as in reference to Berkeley, which we shall now assume to be complete, the real nature of the Berkeleian thought, and as understood by Prof. Fraser, has come very fairly to the surface. There is no matter known, says Berkeley, but that that is known in and with consciousness; the matter that may be supposed to subsist side by side with consciousness and independent of consciousness, is not *known*,—it is only *inferred*, and that *falsely*. This single position together with the arguments for, and the corollaries from, it, constitutes what we may call the whole philosophy of Berkeley. Having settled abstract matter not to exist, all, to Berkeley's mind, is settled, and there is nothing more for us to do. But this a serious mistake on the part of Berkeley and all subsequent Berkeleians. All that follows from the position of Berkeley is, that the whole natural universe is now, in quality and region, mental. But, as Hegel objects, that has changed nothing; though mental in

the stuff it is now made of, and mental in the place where it is now put, the whole burthen of existence remains in its system of relations—whether these are outer or inner—after as before; and philosophy has still to begin. A philosophy that knows itself, demonstrates God to us, what he is, where he is, how the universe of things issues from him, how it returns to him—what that universe of things is in its fundamental relations of quality, quantity and measure, of finite and infinite, of substance and accident, of cause and effect—what that universe of things is in its relations of externality, no matter whether said externality be noumenal or only phenomenal in its relations of space and time, of mechanics, physics, and the organic world—what that universe of things is as on the stand-point of man; when, for explanation, many entire sciences are required, of Psychology, Law, Morals, Politics, History, Æsthetics, Religion, &c. That is the business of philosophy, and that performed, a man is *wise;* he knows the world he lives in and what he has to do in it. *But all this he may know, and, in perfectly the same manner and to the same effect, Berkeley's question as to whether externality is noumenal or phenomenal being all the time left in abeyance.* He is cheaply a philosopher, then, who is so only by virtue of knowing that externality is phenomenal! Knowing that, and indulging imagination in the few exaltations and exultations in regard to a spiritual universe that at once suggest themselves, a man may remain in an ignorance otherwise utterly crass, in an ineptitude otherwise utterly Bœotian. This, then, is a delusion that, as it has existed for some time in the world, it would be well to remove. It must become matter of universal recognition here that to know all Berkeley is scarcely to have moved from the spot, is not to have even *begun* to know philosophy. That, while to know philosophy as philosophy is the labor of years, to know philosophy as the philosophy of Berkeley, adding as well what leads from as what leads to it, is but the interest of an hour. Our understanding of a watch is not one whit advanced when we have proved that it is *in* gold, and not in copper; neither do we know one particle more of the universe when we assume it to be *in* the stuff mind than when we assume it to be *in* the stuff matter. The whole relations of

things remain the same, and the *necessity* of these relations, the *necessary intussusception* of these relations, is the business of philosophy—a matter complex, laborious, and long. What may be objected here is only what we have described as the exaltations natural to imagination in view of a universe wholly spiritual; but these exaltations are not philosophy, and in regard to God, Immortality, and Free-will, which are the only relations a spiritual universe seems to make easier for us, we are in effect just as we were. The very materialists now-a-days ply their trade with as much satisfaction in the sublimed Berkeleian matter as in the ordinary raw material. Mr. Huxley does not know, and need not know, what matter is. Mr. Darwin himself, if allowed the *relative external* conditions, will not care a brass farthing that you should prove them *absolutely within.* Noumenon-phenomenon is to him Homoousia-homoiousia, and he will leave it quite unconcernedly to you. The transference, then, of all things from a noumenal to a phenomenal externality, leaving no substrate and no element but mind, even if it were established, would be but a very small matter, and wholly idle as regards philosophy, which would remain apart and indifferent thereby —which very certainly were never *learned* thereby. It can no longer be possible, then, to put so very much weight on Berkeley, or to assign him any capital place historically. His position, his argumentation there*for*, his consequences there*from*, are all matters eminently incomplex and simple. Even if granted, they would have but a very inappreciable effect on philosophy proper, and philosophy proper neither grants them, nor requires that they should be granted! It is but misleading and mischievous to call Berkeleianism a philosophy, or a Berkeleian a philosopher—very misleading and mischievous, especially to this latter. But here we do not allude even in the most distant manner to Prof. Fraser, whose wide general acquirements and whose own profound reflections place him utterly beyond reach of any such allusions. It may be said that Berkeley was necessary to Hume, and that *through* Hume, at least, Berkeley will always have an historical position in philosophy. Even that is not so certain. Fichte and Schelling both acted on Hegel; but Hegel, for all that, makes good his historical connection directly

with Kant. So Hume. Berkeley acted on Hume doubtless; but Hume did not stand in need of this action, and has, in independence of it, made good his historical connection with Locke. Then look to the vast difference of contents in the one and in the other. While Berkeley says little more than, the inference to noumenal matter is false, there is scarcely a single one of all those great concrete interests named above as belonging to philosophy, on which the most important bearings are not to be found in Hume. In this single action of making matter mental in quality and place, it is not so certain however, that, whether it cover much or whether it cover little, whether it constitute a philosophy or whether it prove scarcely a contributory crumb, Berkeley is original. There were brave men before Agamemnon, and even idealists before the idealist special. It will be sufficient, in this reference, with barely allusion to Eleatics, Sophists, Stoics, Neoplatonists, and passing over the entire middle ages, with St. Augustin in front of them, to name Leibnitz, and to point out that, after the Cartesian doubt, such a position was involuntary. It is undeniable that Locke named what Descartes saw, the impossibility of proving the independent existence of external things, and that is almost already the position of Berkeley. In fact, that matter is only known *in* consciousness, which is at once the centre and the circumference of Berkeley, will, in the history of philosophy, not be found to have been *restricted* to Berkeley, but to have occurred to others also, although to Berkeley and to Collier only did it seem a determination of reach enough to constitute a philosophy by itself.

The quotation which we have made above will prove that our understanding of *what* constitutes the *essential* feat of Berkeley is, however much we may disagree as to the value and reach of it, identical with that of Prof. Fraser. There are other points in this quotation, however, in which we differ from Prof. Fraser, which to discuss will further tend to enable the reader to understand this phase of philosophy and in its connections with general philosophy at present. One of these points concerns cosmothetic idealism, and the allegation that Berkeley was the first in modern times to attack its "root," and "to lay the foundation, however indistinctly, of

a reasoned Natural Realism—by discarding representative images in sense, and accepting instead what he believed to be the facts of consciousness." Now, when we consider that, in regard to "representative images," Berkeley only said, what has been also said in another reference, "the curtain is the picture," or, what is the same thing, the image is the object, Berkeley's connection with the Cosmothetic Idealism will be seen to be a much simpler matter than we should be led to imagine from the words of Prof. Fraser. In fact, the entire rôle ascribed here to Berkeley is one which belongs more to Prof. Fraser's own position and in connection with Sir W. Hamilton than directly to the position of Berkeley. So situated also is the phrase "Natural Realism" in the same passage. What Hamilton meant by Natural Realism was what we all mean, that Nature in space is a noumenal independent entity, and that we directly perceive it. What Prof. Fraser means by a "reasoned Natural Realism" is, that we perceive not a reality different from the mind in matter and in place, but identical with the mind in matter and in place. There is really then, in both respects, a certain perversion here that has only appearances, only phrases, in its support. Cosmothetic Idealism is identical with what Reid calls the "Ideal Theory." It holds us to have direct traffic not with noumenal external things, but only with ideas. So far, then, as Berkeley acknowledges himself to know not things but ideas, he is as much a Cosmothetic Idealist as Descartes and the rest; differing from them only in this, that he withdrew the things which the ideas, for Descartes and the rost, postulated. So far also as he withdraws these things, or abolishes what Hamilton calls the objective object, he cannot be, in Hamilton's or the ordinary sense, a Natural Realist; for to Hamilton, and the whole body of mankind to whom he appeals, the existence of an objective object is the distinctive characteristic of Natural Realism. It is only by way of a caution in the understanding of phrases that we permit ourselves these observations; for indeed, so far as philosophy is concerned, it is a matter now of no consequence whatever how Berkeley was related to Cosmothetic Idealism, or to Natural Realism either. These are names which men have ceased to conjure with.

A second point to note in the same quotation is what bears on the relation of Berkeley to the Skeptics. It sounds magniloquent that Berkeley should be so spoken of, as against the skeptics, and as in reference to "ascertainable agreement between our perceptions and reality," when we recollect that Berkeley made at once short work with *dis*agreement, by cutting off one side—the side of reality.

The third and last point here concerns what is said of Fichte. Fichte's idealism is described as referring "the orderly succession of sensible changes to the laws of the individual mind in which they are perceived," and it is named—of course, with the counter-inference for the Berkeleian idealism, which is here placed "in opposition" to it—a "subjective" idealism. It is difficult to feel sure that Fichte's genetic process is here properly named; Fichte himself, at all events, meant this process to be carried on in the absolute subject; and he is praised by Hegel as having been the first, so far as genesis is concerned, to trust himself to thought alone. It is really the flexions of pure thought that constitute the instrument of Fichte's deduction, and we can hardly recognize as much in that reference to "sensible changes" and "the individual mind in which they are perceived." Fichte's is universally named a subjective idealism, but it would be infinitely more deserving of the name did the above description apply to it. But, apply or not to Fichte's, does not this description apply perfectly to Berkeley's idealism? In Berkeley's idealism, indeed, "the orderly succession of sensible changes," which just means the world and its daily march, are not referred to the "individual mind," but to God. Passing over that Fichte's idealism is not behind Berkeley's here, for Fichte only refers to the absolute individual, and that is God, but has even the advantage over it inasmuch as Berkeley's God is but an idle word—a word as idle as when to the question, What supports the world? it is answered, An elephant;—whereas what stands for God in Fichte's scheme is itself deduced and articulately determined, as well as deductively and articulately connected with all the rest. But if, from the scheme of Berkeley, God be withdrawn, all pretence for denying Berkleianism to be a subjective idealism must fall to the ground. But how is it possible to do otherwise than with-

draw from the scheme of Berkeley the element of a God? Hegel calls Berkeley's God a *Gosse*, that is, a *spout*. Whence are the ideas—that used to be the outer world—in my consciousness? From God, says Berkeley; and does not see that to the question, What supports the world? he has only answered, The elephant. I am conscious, and I have ideas in my consciousness; but when I ask, Whence come they? and say, God, I have only used a word—I have demonstrated nothing. Even should there be an existence correspondent to the word, this existence were only the *spout* of the ideas—the spout from which they were delivered into me. Even grant the existence, it could be no more than this spout, for there is no connection, no deduction; the pieces of the machinery stand quite apart from each other in mutual isolation. But, in effect, there is only one piece known, only consciousness. The other piece is only *feigned:* we have only feigned a spout, and not demonstrated one. There are these ideas in me, but the real world to which they were ascribed no longer exists; whence, then, are they? Oh! there is a spout from which they are discharged into you, as there used to be an elephant to support the world. This, probably, will be plainer to the reader from an illustration. Here is a printed page, and there are the types that printed it. That is the relation of consciousness and the world, as ordinarily believed. Let us withdraw the types now, and we do by the page what Berkeley does by consciousness—only, the letters on the page must be supposed to drop their very ink and creep into its (the page's) substance. The page now assumes, let us say, that the letters come not from itself, and it asks, in this regard, Whence? How is it possible, if it now names a whence (nothing whatever being known *but* the letters), that this "whence" can be anything else than what Hegel figures as Berkeley's imaginary spout of supply, or what the Indians figure as the imaginary elephant of support? In point of fact, so far as connection and deduction are concerned, the Berkeleian consciousness is limited to its own self, and the idealism of the name (Berkeleian) must be purely subjective.

But the sufficient reason as regards refusal of the application of the epithet "objective" to the Berkeleian idealism, lies in what is the true distinction between the idealisms indi-

cated. We could quote scores of passages in which Hegel (with anything but respect) characterizes the Berkeleian as a subjective idealism, and in this he is followed by all the later German philosophers. Now Hegel's reason is, that that idealism which resolves the system of things, substantially, into a congeries of relations of thought as thought, is necessarily objective; whereas that idealism which only transfers the universe of things from independent externality into the consciousness of the subject without further *Vermittelung*, or interconnecting process of reason, is only subjective. Anything that exists in the mere feeling or the mere conception (*Vorstellung*) of a subject is subjective. But any system of the necessary relations of thought as thought is independent of mere subjective feeling or subjective conception (*Vorstellung*), and, consequently, as being the same to all thought, objective. The cognition that appertains to the 47th proposition of Euclid is objective; but any mere feeling or conception of any matter sensuous, political, religious, æsthetic, is, as such, and though in reference to matters capable of being expressed in thoughts, subjective. This is the true distinction; and the idealism of Hegel depending on thought in its own form as thought, is objective; whereas the idealism of Berkeley that points only to the fact of sensation or perception (and that is always the element of feeling and *Vorstellung*) as its reason and its basis, is subjective. It is quite incompetent, then, to speak of Berkeleianism as opposed to subjective idealism, or to claim for it the character and name of objective idealism.

Before leaving the citation that has been so long before us, we shall just refer to the phrase "however defectively" applied by Professor Fraser in characterization of the procedure of Berkeley. What this phrase means is repeated again and again in the course of these volumes. Thus Berkeley is held (p. viii) not to have "thought out" his own doctrine "in its primary principles," not to have "sufficiently guarded" it "in some parts." Or it is alleged (p. xv) that "it is necessary to unfold what is latent, as Berkeley presupposes important principles which he does not articulately express." Or Berkeley in his *Siris* (p. xi) shall have supplemented and corrected "extreme statements to which he was impelled in

his youth," &c. What is said of the *Siris*, we may remark by-the-bye, is perhaps somewhat exaggerated, and not quite true to the mark. A note in a recent translation of Schwegler's *Umriss* of Philosophy has the merit perhaps—at least, so far as we know—of first calling attention to the peculiarities of the *Siris*. But the expectations with which certain Berkeleians have rushed to the *Siris* on this intimation—the claims they would seek to maintain of anticipations on Berkeley's part of Kant, Schelling, Hegel, and who not, are simply amusing. Even Professor Fraser has yielded too readily to a like enthusiasm, and spoken too unwarily of the *Siris* being "probably the profoundest English philosophical book of the last century," of its affording supplement and corrections to early statements (as said), of its supplying us with Berkeley's philosophy "in its latest form," and of "the speculative thought of Berkeley" being "only partially conceived by those who neglect the latter part of the *Siris*." Alas! all this has but little support in fact. Berkeley's philosophical theory was complete in his publication of 1710, and the *Siris* of 1744 has hardly any bearing on it—rather, indeed, it is separated by a gulf from it, and stands confronting it, even frowning opposition. This is the nature of the *Siris* in Berkeley's own regard, and in other regards there cannot, so far as contribution to philosophy is concerned, be much claimed for it. What the *Siris* shows mostly is that Berkeley has somewhat forgotten his first love, his "Principles," and that meanwhile he has been reading the Greeks. In this latter respect, the erudition to which he has manifestly attained is very considerable; for his age and for his country, extraordinary indeed.

The *Siris* apart, then, what the above remarks amount to, is very obvious: we are to suppose that Berkeley attained only to an imperfect statement of his own doctrine. Now this, if well-founded, would be a most extraordinary result for a doctrine so simple, and for a writer so accomplished, as we know both, and as both are generally admitted to be. But is it well-founded—this general conception of Berkeley's statement? We are compelled to disagree with Professor Fraser here, and avow our conviction that few philosophical statements in the world stand less in need of supplement and

correction than that of Berkeley—as regards his Idealism, that is. Here Berkeley must be acknowledged to be perfectly perspicuous and perfectly complete. The completion for the doctrine of Berkeley that Prof. Fraser desiderates is, it is to be feared, only such modification of terms as might by their very newness restore to Berkeleianism some of its faded lustre and lost interest, or even perhaps lead the doctrine itself into new issues—such issues as engage the deep-thinking reflection of Professor Fraser himself on (p. xvii) "what this sense-conscious life through which we are now passing really means."

And here we will stop for the present, having accomplished, it is hoped nevertheless, such preliminary view of the main elements of Berkeleianism as may at least usefully *guide* an examination in detail.

HEGEL'S PSYCHOLOGY.

Translated from the German of Dr. K. ROSENKRANZ, by G. S. HALL.

The presupposition for Hegel's philosophy of right, of the state, and of history, was not, as is commonly said, his logic alone, but no less his psychology. Since Locke's philosophy, psychology had become properly a central science, to which investigation was directed with special predilection, and proceeding from which it was attempted to ground the other sciences, ethics, æsthetics, and religious doctrine. In this the Germans had accomplished no less significant results than the English and French. With Kant's "Critique of Pure Reason" the conception of consciousness advanced so far into the foreground as entirely to absorb psychology.

Kant left behind him an Anthropology which was an ingenious and elegant discourse on the principal elements of psychology; his scientifically established psychology will ever be sought in the transcendental æsthetics and logic of his Critique of Reason, especially in the chapter on the deduction of categories. Fichte had no psychology outside of the Science of Knowledge, Schelling none outside of his transcendental idealism. Herbart, again, had a psychology, because he replaced the ego as the subject, which maintains itself by notions (*Vorstellungen*), since he regarded these as psychic

quanta, which are related to one another with external independence. His psychology became therefore essentially a theory of the mechanism of notions, which made the spontaneity of the ego illusory.

Hegel apprehended psychology from a higher principle, which distinguished his philosophy from all others—from the idea of Spirit. He distinguished (1) the subjective, (2) the objective, (3) the absolute mind, and thus brought light into a region which had been desolated by the most extreme confusion. Under the first designation he understood the individual mind, which he developed from its naturalness to formal freedom; under the second, mind, as it determines itself in its action by the idea of good; under the third, mind, as in art, religion, and science, it elevates itself to intuition, to feeling, and to the conception of the absolute.

The conception of subjective mind, again, Hegel distinguished in three special moments: (1) that of the soul; (2) that of consciousness; (3) that of mind. As special sciences, he named them, respectively, anthropology, phenomenology, and psychology. This latter designation I think he would have done better to omit, since the name "psychology" had already come into use for all which he comprised in the doctrine of subjective mind. It must remain the general name, and Hegel might quite properly have called the third part pneumatology, a name of which earlier metaphysics had made use. Under this term Hegel understood the entire sphere of the unconscious in man, so far as it was still determined by nature immediately as mind. It is the passive side of man so far as it appears in its natural qualities, changes, and in the conflict of the soul with its corporeity in order to make it the symbolic expression of its interior (or content). One should contemplate the confusion with which, before Hegel, the conception of race, temperament, talent, sex, periods of age, sleep and waking, dreaming, custom, mimicry, &c., had been casually treated in order to realize the immeasurable progress he has made here. Here, as in ethics, he causes to be conceived a still more strict ordination, a still more interior concatenation of determinations, than he has presented; but the credit of laying the foundation for this connected treatment must remain with him.

The chief difficulty in human psychology lies in correctly apprehending thought in its unity as well as in its distinction from sensation. The animal cannot pass beyond sensation, while with man thought constitutes the active principle from the very first, and even in his sensations. Apparently he sets out empirically from sensation, but essentially he bears himself even in sensation as an intrinsically rational subject. The animal, as sentient, remains in individuality; man exalts himself from the individual to the universal. We call thought, so far as it is opposed to sensation, consciousness. Consciousness, however, does not arise at first successively, but is originally present in man as his thinking relation to himself. Immediately man does not yet know that he thinks. Original consciousness is unconsciousness. The ego already exists in itself (*an sich*), but not for itself. Hence consciousness, within the sphere of the unconscious, can be apprehended only as a self still in its natural state. Sleeping and waking, &c., are natural changes, contrasted conditions. The human state of wakefulness is distinguished from that of animals by the fact that man comes into relation not only to sensuous objectivity, but that he also distinguishes himself for himself from this relation. It may be contested where the conception of waking should be treated, but in this case we must not be confused, but must hold fast to the principle. It is for this reason that the dream belongs to the sphere of the unconscious, although it presupposes the formation of notions and of intuitions. While we dream, the free distinction of self as subject from objectivity does not occur. The condition of dreaming is sleep. Sleep is, however, an act of natural vitality, i.e. of a natural process which is independent of thought. Lunacy is likewise a decadence into unconsciousness. The lunatic has a formal consciousness, but he is involved in a condition of unconsciousness so far as concerns his crazy notions. With respect to these he is not free, like the dreamer with respect to the images which hover past in his chaotic soul. When the lunatic is freed from his illusion, this return to free subjectivity is analogous to awaking from a dream. The condition of day-dreaming as well as that of somnambulism must be placed in the category of unconsciousness, although their mediation may belong to much higher spheres.

Hegel treated the conception of consciousness under the name of phenomenology. It constitutes the antithesis of anthropology, for in this all determinations are necessary, are posited by nature; while with consciousness the freedom of thought arises, as in itself infinite self-determination, as subjectivity, which makes as its object its own entire psychic individuality, with all its qualities, changes, and conditions. As moments of phenomenology, Hegel distinguished: (1) consciousness; (2) self-consciousness; (3) rational self-consciousness. Subject distinguishes itself, first, from others; secondly, from itself; thirdly, from the universal conception which it finds as the identical bond between its outer and inner world. Reason is the identical essence as well of objectivity in itself as of subjectivity in itself. Unquestionably, this course is a process of knowledge, but very different from that which he presented later under the name of theoretical intelligence. For consciousness, recourse must ever be had to the antithesis of subject and object. The object is either given in existence external to me, which I seek to know according to its truth; or I make myself an object, but find objects outside of myself which, like me, are subjects for themselves; or, finally, I find the conception of reason, the necessity of which is the same without as within me.

In this development Hegel organically integrated the great achievement of Kant and Fichte in finding the conception of consciousness for science. By so doing, however, he aroused the greatest opposition. Philosophy had again given up the doctrine of consciousness and had again fused it with that of theoretic intelligence, just as even so strict a Hegelian, as Michelet seeks to be, had done. But here also we must submit to the consequences of the principle. The antithesis of natural, psychic individuality is subjectivity, as which thinking, yet inseparate from will, distinguishes itself from itself as ego.

That which, in the third part of his "Science of Subjective Mind," Hegel calls especially mind, is a conception which transcends that of the rational self-consciousness by virtue of the fact that the subject, as rational, becomes content no less than form. As individuality, it bears a passive relation; to be, as it were, a genius, the individual must become self-complacent. As subjectivity it is essentially actuosity; con-

sciousness itself posits the difference as well as the unity of subject and object; but it is still dependent upon that which is presented as its object, and does not itself produce the categories of reason, though it explores the entire world without and within self. Knowledge of these is what it produces. The subject in itself is truly free only when it produces itself in both form and content. Freedom holds the antithesis of theoretical and practical in itself. The theoretical is the condition of the practical in the same way that individuality is the condition of subjectivity, or that this latter is the condition of spirituality. In the treatment of theoretical intelligence, Hegel distinguished: (1) intuition (*Anschauen*); (2) imagination (*Vorstellen*); (3) thought. Mind, as immediate substance, is feeling, which, as the proper content of mind, is progressively formed through it from intuition yet involved in space and time, to pure thought. The content is the same through all the different steps of intuition, imagination, and thinking; but I change its form, and thereby give myself another relation to it. I intuite e.g. the sun as a luminous, round body. It becomes night, and I see it no longer; but I have a mental image of it within myself. By this image I have freed myself from the externality of the phenomenon. The image as a purely ideal object is absolutely fluid. I can bring it into relation with a thousand other objects. It is also general. I can subsume other similar bodies under the notion "sun." But necessity is wanting. When I add this to generality, I change imagination to thought. The sun is the central body of a planetary system. With this apprehension, these relations, which I can arbitrarily give to the notion of a sun, cease, and necessary relations take their place. Nothing is more frequent in the ordinary psychology and logic than the confusion of intuition, imagination, and thought, because they cohere most closely in fact. It remains an immortal service of Hegel's that he has elucidated their difference upon the foundation which Kant's "Critique of Reason" afforded. The first and exhaustive discussion of his doctrine is found in Carl Daub's "Anthropology," but it is as though this labor had never been performed. There is also a presentation of the entire doctrine of the subjective mind by Hegel himself, which is generally entirely ignored. When, after his death,

his entire works were published, Dr. Bouman undertook to add a commentary from Hegel's lectures on the corresponding topics, to the short paragraphs of the "Encyclopedia," which he very admirably executed. Here Hegel entered very intelligibly into all the difficult points of his systematology; he showed in how extended a way he was familiar with the empirical material; in the expression of psychic phenomena he evinced himself an ingenious soul-painter, whom the most delicate shadings of his object did not escape; this he did especially in his delineations of the diseases of the soul, of somnambulism, custom, temperament, &c.

Among the numerous dissensions of psychologists, two points have become especially prominent since Hegel's death, which we will briefly mention. One is the conception of attention; the other, that of language. To attend is, according to Hegel, the act by which the mind distinguishes a content which is present to it as sentient, from itself and from other content in itself. The condition for this act is, therefore, that I am subject; that I distinguish myself as ego from myself, and thereby from all which immediately I am not. He presupposes consciousness. So long as I exist only as sentient, I cease to exist in the specialty of that which I feel. But because I am subject, I can distinguish myself from myself as a sentient individual. I can direct myself in free self-determination to my immediate being. This spontaneous direction is attention. Sensuous certainty and apprehension are moments of this act. Through it I make my feeling an object for myself. I strip off from its content the external time and space conditions wherein I find it. I transfer it into the ideal space and the ideal time of consciousness. By so doing I make it an intuition, which, as being in me and remembered by me, becomes a mental image. The animal is also attentive, but only as a sentient individual. It remains dependent upon sensuousness. There exists a movement of sensation, but not a free activity of self-determination. The animal cannot form its sensations into intuitions; and since intuition again is a condition of representation, it can still less reach the latter. An animal cannot make its conditions present to itself. When a man says he feels that it is warm, he has already advanced beyond feeling, although it still ex-

ists in him as a condition. The word "intuition" is of course derived originally from the sense of sight, though it has acquired a general significance for that content which is projected from feeling into consciousness. The expression "representation" is correct in so far as it is intuition which is reproduced by the subject in and from itself. Representation is free from the connection which intuition bears to feeling. It makes the content of intuition independent in a free image, from which all that is casual and unessential in the original genesis is omitted. Representations, e.g. stream, wood, animal, anger, command, &c., are general. Every representation as such is different from every other. But the representing subject distinguishes itself also from its representations and is free from them, since they attain existence only through his own activity. When a subject ceases to hold the power over its representations, it either becomes lunatic or it dreams. That which the school of Herbart has elaborated as a mechanism of representation into an extended dynamics and statics of representation in the intelligible tract of consciousness, is essentially a psychological disguise of the laws of thought. We can cast heterogeneous representations promiscuously together, as e.g. in reading-books for children, in order to exercise them on a particular letter, *bridge*, *book*, *buck*, *blood*, *ball*, &c., occur promiscuously. But when we arrange our conceptions, we do it according to logical laws.

Language originates, according to Hegel, from the incitement which we feel at the moment in which we wish to express a conception, to make a sound as its sign. If we had no organs of speech, we should, of course, be able to produce no word. In this respect, there exists between our mind and organism a teleological connection. Without thinking, we should only express feelings by inarticulate sounds, like animals. Deaf mutes can, of themselves alone, advance only as far as notions; but, since they can have no idea of sound, they remain dumb, and can furnish themselves with a language only by the indirect method of writing. As soon as a child, endowed with perfect senses, begins to form notions, it begins to take pleasure in words. When we say that language is produced without consciousness, we mean to designate merely the unintentionality of the form of the sound and of the gram-

matical organization. This latter is an actual proof that the language-forming mind is rational in itself. Language is the *renaissance* of notions in phonetic forms, which are the peculiar product of mind. The reproduction of the notion as such, without reference to the sound which custom has fixed for it among a given people, we call recollection, or *reminiscentia, recordatio;* recollection in the form of words is memory. Language, on the one hand, is the product of the thought which is latent in its construction; on the other hand, it is the condition of its development. Now also it becomes clear how much the self-formation of thought in the construction of conceptions, in the passing of judgments, and in drawing conclusions, is distinguished from those forms which it possesses as consciousness, i.e. as relation of subject and object.

There exists no psychology except the Hegelian, which so well develops the inner connection of the forms of the theoretical intelligence, the origin of language, the consequent process of the transformation of knowledge from step to step. The practical relationship of mind proceeds also from feeling as impulse, but is mediated especially by difference of theoretical relation. It is indeed very pleasant to speak only of will and of representation, as Schopenhauer's philosophy does, without actually deducing its idea, so that instinct, appetite, desire, passion, and will, are thrown promiscuously together; but, for the critical inspection of science, a process so full of confusion cannot succeed. Such expressions as "desires," "will," &c., admit of a very indeterminate usage; but science, it should be said, exists precisely in order to determine their usage more accurately, without thereby destroying their current identity.

Hegel assigned also to Eudemonism its systematic position in his Psychology, and thus freed ethics from all those errors which arise when it is confounded with the idea of good. Instinct, propensity, appetite, desire, passion, comes to an end in attaining satisfaction. It is agreeable to the subject, but the enjoyment of this happiness is quite relative. The manifoldness of natural individuality modifies the kind and manner of satisfaction unlimitedly. The composition of the means of enjoyment opens in another direction a new infinity of qualitative and quantitative differences, which, by the opin-

ion of men, by popular prejudice, and by fashion, are modified again without limit. That which was at first felt to be pleasure, is converted by excess into its opposite, or is degraded to something quite indifferent. Here is never firm ground for ethics. Schopenhauer has made a great impression upon his contemporaries by choosing the words of Goethe's "Faust,"

> "Thus I reel from desire to gratification,
> And in gratification I pine for desire,"

as the text of his gospel of Pessimism. The thinking man who, by his intellect, knows the torment to which the will of Nature condemns all that has life, can only have the profoundest pity for that which he attempts to make the principle of ethics. But pity is also an entirely relative feeling, for it depends partly upon the notion which I form of the wretched condition of myself or of another, and partly upon the degree in which this notion is developed. Here, also, is nothing but relativity. Eudemonism demands continuous pleasure; there must be no pain. Here Hegel adopted all the rigorism of Kant in regarding happiness as an element out of which, for ethics, a motivation, but no principle of action, could arise. The difference of desires, inclinations, and passions, compels man to reflect as to which of them he shall yield the precedence of satisfaction. The eudemonist is constrained to moderation in order to compute for his well-being the correct total. Well-being must, however, be subordinated to good, the idea of which alone is adequate to stand for the thinking man as the principle of ethics. With Hegel, eudemonism is not represented as a mere illusion, as imposture, as it is by Schopenhauer. Well-being, with its pleasure and displeasure, should have no other justification than is permitted it by the idea of good. Hegel's philosophy may be regarded as the interpretation of another passage of Goethe's "Faust," who, at the close of his experiences, sums them up in the result:

> "They alone deserve life and freedom
> Who are daily obliged to conquer it."

TRENDELENBURG AS OPPONENT OF HEGEL.*

Translated from the French of A. VERA, by ANNA C. BRACKETT.

In leaving Schopenhauer, I think that I cannot do better than to enter upon a short consideration of Trendelenburg. Without doubt the reader is acquainted with him and his works. I shall, then, only need to add that it would be the last thing I should do to bring these two men together in my thought, or to wish to place them on the same level. No. Trendelenburg treats Science and Philosophy with seriousness. But one can be grave and serious and yet mistake, and this is what Trendelenburg does. For on an unhappy day he had the unfortunate thought of imagining a logic, and, what is more, a Hegelian logic, which, at the same time that it was Hegelian, did violence to the logic of the master. It was, I repeat it, an unhappy day; and a more unfortunate thought could not have arisen, as far as the reputation of Trendelenburg was concerned. If I had been a musician, and had said to myself, "Now I am going to compose a *William Tell* in the style of Rossini, in order to consign the great master to oblivion"; or, if I had been a poet, and had said, "I propose to write a *King Lear*, or a *Hamlet*, in order to eclipse the great English poet," I think that the "eclipse" would have been rather of my own reason. I assert, then, that such an eclipse is on the reason of Trendelenburg, and that it is more complete than would have been that of either poet or musician. For the Logic of Hegel is one of those monuments which are stronger and more indestructible than brass, because it is the work of that reason which has made brass, as it has created art itself and all things. So that, if the master-pieces I have named are immortal, it is more immortal than they; and if any attempt to recast or improve them must necessarily fail, much the more certainly must any attempt to improve upon Hegel's logic come to nought. Such is the destiny which without the shadow of a doubt awaits the attempt of Trendelenburg, and this will become plain at first sight. For, what has Trendelenburg

* From advance sheets of the Preface to the second edition of the Introduction to the Philosophy of Hegel. Paris: 1864. By A. Vera, Professor of Philosophy in the University of Naples.

done? He has adopted the general and fundamental point of view as well as the form of the Hegelian logic, but has modified the content. In other words, he rejects formal logic, and admits with the Hegelian logic that the logical idea is not a simple subjective determination of thought, but an objective determination residing at the same time in thought and in things. More than this, he admits the dialectic or speculative form as the absolute form of the logical idea, but at the same time he modifies the Hegelian logic either by changing the order and the relation of the terms, or by introducing new terms. I say, modifies it; I should rather say, subverts it; and should add, that the work of Trendelenburg is in reality only a subversion. It is easily seen that, in doing this, he has entirely inverted it. For it seems to me that he has done the same as a painter who should desire to recast and surpass the *Last Judgment* of Michael Angelo, or the *Transfiguration* of Raphael, and who should commence by adopting the fundamental conception, and, so to speak, the substance as well as the outlines and the essential forms, if not of all, at least of a part (and it must not be forgotten that all the parts are indivisibly united), but who should afterwards place an angel in the place of Christ; or who should paint, in the place of Christ or of an angel, a sun, or a hippopotamus, or a demon;—now, of a painter who should take such liberties with these master-pieces, one would say that he has not only subverted the master-pieces, but that he has subverted his art. Now this is exactly what Trendelenburg has done. He has subverted not only the Hegelian logic, but Logic itself; or, as an Hegelian would say, in subverting the Hegelian logic he has overthrown Logic and Reason. Let the reader judge.

We know that the first triad, the triad which forms the base and the point of departure of Hegelian logic, is composed of *Being*, *Non-being*, and *Becoming*. There has been much discussion about this triad. There have been some, I scarcely need say, who have rejected it—as many have rejected the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost; there have even been some who have ridiculed it, (what will the world not ridicule!) and there are yet others who, while admitting it, have demonstrated it quite differently from Hegel himself. I myself am

convinced that the more one reflects on the logical idea—on its form as well as on its content—on the intimate relation of form and content—and, above all, on its systematic form,—the more one will find the simplicity, the truth, and the depth, of the Hegelian logic; and the demonstration which Hegel has given, unassailable and admirable. I am consequently convinced that any effort to substitute another triad, or even to give a better demonstration, can have no other result than to show more and more clearly the truth of the Hegelian conception and exposition. This is, in my opinion, the result, and the only positive result, which can be discovered in the logical researches of Trendelenburg. He certainly admits a point of departure in logic, since there must be a point of departure for all things, and he also admits that the point of departure is a triad; but for *Being*, *Non-being*, and *Becoming*, he substitutes another triad—Being, Thought, and Movement. Now, it is not necessary to be profoundly initiated into the secret of the dialectic to hear almost at first the discordance of these three notes, and to see that they have no natural and internal harmony with the Idea, that their union is only accidental, and that they are held together by a kind of external violence. Truly, when I consider this *Trendelenburgan* triad (the reader will pardon the word, knowing that new things demand new signs)—when I consider this triad from a historical point of view, I am led back beyond the time of Plato to an epoch which I do not know how to characterize, and which it is besides of very little importance to characterize perhaps to the epoch of old Pythagoras, when they began to construct rude tables of contraries, with which the reader is no doubt familiar. This is very serious, for it is in effect, no more nor less, than making the world go backward instead of forward.

Plato, who understood the dialectic, but not as well as Hegel, took great care not to oppose to Being the white or the black, or thought, which is nearly the same thing; but in the *Sophist*, the *Parmenides*, and the *Timæus*, he puts Non-being as opposed to Being, as he opposes *the Other* to *the Same*, and *Movement* to *Rest*. Hegel, with the profound knowledge which he had of the ancient dialectic, and with that admirable tact which enabled him to seize the common point of

historical and rational truth, recognized what there was of absolute and eternal Truth in the Platonic dialectic; and in seeing this, he saw also that the new dialectic could be rational and original, not by excluding, but by illuminating and vivifying by means of a deeper principle, and by throwing together in a higher and wider synthesis these imperishable and absolute elements of the old Platonic dialectic. M. Trendelenburg, on the contrary, does not seem to have concerned himself at all about these traditional and historical matters, and to have undertaken a revolutionary course by presenting us with a wholly new and original dialectic. His originality consists however, really, in rejecting the dialectic as Plato had left it, in order to set out with more precision in giving us a dialectic which is neither Hegelian nor Platonic, nor even Pythagorean (for at least the Pythagoreans opposed the dyad to the monad), nor any dialectic whatever, but rather the contrary of all dialectic.

Now, I demand of Trendelenburg to know what he has done with Non-being. Where has he concealed it? Where has he sent it? Will he reply to me that there is no Non-being—I mean no Non-being forming a proper and distinct category of equal rank with Being? But a dialectician who would reply that there is no Non-being, is like a mathematician who should assert that there was no dyad, or like a painter who should deny the existence of black; i.e. such a reply would be absurd. And besides, Trendelenburg admits that there is an opposite of Being; only he wishes not to have this opposite Non-being, but Thought. Now to admit, as he does, an opposite to Being, and at the same time to assert that this opposite, i.e. the natural and rational opposite of Being, is Thought, and not Non-being,—this is what I call a subversion not only of the dialectic, but of science and philosophy. How can one conceive that the opposite of Being is Thought, and the same as Non-being? He will say: Being and Thought are two entirely different things; or, to speak with more precision, Thought is that which is the most directly opposed to simple Being, or to Being as Being. And one will conclude from this that the opposition, or the contradiction, or whatever one may choose to call it, should be composed of two extremes—Being, and that which is most opposed to Being

viz. Thought. But, to begin with, one will admit that if Thought is the opposite of Being or Non-being, i.e. a direct and immediate negation of Being, it is also a different somewhat from Non-being or this negation, and this for the reason that it is Thought. For if Thought is a negation, or a limitation of that which is not Thought, on the other hand it is also an affirmation of that same Being which is not Thought. In other words, Thought is neither Being nor Non-being, but it is both; and it is because it is both, that it thinks both of them. If one says that Thought is Being or that it is Non-being, that it is affirmation or that it is negation, he mutilates and destroys its nature. For he destroys its nature in applying to it categories which do not belong to it—categories which it contains, but which it transcends for the very reason that it contains them.

To make this clearer, let us take the case of two opposites, white and black, light and darkness, or unity and duality. What is the opposite of unity? "It is," you reply, "duality." But in a certain sense I could say, using Trendelenburg's point of view, that Thought is the opposite of unity, for unity as unity and Thought as Thought are two different things. But if Thought is in this sense the opposite of unity, it does not at all follow that it is duality, and consequently the true and rational opposite of Being is not Thought but Non-being, and the relation which Thought bears to Unity and to Duality is the same that it sustains to Being and Non-being, i.e. it thinks both of them, and it is both in thinking them.

Finally, of what Being and of what Thought are we speaking? Without doubt, of them as ideas and in their most immediate and abstract form; or, as we Hegelians say, in their most empty form. One has consequently two absolutely abstract ideas, that of Being and that of Thought. Now, one may ask why the idea of Thought is the opposite of Being. For it is not sufficient to say that it is the opposite of the idea of Being because it is another than this idea. Such a dialectic would be the confusion of all things, since one can say of anything that it is different from another thing. When it is said that Non-being is the opposite of Being, he expresses a perfectly intelligible thought; for one would say that he has the most abstract and undetermined negation of

an equally abstract and indeterminate affirmation. But it is very different when one places Thought opposite to Being as its negation; for even to suppose that Thought is the negation or the Other of Being, one must define the thought of which he speaks. If he says that it is Thought in its most abstract and indeterminate form, as simple possibility of all thought, such Thought is so far from being the opposite extreme of Being, that one can only with difficulty distinguish it from Being. In any shape, this Thought is no other than Being, or it is a Non-being only, through its opposition to Being, i.e. by the presence in it of the Other or of Non-being; and if one says that it has neither other, nor limit, nor multiplicity, nor difference, &c., he does neither more nor less than suppress all dialectic and all logic . . . .

The exactness of my words will be more clearly perceived if we pass from Being and Non-being to the third member of Trendelenburg's triad. For Hegel, the third term is *Becoming*. But Trendelenburg will not have it Becoming; and as he has substituted Thought for Non-being, he substitutes *Movement* for *Becoming*, using always the same way of proceeding, and this proceeding is the subversion of all logic. For Trendelenburg has already mutilated the Logic by suppressing Non-being, and introducing in its place a term which belongs to another sphere of science; and he continues mutilating it by suppressing Becoming, and introducing in its place a category which belongs to the sphere of Nature. If one said to a mathematician that number moves, he would prick up his ears; and one knows that one of the reproaches against Newton was that he introduced into his theory of fluxions a new term, viz. this one of Movement. Geometricians, it is true, define a line as a moving point. But they give us this definition because, as it appears, they have no better to give; and without determining whether, in saying that the point moves, they mean that there really is movement in space; but since one is dealing with space, however insufficient and inexact this definition is, one may readily understand the possibility of the introduction of Movement. But it is absurd to introduce Movement into pure quantity (which, besides, is one of the categories of logic). How can he make of Movement one of the most abstract logical moments?

And it is difficult to see why, after having introduced into his triad Thought and Movement, M. Trendelenburg has allowed Being to remain there. For Being has nothing to do in this triad, where Matter finds its natural place, and could well replace Being. A triad composed of Thought, Matter, and Movement, would, logically speaking, be worth quite as much as Trendelenburg's. Thus I find fault with Trendelenburg in respect to Becoming just as I found fault with him in regard to Non-being. I complain of his taking away Becoming as he took away Non-being; and I ask of him, also, where he has hidden Becoming. Will he make the same response, that there is no logical Becoming? But such a response would be even more illogical than his first. For if there is no Becoming in Logic, how shall the content of Logic be developed? How shall Being and Non-being (or even Thought) become the Same or the Other, or Limit, or Quantity, or Quality, &c.? Will he say that in the development of the logical content there is Movement in time and space, or, what amounts to the same thing, that the logical Becoming is no other than Movement in time and space? But I suppose he would not dare to say this. Or, will he say that the Movement (*Bewegung*) of which he speaks is not the Movement in time and space, but Movement in general; or, better, change or transformation — a transformation which would include the development of the logical content itself? In this case, I should say to him that this transformation is nothing else than Becoming, and that we have nothing more than a change of word; or, if I do not know by what arguments Trendelenburg wished to prove to me that it is not Becoming, I should say that, in any case, if by Movement we are to understand the transformation of things, it would not follow both terms Being and Thought, but come *immediately after Being;* for Being could never become anything else than itself, Non-being, or Thought, or anything else whatsoever, except by moving or in transforming itself, and that consequently we should have to-day, Being, Movement or Transformation, —— I leave to M. Trendelenburg the task of discovering a third term.

HEGEL'S PHILOSOPHY OF ART.

Translated from the second volume of HEGEL'S ÆSTHETICS, by Miss S. A. LONGWELL.

CHIVALRY.—III. *Fidelity.*

The third sentiment that it is necessary to notice, as expressing the romantic subjectivity in the circle of social life, is Fidelity. By fidelity we have to understand neither the fidelity to a promise of love, nor the constancy in friendship of which Achilles and Patroklus were most beautiful examples, as were also Orestes and Pylades in the still more intimate tie that united them. Friendship, in this sense of the word, develops itself especially in youth. Every man has his own way to make in the world—a rank, a social position, to obtain and to preserve. Now, in youth, individuals live in a general indefiniteness as to their actual relations, and combine so closely in one view, one purpose and active endeavor, that through this union every undertaking of the one becomes at the same time the undertaking of the other. This is no longer the case in the friendships of mature age. The man follows, in his social relations, a more independent course; he does not allow himself to be led into so close a friendship that he could accomplish nothing without the other. Men meet and separate again; their interests and pursuits sometimes accord and sometimes are diverse; friendship, fervor of sentiment, conformity of principles and of general tendency remain, but it is not the friendship of youth, in which neither determines and undertakes anything which may not immediately concern the other. It pertains essentially to the principle of our deeper life that in the totality every one cares for himself, i.e. each one possesses essential aims for himself.

(*a*) Now, if Fidelity in friendship and love exists only between equals, yet Fidelity, as we have to consider it, pertains to a superior, a lord, a sovereign. We have already found something similar among the ancients, in the fidelity of servants to the family, to the house of their master. The most beautiful example of this is offered by the swineherd of Ulysses, who exposes himself at night and in storm to guard the herd, full of anxiety concerning the fate of his lord, to

whom he finally renders faithful aid against the wooers of Penelope. Shakespeare shows us the picture of a similar and not less touching fidelity in *King Lear*, Act I., Scene 4.

Lear says to Kent, who wishes to serve him, "Dost thou know me, worthy fellow?" "No, sir; but you have that in your countenance which I would fain call master," answered Kent. This approaches very near the character that determines romantic fidelity. For fidelity, in the phase that we are considering, is not the fidelity of the servant and slave, which certainly may be beautiful and touching, yet wants the free self-dependence of the individuality, personal aims and endeavors, and is consequently inferior.

What we, on the contrary, have before us, is the feudatory fidelity of chivalry, by which the subject, in spite of his yielding to a superior, to a prince, king or emperor, preserves his free self-dependence as a predominant moment throughout. Yet this fidelity occupies an elevated place in the world of chivalry, because in it is comprehended the chief force of the commonwealth and its social order, at least in its origin.

(*b*) This sentiment, notwithstanding its superiority as a social principle to that which had preceded it, resembles not at all the patriotism that has for an end a general interest. It addresses itself only to the individual, to the lord, and therefore is again limited through the personal honor, the particular interest, the subjective intention. Fidelity appears in its greatest brilliancy in a society not yet regularly constituted, semi-barbarous, without the dominion of law or justice. In such a lawless state of society the most powerful, the most ambitious, place themselves as firm centres, as leaders, as princes, while others gather about them from free choice. Such a relation developed later into a more positive legal state of lord and vassal, under which every vassal demands for himself his rights and privileges. But the fundamental principle upon which the whole, in its origin, rests, is free choice, as well in reference to the subject of dependence as well as in the constancy in this dependence. So chivalric fidelity knows very well how to maintain its advantanges and its rights, the personal independence and honor of the individual, and is not therefore recognized as a duty which as such might oppose the contingent will of the subject. On

the contrary, every individual makes his constancy, and thereby the permanency of universal order, dependent upon his pleasure, inclination, and personal disposition.

(*c*) Fidelity and obedience to the lord may therefore come very easily into collision with subjective passion, the sensitiveness to honor, the susceptibility of taking offence, the sentiment of love, and with many special inner and outer contingencies, and consequently become something highly precarious. A knight e.g. is faithful to his prince, but his friend becomes involved in a dispute with this prince; then he must immediately choose between the one and the other form of fidelity, and he may be especially faithful to his own honor and to his own interest. We have the finest example of such a collision in *The Cid.* He is faithful to the king, and just as true to himself. When the king acts justly, he lends him his arm; yet when the prince does wrong, or Cid is injured, he withdraws his support. Also the nobles of Charles the Great exhibit the same relation. There is a union of command and obedience just such as that we have already learned to recognize between Jupiter and the other divinities; the chief commands, blusters, and disputes, but the self-dependent powerful individuals oppose him when and how they please. This loose and dissoluble union is depicted most truly and gracefully in *Reynard the Fox.* As in the poem the grandees of the kingdom in reality serve only themselves and maintain their individual interests, so the German knights and princes in the Middle Ages were not at ease if they were obliged to do anything for the general interest or for their emperor; and it appears as if the Middle Ages were exalted on that account, because in such a state every one is justified, and a man of honor in following his own will—a thing which cannot be allowed in a rationally organized civil life.

In all these three phases—Honor, Love, and Fidelity—the foundation is the independence of the subject, the disposition of the heart that is ever opening to wider and deeper interests and that remains in harmony with these interests. This is in romantic art the most beautiful division of the circle which is found outside of religion as such. Here all has, for an immediate end, the human, with which we can sympa-

thize, and we do no not find, as is frequently the case in the religious field, the subject, as well as the mode of manifestation, in collision with our ideas. But just as fully may these sentiments be brought into manifold relations with religion as religious interests are now intertwined with those of secular chivalry, as e.g. the adventures of the Knights of the Round Table in the search for the holy Graal. This combination introduces in chivalric poetry much that is mystical and fantastic, and also much that is allegorical. Likewise the worldly sphere of love, honor, and fidelity, may manifest itself quite independent of the deeper complication with religious aims and sentiments, and only exhibit the intrinsic emotions of the soul in its more personal and human subjectivity. Yet what the present phase still lacks is the realization of this subjectiveness with the concrete meaning of human relations, character, passion, and of real life generally. This manifold concrete world of human interests and passions remains standing in antithesis to that self-involved infinite depth of feeling which is empty of content and formal, and therefore offers as its problem the question how it shall take up this material so heterogeneous and all-containing, and present it elaborated in a more artistic manner.

FACTS OF CONSCIOUSNESS.

Translated from the German of J. G. Fichte, by A. E. Kroeger.

BOOK II.

FACTS OF CONSCIOUSNESS IN REGARD TO THE PRACTICAL FACULTY.

CHAPTER IV.

Recapitulation.—Let us recapitulate all we have said hitherto.

I. The one fundamental life presupposed by us represents itself in its unity. It represents itself, places itself before it-[illegible] in a sketch or scheme.

This representation is contradistinguished from another representation—which in the same way is not a unity,

but merely a partial representation — a thinking; and, since it is an absolute self-representation of life, an absolute thinking.

III. Thus we have reduced the whole consciousness, in so far as we can survey it now, to two fundamental facts: immediate contemplation, which we have characterized through opposition as internal, and absolute thinking, which, in regard to the former, is externalizing.

IV. But it is by no means to be understood as if the individual thinks by means of himself and his own power. He thinks only as one and with the annihilation of his individuality. Hence we shall do well, in describing the content of this thinking, to place ourselves at once on the stand-point of that oneness by asking, not how does the individual think? but rather, how does the one and universal thinking think?

A. — It thinks wherever it is, and thinks a community of individuals possible *ad infinitum*, but actually limited and altogether determined both as a whole and in its parts.

But together with this universal thinking there is united always individuality, for only in individuality does life break out into self-representation and consciousness. In individuality it thus arrives at a self-representation of its form generally; in thinking, at an express genetically attained and thus visible unity. If we look at this point, we must say that this thinking is to be numerically repeated in all individuals, and occurs as often as there are individuals, though always remaining in its content the same in all these repetitions.

Nevertheless there is a difference in this thinking from the stand-point of the individual; not, however, in regard to the content, but only in regard to the relation. For each individual thinks one of the whole series of Egos as its own particular Ego, and each one thinks another one as this its particular Ego. It has been clearly shown above that the ground of determination in this separation lies in the particular sphere of immediate internal contemplation.

Now this thinking is not at all based upon any perception, but is an absolutely *à priori* thinking, that prescribes laws to perception.

(According to Kant, there is an absolutely *à priori* knowledge by virtue of an inner contemplation of our faculties, as,

for instance, Space, Time, &c. The external world Kant did not touch at all. We proceeded in the same manner in our first part. But now the whole view changes. We now posit an absolutely *à priori* knowledge for the external world; and it will soon appear that, from this view, the whole external world will change into an *à priori*.)

It is *à priori*, I say; that is, through this thinking there is posited externally and absolutely a conception—of the Ego—which can be formed only in inner contemplation, and which contradicts all external perception. This conception is realized as a mere pure faculty and law; not as any perceivable activity, but as the future ground and rule of such. For we do not think the external Ego by virtue of its manifestation, but we think it absolutely. It is only in consequence of this conception that we expect and assume it to manifest itself as an Ego if it does manifest itself; the activity expected from it is anticipated by us, and its law prescribed by us in advance.

B.—An individual, as a sense and organ for the material world, is necessarily thought as represented in this material world by a material body. This absolute synthesis and inseparability of an Ego of internal contemplation from a material body is not made by a new act of thinking, is not inferred —neither *immediately*, inferring from a body shaped in a certain manner by some principle of a syllogism to the presence of an Ego, for how could such a principle be proved? nor *mediately*, concluding from the fact that I as individual have such a body, for how do I as individual get at such a body, or how can I know that this body is not merely accidental, and belongs to me not as this particular individual but as Ego generally?—but is to be conceived thus: In the absolute and original thinking there is the synthesis of an Ego, as principle, and in so far pure noumen, which is perceptible alone in its acts, and firstly in internal contemplation but secondly as a bodily organ, but which in all these forms is absolutely one and the same Ego.

Let us dwell a while upon this important point, and make it clear to us by its consequences. We, therefore, utterly repudiate the separation of the individual into body and soul, and the composition of the individual out of these

two pieces; a doctrine which perhaps even asserts that the soul alone will continue to exist after the decease of the body. The Ego is in itself principle, and as such a pure thought altogether unsensuous and supersensuous. Now, as an image of this Ego we form necessarily, through free—here poetizing—productive imagination, because we have no other creative faculty, a soul, and this soul necessarily assumes an extended shape, no matter how we twist around, simply because extension is the form of contemplation for the productive power of imagination. But this forming was a very superfluous piece of business, throwing an unnecessary and uncomfortable burden upon original thinking. The Ego, as a pure noumen, ought to have no image at all; it makes itself perceptible by its manifestations of inner contemplation. In so far as it is to be imaged, it is already imaged, without any coöperation of our wisdom, by the absolute productive power itself, and this image is the *body*. This body is the very soul you are searching for, whilst you always have it; it is the Ego in the form of contemplation.

Matters, therefore, stand thus: the Ego, or the individual—for as yet we know no other Ego—occurs in the three ground-forms of consciousness: pure thinking, internal contemplation, and external contemplation. In all these forms it is the same one, and in each it is whole. There is no separation.

The existence of a soul is, therefore, absolutely denied, and the whole conception of a soul repudiated as a miserable poetical invention. Nor is this an unessential matter, but it is a very essential criterion of our system. With the presupposition of such a soul, you can neither enter nor remain in this system.

This body of the Ego—at least that of the Ego outside of us; how it stands with our own Ego we shall see hereafter—is as posited, as all bodily matter is posited, by the absolute productive power of imagination attempting its own free construction, and finding itself limited therein. Now, what is that which really limits the power of imagination? This question, which heretofore we could not answer, is answerable here, because the power of imagination itself has been comprehended under a higher connection.

It is thinking itself which limits it. Simply because think-

ing is limited to posit precisely such a number of individuals, the power of imagination is limited to contemplate the very same number of organized bodies in the material world.

In short, that which represents itself is the One Life. This life represents itself as it is; its representation, therefore, corresponds altogether with itself. But it thus represents or manifests itself in two forms: firstly, through *thinking*, in so far as absolute principles are posited; and secondly, through contemplation, in so far as organized bodies are posited. But in both forms the one and the same self-representation manifests itself. Hence both forms must correspond in their contents. This part of universal thinking may, therefore, be thus expressed from the stand-point of unity:

1. It involves a self-same external contemplation of a fixed sum of organized bodies which altogether corresponds with the thought sum of Egos.

2. Since this general self-representation in actuality occurs only in connection with individuality, and since individuality is repeatable, contemplation also must be repeatable; but contemplation can be repeatable, so far as its content is concerned, only in the same one manner. It is the same sum of organized bodies and the same relation of them to other matter in space for all individuals.

3. Nevertheless there is a difference in regard to relation. For just as each individual thinks only one of the series of Egos as its own and all the others as foreign to it, so it also takes only one of the series of organized bodies as its own and all the others as foreign to it. Now we know from what has been said above, that it ascribes to itself that body upon which it can exercise immediate causality through the conception. Nevertheless there is another mark very important. It is this: the foreign body is to each individual a mere object of external contemplation, as all other material bodies are; whereas his own body is not at all an object of contemplation whether internal or external, but altogether of thinking. Not of internal contemplation, for we have no internal feeling of the totality of our body, though we have such a feeling of the parts — for instance, in pain; nor of external contemplation, for we never see ourselves as a whole, though we do see parts of ourselves. (We certainly do see our whole

body in the mirror, but therein we see really not our body, but simply an image of it, and *think* it as such image only in so far as we know already that we have a body.) Nor do we perceive ourselves by means of the external sense of touch as a whole, though we do perceive parts of our body by means of touch; in which case, however, some parts themselves of that body are always the touching organ, and hence the sense itself, but not the object of that sense. Hence we merely think our body, and think it thus as the organ of our conception. Thus our whole body is very evidently a conception purely *à priori*, just as the whole contemplation here spoken of is altogether *à priori* in so far as it has foreign bodies for its object, since the altogether *à priori* thinking is the determination of this contemplation.

C.—The material world of mere objects has been deduced above as the absolute limitation of the productive power of imagination; but it has not yet been stated clearly and expressly whether the power of imagination in this its function is the self-representation of the one life as such, or whether it is merely the representation of individual life; and hence, whether a material world is posited by the one life or by the individual as such. True, the former may be immediately inferred; for individuality is only in the sphere of internal contemplation, whereas that contemplation of the world is external. But we can also prove it mediately.

The contemplation of a sum of organized bodies is the immediate expression of the one life. These bodies altogether are represented as having the material world for the sphere of their external causality, and as contemplating each other mutually by means of the one contemplation originating from the one life. Hence the contemplation of the world of merely material objects is synthetically united with the contemplation of organized bodies and lies altogether in connection with the same one contemplation; hence it also is the immediate expression of life in its unity. The objects of the material world, therefore, are contemplated not by the individual as such, but by the one life.

At present, we can express this also in this manner:

1. An altogether determined material world is thought through universal thinking, and through the external con

templation connected with that thinking. This thinking, moreover, is, in regard to its content, altogether the same.

2. If we take this thinking as connected with individuality, it is repeatable as many times as there are individuals, and is actually repeated so many times; but the content remains unchanged in all these repetitions.

3. Nevertheless there is a difference according to relation. For as each individual ascribes to itself a particular body, it necessarily posits this body in a particular location in space and in a location not occupied by other organized bodies. Now this its location becomes for it necessarily the central point of its comprehension of the other objects in space, and of their order and position as related to itself. Hence there is for each individual a peculiar series of the existing objects of the universe.

THE FOUNDATION OF AUTHORITY IN THE STATE.

By H. H. Morgan.

What right has the state to impose conditions and responsibilities? Of course, then, one must first ascertain what the state *is*. It will be remembered that among the colonies there were then forms of government: the provincial, the proprietary, and the charter. In the first, the king constituted the state, and, possessing all rightful authority, exercised it according to his pleasure; in the second, the proprietor stood in *loco regis*, with the same unlimited rights and responsibilities; under the third, powers more or less extensive, more or less absolute, were vested in those to whom the charter was granted—just as the rights and privileges of any corporation now vest in those to whom the charter is issued. Granting, then (for the moment), the original right of the king, the basis of state rights in each of the colonies will be clear. The king, the proprietor, and the grantees of the charter, could grant the rights of citizenship, just as any man can alienate his property. Thus under the charter governments (with which we are most interested as implying the other forms) the *state* meant the citizens collectively, and that the officers

of the state were only agents empowered to discharge the duties assigned to them by the state; that is, the state was the *organic* expression of the will of its citizens. What, then, is a citizen? A citizen is one who is allowed to have a voice in the state, one who is an integral part of the organism; the citizens collectively are the state, and each citizen is a necessary element of the state. To whom, then, does citizenship belong as a natural and inherent right? To nobody, because the rights of citizenship when alienated by the king vested in those to whom the alienation was made. The state, as far as its rights and privileges are concerned, is and must be a law unto itself, and, as it owns its own rights, may grant or withhold them as it pleases.

If this be true, why are not the decrees of the state arbitrary and tyrannical? If, as has been said, the state is the organic expression of the will of its citizens, its decrees are not arbitrary, because they express the rational (or reasonable) will of its constituent elements: one is by nature compelled to recognize the validity of his own rational will; therefore the citizen is obliged by the laws of his being, and not by arbitrary enactment, to recognize the state, which is but the expression of the common will.

It may be objected that we find unjust statutes, unwise legislation: how explain that what to-day we find rational, we shall next year disregard? Why should Missouri uphold slavery and then repudiate the institution? Because the reason of the world (which is but the generalization of the reason of the individuals who compose it) passes from plane to plane by steps—stumbles through the dark to the light.

To recapitulate: the state is the expression of the rational will of its members; its members are its citizens; its citizens are those who have acquired the right to be considered as integral parts of the organism; that the privileges of citizenship may be extended at the will of its citizens; that no one to whom such extension is not freely granted can have any valid claim to citizenship; and that the rational will of the citizens may from time to time undergo change without losing its specific character, just as change takes place in all organisms (and only in organisms).

Suppose, then, that one seems to have a broader view than

that expressed by the consciousness of the mass of the people. Suppose that to one the thought of universal suffrage is rational, while to the mass limited suffrage is still reasonable; how can any change be wrought? In those ways (and only in those ways) in which the state (that is, one's rational self) gives him prescribed means of expression. But, to take an extreme case, an enactment of the state is to me iniquitous; what should be my course? Try, by the use of prescribed modes, to effect a change. Why not resist the state? Because the state is one's rational self. But suppose that I think my view the more correct; still my thinking myself right does not make my thought true, and I should be opposing my individual idea of right to the ideas of all other persons, and should be opposing my own narrow experience to that of the whole community. Because I should, in effect, be saying: World, in four thousand years you have learned less than I know by intuition. World, I am the only honest, conscientious, intelligent person that has ever lived; I am the only wise man; I have a patent-right upon virtue and intelligence.

But suppose that my idea not only seems right, but is right. Then I may use my best efforts to demonstrate its reasonableness, and in proportion to its truth it will convert the national mind, just as the truth of freedom has converted those who were its opposers.

Still one may answer, these deductions follow if we grant your idea of the state. But what was its origin? Where did it originally get its power? Is not the state a compact? Did not man make it, and cannot man unmake it? Is it binding upon me who had no part in its institution—who, it may be, have no part in its action? The answer is that you must grant the validity of my idea of the state; it is the ignorance of this that forms the basis of false legislation and political error.

First, what reason have you for the assumption that the state is a compact? Can you, as evidence, point to the time and place? Can you find man in an isolated condition, feeling his weakness and therefore agreeing to form a state? Or can you show, from the *nature* of the state, that this assumption is demonstrably true? One or the other of these evi-

dences you must produce, or else you must admit your statement to be a baseless and unwarrantable assumption.

What then, you ask, is the state if it be not a manufacture, a device of man? I answer that it (as well as human society) is a *growth.* Do you now, in turn, demand the evidence? In reply, I ask you to test it by this thought, and see whether any phenomena remain unexplained. I answer furthermore, that whatsoever is a growth, and therefore organic, can be completed from any part that may be given, and that with this thought a knowledge of the laws of growth (laws which each organism has within itself and laws which are peculiar to each organism) one can construct the state, for the same reason and with the same certainty that a man of science can complete the fish if you give him but one of the scales. The very idea of an organism will show you that an organism, and nothing but an organism, will answer this condition. The evidence of origin in time and place, for the same reason, *cannot* be given. When Agassiz has determined the laws of growth in an animal, he is through; he *cannot* give you the laws of its creation. When the natural philosopher reduces motion to attraction or gravitation, he can state its laws, but he cannot go back and explain its origin. When the botanist has ascertained the laws of growth in any plant, he can cultivate it with success, but he cannot go back and tell us its origin; he cannot say why the one seed should produce the rose and another the thistle; he can only say such is the law of its growth, and this it must obey. Why can we not gratify this universal longing to know *why*, instead of *how*, God acts; why He should prescribe one mode of growth rather than another? Because we are stating a contradiction, and Divinity itself cannot realize a contradiction. What is this contradiction? The proposition to go *back of* the beginning. But the beginning is the initial point; nothing, therefore, can exist prior to the beginning.

A state, therefore, is and must be a law unto itself, because every organism must follow its own laws of growth: we for our part can learn to comprehend the laws of growth, but can only control them by obeying, and can never get behind them. Now let this test be applied where you will, and let its validity be determined by the results which you obtain.

A few words only in exemplification. Why is there so much foolish legislation? Because legislators, being human, mistake their own views for the voice of the universally rational element of mankind. Because, not knowing that society is a *growth*, they try to substitute the work of individual man. Legislators, for example, have tried to destroy intemperance by legislative enactment, and the futility of their efforts is conclusive evidence of the unfitness of their means. Men may even *seem* to carry their points—may, as a legislative body, do unwise or unjust acts,—and yet, because the state is a growth (and it seems to me that no other view will explain this), their acts fall dead. Legislatures have decided it rational to hang him who steals a horse, but the law is inoperative; legislatures have proscribed intemperance, but the evil has not been destroyed. On the other hand, human wilfulness or human malice may try to destroy the state, but the effort is vain, for it, like Christianity and all truth, lives on in spite of foolish zealots or stupid malignants.

The state, like the plant, cannot prevent our giving it what it does not need for its perpetuation, but it will *assimilate* only what its laws of growth require; it will appropriate all that is truly rational, and repel the vain efforts of individual man to infix his whims and crudities.

PHILOSOPHEMES.

By A. Bronson Alcott.

Genesis.

Desire is the live spark of our immortality, all delights being seminal, spirit in tranfusion, and bodies in embryo.

> The Procreant instincts out of spirit's chaste seat,
> Peopling Cosmos from Chaos in fashion complete.

The Incarnation were not without sex, nor were "either sex alone but half itself." Hereby the One defends and embodies his Personality, returning into his Godhead while peopling matter with his image and intelligence. And this the ancient wise men obscurely signified in those mysteries wherein they represented the virile Hermes as the ideal Reason generating the visible world. The genesis is spiritual; creation a descent and degradation: the spirit stooping to

organize. Effects depend from their causes in descending series and degrees successively. Spirit, the Cause of causes, incarnating, lives first, fashioning mankind, and through them generating the visible hierarchy of creatures and things in Nature. Nor were Nature extant had man preserved his rectitude inviolate. Nature being the man filling the void where himself should be; the man dismembered, deposed, he treading the while upon the prostrate torso of his fallen self. Behold the lapsed man striving throughout to recover his former self, but, wanting the generative force for self-recovery, pauses, faints, falls short of his quarry;—systole, diastole, tugging incessantly at the cisterns, life ebbing from organ, atom seizing atom, element preying on element, till all return into the common chaos for renewal and regeneration.

The Genesis is spiritual. The spirit incarnating souls in fitting organs, first fashioning mankind personally, and through his volitions generating the visible hierarchy or chain of creatures and things in Nature. Nature is the physiognomy of mind, and answers in feature and limbs to man's loyalty or lapse from the law of personal rectitude.

Sense.

Our very senses furnish illustrations of our soul's immateriality in the perishing substances of which themselves are organized, as these were life's effigy and weed. Superior to the changes of substances, the soul converts these the while into similitudes of its own imperishableness as it lends to all things visible their seeming consistency and permanence. Yet a thought dispels the illusion and dissipates the fleeting show in a moment.

"Invisibilia non decipiunt."

Sense, says Plotinus, is but the employment of the dormant soul. So much of the soul as is merged in body, so far it sleeps. And its vigilance is an ascent from the body, since a resurrection with body were but a transformation from sleep to sleep and from dream to dream, like mere passing in the dark from bed to bed. That alone is the real of ascension which frees the soul from the shadowy essence of body.

The One.

"Of inferior beings, the human mind, self, or person, is the

most simple and undivided essence. And the Supreme Father is the most perfect One."

The presupposition of Personality alone renders the One thinkable, and things realizable to the Mind. There is nothing where *the One* is not. Matter were not, void of Spirit to animate and uphold it. And where Spirit is, there is Personality, a self-determining will reconciling extremes, converting other into one. The will includes threefoldness of operation, being the sub-God in the Person, and bridging the chasm between Nature and Spirit. Three in one and one in three, the Person transcends Nature and denominates it. It is the copulative of Spirit. There is but one One, since to be One is to be a Will, not having a will merely, but to be personally inseparably One and eternal. God is the One, the Person; and Man is one personally embosomed in His spiritual Oneness, bereft of which he were an individual creature, and no more. Nature is other, or many; being less than one, or oneless, will-less, impersonal, and a thing, dual, divided, Nature recoiling on itself. Man partakes of the triple life in virtue of his will. Inferior creatures fall short of Personality, being under fate or the twoness that bestrides them. Lapsing out of the oneness, souls dualize themselves, debased hereby into duplicity and individualism. This Personal identity is spiritual, not numerical merely, souls being one, bodies not one. Any number of bodies, or of things, never attain to unity, since it is the one in each that defines and denotes it. The Personality is copulative, not disjunctive, and notation is not predicable of body but of spirit.

One is the One in holy Three,
While lapsed in Self 's duplicity.

Faith.

Faith suffices where knowledge is wanting: an instinct, having a lively human root in some tender association, some outward rite — some sacred place, person, book — all clearly entwisted with the affections and cropping out in some homely mythology, running far into the past; then wonder, credulity, superstition qualifying all these persuasions, and idealizing what is thus cherished and loved as a part of one's Personality itself. Man is not a terrestrial plant but a celestial, blossoming in time, to ripen its fruit in eternity.

PEDAGOGICS AS A SYSTEM.

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Translated by ANNA C. BRACKETT.

SECOND PART.

The Special Elements of Education.

§ 51. Education in general consists in the development in man of his inborn theoretical and practical rationality; it takes on the form of labor, which changes that state or condition, which appears at first only as a mere conception, into a fixed habit, and transfigures individuality into a worthy humanity. Education ends in that emancipation of the youth which places him on his own feet. The special elements which form the concrete content of all Education in general are the Life, Cognition, and Will of man. Without life mind has no phenomenal reality; without cognition, no genuine, i.e. conscious, will; and without will, no self-assurance of life and of cognition. It is true that these three elements are in real existence inseparable, and that consequently in the dialectic they continually pass over into one another. But none the less on this account do they themselves prescribe their own succession, and they have a relative and periodical ascendancy over each other. In Infancy, up to the fifth or sixth year, the purely physical development takes the precedence; Childhood is the time of learning, in a proper sense, an act by which the child gains for himself the picture of the world such as mature minds, through experience and insight, have painted it; and, finally, Youth is the transition period to practical activity, to which the self-determination of the will must give the first impulse.

§ 52. The classification of the special elements of Pedagogics is hence very simple: (1) the Physical, (2) the Intellectual, (3) the Practical. (We sometimes apply to these the words Orthobiotics, Didactics, and Pragmatics.)

—Æsthetic training constitutes only an element of the education of Intellectual Education, just as social, moral, and religious training form elements of Practical Education. But because these latter elements concern themselves with what

is external, the name "Pragmatics" is appropriate. In this sphere, Pedagogics should coincide with Politics, Ethics, and Religion; but it is distinguished from them through the aptitude which it brings with it of putting into practice the problems of the other three. The scientific arrangement of these ideas must therefore show that the former, as the more abstract, constitutes the conditions, and the latter, as the more concrete, the ground of the former, which are presupposed; and in consequence of this it is itself their principal teleological presupposition, just as in man the will presupposes the cognition, and cognition life; while, at the same time, life, in a deeper sense, must presuppose cognition, and cognition will.—

FIRST DIVISION.

PHYSICAL EDUCATION.

§ 53. The art of living rightly is based upon a comprehension of the process of Life. Life is the restless dialectic which ceaselessly transforms the inorganic into the organic, but at the same time creates out of itself another inorganic, in which it separates from itself whatever part of the inorganic has not been assimilated, which it took up as a stimulant, and that which has become dead and burned out. The organism is healthy when its reality corresponds to this idea of the dialectic, of a life which moves up and down, to and fro; of formation and re-formation, of organizing and disorganizing. All the rules for Physical Education, or of Hygiene, are derived from this conception.

§ 54. It follows from this that the change of the inorganic to the organic is going on not only in the organism as a whole, but also in its every organ and in every part of every organ; and that the organic as soon as it has attained its highest point of energy, is again degraded to the inorganic and thrown out. Every cell has its history. Activity is, therefore, not contradictory to the organism, but favors in it the natural progressive and regressive metamorphosis. This process can go on harmoniously; that is, the organism can be in health only when not only the whole organism, but each special organ, is allowed, after its productive activity, the corresponding rest and recreation necessary for its self-renewal. We have this periodicity exemplified in waking

and sleeping, also in exhalation and inhalation, excretion and taking in of material. When we have discovered the relative antagonism of the organs and their periodicity, we have found the secret of the perennial renewal of life.

§ 55. Fatigue makes its appearance when any organ, or the organism in general, is denied time for the return movement into itself and for renovation. It is possible for some one organ, as if isolated, to exercise a great and long-continued activity, even to the point of fatigue, while the other organs rest; as e.g. the lungs, in speaking, while the other parts are quiet; on the other hand, it is not well to speak and run at the same time. The idea that one can keep the organism in better condition by inactivity, is an error which rests upon a mechanical apprehension of life. Equally false is the idea that health depends upon the quantity and excellence of the food; without the force to assimilate it, it acts fatally rather than stimulatingly. *True strength arises only from activity.*

—The later physiologists will gradually destroy, in the system of culture of modern people, the preconceived notion which recommended for the indolent and lovers of pleasure powerful stimulants, very fat food, &c. Excellent works exist on this question.—

§ 56. Physical Education, as it concerns the repairing, the motor, or the nervous, activities, is divided into (1) Diatetics, (2) Gymnastics, (3) Sexual Education. In real life these activities are scarcely separable, but for the sake of exposition we must consider them apart. In the regular development of the human being, moreover, the repairing system has a relative precedence to the motor system, and the latter to the sexual maturity. But Pedagogics can treat of these ideas only with reference to the infant, the child, and the youth.

FIRST CHAPTER.

Dietetics.

§ 57. Dietetics is the art of sustaining the normal repair of the organism. Since this organism is, in the concrete, an individual one, the general principles of dietetics must, in their manner of application, vary with the sex, the age, the temperament, the occupation, and the other conditions, of the individual. Pedagogics as a science can only go over its gen-

eral principles, and these can be named briefly. If we attempt to speak of details, we fall easily into triviality. So very important to the whole life of man is the proper care of his physical nature during the first stages of its development, that the science of Pedagogics must not omit to consider the different systems which different people, according to their time, locality, and culture, have made for themselves; many, it is true, embracing some preposterous ideas, but in general never devoid of justification in their time.

§ 58. The infant's first nourishment must be the milk of its mother. The substitution of a nurse should be only an exception justified alone by the illness of the mother; as a rule, as happens in France, it is simply bad, because a foreign physical and moral element is introduced into the family through the nurse. The milk of an animal can never be as good for a child.

§ 59. When the teeth appear, the child is first able to eat solid food; but, until the second teeth come, he should be fed principally on light, fluid nourishment, and on vegetable diet.

§ 60. When the second teeth are fully formed, the human being is ready for animal as well as vegetable food. Too much meat is not good; but it is an anatomical error to suppose that man, by the structure of his stomach, was originally formed to live alone on vegetable diet, and that animal food is a sign of his degeneracy.

—The Hindoos, who subsist principally on vegetable diet, are not, as has been often asserted, a very gentle race: a glance into their history, or into their erotic poetry, shows them to be quite as passionate as other peoples.—

§ 61. Man is omnivorous. Children have therefore a natural desire to taste of everything. For them eating and drinking possess a kind of poetry; there is a theoretic ingredient blended with the material enjoyment. They have, on this account, a proneness to indulge, which is deserving of punishment only when it is combined with disobedience and secrecy, or when it betrays cunning and greediness.

§ 62. Children need much sleep, because they are undergoing the most active progressive metamorphosis. In after-life sleep and waking should be subjected to periodical regulation, but not too exactly.

§ 63. The clothing of children should be adapted to them; i.e. it should be cut according to the shape of the body, and it must be loose enough to allow free play to their desire for movement.

—With regard to this as well as to the sleeping arrangements for children, less in regard to food—which is often too highly spiced and too liberal in tea, coffee, &c.—our age has become accustomed to a very rational system. The clothing of children must be not only comfortable, but it should be made of simple and cheap material, so that the free enjoyment of the child may not be marred by the constant internal anxiety that a rent or a spot may bring him a fault-finding or angry word. From too great care as to clothing, may arise a meanness of mind which at last pays too great respect to it, or an empty frivolity. This last may be induced by dressing children too conspicuously.—

§ 64. Cleanliness is a virtue to which children should be accustomed for the sake of their physical well-being, as well as because, in a moral point of view, it is of the greatest significance. Cleanliness will not endure that things shall be deprived of their proper individuality through the elemental chaos. It retains each as distinguished from every other. While it makes necessary to man pure air, cleanliness of surroundings, of clothing, and of his body, it develops in him a sense by which he perceives accurately the particular limits of being in general.

SECOND CHAPTER.

Gymnastics.

§ 65. Gymnastics is the art of systematic training of the muscular system. The action of the voluntary muscles, which are regulated by the nerves of the brain, in distinction from the involuntary automatic muscles depending on the spinal cord, while they are the means of man's intercourse with the external world, at the same time re-act upon the automatic muscles in digestion and sensation. Since the movement of the muscular fibres consists in the change of contraction and expansion, it follows that Gymnastics must bring about a change of movement which shall both contract and expand the muscles.

§ 66. The system of gymnastic exercise of any nation corresponds always to its way of fighting. So long as this consists in the personal struggle of a hand-to-hand contest, Gymnastics will seek to increase as much as possible individual strength and adroitness. As soon as the far-reaching missiles projected from fire-arms become the centre of all the operations of war, the individual is lost in a body of men, out of which he emerges only relatively in sharp-shooting, in the charge, in single contests, and in the retreat. Because of this incorporation of the individual in the one great whole, and because of the resulting unimportance of personal bravery, modern Gymnastics can never be the same as it was in ancient times, even putting out of view the fact that the subjectiveness of the modern spirit is too great to allow it to devote so much attention to the care of the body, and the admiration of its beauty, as was given by the Greeks.

—The Turners' unions and halls in Germany belong to the period of subjective enthusiasm of the German student population, and had a political significance. At present, they have been brought back to their proper place as an Educational means, and they are of great value, especially in large cities. Among the mountains, and even in the country towns, a special institution for bodily exercise is less necessary, for the matter takes care of itself. The attractions of the situation and the games help to foster it. In great cities, however, the houses are often destitute of halls or open places where the children can take exercise in their leisure moments. In these cities, therefore, there must be some gymnastic hall where the sense of fellowship may be developed. Gymnastics are not so essential for girls. In its place, dancing is sufficient, and gymnastics should be employed for them only where there exists any special weakness or deformity, when they may be used as a restorative or preservative. They are not to become Amazons. The boy, on the contrary, needs to acquire the feeling of good-fellowship. It is true that the school develops this in a measure, but not fully, because it determines the standing of the boy through his intellectual ambition. The academical youth will not take much interest in special gymnastics unless he can gain preëminence therein. Running, leaping, climbing, and lifting, are too mean-

ingless for their more mature spirits. They can take a lively interest only in the exercises which have a warlike character. With the Prussians, and some other German states, the art of Gymastics identifies itself with military concerns.—

§ 67. The real idea of Gymnastics must always be that the spirit shall rule over its naturalness, and shall make this an energetic and docile servant of its will. Strength and adroitness must unite and become confident skill. Strength, carried to its extreme produces the athlete; adroitness, to its extreme, the acrobat. Pedagogics must avoid both. All immense force, fit only for display, must be held as far away as the idea of teaching Gymnastics with the motive of utility; e.g. that by swimming one may save his life when he falls into the water, &c. Among other things, this may also be a consequence; but the principle in general must always remain: the necessity of the spirit of subjecting its organism of the body to the condition of a perfect means, so that it may never find itself limited by it.

§ 68. Gymnastic exercises form a series from simple to compound. There appears to be so much arbitrariness in them that it is always very agreeable to the mind to find, on nearer inspection, some reason. The movements are (1) of the lower, (2) of the upper extremities; (3) of the whole body, with relative striking out, now of the upper, now of the lower extremities. We distinguish, therefore, foot, arm, and trunk movements.

§ 69. (1) The first series of foot-movements is the most important, and conditions the carriage of all the rest of the body. They are (*a*) walking; (*b*) running; (*c*) leaping: each of these being capable of modifications, as the high and the low leap, the prolonged and the quick run. Sometimes we give to these different names, according to the means used, as walking on stilts; skating; leaping with a staff, or by means of the hands, as vaulting. Dancing is only the art of the graceful mingling of these movements; and balancing, only one form of walking.

§ 70. (2) The second series embraces the arm-movements, and it repeats also the movements of the first series. It includes (*a*) lifting; (*b*) swinging; (*c*) throwing. All pole and bar practice comes under lifting, also climbing and carrying.

Under throwing, come quoit and ball-throwing, and nine-pin playing. All these movements are distinguished from each other, not only quantitatively but also qualitatively, in the position of the stretched and bent muscles; e.g. running is something different from quick walking.

§ 71. (3) The third series, or that of movements of the whole body, differs from the preceding two, which should precede it, in this, that it brings the organism into contact with a living object, which it has to overcome through its own activity. This object is sometimes an element, sometimes an animal, sometimes a man. Our divisions then are (*a*) swimming; (*b*) riding; (*c*) fighting, or single combat. In swimming, one must conquer the yielding liquid material of water by arm and foot movements. The resistance met on account of currents and waves may be very great, but it is still that of a will-less and passive object. But in riding man has to deal with a self-willed being whose vitality calls forth not only his strength but also his intelligence and courage. The exercise is therefore very complicated, and the rider must be able perpetually to individualize it according to the necessity; at the same time, he must give attention not only to the horse, but to the nature of the ground and the entire surroundings. But it is only in the struggle with men that Gymnastics reaches its highest point, for in this man offers himself as a living antagonist to man and brings him into danger. It is no longer the spontaneous activity of an unreasoning existence; it is the resistance and attack of intelligence itself with which he has to deal. Fighting, or single combat, is the truly chivalrous exercise, and this may be combined with horsemanship.

—In the single combat there is found also a qualitative modification, whence we have three systems: (*a*) boxing and wrestling; (*b*) fencing with sticks; and (*c*) rapier and broadsword fencing. In the first, which was cultivated to its highest point among the Greeks, direct immediateness rules. In the boxing of the English, a sailor-like propensity of this nation, fist-fighting is still retained as a custom. Fencing with a stick is found among the French mechanics, the so-called *compagnons.* Men often use the cane in their contests; it is a sort of refined club. When we use the sword or rapier,

the weapon becomes deadly. The Southern Europeans excel in the use of the rapier, the Germans in that of the sword. But the art of single combat is much degenerated, and the pistol-duel, through its increasing frequency, proves this degeneration.—

THIRD CHAPTER.

Sexual Education.

NOTE.—The paragraphs relating to Sexual Education are designed for parents rather than for teachers, the parent being the natural educator of the family and sexual education relating to the preservation and continuance of the family. This chapter is accordingly, for the most part, omitted here. It contains judicious reflections, invaluable to parents and guardians.—*Tr.*

§ 72. Gymnastic exercises fall naturally into a systematic arrangement determined by the chronological order of development through infancy, childhood, and youth. Walking, running, and leaping belong, to the first period; lifting, swinging, and throwing, to the second; swimming, riding, and bodily contests, to the third, and these last may also be continued into manhood. But with the arrival at youth, a new epoch makes its appearance in the organism. It prepares itself for the propagation of the species. It expands the individual through the need which he feels of uniting himself with another individual of the same species, but who is a polar opposite to him, in order to preserve the two in a new individual. The blood rushes more vigorously; the muscular strength becomes more easily roused into activity; an indefinable impulse, a sweet melancholy takes possession of the being. This period demands a special care in the educator.

§ 73. The general preventive guards must be found in a rational system of food and exercise. By care in these directions, the development of the bones, and with them of the brain and spinal cord at this period, may be led to a proper strength, and that the easily-moulded material may not be perverted from its normal functions in the development of the body to a premature manifestation of the sexual instinct.

§ 74. Special forethought is necessary lest the brain be too early over-strained, and lest, in consequence of such precocious and excessive action, the foundation for a morbid excitation of the whole nervous system be laid, which may easily

lead to effeminate and voluptuous reveries, and to brooding over obscene representations. The excessive reading of novels, whose exciting pages delight in painting the love of the sexes for each other and its sensual phases, may lead to this, and then the mischief is done.

SECOND DIVISION.

INTELLECTUAL EDUCATION.

§ 80. *Mens sana in corpore sano* is correct as a pedagogical maxim, but false in the judgment of individual cases; because it is possible, on the one hand, to have a healthy mind in an unhealthy body, and, on the other hand, an unhealthy mind in a healthy body. To strive after the harmony of soul and body is the material condition of all proper activity. The development of intelligence presupposes physical health. Here we are to speak of the science of the art of Teaching. This had its condition on the side of nature, as was before seen, in physical Education, but in the sphere of mind it is related to Psychology and Logic. It unites, in Teaching, considerations on Psychology as well as a Logical method.

FIRST CHAPTER.

The Psychological Presupposition.

§ 81. If we would have a sound condition of Philosophy, it must, in intellectual Education, refer to the conception of mind which has been unfolded in Psychology; and it must appear as a defect in scientific method if Psychology, or at least the conception of the theoretical mind, is treated again as within Pedagogics. We must take something for granted. Psychology, then, will be consulted no further than is requisite to place on a sure basis the pedagogical function which relates to it.

§ 82. The conception of *attention* is the most important to Pedagogics of all those derived from Psychology. Mind is essentially self-activity. Nothing exists for it which it does not itself posit as its own. We hear it not seldom implied that something from outside conditions must make an impression on the mind, but this is an error. Mind lets nothing act upon it unless it has rendered itself receptive to it. Without this preparatory self-excitation the object does not

really penetrate it, and it passes by the object unconsciously or indifferently. The horizon of perception changes for each person with his peculiarities and culture. Attention is the adjusting of the observer to the object in order to seize it in its unity and diversity. Relatively, the observer allows, for a moment, his relation to all other surroundings to cease, so that he may establish a relation with this one. Without this essentially spontaneous activity, nothing exists for the mind. All result in teaching and learning depends upon the clearness and strength with which distinctions are made, and the saying, *bene qui distinguit bene docit*, applies as well to the pupil.

§ 83. Attention, depending as it does on the self-determination of the observer, can therefore be improved, and the pupil made attentive, by the educator. Education must accustom him to an exact, rapid, and many-sided attention, so that at the first contact with an object he may grasp it sufficiently and truly, and that it shall not be necessary for him always to be adding to his acquisitions concerning it. The twilight and partialness of intelligence which forces us always to new corrections because a pupil at the very commencement did not give entire attention, must not be tolerated.

§ 84. We learn from Psychology that mind does not consist of distinct faculties, but that what we choose to call so are only different activities of the same power. Each one is just as essential as the other, on which account Education must grant to each faculty its claim to the same fostering care. If we would construe correctly the axiom *a potiori fit denominatio* to mean that man is distinguished from animals by thought, and that mediated will is not the same as thought, we must not forget that feeling and representing are not less necessary to a truly complete human being. The special direction which the activity of apprehending intelligence takes are (1) Perception, (2) Conception, (3) Thinking. Dialectically, they pass over into each other; not that Perception rises into Conception, and Conception into Thinking, but that Thinking goes back into Conception, and this again into Perception. In the development of the young, the Perceptive faculty is most active in the infant, the Conceptive in the child, and the

Thinking in the youth; and thus we may distinguish an intuitive, an imaginative, and a logical epoch.

—Great errors arise from the misapprehension of these different phases and of their dialectic, since the different forms which are suitable to the different grades of youth are mingled. The infant certainly thinks while he perceives, but this thinking is to him unconscious. Or, if he has acquired perceptions, he makes them into conceptions, and demonstrates his freedom in playing with them. This play must not be taken as mere amusement; it also signifies that he takes care to preserve his self-determination, and his power of idealizing, in opposition to the pleasant filling of his consciousness with material. Herein the delight of the child for fairy tales finds its reason. The fairy tale constantly destroys the limits of common actuality. The abstract understanding cannot endure this arbitrariness and want of fixed conditions, and thus would prefer that children should read, instead, home-made stories of the "Charitable Ann," of the "Heedless Frederick," of the "Inquisitive Wilhelmine," &c. Above all, it praises "Robinson Crusoe," which contains much heterogeneous matter, but nothing improbable. When the youth and maiden of necessity pass over into the earnestness of real life, the drying up of the imagination and the domination of the understanding presses in.—

I. *The Intuitive Epoch.*

§ 85. Perception, as the beginning of intellectual culture, is the free grasping of a content immediately present to the spirit. Education can do nothing directly toward the performance of this act; it can only assist in making it easy:—(1) it can isolate the subject of consideration; (2) it can give facility in the transition to another; (3) it can promote the many-sidedness of the interest, by which means the return to a perception already obtained has always a fresh charm.

§ 86. The immediate perception of many things is impossible, and yet the necessity for it is obvious. We must then have recourse to a mediated perception, and supply the lack of actual seeing by representations. But here the difficulty presents itself, that there are many objects which we are not

able to represent of the same size as they really are, and we must have a reduced scale; and there follows a difficulty in making the representation, as neither too large nor too small. An explanation is then also necessary as a judicious supplement to the picture.

§ 87. Pictures are extremely valuable aids to instruction when they are correct and characteristic. Correctness must be demanded in these substitutes for natural objects, historical persons and scenes. Without this correctness, the picture, if not an impediment, is, to say the least, useless.

—It is only since the last half of the seventeenth century, i.e. since the disappearance of real painting, that the picture-book has appeared as an educational means; first of all, coming from miniature painting. Up to that time, public life had plenty of pictures of arms, furniture, houses, and churches; and men, from their fondness for constantly moving about, were more weary of immediate perception It was only afterwards when, in the excitement of the thirty-years' war, the arts of Sculpture and Painting and Christian and Pagan Mythology became extinct, that there arose a greater necessity for pictured representations. The *Orbis Rerum Sensualium Pictus*, which was also to be *janua linguarum reserata*, of Amos Comenius, appeared first in 1658, and was reprinted in 1805. Many valuable illustrated books followed. Since that time innumerable illustrated Bibles and histories have appeared, but many of them look only to the pecuniary profit of the author or the publisher. It is revolting to see the daubs that are given to children. They are highly colored, but as to correctness, to say nothing of character, they are good for nothing. With a little conscientiousness and scientific knowledge very different results could be obtained with the same outlay of money and of strength. The uniformity which exists in the stock of books which German book-selling has set in circulation is really disgraceful. Everywhere we find the same types, even in ethnographical pictures. In natural history, the illustrations were often drawn from the imagination or copied from miserable models. This has changed very much for the better. The same is true of architectural drawings and landscapes, for which we have now better copies.—

§ 88. Children have naturally a desire to collect things, and this may be so guided that they shall collect and arrange plants, butterflies, beetles, shells, skeletons, &c., and thus gain exactness and reality in their perception. Especially should they practise drawing, which leads them to form exact images of objects. But drawing, as children practise it, does not have the educational significance of cultivating in them an appreciation of art, but rather that of educating the eye, as this must be exercised in estimating distances, sizes, and colors. It is, moreover, a great gain in many ways, if, through a suitable course of lessons in drawing, the child is advanced to a knowledge of the elementary forms of nature.

—That pictures should affect children as works of art is not to be desired. They confine themselves at first to distinguishing the outlines and colors, and do not yet appreciate the execution. If the children have access to real works of art, we may safely trust in their power, and quietly await their moral or æsthetic effect.—

§ 89. In order that looking at pictures shall not degenerate into mere diversion, explanations should accompany them. Only when the thought embodied in the illustration is pointed out, can they be useful as a means of instruction. Simply looking at them is of as little value towards this end as is water for baptism without the Holy Spirit. Our age inclines at present to the superstition that man is able, by means of simple intuition, to attain a knowledge of the essence of things, and thereby dispense with the trouble of thinking. Illustrations are the order of the day, and, in the place of enjoyable descriptions, we find miserable pictures. It is in vain to try to get behind things, or to comprehend them, except by thinking.

§ 90. The ear as well as the eye must be cultivated. Music must be considered the first educational means to this end, but it should be music inspired by ethical purity. Hearing is the most internal of all the senses, and should on this account be treated with the greatest delicacy. Especially should the child be taught that he is not to look upon speech as merely a vehicle for communication and for gaining information; it should also give pleasure, and therefore he should be taught to speak distinctly and with a good style,

and this he can do only when he carefully considers what he is going to say.

—Among the Greeks, extraordinary care was given to musical cultivation, especially in its ethical relation. Sufficient proof of this is found in the admirable detailed statements on this point in the "Republic" of Plato and in the last book of the "Politics" of Aristotle. Among modern nations, also, music holds a high place, and makes its appearance as a constant element of education. Piano-playing has become general, and singing is also taught. But the ethical significance of music is too little considered. Instruction in music often aims only to train pupils for display in society, and the tendency of the melodies which are played is restricted more and more to orchestral pieces of an exciting or bacchanalian character. The railroad-gallop-style only makes the nerves of youth vibrate with stimulating excitement. Oral speech, the highest form of the personal manifestation of mind, was also treated with great reverence by the ancients. Among us, communication is so generally carried on by writing and reading, that the art of speaking distinctly, correctly, and agreeably, has become very much neglected. Practice in declamation accomplishes, as a general thing, very little in this direction. But we may expect that the increase of public speaking occasioned by our political and religious assemblies may have a favorable influence in this particular.—

II. *The Imaginative Epoch.*

§ 91. The activity of Perception results in the formation of an internal picture or image of its ideas which intelligence can call up at any time without the sensuous, immediate presence of its object, and thus, through abstraction and generalization, arises the conception. The mental image may (1) be compared with the perception from which it sprang, or (2) it may be arbitrarily altered and combined with other images, or (3) it may be held fast in the form of abstract signs or symbols which intelligence invents for it. Thus originate the functions (1) of the verification of conceptions, (2) of the creative imagination, and (3) of memory; but for their full development we must refer to Psychology.

§ 92. (1) The mental image which we form of an object may

be correct; again, it may be partly or wholly defective, if we have neglected some of the predicates of the perception which presented themselves, or in so far as we have added to it other predicates which only seemingly belonged to it, and which were attached to it only by its accidental empirical connection with other existences. Education must, therefore, foster the habit of comparing our conceptions with the perceptions from which they arose; and these perceptions, since they are liable to change by reason of their empirical connection with other objects, must be frequently compared with our conceptions previously formed by abstractions from them.

§ 93. (2) We are thus limited in our conceptions by our perceptions, but we exercise a free control over our conceptions. We can create out of them, as simple elements, the manifold mental shapes which we do not treat as given to us, but as essentially our own work. In Pedagogics, we must not only look upon this freedom as if it were only to afford gratification, but as the reaction of the absolute ideal native mind against the dependence in which the empirical reception of impressions from without, and their reproduction in conceptions, place it. In this process, it does not only fashion in itself the phenomenal world, but it rather fashions out of itself a world which is all its own.

§ 94. The study of Art comes here to the aid of Pedagogics, especially with Poetry, the highest and at the same time the most easily communicated. The imagination of the pupil can be led by means of the classical works of creative imagination to the formation of a good taste both as regards ethical value and beauty of form. The proper classical works for youth are those which nations have produced in the earliest stages of their culture. These works bring children face to face with the picture which mind has sketched for itself in one of the necessary stages of its development. This is the real reason why our children never weary of reading Homer and the stories of the Old Testament. Polytheism and the heroism which belongs to it are just as substantial an element of childish conception as monotheism with its prophets and patriarchs. We stand beyond both, because we are mediated by both, and embrace both in our stand-point.

—The purest stories of literature designed for the amuse-

ment of children from their seventh to their fourteenth year, consist always of those which were honored by nations and the world at large. One has only to notice in how many thousand forms the stories of Ulysses are reproduced by the writers of children's tales. Becker's "Tales of Ancient Times," Gustav Schwab's most admirable "Sagas of Antiquity," Karl Grimm's "Tales of Olden Times," &c., what were they without the well-talking, wily favorite of Pallas, and the divine swine-herd? And just as indestructible are the stories of the Old Testament up to the separation of Judah and Israel. These patriarchs with their wives and children, these judges and prophets, these kings and priests, are by no means ideals of virtue in the notion of our modern lifeless morality, which would smooth out of its pattern-stories for the "dear children" everything that is hard and uncouth. For the very reason that the shadow-side is not wanting here, and that we find envy, vanity, evil desire, ingratitude, craftiness, and deceit, among these fathers of the race and leaders of "God's chosen people," have these stories so great an educational value. Adam, Cain, Abraham, Joseph, Samson, and David, have justly become as truly world-historical types as Achilles and Patroclus, Agamemnon and Iphigenia, Hector and Andromache, Ulysses and Penelope.—

§ 95. There may be produced also, out of the simplest and most primitive phases of different epochs of culture of one and the same people, stories which answer to the imagination of children, and represent to them the characteristic features of the past of their people.

—The Germans possess such a collection of their stories in their popular books of the "Horny Sigfried," of the "Heymon Children," of "Beautiful *Magelone*," "Fortunatus," "The Wandering Jew," "Faust," "The Adventurous Simplicissimus," "The *Schildbürger*," "The Island of Felsenburg," "Lienhard and Gertrude," &c. Also, the art works of the great masters which possess national significance must be spoken of here, as the Don Quixote of Cervantes.—

§ 96. The most general form in which the childish imagination finds exercise is that of fairy-tales; but Education must take care that it has these in their proper shape as national productions, and that they are not of the morbid kind

which poetry so often gives us in this species of literature, and which not seldom degenerate to sentimental caricatures and silliness.

—The East Indian stories are most excellent because they have their origin with a childlike people who live wholly in the imagination. By means of the Arabian filtration, which took place in Cairo in the flourishing period of the Egyptian caliphs, all that was too characteristically Indian was excluded, and they were made in the "Tales of Scheherezade," a book for all peoples, with whose far-reaching power in child-literature, the local stories of a race, as e.g. Grimm's admirable ones of German tradition, cannot compare. Fairy-tales made to order, as we often see them, with a mediæval Catholic tendency, or very moral and dry, are a bane to the youthful imagination in their stale sweetness. We must here add, however, that lately we have had some better success in our attempts since we have learned to distinguish between the naïve natural poetry, which is without reflection, and the poetry of art, which is conditioned by criticism and an ideal. This distinction has produced good fruits even in the picture-books of children. The pretensions of the gentlemen who printed illustrated books containing nothing more solid than the alphabet and the multiplication table have become less prominent since such men as Speckter, Fröhlich, Gutsmuths, Hofman (the writer of "Slovenly Peter"), and others, have shown that seemingly trivial things can be handled with intellectual power, if one is blessed with it, and that nothing is more opposed to the child's imagination than the *childishness* with which so many writers for children have fallen when they attempted to descend with dignity from their presumably lofty stand-point. Men are beginning to understand that Christ promised the kingdom of heaven to little children on other grounds than because they had as it were the privilege of being thoughtless and foolish.—

§ 97. For youth and maidens, especially as they approach manhood and womanhood, the cultivation of the imagination must allow the earnestness of actuality to manifest itself in its undisguised energy. This earnestness, no longer through the symbolism of play but in its objective reality,

must now thoroughly penetrate the conceptions of the youth so that it shall prepare him to seize hold of the machinery of active life. Instead of the all-embracing Epos they should now read Tragedy, whose purifying process, through the alternation of fear and pity, unfolds to the youth the secret of all human destiny, sin and its expiation. The works best adapted to lead to history on this side are those of biography—of ancient times, Plutarch; of modern times, the autobiographies of Augustine, Cellini, Rousseau, Goethe, Varnhagen, Jung Stilling, Moritz Arndt, &c. These autobiographies contain a view of the growth of individuality through its inter-action with the influences of its time, and, together with the letters and memoirs of great or at least note-worthy men, tend to produce a healthy excitement in the youth, who must learn to fight his own battles through a knowledge of the battles of others. To introduce the youth to a knowledge of Nature and Ethnography no means are better than those of books of travel which give the charm of first contact, the joy of discovery, instead of the general consciousness of the conquests of mind.

—If educative literature on the one hand broadens the field of knowledge, on the other it may also promote its elaboration into ideal forms. This happens, in a strict sense, through philosophical literature. But only two different species of this are to be recommended to youth: (1) well-written treatises which endeavor to solve a single problem with spirit and thoroughness; or, (2) when the intelligence has grown strong enough for it, the classical works of a real philosopher. German literature is fortunately very rich in treatises of this kind in the works of Lessing, Herder, Kant, Fichte, Schleiermacher, Humboldt, and Schiller. But nothing does more harm to youth than the study of works of mediocrity, or those of a still lower rank. They stupefy and narrow the mind by their empty, hollow, and constrained style. It is generally supposed that these standard works are too difficult, and that one must first seize them in this trivial and diluted form in order to understand them. This is one of the most prevalent and most dangerous errors, for these Introductions or Explanations, easily-comprehended Treatises, Summary Abstracts, are, because of their want of originality

and of the acuteness which belongs to it, much more difficult to understand than the standard work itself from which they drain their supplies. Education must train the youth to the courage which will attempt standard works, and it must not allow any such miserable preconceived opinions to grow up in his mind as that his understanding is totally unable to comprehend works like Fichte's "Science of Knowledge," the "Metaphysics" of Aristotle, or Hegel's "Phenomenology." No science suffers so much as Philosophy from this false popular opinion, which understands neither itself nor its authority. The youth must *learn how to learn to understand*, and, in order to do this, he must know that one cannot immediately understand everything in its finest subdivisions, and that on this account he must have patience, and must resolve to read over and over again, and to think over what he has read.—

§ 98. (3) Imagination returns again within itself to perception in that it replaces, for conceptions, perceptions themselves, which are to remind it of the previous conception. These perceptions may resemble in some way the perception which lies at the basis of the conception, and be thus more or less symbolical; or they may be merely arbitrary creations of the creative imagination, and are in this case pure signs. In common speech and writing, we call the free retaining of these perceptions created by imagination, and the recalling of the conceptions denoted by them, *Memory*. It is by no means a particular faculty of the mind, which is again subdivided into memory of persons, names, numbers, &c. As to its form, memory is the stage of the dissolution of conception; but as to its content, it arises from the interest which we take in a subject-matter. From this interest results, moreover, careful attention, and from this latter, facility in the reproductive imagination. If these acts have preceded, the fixing of a name, or of a number, in which the content interesting us is as it were summed up, is not difficult. When interest and attention animate us, it seems as if we did not need to be at all troubled about remembering anything. All the so-called mnemonic helps only serve to make more difficult the act of memory. This act is in itself a double function, consisting of, first, the fixing of the sign, and second,

the fixing of the conception subsumed under it. Since the mnemonic technique adds to these one more conception, through whose means the things with which we have to deal are to be fixed in order to be able freely to express them in us, it trebles the functions of remembering, and forgets that the mediation of these and their relation—wholly arbitrary and highly artificial—must also be remembered. The true help of memory consists in not helping it at all, but in simply taking up the object into the ideal regions of the mind by the force of the infinite self-determination which mind possesses.

—Lists of names, as e.g. of the Roman emperors, of the popes, of the caliphs, of rivers, mountains, authors, cities, &c.; also numbers, as e.g. the multiplication table, the melting points of minerals, the dates of battles, of births and deaths, &c., must be learned without aid. All indirect means only serve to do harm here, and are required as self-discovered mediation only in case that interest or attention has become weakened.—

§ 99. The means to be used, which result from the nature of memory itself, are on the one hand the pronouncing and writing of the names and numbers, and on the other, repetition; by these we gain distinctness and certainty.

—All artificial contrivances for quickening the memory vanish in comparison with the art of writing, in so far as this is not looked at as a means of relieving the memory. That a name or a number should be this or that, is a mere chance for the intelligence, an entirely meaningless accident to which we have unconditionally to submit ourselves as unalterable. The intelligence must be accustomed to put upon itself this constraint. In science proper, especially in Philosophy, our reason helps to produce one thought from others by means of the context, and we can discover names for the ideas from them.—

III. *The Logical Epoch.*

§ 100. In Conception there is attained a universality of intellectual action in so far as the empirical details are referred to a *Schema*, as Kant called it. But the *necessity* of the connection is wanting to it. To produce this is the

task of the thinking activity, which frees itself from all representations, and with its clearly defined determinations transcends conceptions. The Thinking activity frees itself from all sensuous representations by means of the processes of Conception and Perception. Comprehension, Judgment, and Syllogism, develop for themselves into forms which, as such, have no power of being perceived by the senses. But it does not follow from this that he who thinks cannot return out of the thinking activity and carry it with him into the sphere of Conception and Perception. The true thinking activity deprives itself of no content. The abstraction affecting a logical purism which looks down upon Conception and Perception as forms of intelligence quite inferior to itself, is a pseudo-thinking, a morbid and scholastic error. Education will be the better on its guard against this the more it has led the pupil by the legitimate road of Perception and Conception to Thinking. Memorizing especially is an excellent preparatory school for the Thinking activity, because it gives practice to the intelligence in exercising itself in abstract ideas.

§ 101. The fostering of the Sense of Truth from the earliest years up, is the surest way of leading the pupil to gain the power of thinking. The unprejudiced, disinterested yielding to Truth, as well as the effort to shun all deception and false seeming, are of the greatest value in strengthening the power of reflection, as this considers nothing of value but the actually existing objective circumstances.

—The indulging an illusion as a pleasing recreation of the intelligence should be allowed, while lying must not be tolerated. Children have a natural inclination for mystifications, for masquerades, for raillery, and for theatrical performances, &c. This inclination to illusion is perfectly normal with them, and should be permitted. The graceful kingdom of Art is developed from it, as also the poetry of conversation in jest and wit. Although this sometimes becomes stereotyped into very prosaic conventional forms of speech, it is more tolerable than the awkward honesty which takes everything in its simple literal sense. And it is easy to discover whether children in such play, in the activity of free joyousness, incline to the side of mischief by their showing

a desire of satisfying their selfish interest. Then they must be checked, for in that case the cheerfulness of harmless joking gives way to premeditation and dissimulation.—

§ 102. An acquaintance with logical forms is to be recommended as a special educational help in the culture of intelligence. The study of Mathematics does not suffice, because it presupposes Logic. Mathematics is related to Logic in the same way as Grammar, the Physical Sciences, &c. The logical forms must be known explicitly in their pure independent forms, and not merely in their implicit state as immanent in objective forms.

HAMLET.

By D. J. Snider.

Hamlet is the Sphinx of modern literature. The difference of opinion concerning its purport and character is quite as general as the study of the work. Persons of the same grade of culture and ability hold the most contradictory theories respecting its signification; even the same persons change their notions about it at different periods of life. To others, again, it remains an unsolved mystery. Yet, curious to say, everybody recurs to this play as if it possessed some strange fascination over the mind, as if it had some secret nourishment for the spirit of man which always drew him back to take repeated drafts. A work to which intelligence thus clings must be something more than an idle riddle; in fact, it must lay open some of the profoundest problems of life. Even to appreciate and comprehend such a problem when stated, requires no ordinary degree of culture and thought. Every individual brings his own intellectual capacity to the comprehension of the play, and it is no wonder that people differ so much since they have so many different mental measuring-rods. If one man has a deeper or shallower insight than another, there must be a corresponding difference of opinion. Also advancing years bring along great spiritual mutations; new views of life and broader experience must reveal deeper phases in *Hamlet*, if it be that absolute work which enlight-

ened mankind generally believe it to be. Hence we may account for the frequent occurrence of a change of opinion in the same person at the several periods of life. Indeed, a man ought perhaps to change his opinion concerning this drama once every decade during the first forty years of his existence; it would in most cases be a good sign of increased culture and maturer intellect. According to our own premises, therefore, we can hardly expect to satisfy all or even the majority, and to harmonize the many conflicting opinions. But we intend to grapple honestly with its difficulties, which are both many and great, and to attempt to state the thought which gives unity to its widely diversified parts.

At the very threshold of the subject stands the question of Hamlet's insanity. Was it real or feigned? If he is insane, and so intended by the poet, let us shut the book and say no more, for certainly there is nothing more to be said. But such is not the case. Art is the expression of Reason, and that too of the Reason of a nation, of an age, of an epoch; eliminate this principle, pray, what is left? Criticism, if it be true to its highest end, points out and unfolds the rational element in a drama or other work of Art; but here it could only say: this poem professedly depicts the Irrational, hence the Ugly. A piece which has as its theme the Ugly, cannot well possess much beauty. Moreover, what delight or instruction can there be in the portraiture of the Irrational? Think of the choicest spirits of this and former generations finding spiritual nourishment in the capricious oddities of a madman! In fact, this play would thus become repugnant alike to the intellectual and the moral nature of man: repugnant to his intellectual nature, for it would be stripped of all true intelligence in the dethronement of Reason; repugnant to his moral nature, for insanity destroys responsibility, and thus Hamlet could in nowise be held accountable for his acts. Here lies the greatest objection to the above-mentioned view: it takes away the notion of responsibility, and thereby blasts the very germ of the play. That the poet intends no such thing is very evident. Hamlet has the profoundest sense of duty, the most sensitive moral nature; moreover, the termination of his career at the end of the piece shows how Shakespeare would have us regard the matter. To destroy an insane man for

his deeds would be not merely an absurdity but a moral horror. The view that Hamlet is mad has lately been promulgated with much emphasis by several physicians who have had large experience in the treatment of the insane. Their method of procedure is curious, resting upon a wholly physical basis, though they are judging a work of Art; they carefully reckon up the symptoms and show the various stages, evidently regarding *Hamlet* as a treatise on insanity. One is at first inclined to think that these doctors ought to take the place of their patients, and be incarcerated for a while in an insane asylum. Yet we should not, perhaps, blame them; for does not everybody read into *Hamlet* his own life-experience and culture? Why not let these men read into it their own insanity in peace?

A modification of this opinion is that Hamlet is deranged in some of his faculties, though not in all; is mad at times, with lucid intervals, etc. These views are hardly worthy of a detailed examination; in them all definiteness fades away; their supporters are evidently on both sides, and on neither. But a true criterion may be laid down to guide our wandering steps in this trackless waste of uncertainty. *Hamlet is never so mad as not to be responsible.* Hence, with any ordinary definition of insanity, he is not mad at all. He has undoubtedly weaknesses, so has every mortal; he possesses finite sides to his character and intelligence, otherwise he could hardly perish as the hero of a tragedy. A definition of insanity which includes Hamlet would sweep at least three fourths of mankind into the madhouse. That he is lacking in the element of will, that he is melancholy in his feelings, that his reasoning is often unsound, and in fact so intended by Hamlet himself, is all very true, but does not make out a case of insanity. He assumes madness for a special purpose, and says so when he speaks of his antic disposition; nothing can be plainer than that purpose throughout the entire play. He took a mask to conceal his own designs, to discover the secrets of the King and to deceive the court, and particularly Polonius, the sharp-scented detective, who was sure to be placed upon his track. But why should he take this special form of insanity to hide his plans? This was determined by the character of Polonius, who was no fool, but very astute in his

particular calling, who had therefore to be caught in his own net. That trait of his character in which all others were resumed was cunning. Now Hamlet was known to the court as a man of profound candor and earnestness, and disinclined to all trickery and deceit; hence, to meet Polonius, he had to reverse his entire nature and reputation. But how would everybody regard this sudden transformation? Either in its true light as a disguise, in which case the whole design of it would fail, or that the man had lost his wits. Hence Hamlet, in order to conceal his plans and thoughts, had to counterfeit madness; such was the impression that he was compelled to make upon the world. Thus he had a veil beneath which he could be cunning too, and indulge in all sorts of vagaries without exciting suspicion, and could thwart Polonius and the other court-spies on all sides. Moreover, Hamlet was intimate with Ophelia, the daughter of Polonius, and had been dismissed by the father's orders; here was just what was wanted, namely, a ground for the theory of Hamlet's madness—his affection for Ophelia. Hence the self-love of the old courtier assisted in leading him astray; besides, he did not and could not comprehend the profound ethical nature of Hamlet, who had a deep underlying motive for the disguise. Still Polonius sometimes half suspects the truth, for he cannot but observe that there is method in Hamlet's madness. Such are the reasons why Hamlet had to feign insanity. He was the self-chosen instrument of a mighty design, which however for a time required concealment; concealment demanded cunning; cunning was the reversal of his entire rational nature; still, to carry out his end, he had to submit to the circumstances, and hence to assume the garb of the Irrational. How perfectly our poet has succeeded in portraying this disguise is shown by the fact that quite a number of modern critics have been deceived as badly as Polonius. They maintain that Hamlet is mad; that his profound intelligence and his deep, conscious planning mean nothing; or, to cite the expression of one of them, that "madness is compatible with *some* of the ripest and richest manifestations of intellect," whereof Hamlet is an example. Just the thought of old Polonius. Hear him: "How pregnant *sometimes* his replies are! a happiness that often madness hits on, which

reason and sanity could not so prosperously be delivered of." Hence we cannot but regard those persons who believe in the madness of Hamlet as in the condition of Polonius in the play: most completely befooled by Hamlet's disguise. If, too, the characters of the play are considered, but little will be found to justify the hypothesis of Hamlet's madness. Besides Polonius, only the two women, the Queen and Ophelia, neither of whom was strong enough to have an independent opinion, take Hamlet to be mad. The King knows better, and acts upon his conviction to the end; moreover, Horatio, the most intimate friend and chosen vindicator of Hamlet, does not seem to have the remotest notion of the insanity of Hamlet.

But, after taking away the question of insanity, there still remains a very great difference of opinion. In regard to the character of Hamlet, one man considers him to be courageous—another, cowardly; one, that he is moral in the highest degree—another, that he is wicked; one, that he possesses vast energy of will—another, that he has little or no power of action. The same diversity of judgment exists in regard to the play as a Whole. It has been condemned as the wild work of a barbarian; it has been praised as the highest product of modern Art. Between these two extremes almost every shade of opinion has had its representative. Even Goethe denies its unity; he declares that there are many things, such as the story of Fortinbras, the journey of Laertes to France, the sending of Hamlet to England, which have no justification in the thought of the piece. That is, if it be a true totality, we must find some higher solution and some more adequate and comprehensive statement than that of Goethe. In fact, most of these conflicting opinions may in this way be harmonized; they are not absolutely false, but only partial views which become erroneous by laying claim to universality. Hamlet is thus a sort of universal man; in him every individual sees on some side a picture of himself; each one bears away what he comprehends, and often thinks it is all. If Goethe, whose criticism of this play in *Wilhelm Meister* is undoubtedly the best that has yet been given, complained of the many external and unnecessary incidents, our difficulty, be it said with all respect to so great a genius, is

quite of the opposite kind; we are compelled to supply so much, the poet has left so many faint outlines and even wide gaps to be filled up by the thought and imagination, that we would find here if anywhere a blemish in the construction of the drama. He ought rather to have taken a whole volume for his work as Goethe himself did in his *Faust*. But the defence of Shakespeare is at hand. He wrote for representation, which is an essential side of the drama; hence the limits which it imposed upon his art must be respected. In the space of a few hours he develops what might be the theme of the grandest epic. Hence he has dropped much that would otherwise be necessary, and the missing links must be supplied if one wishes to grasp the connecting thought of the piece. It will be seen that for this reason we shall often have to go outside of the poem and bridge over the chasms, for which work however the poet always furnishes the hint. But let it not be understood that we are thus correcting the defects of the play, or even completing what was before imperfect; besides the presumptuousness of the attempt, such a proceeding is destructive of all true criticism, whose duty it cannot be to supply the deficiencies of a work of Art, or to see in it things which do not exist.

First of all, the collision which constitutes the basis of the action of the entire play is between Hamlet and the King. They form the most wonderful contrast, yet both exhibit sides of the same great thought. Hamlet has morality without action, the King has action without morality. Hamlet cannot do his deed at the behest of duty, nor can the King undo—that is, repent of—his deed at the command of conscience. Hamlet represents the undone which should be done, the King represents the done which should be undone. Neither reaches the goal which reason so clearly sets before them, and both perish by the inherent contradiction of their lives. Each one seeks the death of the other, and, by the most rigid poetic justice, they die by the retribution of their deeds.

Hamlet has the most powerful motives which can urge the human breast: his struggle is with one who has murdered his father, debauched his mother, and usurped his throne. These facts are not revealed to him of a sudden in all their fulness; it is the course of the poem to unfold them gradually before

his mind; but even at the beginning his prophetic soul surmised the whole truth. It is a curious fact of anthropology that sensitive natures often feel that of which they have no information; instinct and presentiment seem to supply the place of knowledge. Hence the melancholy of Hamlet at the very outset shows the morbid activity of feeling, though there is a partial motive in the conduct of his mother which is known to him. But when the guilt of the King is as clear as day, he does not act. Why? The answer to this question must give the solution of his character.

Let us make a comparison with the Greek view, for there is an excellent opportunity. In the legend of *Orestes* we see the same content: father murdered, mother debauched, throne usurped. But Orestes, true to the tragic instinct of Greece, is one with his end; he marches directly to it by the deepest necessity of his nature. He never stops to reflect on the character of his act; he never for a moment doubts what he is to do; nothing can possibly interpose itself between him and his deed. To be sure, if that deed was wrong, the dreadful Furies might pursue him with their terrors; but they were something external to him, with which he had nothing to do. In other words, he never asked, never could ask himself the question: Is this act right or wrong? There was his dead father, his only duty was revenge. He might thereby commit another crime equally great, but this reflection he did not make. Hence he did not possess what is now called a moral consciousness, nor was it possessed by the Grecian world, for it is the special product of modern spirit. Now, if we add this moral element to Orestes, we shall in all essential features have Hamlet. Its leading characteristic is to react against the end proposed, to call it into question, and to test the same by its own criteria. Hamlet is impelled by the strongest incentives to kill the King—such is one side; but the other side comes up before him with appalling strength: have I the right to kill him? And here it is important to inquire into the nature of this right which has such authority with Hamlet. It is not law, it is not custom, nor even public opinion; indeed it would defy all these, if it came into conflict with them; it is, therefore, nothing established, and possessing objective validity. Moreover, mankind would justify

him if he slew the King. Hence it is *himself*, his own subjectivity, which he sets up as the absolute umpire of his actions. He cannot satisfy *himself* that he should do the deed, however great the other considerations may be which impel him to it. Here we see the moral consciousness in its extreme expression; it is the assertion of the right of the individual to determine the nature of his act. That the modern world gives validity to this right need not be told to the reader. It is commonly called conscience in the wider and not strictly religious use of the word; by it the individual claims the privilege of determining his own action *through himself*, against all demands of objective institutions, as State, Law, or authority in general. In Hamlet these two sides are in the most fearful contradiction. He acknowledges both principles; he thinks it to be his sacred duty to avenge his father, at the same time he feels the unspeakable iniquity and misery of murder. The difficulty is, he cannot subordinate these two principles of action; at one moment the one is uppermost, but the next moment the other is stronger. Such is the terrible struggle which rends his heart asunder and destroys his peace of mind. It should be observed that in his language he dwells more upon his revenge, and he tries to goad himself onward to it, but there is always the moral scruple which stays his hand. The presupposition of the entire play is the moral nature of Hamlet, hence it is not brought into prominence directly, but is always implied as the element which he is trying to overcome; it is the old stock which he is attempting to inoculate with a new principle. Nor are his scruples without foundation. He is seeking revenge, which means that he is taking justice into his own hands, and hence he commits a new wrong, which in its turn begets another; the result of which conduct, as exhibited in history, is the feud which transmits itself from generation to generation. It is the annihilation of law for the individual to administer the law in his own case. There is, therefore, an institution of society, the court of justice, before which the criminal is to be cited to receive the penalty due to his crimes. But in the present instance the criminal happens to be the King himself, the very fountain of justice and authority. His trial would hence be a mockery, a contradiction in

terms. What remains? Only this: that if the King is to be punished at all, it must be by the individual Hamlet. Thus the deed is thrown back upon him singly and alone, with all its consequences and responsibilities. Here we see the internal conflict which always palsied the arm of Hamlet; it is a fearful struggle which may well excite our pity and terror; he would not, yet he could—he could not, yet he would. It is just at this point where we must seek for the tragic element in Hamlet's character. Tragedy is not merely stage-slaughter; in its true significance it exhibits a collision of duties, which duties have equal validity in the breast of the hero; hence he perishes beneath their strife, because he knows not how to subordinate them. Here also may be noticed an essential distinction between ancient and modern tragedy. In the former the character is the bearer of one end alone; each individual has his single object to accomplish, in the execution of which he lays his whole existence; hence the collision is external and between the different individuals who have different ends. But modern tragedy, while it has this element too, possesses in its most complete manifestations an additional principle; it makes the collision internal as well as external; the same individual has two different and contradictory ends, both of which demand realization; thus there is a double collision, with himself on the one hand, and with the external individual on the other.

But this does not yet complete the statement of the collision in Hamlet's mind. It involves in its sweep not merely the moral but also the entire intellectual nature of man. We shall revert for a moment to our former illustration taken from the Greeks. They lacked not only the moral consciousness above mentioned, but the whole realm of which it is only a part—the absolute mediation of spirit with itself; in other words, subjectivity in its highest form, or, to employ still another expression, the complete thought of Freedom. On the theoretical side, this is seen in their doctrine of Fate, which at last ruled the King of Gods and men, the mighty Jupiter. An external power thus controls even the Absolute—the highest, after all, has over itself a higher. But it is most plainly observed in the practical affairs of the Greeks; every important action was determined by omens, by oracles, by

prophetic utterances; the greatest generals never gave battle without consulting the sacrifices. This custom, so strange to our ways of thinking, was founded upon an essential limitation of the Grecian spirit. It demanded this external impulse, and no Greek could, as we say, make up his mind, that is, have his will determine out of its own activity, from its own infinite depths, what was to be done. This element, which will perhaps be better understood by the contrast with the Greeks, who did not have it, must be again added to Hamlet in order to embrace all the moments of his character.

Hence between Hamlet and his deed is interposed what we may call the entire world of subjectivity. It is, moreover, this world in its one-sidedness without the objectifying element or Will. We have dwelt upon one phase of this principle, the moral consciousnesss; but it has many phases, and indeed includes the whole sphere of Intelligence as distinguished from Will. The fact is, therefore, to be emphasized that Hamlet represents the entire range of subjective spirit. This has three leading forms, each of which we shall find in excessive development in Hamlet.

The first and lowest of these forms is the emotional principle of man's nature, which includes the feelings, presentiments, impulses,—all of which are important elements in Hamlet's character, and sometimes are found in morbid activity. It is the dark realm of the Unconscious, in which the guiding light of reason may be dimmed or quite extinguished. So it will be seen when Hamlet follows impulse, not only all rational action is destroyed, but he becomes a criminal. The excess of emotion and passion in which Hamlet is generally portrayed by the poet is highly characteristic of a subjective nature, which must always lack that calmness and steadiness which result from a conscious mastery over the objective world.

The second form is what may be termed the phenomenal principle of mind, in which the subject becomes conscious of itself on the one hand, and of an external world of reality on the other. Upon this world of reality the mind now imposes its own subjective forms, applies its own one-sided predicates to all the manifold phases of existence. Thus the whole objective world from the realm of nature upwards may be

completely transformed by being passed through a peculiar mental medium. Hence this world only appears to be—is phenomenal. Now Hamlet exhibits many characteristics of such a state of mind. He cannot see the rationality of the world; it is a dire, horrible phantasm which he would be glad to leave in a hurry.

> "'Tis an unweeded garden
> That grows to seed; things rank and gross in nature
> Possess it merely."

Thus he did not look at the moral order of the universe in its true reality, but as transmuted in its passage through his own mind. Indeed sometimes even his sensations and perceptions of external objects seem to be affected in the same way, as Coleridge has observed. There is an expression of his own, which, though it probably has a different meaning in the connection where it is found, may nevertheless be applied here: there is nothing good or bad, but thinking makes it so. The predominance of this phenomenal principle gives to the play its unreal, ghostly element, a side which will be considered more fully in another place when we come to treat of the Ghost.

The third form of subjective spirit is the psychological, which is the most important of all in the consideration of Hamlet. In the first sphere, the emotional, mental operations were unconscious and instinctive; in the second, the phenomenal, we see the realm of consciousness begin, and the mind busied with the objective world; but now, in the third, it goes back to itself and grasps its own doings. The mind turns from the contemplation of external reality, which trait it showed in the last phase, the phenomenal, and looks at itself, feeds upon its own operations. This is the extreme of subjectivity, the intellect is pushed to the very limit of its own negation, and, unless it can make the logical transition to the Will, it must remain forever entangled in its own meshes. Consider its condition. The mind retires in upon itself and looks at its own operations; this process, however, is a mental process, and in its turn must be scanned; this step, too, being like the preceding, demands examination as well as they; the result is an infinite series in which the mind is hopelessly caught, and in which all action must perish.

Such is what we call Reflection, an interminable passing from one subjective notion to another which in its fundamental nature is mere repetition. Here is the the point where we must seize the character of Hamlet in its concentration; here we must place the limit beyond which he cannot stir. This finitude which he cannot overcome is the ultimate cause of his ruin. If we examine the above-mentioned principles with care, we think that from them can be deduced all the peculiarities of Hamlet's character, and its seeming contradictions understood. We can thus account for the tendency of his mind to play with itself, to seek out hidden relations in every direction. We can thus comprehend how he is so perfectly conscious of all his states, and even of his weaknesses; for Hamlet knows what is the matter with himself, and declares it in the bitterest language of self-denunciation. His fondness for quibbling which seeks the hidden relations of words, is one phase of this same element; his tendency to spin out a notion into all its relations is another; the one finding its material in language, the other in thought. His intellectual keenness in deceiving, in feigning madness, in discovering the plans of his enemies, in reading the thoughts and intentions of others who were sent to pump him or ensnare him, and in many other similar cases, shows him the master of every form of subjective intelligence; he could cast himself into these infinite Protean shapes, could even carry them out as individual acts; but the ultimate purpose of them all was a fruit which he could never reach. Finally, the moral consciousness before spoken of must be referred to this head; for it is only the subjective element claiming the right to determine the deed, demanding that it be satisfied, and in the case of Hamlet refusing to be satisfied.

Moreover, the vicious elements of Hamlet's character spring from the same source. Hence his procrastination, for his mind cannot free itself from the net of its own working so as to translate itself into objectivity. He resolves on the death of the King even with passion; he places his end before himself even with violence; but that end is subjective, and hence exposed to the endless twistings and curvetings of Reflection, and at last is buried beneath the confusion. His sporting with possibilities also finds its basis here; for the

mind is the world of possibilities; they only exist in it, and are hardly to be found in the world of actuality. Here, then, is a glorious field for the exercise of his peculiar faculty; what may be is ever before his mind, and has quite as much validity as what is; nay, sometimes more. Again, what perfect excuses can he frame for not acting, as in the case when he refuses to strike the fatal blow while the King is at prayer, lest the latter might go to heaven! Nobody knew better than Hamlet the absurdity of such a proposition, yet it is good enough for a pretext. But all these psychological peculiarities, of which the play is full, need not be stated, for they have the same logical basis.

Such is the most general form of the internal collision in Hamlet. He is the grand representative of the entire realm of subjectivity, and he exhibits its finitude and its negation in his own fate. For subjective spirit, mere intelligence without activity cannot save man. He must be able not merely to understand the world, but to create it anew in a certain degree; not merely to translate it into the forms of his own mind, but to impose his own forms upon it, to make it the bearer of his own ends. Thus only can man assert his universality. Hamlet knows of action in its highest sense, since he is master of the world of thought, yet he cannot attain to it, though perpetually striving. He is intellectual and but little more. He cannot realize his plan, he cannot make himself valid in the objective world but to a small degree, and, in so far as he falls short of this, he can hardly be called an actual being, since he—his mind, his thought—has no existence in the world of reality. How, then, can he continue to live? It must be found in the end that he has not strength of individuality sufficient to maintain life. He complains of the external world which is always intruding upon his privacy and disturbing his quiet intercourse with himself; he even meditates to end this "sea of troubles" by ending his own existence. It is a troublesome world indeed, which, if it be not controlled, must itself necessarily control.

But it is not our purpose to maintain that Hamlet is excluded from every species of action. On the contrary, there is only one kind of action from which he is wholly excluded, though his tendency to procrastination is always

apparent. Just here occurs, perhaps, the greatest difficulty in comprehending Hamlet's character. He is wonderfully ready to do certain things; other things he will not do, and cannot bring himself to do. In fine, he acts and does not act. Hence different critics have given exactly opposite opinions of him; one class say he possesses no power of action, another class declare that he possesses a vast energy of Will. How can this contradiction be reconciled? Only by distinguishing the different kinds of action of which men are capable. Undoubtedly Hamlet can do some things, but the great deed he cannot reach. We shall attempt a classification of the different forms of action, and point out what lies in the power of Hamlet.

1. Impulse has sway over Hamlet at times as over every human being. This is the first and lowest form of action, unconscious, unreflecting, and belongs to the emotional nature of man, in which, as we have before seen, Hamlet is not wanting. Under its influence people act upon the spur of the moment, without thinking of consequences. Hence Hamlet's drawback—reflection—is not now present, and there is nothing to restrain him from action. But the moment there is delay sufficient to let his thoughts get a start, then farewell deed: impulse possesses him no longer. This is most strikingly shown when he sees the King at prayer; his first impulse is to slay him; but a reflection steps between, and the accomplishment of his plan is again deferred. Moreover, impulse may lead to immoral action, even crime, since it acts regardless of content; it cannot inquire of itself, What is the nature of this deed which I am doing? but blindly carries itself into execution. Hamlet therefore, as a sentient being, is capable of this kind of action, and here is where we must seek the source of all his positive acts. He slays Polonius under the influence of a momentary impulse, and finally even in the catastrophe it requires the goading of a sudden passion to bring him to kill the King.

2. Hamlet possesses what may be called negative action, the power of frustrating the designs of his enemies. He exhibits an infinite acuteness in seeing through their plans; in fact, this seems an exercise of intellectual subtlety in which he takes especial delight; he also possesses the practical

strength to render futile all the attempts of the King against his person. He is prepared for everything; his confidence in himself in this direction is unlimited; he knows that he can "delve one yard below their mines and blow them at the moon." But here his power of action ends; it has only this negative result—the defeat of the schemes against him. It is undeniable that this requires speedy resolution and quick execution, and hence may appear contradictory to what has been before stated; still it is not inconsistent with the character of Hamlet. For this sort of action, though it is no doubt a deed, ends with negating some other deed, and not with any truly positive act. Moreover, it is a condition of the drama itself that Hamlet possesses so much action at least as to maintain himself for a while, otherwise he must fall a victim to the first conspiracy, and the play abruptly terminate. It is only the great substantial deed, which includes all other deeds in its end, that Hamlet cannot perform. This brings us to the next form of action.

3. It is what we term Rational Action from which Hamlet is excluded. Here the individual seizes a true and justifiable end, and carries it into execution. This end Intelligence knows as rational, for it alone can recognize the worth and validity of an end—and the Will brings it to realization. Thus we have the highest union of Intelligence and Will, which gives the most exalted form of action. This unity Hamlet cannot reach; he grasps the end and comprehends it in its fullest significance, but there it remains caught in its own toils. But what would true action demand? There may be doubts and difficulties in the way, but these are ultimately brushed aside; there may even be moral scruples which rear their front, and this is actually the case with Hamlet, but these too must finally be subordinated, the higher to the lower. Thus the rational man acts; having seized the highest end, he casts aside all doubts, reflections, also moral misgivings, for the true morality must be contained in his end, if it be really the highest. Now, what is this end? Hamlet is invoked to vindicate both the Family and State, together with his own individual rights; it is his father who is slain, his king who is murdered, himself who is deprived of a throne. The order of the world is thus turned upside down; he knows that he is born to set it right—that this is the highest

duty, to which every inferior duty must yield; he repeatedly makes his resolution in the strongest terms; yet after all he allows his purpose to be first clouded and then defeated by his moral feelings and interminable reflections. The objective world of Spirit—State, Family, Society, Right—which Hamlet, by station and culture, is called upon to maintain as the highest end which man can place before himself, since upon them depend his very existence as a rational being, is lost in the inextricable mazes of subjectivity.

By this distinction it would seem that the striking contradiction in the character of Hamlet, his action and his non-action, can be reconciled. We are to consider what he can perform and what he cannot. Certain kinds of action lie in his power, but the one great act is beyond his ability. In like manner the difference of opinion among critics upon this subject would meet with a satisfactory solution.

Moreover, this distinction will assist us in dispelling a confusion which very often haunts the reader of this drama. When it is said that Hamlet's reflection destroys his action, is it meant that we should never think before we act? Many have taken such to be the poet's meaning, and even accepted the doctrine that we must go back to impulse and cut loose from our intellect; in other words, they declare that instinctive is higher and truer than conscious activity. They do this because they think that nothing remains but to take the lower form of action, impulse. But we have seen above that there is another more exalted kind, Rational Action, which demands thought, for its content can only be seized by thought, and indeed that content itself is thought in its objective form. Thus Intelligence passes over into reality, becomes a moment of action; man now grasps a substantial end by mind, and then carries it into execution. That the poet does not regard impulse as the true basis of action, is shown by the fact that he gives it to Hamlet, who by this very means is first made a criminal, and then brought to destruction. Hence the lesson is that we are to reflect before acting, but not to stop there. Rational Action is the great object, and that always includes Intelligence. Having grasped a true end (of course through Intelligence), we should proceed to realize it without thinking on all possible relations nd consequences. For subjective reflection looks at the deed

and summons up every imaginable possibility. As these are simply infinite, the action is infinitely deferred. Consider for a moment what *may* take place, if you merely go to your daily occupation—a team may run over you, a house may fall on you, a stray bullet may hit you—and it will be evident what possibilities lie in the most ordinary act, what excuses a lively fancy can rouse up to shirk the performance of any duty. Hamlet clearly recognizes this rational end, yet will not translate it into reality because of "thinking too precisely on the event," to use his own expression.

With this somewhat lengthy introduction, in which it is attempted to give the elements of Hamlet's character in their logical relation, we may now turn to the drama itself and watch its development under the hands of the poet. The plan is quite simple. It is to bring a series of external influences to bear upon Hamlet which first supply him with the most powerful motives and then spur him on to action. Given a character of deep moral feeling and decided intellectual culture, and we have the grand presupposition of the play. Hamlet is introduced as a man about thirty years of age, who has spent a number of years at the University of Wittenberg. It is to be observed that this is is a German university, and moreover the home of the Reformation: hints which the poet has given not without a profound purpose. For it is here indicated that the culture of Hamlet is German in contrast to the French culture of Laertes, and hence lays stress upon the internal and spiritual nature of man rather than the outward show and conventionalities of life. For the German mind is now and always has been speculative rather than practical, and hence to-day it is the teacher of the world in thought and philosophy. Also in Germany began that rebellion against the externality of the Catholic church in favor of subjectivity, which rebellion was nourished in this very Wittenberg. So by a happy stroke the poet has identified Hamlet with the great historical movement of modern times which sought to free the human mind from the domination of outward forms and to bring it to a profounder self-consciousness. Hamlet, therefore, is true to his education in the highest degree. But this part of our subject we must reserve for the next number.

BOOK NOTICES.

Welt und Weltzeiten, in two volumes, by Dr. Hugo Delff. Published by Brockhaus & Co., Leipzig, Germany.

In a previous number of this Journal we had occasion, in noticing two of Dr. Delff's works on Dante, to refer also to his several philosophical works, and indicate their general stand-point as most closely allied to the teachings of F. Baader. In the present two volumes, published by the large establishment of Brockhaus, in a superior style of type and paper, Dr. Delff has entered much more thoroughly than in any of his previous works upon the development of his views, and also established their historical continuity with greater precision. In this historical continuity the two most prominent figures are Plato and Jacob Boehme, with F. Baader as the nearest modern connecting link. This remark alone might be sufficient to indicate that the book before us lives and moves in a spirit of uncompromising protest against the superficial materialistic teachings and writings which in Germany, as well as in England and here with us, seem to sweep from the field of pure scientific literature all that is thorough and worthy of study. Discoveries and hypotheses are heralded as new, that to the student of science are as familiar as household words. To note this in merely one direction, it may be safely said that there is scarcely a theory, or, as it is absurdly called, "newly discovered law of nature," put forward by the men of natural science of the present day, which was not set forth with greater precision in the scientific works of Descartes, some three hundred years ago, whose theory of the sun-spots, to mention only one, is to this day the completest that we have, and one to which our new men of Science are gradually drifting back again, just as they are drifting back to his purely mechanical theory of the universe.

Though Dr. Delff also touches off these characteristics of superciliousness and ignorance in the modern works of science, his opposition takes chiefly the stand-point of an earnest warfare against the utter demoralization and degeneration of man, which he conceives to be the inevitable result of their influence. Against this degenerating view and philosophy, Dr. Delff seeks refuge in the revival of that higher view of man, nature, the relations of man, &c., the sublimest exponents whereof, in his opinion, have been Plato, amongst the ancients, and Jacob Boehme, amongst the moderns. His standpoint in this matter is best characterized in his own words, thus:

"It is incomprehensible how those people who boast so much about science, and who by imposing attitudes have acquired an almost contradiction-proof authority in scientific matters, have after all not the remotest understanding as to the real nerve and essence of scientific method . . . If they possessed less pretension, and could bring themselves to first attending the school of Plato and Aristotle, with whom the conception of science had its origin, that is, to study philosophy, where that conception has necessarily its most natural and valid form, whereas in its course from thence it of necessity receives additions that obscure and distort it,—they would be able to maintain their dignity with more justice.

"That knowledge which in this manner raises opposition to philosophy is in itself absolutely nought, and a glossed ignorance from the very fact that it deals only with the finite, the external and particular, and that it ex-

presses even in its generalizations nothing but a particular, external content. For there is no such thing as a knowledge of the finite, as a particular, and an external, since it is not the substance but the form which constitutes knowledge. In other words, it is not the immediately given content of experience which is the essential of knowledge, but the force of that content—a force which reveals itself and organizes its content, thereby qualifying it into a knowledge, only in thought . . .

"Thus it is only in and through philosophy that knowledge, science, and scientific method, are brought about: and it is evident that every self-named science which claims independence and absoluteness outside of (or perhaps even opposes) philosophy, is by that very fact condemned and pronounced necessarily unscientific. . . . Philosophy is therefore, if not all science, at least the heart in the organism of science; its empress, whom all the other sciences have to submit to as her vassals."

A point so often repeated, and yet so constantly lost sight of! Where do the men of so-called science—meaning the men of all sciences except philosophy—get their categories and classifications from if not from philosophy? Did any mathematician ever *see* a point, a straight line, a perfect curve, &c.? Did any naturalist ever see, hear, feel, taste, or smell, such things as cause, substance, force, pure light, &c.? If in using these words, these words mean to them some sensuous, perceptible, outside things of their own world, why does no one point it out?

"It is not the finite," continues Dr. Delff in another place, "which constitutes man as man, but the infinite, which fills up the finite and develops therein the powers of the infinite. Hence those other arguers are quite right in arguing their origin for themselves back to the monkeys, or to the creeping larvæ of a horrible primitive mud-chaos."

And again:

"Philosophy is such an immense achievement of the mind, because it involves emancipation from the whole series of tradition, wherein man is involved, and from the oppression of natural reality, the coarse fact. It is the very highest freedom which achieves itself in philosophy. For that emancipation is not an arbitrary, groundless negation, but a liberation, which by freeing itself from its oppression does not cut loose from it, but becomes its master. Its content is not a formal, but the true, substantial freedom . . . . Philosophy is, in truth, a divine deed. For it is not the sundering itself of a finite subjectivity from an equally finite objectivity, *but it is rather the divine in man, the unity which the mind has with the infinite; philosophy is that which excludes all mere finity and externality, and which tries to compel the actual to speak spiritually, ideally, rationally.*"

In another part of his book, Dr. Delff thus completes the description of that general stand-point which his book elaborates in the various detailed departments of Logic, Metaphysic, Natural Science, &c.:

"There is this distinction between the absolute idea, with the absolute system resulting from it, and the particular systems: the former is the constitutive principle of rational consciousness and reason, wherein these live by their very nature. Their close union with that idea is an intimacy and unity of contemplation, but it is not a perceivable unity, since sensuousness throws a shadow on the clearness of contemplation. We stand, as Plotinus says, in the face of a completed arithmetical problem, and in gathering together its particular elements we must first toilsomely make the calculation. But the key to it is the absolute or its contemplation, and the original forms of development which result from it and continue themselves in us. At

first these are involved only in the exercises of pondering and thinking. But if reason wishes to arrive at these fundamental ideas and principles themselves, it can be done only by turning aside from all the particular and singular, for only thus does reason return to the roots of its inner activity. Thus does reason gain the real representation of the absolute, or of the absolute idea in thought. When Eschenmayer, Jacobi, and others of the same tendency, objected against Schelling, that that which we cognized of the absolute was after all not the absolute itself but only a shadow thereof, they should have added 'in thought.' *For in thought we have not the absolute itself; but we are one with the absolute in consciousness.*"

This latter sentence is probably as concise a statement of Dr. Delff's whole philosophy as could be made. It contains all his views in a nut-shell. He proceeds:

"And when they said that the absolute could only be felt, they forgot that to feel is not the natural and peculiar determinedness of consciousness, but that its characteristic is cognition as an immediate cognizing of the Being itself, hence a contemplation. . . . . Feeling is the passive being filled with a foreign Other; it is an oppression of consciousness and of the individual unity actualized in it. But it is not the manner of the Absolute to suppress that which grew out of it as it has grown to be; but rather to gather it up and retain it in itself, and, thus retaining it in its peculiarity, make it a member of itself, a one within it, and a distinct unity within it of its own unity. But this is cognizing unity; for whereas feeling cancels distinction, cognition is conditioned by distinguishing within a unity. . . .

"*Deum esse non creditur, sed scitur.* No man can get rid of this knowledge, though he may drown it awhile, so long as he can muffle his consciousness in external sensuality. If we could strip off sensuousness, we should be forced inevitably and even against our will to confess and know that God is. Yet this knowledge makes neither wise nor happy. That God makes me and includes my individual unity in his own absolute unity, I can neither hinder nor assist in accomplishing. But that I shall really be and remain in unity with God, this only my will can achieve; I must comprehend myself in God as I am comprehended in him, must fill myself with God as I am filled with him."

These latter words will recall to the mind of our readers some of the profound sayings of Angelus Silesius, published in a previous number of the Journal; and with them we must conclude our introduction to the American public of an author whose efforts in behalf of a higher cause and of genuine science are as untiring and zealous as they are inspired by rare knowledge and a happy gift of presentation. A. E. K.

Die Neue Zeit. Freie Hefte fuer Höherbildung der Wissenschaft und des Lebens, den Gebildeten aller Stände gewidmet. Im Geiste des Philosophencongresses unter Mitwirkung von Gesinnungs-genossen, herausgegeben von Dr. Hermann Freiherrn von Leonhardi, ord. öffentl. Professor an der Prager Universität. Vol. II.

It will be remembered by the readers of the *Journal of Speculative Philosophy* that in September, 1868, the first of a series of Philosophical Congresses was called together at Prague, a call for the third of which series is published in the volume of the periodical now before us. Dr. H. Freiherr von Leonhardi, Professor of Philosophy at the University of Prague, was the main originator of and is still the chief mover in the continued meetings of these Congresses of Philosophers, one of the results of which, so far, has been the establishment of *Die Neue Zeit*, a periodical of a quarterly nature, devoted not only to Philosophy as a science, but also in a general

way to a "higher culture of science and of life," dedicated "to the cultured classes of all professions and ranks," and edited by Professor von Leonhardi. Leonhardi is, if we mistake not, a brother-in-law of the renowned Philosopher Krause,* of whose doctrines he is a very zealous adherent. Indeed this serves somewhat to explain the wide range of subjects to which he opens his periodical, and which, under his direction, were put before the Philosophers' Congresses; for Krause's philosophy, or rather system of doctrines, is essentially of what is usually called a practical character, largely devoted to Law, Politics, Ethics, Education, Freemasonry as a means of reaching higher general culture, &c. Thus we find the *Neue Zeit* paying special attention to the questions that agitate the Catholic world since the promulgation of the Infallibility, as also to the new legal results which the Imperialization of Germany has grafted upon the formerly independent minor German States by forcing the Prussian Code upon them—and thus, for instance, reëstablishing the death penalty where this atrociously irrational and barbarous practice had previously been done away with by enlightened communities;—and to the school system of Germany, the Frœbel Kindergarten system, &c. &c. Speaking about the Prussian Conscription Law, the *Neue Zeit* pertinently asks: "What is to become of Europe if the *compulsory murder-service*, the so-called general military duty, becomes everywhere an inexorable state law, obligatory even for those whose consciences revolt at it; when, in the thoughtless execution of a so-called Unification, the voice of conscience is everywhere silenced by the belief in the infallible assurance of the supreme War-chief, ... that he alone is and that not the people are responsible for his ordered violation of divine moral law."

Besides articles on these more general subjects, the volume before us contains a lecture on Immortality by Theo. Schliephake, an article on Schelling by Moritz Schwach, and one by Dr. Franz Hoffmann, well-known to our readers, on Baader's Philosophy. In connection with the first article it may be mentioned, what seems to have been overlooked in the countless essays on Immortality since Plato, that the question is *not* whether reason, or spirit in general, is immortal—for it is as absurd to question its permanency as the permanency of matter, force, time and space; but that the question is, whether this veritable Tom, Dick, or Harry, of earthly, planetary experience, with his individual personality—that is to say, his memory, culture, and achievements—will continue to live, in some other body or shape, throughout an infinite time, in some part or another of infinite space. Or, to put it into stricter form: when universal reason comes to self-consciousness in this or that earthly individual—for instance, in me—does that self-consciousness, with all its acquired content of earthly culture, remain during all infinite time; or does it, with the death of my earthly personality, my body, discard, like a force, its peculiar character as this peculiar individual self-consciousness, and become again mere general reason, to reappear perhaps to-morrow in some other new-born individual with utter oblivion of previ-

* A son of this celebrated Professor died lately at Jefferson City, Mo., where he had resided for a long time and successfully practised his profession of medicine.

ous life and attainments? This is really the only matter in dispute, and all *general* arguments do not, therefore, touch the question at all. It is an empirical question and can be answered only empirically; either by the reappearance of a dead person, which is the chief proof of the Christian religion, or by the individual empirical self-consciousness of an immortal will. A man who feels a lingering doubt that the moral world could get along just as well without as with him, may be pardoned if he ponders the question, though it scarcely justifies him in inflicting a useless dissertation upon the matter on the reading public; a man who knows himself a necessary member of that world, will neither doubt nor "dissent."

Prof. Schliephake in his eloquent lecture unhappily wastes considerable time in discussing the first mentioned question, which is *not* under discussion, namely, that universal spirit, like universal everything else, can have no category of mortality predicated of it; but we are glad to say that in the latter half of his essay he does formulate the question in its real shape. Of course, the theological-historical argument of the resurrection of Christ he, as a philosopher, does not touch; and the only remaining proof of immortality is to him therefore, as just stated, the empirical self-consciousness of an immortal will, or, in Prof. Schliephake's own words, "a permanent continuance"—i.e. of the individual Tom or Dick—"is the only correspondent measure for the temporal development and full unfolding of the rational being."

It is rather odd that Prof. Schliephake does not see and state that this is precisely the proof of immortality which Kant, who was the first to put a stop to the absurd metaphysical ravings about proofs of immortality, announced in his Critique of Practical Reason as the only possible proof, and which, in his words, reads: "a *holy* will can be realized only in the thinking of an infinite progress, which is possibly only under the presupposition of an infinitely continuing existence and personality of the same rational being."

Far be it from us to make this remark in order to give Kant credit for the originality of the discovery. Such claims of credit are low and childish, and Kant would be the last to make pretensions to them. But we should like to know, of what earthly use is it for philosophy and philosophers to go over this question again after it has been once for all settled by Kant? That it has been so settled, Prof. Schliephake, by agreeing with Kant as to the only proof, admits. Why, then, waste further breath, further muscular power, and further talents in style of diction—which in this essay, or rather lecture, of Prof. Schliephake's shows a degree of clearness, and at the same time rhythmical elegance of language, rarely attained by German writers on philosophical matters—upon an exhausted subject?

Dr. Hoffmann, in his article on Baader, reopens his controversy with Karl Rosenkranz, which was first broached in the *Journal of Speculative Philosophy*, regarding the latter's estimate of Baader's doctrines. Curiously enough, the immortality question plays also in this article the most important part, Dr. Hoffmann repeating his charge that Rosenkranz and Hegel deny immortality. Hoffmann makes his chief point against Hegel's system in this way:—How can you call that a system which leads its followers and

professed students to say of it three things: the one party, MICHELET *et al.*, holding that Hegel denied Personality of God and Immortality; the second party, ERDMANN *et al.*, holding that Hegel asserted Personality of God and Immortality; and the third party, ROSENKRANZ *et al.*, holding that Hegel asserted Personality of God, but denied Immortality?

There is getting to be amongst our philosophical friends across the water an amount of personal matter, egotism, and pretension to first discovery, in these controversies of theirs, which seems to us not only superfluous but harmful. What on earth does it matter who worked hardest, and who discovered first? In matters of pure science, it is the science alone which is of moment; and we might well suggest to these good gentlemen that the works of Leibnitz and Kant are not only worthy of study as embodying all the results of the science of Philosophy on those matters of God, Freedom, and Immortality, but also for that unegotistic calm and repose which characterizes the true lover of science.

At some future time we propose to sketch, for the benefit of the readers of this Journal, Professor Leonhardi's own views and applications of Krause's system; views that, at least in their educational and generally humanitarian aspect, are of general and constantly growing interest amidst our own stormy agitations of the various reform questions.

A. E. KROEGER.

[Our contributor, Mr. Kroeger, expresses his own views very freely in the foregoing notice of Dr. Leonhardi's periodical, and we cannot but dissent emphatically from many of his positions. The question of capital punishment is one of historical and social development that is not by any means clearly settled by our most enlightened political philosophers. Again, Professor Schliephake, we must acknowledge, discusses a philosophical question of the highest importance, and Mr. Kroeger seems utterly to mistake the significance of the category of Universality when applied to human consciousness. Mind is indeed a generic entity—a universal—but only as individual Ego whose atomic particularity is infinite. But there is no "mere general reason" that could "discard its peculiar character as this peculiar individual self" and "reappear to-morrow in some other new-born individual"; but the essence of reason is, as Fichte declared it, "subject-objectivity," or, in other words, its essence is to be subject which is its own object—self-consciousness. Its individuality consists in this, and its possibility of knowing or thinking at all depends upon this fundamental act of *self*-cognition; hence a Reason that did not cognize itself as individual, as person, would not and could not know or think at all, and the name REASON would be a misnomer. On the contrary, a philosophic proof of immortality is one of the fittest subjects of philosophic investigation, and such a proof is certainly a possible thing in many different forms. Indeed, that philosophy that has not penetrated the essence of personality far enough to find immortality has not completed its phenomenology or "voyage of discovery," and can in nowise be said to be a "system." The problem of Immortality is to be solved by investigating the determinations of the idea of Universality, or the Generic. If the procedure is strict, the thinker will find that the Universal can be predi-

cated only of that which is its own object—a self-determined, "self-moved," self-defined, a "subject-object," an Ego. The quotation from Kant at once reveals to us the occasion of the misunderstanding on Mr. Kroeger's part. That "infinite progress" which Kant found necessary as the logical presupposition of the will in its ideal or normal condition, is precisely that "reflection into itself," as Hegel calls it, which is the characteristic of the Generic, or of the "*actus purus*," as the Aristotelians called the Universal. "Reflection into itself" is realized perfectly in consciousness where the object, the *other*, the non-Ego is the Ego, the subject itself. No infinite progress can be thought or imagined except as reflection into itself, i.e. except as the pure form of self-consciousness. Kant was a great thinker indeed, and in no utterance of his is that greatness more manifest. But had he been able to precipitate his thought in Aristotelian forms, had he been able to find the pure thought underlying the Idea of Infinite Progress as its logical condition, he would have found a *speculative* basis as well as a practical or "regulative" basis for the doctrine of Immortality. This was done by the logical acumen of Hegel, who found "substance to be subject" and infinite progress to be only the phenomenal view of self-determination; in short, he ascended from the subjective doctrine of "forms of the mind," set up by Kant and elaborated into a system of absolute Psychology by Fichte, to the Greek thought of Entelechy and a Personal Theism. It is "*not* of so much matter who discovered first" indeed, but to discover at all is the greatest of matters.

The promised paper on Dr. Leonhardi's views will be looked for with interest. EDITOR.]

Philosophische Monatshefte. Herausgegeben von J. Bergmann. V. Band. Sommersemester 1870. Berlin: Otto Loewenstein.

The fifth volume of this Journal of Philosophy contains the following articles:—No. 1: *Dr. Otto Liebmann*—On a Modern Application of Mathematics to Psychology. *Dr. E v. Hartmann*—"Is Pessimistic Monism without Consolation?" *Dr. Adolph Bennecke*—A short Exposition and Critique on the Leibnitzian Proof of the Existence of God; Literary Reviews and Book Notices on "Christopher Sigwart on Spinoza's Tractate on God, Man, and Happiness," and Bratuscheck's work on Instruction in French Grammar in the Realschule.—No. 2: *Theodor Jahr* on National Movements and the Unions of States; *Literary Reviews* on Ueberweg's Criticism of Berkeley's System: Article I. by *Collyns Simon*, Art. II. by *R. Hoppe*, Art. III. by *Wilhelm Schuppe*.—No. 3: *Conrad Hermann*, on the History of Æsthetics and the latest works on the same. *Literary Reviews* on the Outlines of a Theory of Consciousness by J. Bergmann, and Book Notices of Harms: Philosophical Introduction to the Encyclopedia of Physics; *A. Mayer*—Sensuous Illusions and Hallucinations; *C. Gruppengiesser*—Kant's Doctrine on Time and Space.—No. 4: *E. Bratuscheck* on Kuno Fischer and Trendelenburg. *Melchior Mayr* on Infinite Time and Eternity. *Literary Reviews:* on the Life of Schleiermacher, by Wilhelm Dilthey; on Important Questions of the Time, by G. H. G. Jahr; on the Admission of Women to higher Schools and Universities.—No. 5: *E. v. Hartmann* on

the Necessary Reconstruction of the Hegelian System from its Fundamental Principle. *F. Ueberweg* on the Criticism of the Berkeleyan System. *Book Notices* on Windelband's Doctrine of Chance; on Prosper Despine's "Psychologie Naturelle"; on Max Schassler's "Popular Thoughts collected from the Writings of Hegel"; on Fortlage's Psychological Lectures.

The sixth volume of the *Philosophische Monatshefte* contains the following articles, published during the winter of 1870–71:—No. 1: *Adolph Lasson* on the Nature of [Legal] Right; *Julius Frauenstädt* on Minding's "Pope Sixtus the Fifth" and Hartmann's "Aphorisms on the Drama"; *J. Bergmann* on Thaulow's "Centennial Birth-day of Hegel"; Correspondence between Strauss and Renan.—No. 2: *Adolph Lasson* on the Nature of the State; *E. Mätzner* on Rosenkranz's "Hegel as the National Philosopher of Germany"; *J. Bergmann* on Köstlin's "Hegel exhibited in his Philosophical, Political, and National Relation to the German People."—No. 3: *E. v. Hartmann* on Dynamism and Atomism (Kant, Ulrici, Fechner); *Conrad Hermann* on the Scientific Definition of Æsthetics; *J. Gillies* on Hansemann's "Atoms and Atomic Movements"; *Bratuscheck* on "Index Aristotelicuis, ed. Hermannus Bonitz"; *J. Bergmann* on Leopold George's "Logic as Science of Knowledge"; on the Centennial Celebration of Beethoven's Birth-day; on the Course of Study for Women.—No. 4: *Leonhardt Freund*, "Remarks on the State and Society with especial reference to the Views of Stein and Gneist"; *J. Hülsmann* on "What is Actual is Reasonable. and What is Reasonable is Actual"; *J. Frauenstädt* on Friedrich Zelle's "Difference between the Kantian and Aristotelian Conceptions of Logic"; *Ernst Kuhn* on Theophilos' "Philosophy of Luther," and Richter's "Melanchthon's Services in the Cause of Philosophical Instruction.—No. 5: *Julius Bahnsen*, "A Word against Overstrained Criticism"; *Melchior Mayr* "on the Propriety of a Closer Union of Poetry and Philosophy"; *Wilhelm Schuppe* "An Open Letter to Professor Ueberweg"; *C. Schaurschmidt* "on the Examination of the Sources of Spinoza's Theological-political Tractate by Dr. M. Joel, Rabbi of the Jewish Church at Breslau"; "on the Italian Society for the furtherance of Philosophy and Literary Studies."

The seventh volume of the *Philosophische Monatshefte* contains the following articles:—No. 1: *Conrad Hermann* on "the Law of Æsthetic Harmony and the Rule of the Golden Mean"; *J. Hülsmann* on E. M. Arndt; *K. Köstlin* on Planck's "Law and Ultimate Aim of the Modern Development of Art as compared with the Antique"; *J. Bergmann* on Hebler's "Philosophical Essays"; *J. Frauenstädt*, Reply to Bahnsen.—No. 2: *E. v. Hartmann*, "Natural Science and Philosophy"; *F. Hoffmann* on "the Hegelian Philosophy in St. Louis, U. S. A."; *E. Bratuscheck* on "Th. Funck-Brentano's *La Pensée exacte en Philosophie*"; *J. Bergmann* on C. Hebler's "Philosophical Essays."—No. 3: *E. v. Hartmann*, "Natural Science and Philosophy"; *J. Hülsmann*, "Remarks on L. v. Ranke and his last work, 'The German Powers'"; *Conrad Hermann* on the Philosophy of History; *Friedrich Harms* on Quäbicker's Critical-philosophical Investigations in Rational Psychology; on the Completion of the Statue of Hegel in Berlin; on Frauenstädt's "Reply."—No. 4: *Friedrich Harms'* Address in Commemoration of Hegel; *Max Eyfferth* on Hartmann's "Thing in Itself and

of its Nature"; Kantian Studies in the Theory of Knowledge and Metaphysics; *F. Hoffmann* on Maximilian Perty's Exposition of "Nature in the Light of Philosophical Intuition"; *F. Hoffmann* on Eberhard Zirngiebel's "Studies on the Institution of the Society of Jesuits with special regard to the Pedagogical Influence of this Order in Germany."—No. 5: *Ernst Bratuscheck*, "In what consists the 'Infinite Attributes of Substance' ('*infininitis attributis*') as taught by Spinoza?" *Julius Bahnsen*, "Indications of the Species of Being"; *Book Notices* on some recent writings in the province of Ecclesiastical and Religious Discussions in the periodical called "Deutschland," edited by W. Hoffmann.—No. 6: *J. Hülsmann*, "Some Thoughts on the Means and Nature of Exposition in the Art of Painting"; *Dr. Jung* on Gustav Gerber's "Language as Æsthetic Art"; *Max Eyfferth* on F. Michelis' "Kant before and after the year 1870"—"Eine Kritik der gläubigen Vernunft"; *Karl Rosenkranz*, "Baader's Theism and my alleged Semi-Pantheism."—No. 7: *Adolph Lasson*, "Memoir of Friedrich Ueberweg"; *K. Rosenkranz* on "Baader's Theism and my alleged Semi-Pantheism"; *J. Hülsmann* on some recent writings in the province of Ecclesiastical and Religious Discussion.—No. 8: *Otto Liebmann* on the Phenomenality of Space; *Adolf Gaspary* on Morality and Darwinism; *C. Schaurschmidt* on Dr. Joel's Investigation of the Origin of Spinoza's Views in the Tractate on "God, Man, and Happiness"; *Ernst Kuhn* on Schuppe's "The Thinking Activity of Man" and "The Aristotelian Categories."—No. 9: *R. Hoppe* on Ueberweg's Criticism of Berkeley's System; *O. Marpurg*, "Critical Aphorisms on Dr. Franck's System of Christian Evidence: its Problem and the General Nature of Evidence"; *J. Hülsmann* on the Relation of Ecstatic Vision to the Theistic View of the World; on Barzellotti's "La Morale nella Filosofia positiva"; *J. Bergmann* on Hollenberg's "Contributions to Christian Knowledge."—No. 10: *E. Bratuscheck* on Hegel's Comprehension of Plato; *O. Liebmann* on Subjective, Objective and Absolute Time.

With the seventh volume closed Dr. Bergmann's Editorship, as we have already announced (Jour. Spec. Phil., vol. vi. p. 183). The contents of the eighth volume together with the Prospectus of Dr. Bratuscheck, the present Editor, we reserve for a future time.

Zur Lösung dreier Zeitfragen: Christenthum, "Confessionsloser" Religionsunterricht, Völkerfriede. Für Erzieher, Religionslehrer, Bildungsvereine, Freimauer und alle höher Strebenden Menschenfreunde. Prag: 1871. Verlag von F. Tempsky.

In this treatise Christianity is considered, apart from its dogmatic claims, as a pure phenomenon of Culture, in the light of Krause's Philosophy of History.

Professor H. Leonhardi is the author of the Essay. He appends a work of Karl Christian Friedrich Krause, entitled "The Commandments of Humanity" (Die Gebote der Menschlichkeit), in which the doctrines of morality are presented in the form of a catechism.

Betrachtungen über die Einrichtung höherer Bürgerschulen ohne Latein, I.–VII. Von Moritz Müller, senior. Pforzheim.

Der Kreissanschluss in Baden über die höherer Bürgerschulen. Von Moritz Müller, senior. Pforzheim.

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INTRODUCTION TO SPECULATIVE LOGIC AND PHILOSOPHY.

By A. VERA.

Preliminary Remarks.

That there is a Logical science is admitted on all hands, and that this science is of paramount importance for purely speculative as well as for practical purposes is a point upon which all men seem to agree. For although in practical life men are mostly guided by opinion, by interest, by passion and caprice, yet there is not one who is not anxious to strengthen and develop his logical powers—"the faculty of reasoning" as it is generally termed—either to apply it to the peculiar object of his industry, or to outdo the adversaries whom every one has to meet and to contend with in the struggles of life. This it is which, with Mathematics, makes Logic the most popular amongst abstract sciences. For every one feels, as if by instinct, that to act rightly one must think rightly, and consequently that the science which inquires into the rules of thought must be worthy of the attention of all rational beings; and as there is neither science nor art, nor any practical avocation, which is not founded upon thought, and does not require the normal exercise of the logical faculties, the conclusion naturally drawn therefrom is that Logic is a science embracing within its boundaries the whole range of human knowledge and activity.

But if Logic, when considered in its abstract notion, takes so high a standing even in popular opinion, it little answers

the general expectation when considered in its present shape and as embodied in the various logical treatises; and this accounts for the fact of Mathematics having seen the number of its worshippers increased, and the field of its researches and application becoming more and more enlarged, whilst Logic has fallen into neglect and decay, and if still taught in colleges and schools it is more owing to the tradition of the scholastic *curriculum* than to the earnest desire of becoming acquainted with it; and this in spite of its intrinsic and acknowledged importance, not only with respect to other sciences in general, but to Mathematics itself, mathematical knowledge supposing the existence and the application of Logical laws. The fact is that this science, the object of which is to strengthen and develop the rational powers of the mind as it is now constituted, seems rather to have been intended to mislead and vitiate them. For its theories consist of nothing but an aggregate of empty formulas, of arbitrary rules, and artificial proceedings, which are neither consistent with themselves nor with the things to which they are applied; and it is only by false teaching and false habits of thought, and by a distortion of facts, that we are brought to think that *concrete objects*, either physical or metaphysical, are apprehended by our mind through, and according to, laws as they are laid down by Logic. For if the matter be truly investigated it will be seen that they are apprehended and known in spite of and in contradiction to them.

The failures of Logic have long been felt by philosophers, and several attempts have been made, since Ramus, to remodel this science. But I do not hesitate to say that all attempts have failed, and not only failed but are merely an inferior reproduction of the theories they propose to overthrow and replace. For there is nothing in Bacon's Organon or Descartes' philosophy,* as far as the fundamental principles of Logic are concerned, which could not be found in the Aristotelian Organon; and those who have seriously attended to these matters, and whose judgment is not biassed by national prejudices and vanity, will agree, I trust, with me in saying that the Aristotelian Organon surpasses all subse-

* *Discours sur la Méthode et Règles pour bien conduire ses Pensées.*

quent logical theories by the range and accuracy of its inquiries, and by the scientific character with which it is stamped. As to Bacon's Organon, the long cherished delusion that he had discovered a method and logical proceedings unknown to Aristotle and ancient philosophers has been exploded by modern criticism and a more accurate knowledge of ancient philosophy.

The common failure of all logical theories—of the Aristotelian as well as others, but more especially of the latter than of the former, as will be shown in the course of this inquiry—the error which has precluded the authors of these theories from establishing Logic on a sound and firm basis, and which vitiates, as it were, the whole structure, is to be found in the very principle from which they start, in the very notion they form of Logical Science. For they have, one and all, considered Logic as a *formal* science, as a science whose business it is to analyze and describe the merely *subjective forms* of thoughts, i.e. forms that possess a value and meaning as far as the mind is concerned, but which have no *objective* bearing or consubstantial connection whatever with the things the mind apprehends and knows through them.

This is the view philosophers have generally taken of Logic, and starting from this notion they have curtailed it, and stripped it, as it were, of all substance, leaving nothing but a mere *form*, which, for the very reason that it has been severed from its substance and considered apart from concrete and real objects—either experimental or metaphysical—is anything but a *rational form* and *organon* of truth. Indeed, from Aristotle down to the present time, it would seem that Logicians, instead of enlarging and completing the field of researches marked out by the Greek philosopher, have exerted all their ingenuity in compressing it into a narrower compass by cutting off some of its essential branches and reducing it to its *minimum*. Hence the arbitrary and superficial distinctions of *Metaphysical* and *Logical Truth*, of *Reason* and *Reasoning*, of Logic as the science of *mere Possibilities* and Metaphysics as the science of *eternal and absolute Realities*—distinctions which, whilst breaking asunder the unity of the mind and knowledge, and with the unity of knowledge the unity also of things, have made of Logic a

sort of *caput mortuum*, wherein the mind is unable to derive any rational guide or real criterion either for practical or speculative purposes.

Such is even at the present moment the position of Logical Science, though it is more than half a century since the renovation of Logic was accomplished by one of the most extraordinary thinkers that ever existed. I mean Hegel.

When Hegel's *Logic* appeared* it was hailed in Germany by the philosophical world with admiration; nay, with enthusiasm. It was felt that it would do away with old Logic, and inaugurate a new era not only for Logic and Philosophy, but for Science in general. For Logic being a universal science, there is no province of knowledge to which its influence does not extend; there is no theory, nor thought, relating either to God, or to Nature, or to ourselves, which does not involve some logical notion or law; and consequently the renovation of Logic must needs carry with it new mental habits and criteria, new methods and principles, in all provinces of science.

That Hegel's Logic, when better known, when a blind attachment to old formulas and a sort of mechanical use of them shall have given way before rational and demonstrative principles, will supersede old Logic, does not leave a shade of doubt in my mind. And the objection raised by some against the Hegelian philosophy, namely, that this philosophy which once held sway has now been falling off; that his disciples are scattered and discouraged, and hardly acknowledge the doctrine of their master; that consequently this doctrine *a fait son temps*, and that it was a transitory phase of the human mind, a bold but sterile attempt to explain the absolute laws of the Universe,—this objection has, in my opinion, very little, if any, value. To those who assume that the Hegelian philosophy has lost its influence, may be opposed the contrary assumption. It may be said that what it has lost in *intensity* it has acquired in *extent*, and that its influence which was formerly confined to Germany is now spread all over Europe and beyond the seas, as is attested by private and public accounts, and by publications relating directly or in-

* It was published in Nuremberg in 1812.

directly to the Hegelian philosophy.* Moreover, were the objection correct as to its influence being on the wane, the inference which some would draw therefrom against its intrinsic worth and its future action and development does not follow at all from the premises. The same has happened to the Hegelian philosophy as to that of Plato and Aristotle, and what must happen to all comprehensive and profound systems, and, we may add, to all great historical events. There is a reaction and there is a stop. There is a reaction brought about by various causes, namely: by the past; by old habits, interests, and tradition; by ignorance, indifference, and the difficulty of embracing the full and real meaning of a theory; and also by impatience and disappointment at not seeing ideas immediately realized. But this is the eclipse and not the evanescence of the planet. Plato's and Aristotle's philosophy was followed, or, as the anti-Hegelian would say, superseded, by the Stoic, the Epicurean, &c. &c.; yet this did not prevent the former from reviving as vigorously—nay, more vigorously, perhaps, than when it first came forth from the brain and mouth of their immortal authors. For, setting aside the Alexandrian school and the Roman philosophy, which are chiefly developments or reproductions of Platonism and Aristotelianism, the influence and doctrines of the latter were never more widely spread, or more indisputably established, than in the middle ages and at the *renaissance;* and even at the present day, in spite of the disdainful attacks and pompous promises of Bacon and Descartes, Greek philosophy stands as the foundation of all serious philosophical training, and there are few works upon which of late years more attention and labor have been bestowed by distinguished thinkers, commentators, and editors, than upon Plato and Aristotle. Therefore the momentary obscuration of these great luminaries, far from being a symptom of decline, is the test of their power and vigorous youth, as it shows how vital is the spirit that lives in them, which, like the phœnix from its ashes, comes out from among the ruins

* Mr. Remusat, in the paper "*Un Voyage dans le Nord de l'Italie,*" published in the *Reveux des deux Mondes* (1st October, 1857), says, "Italy has her Hegelianism. It is the necessity of our time—*c'est la nécessité du temps.*" It would be more correct to say—it is the necessity of the human mind.

that time and generations heap up to obstruct their passage, breathing an ever new and immortal life.

That Hegel belongs to the family of these extraordinary and divine-born thinkers, and that his theories will stand the proof of time, cannot, in my opinion, have the slightest doubt in an unprejudiced mind that will give the subject sufficient attention. For his marvellous speculative power, the vast and profound grasp of his mind embracing all provinces of science, and the faculty—unequalled by any other thinker, not excepting Plato and Aristotle—of systematizing knowledge, and deducing and connecting ideas, assigns him one of the highest places among philosophical geniuses.

CHAPTER I.

§ 1. *Definition of Logic.*

Nothing, perhaps, shows better the unsatisfactory state and the inadequacy of Logical Science than the various and conflicting opinions as to its object and the exact limits of its province. For to some it is a system of rules, a method for forming clear ideas, and for guiding Reason;* to others it is the Science of Argumentation and Reasoning, which faculty they carefully distinguish from Reason.† Kant considers Logic as a *formal* science, the science of the necessary *forms* or laws of thought, and, according to his own expression, of the general use of the Understanding, independent of all particular object or subject-matter, supplied either by Reason or by Experience.‡ There are those who exclude from Logic all questions relating to Ideas, their origin and their objective meaning; there are others, on the contrary, who not only attribute them to Logic, but who go so far as to include in it the *Problem of Certainty*, besides other miscellaneous matters, as the problem of probability, of miracles, &c.§

This divergence of opinion, and this uncertainty as to the precise object and limits of its province, which would be a source of error in any other science, by misleading judgment, and by producing false consequences and applications, is

* Descartes and Watts.

† This is the view more commonly taken of Logic.

‡ Kant's Logic, published by Jaesche.

§ The Logic of Port Royal, for instance.

much more so in a science which is held out as the organon of inquiry, as the method by which truth is to be discovered and tested. For the confusion and error that creep into this the universal science will, for this very reason, invade all the other branches of knowledge.

The difficulty of forming a correct notion of Logic, of its limits and real bearing, arises from various causes, but chiefly from the absence of a systematic knowledge, and of a close inquiry into the nature of *Form*, and of Logic itself. In fact, where there is no system, i.e. where there is not a whole, and where the parts and the whole are not rationally adjusted and connected together, there is only a desultory and fragmentary knowledge; and a particular science which is not systematically arranged, and is not the part of a whole, must necessarily mistake its object, its limits, and the relation in which it stands to other sciences. And so it is with Logic. For this science is handled irrespectively of the relation in which it stands to other sciences, or, when started, the question is answered in a vague and superficial manner, as, for instance, that Logic being the Science of Reasoning, and, as reasoning is needed in all sciences, Logic must necessarily bear upon all sciences; but, what is the nature of this relation, how far and in which way Logic is connected with other sciences, which is the limit that separates and which is the nexus that unites them,—this, the most important point, Logicians do not state; or if, to give a more accurate definition of Logic, they add that it is the Science of the *Form and Method* by which we dispose our thoughts in order to attain Truth, here too we are left in ignorance as to the nature of this Form and Method, and of this relation to the objects of Thought; whether, for instance, there is between the object —finite or infinite, physical or metaphysical—and the *Form* a community of essence, or whether the *Form* is a mere *subjective organon*, a contrivance for the better arrangement of our conception; whether the *Form* is eternal or temporal, and, if temporal, how eternal objects can be known through it; thus overlooking or leaving unanswered the questions that are most important, and without which no correct notion of Logic can be formed.

Let us, then, in order to arrive at the right conception of

Logic, inquire into the nature of this science, by pointing out, in the first place, the principles upon which old Logic is founded, and the inadvertence and misconception which have brought forth these principles. Logic must be established.

§ 2. *Outlines of Formal Logic.*

That Logic is a universal science is a point on which all philosophers agree. In fact, whether Logic be the Science of *Forms*, or the Science of *Reasoning*, the unity of the mind as well as the unity of science requires that there should be a universal science, extending to all departments of thought and knowledge. But if, on the one hand, it is a universal science, it must, on the other, have its own peculiar object, its own peculiar field of researches; it must, in other words, be a particular Science. For were it a universal Science only it would be the only Science, and all other sciences would be but different parts and divisions of Logic. The question, therefore, is how Logic can be both a universal and a particular science, to what extent and in what sense it embraces all other sciences, so as the latter may be considered as various branches of Logic, and in what sense it constitutes a science *sui generis*, having a distinct and limited object.

Now, when we analyze thought, we find two elements in all thoughts, namely, the *Thing* itself—either merely thought, or signified externally by words—and the *manner* in which the various things are disposed and connected in and by thought; there are, in other words, what has been called the *Matter* or *Contents*, and the *Form* of Thought. For instance, if in the proposition "*Man is mortal*" we do not consider in any way what relates either to *man* or to *mortal*—whether there is a man or what it is, whether there is a mortal thing and in what mortality consists, &c.—but only the way in which these two and all similar terms are or may be connected, we will have the *general Form* of this proposition. Again, by the same analytical process we will discover in an argument the same elements, i.e. the *Terms* and the *Form*, through which this relation is apprehended by the mind; and if we apply this process to the various forms through which we apprehend truth, we would obtain the fundamental principles upon which old Logic stands; so that we would have, on the one

hand, the *matter of Thought* and the Sciences—such as Metaphysics and Natural Sciences—which inquire into the *matter*, and, on the other, the *Form* of thought, and the Science which inquires into the *Form*, namely, Logic.

The question is now this: are these the rational and real boundaries of Logic; and how can Logic, or any other Science whatever, be constituted if all *matter* of knowledge is excluded therefrom? And even granted that Logic is the Science of *Form*, is the Form such as it has been conceived by old Logic the truly rational Form? In order to place these points in a proper light, let us draw the outline of Logic such as it has been realized to the present day.

As there can be no thought without some defined forms, there must be some general elements of thought. These elements have been called by some logicians *Terms*, by others *Categories* or *Concepts*, by others *Genus* and *Species*.

Now if, from terms or categories, or whatever name they be called, according to what we have stated, we subtract their *objective* and *material value*—be these derived from experience or from Reason—there will be only left their *magnitude* or *quantity*, and Logic will be the Science of the *Quantity of Thought*.* Hence the relation—or, to speak more properly, the confusion—of Logic and Mathematics. For Terms, when stripped of their *contents*, are like numbers and geometrical figures, and their combination may be compared to a numerical proportion or to concentric circles.†

According to this criterion, the essential character of terms will be what logicians call Comprehension and Extension, which are a certain number—a sum—of characters belonging

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* If, for instance, from the term *man* we take away the *real existence* and the *qualities* of man, the only character or entity which can possibly remain in *man* will be his quantity, i.e. man considered as a *whole*, or as a *part*, or as an *individual*.

† Euler, for instance, compares syllogisms to three concentric circles, the middle circle playing the part of middle term—(*Letters to a German Princess*). Plouquet identifies *Logic* and *Reckoning*, and, after having converted syllogism into calculation, he concludes by the following words: "Posse etiam rudes mechanice totam logicam doceri, uti pueri arithmeticam docentur, ita quidem, ut nulla formidine in ratiociniis suis errandi, torqueri vel fallaciis circumveniri possint, si calculo non errant." It must be said that Leibnitz had already set the example to this superficial and illogical manner of treating Logic by submitting syllogism to combinatory calculation, by calculating the number of combinations into which the proposition may be adjusted in syllogism. (See *Leib. Op.* T. II. p. 1.)

to each term. Let us take, for instance, the term *Tree*. Tree is a *genus* and a *species*. It is a genus if we consider the inferior narrower terms—oak, fir, apple, &c.—it contains; it is a species if we consider the superior or wider terms—organic matter, being, &c.—in which it is contained. The aggregate of the former character constitutes its *extension*, the aggregate of the latter its *comprehension*. Hence follows, 1°. that the Comprehension and the Extension are in inverse ratio, and consequently that whilst the one increases the other diminishes, the Comprehension increasing in a series of terms from upwards downwards, and the Extension from downwards upwards; 2°. that if we picture to ourselves the whole series of terms, we shall see that at the one end of the series —the upper end—there is a term having the widest Extension but no Comprehension, and at the opposite end—the lowest end—there is a term possessing the widest Comprehension but no Extension.

Now terms, considered singly and apart from all connection between them, are but indeterminate elements which do not constitute any positive thought. This property they acquire by their mutual association, and by reflecting, as it were, a part of themselves upon each other. Indeed, their own constitution points to this association. For as each term possesses both Comprehension and Extension, each term points to the term of which it forms either the Comprehension or the Extension.

Now the most elementary and fundamental connection of terms is the *Proposition*. The proposition is nothing but the development and (as it were) the actual position of the relation of terms—of the relation virtually implied in each term separately considered; in other words, the proposition is the actual *affirmation* of the twofold elements contained in each term. In the terms "man" and "mortal," for instance, there is a certain number of characters, some of which constitute their Comprehension and some their Extension. With regard to the term "mortal," *man* is a part of its Extension; and with regard to the term "man," *mortal* is a part of its Comprehension: so that these two terms, as parts of a whole —of the whole series of terms and thought—stand in a reciprocal and inverse relation, which relation is affirmed by the insertion of the copula *is*. In the proposition, "Man is

mortal," *man*, being the *species*, constitutes a part of the Extension of *mortal;* and *mortal*, being the *genus*, constitutes a part of the Comprehension of *man*.

Now, as the Proposition evolves itself out of Terms, so likewise the Syllogism evolves out of the Proposition. And as a series of Terms virtually contains a series of Propositions, so a series of Propositions virtually contains a series of Syllogisms. Nay, Syllogism is already contained in Terms, and, like the Proposition, it is but the actual development of the elements involved in Terms. For each term possessing Comprehension and Extension, i.e. being so constituted as to form, on the one side the Comprehension, and on the other the Extension, of other terms, not only points to a Proposition, but to a Syllogism. The terms "man," "mortal," "plant," "white," "good," &c., possessing each of them these twofold sides, may be combined in a syllogism; and they may moreover, each in its turn, be a middle term, a major and a minor term, in different syllogisms.

On these considerations, the fundamental principle of the Syllogistic theory, the *principium de continenti et de contento*—a term that *contains and is contained*—rests. For each term by its Extension—as genus—*contains*, and by its Comprehension—as species—*is contained;* so that each term is, in its turn, a middle term, a major and a minor extreme.

In the syllogism,

"All created beings are mortal:
Man is a created being;
Therefore," &c.,

man is the minor extreme. In the syllogism,

"All men are mortal:
The Europeans are men;
Therefore," &c.,

man is become middle term. In another syllogism it would become major extreme, and so it should be with the other terms.* Thus the whole series of terms is a series of proposi-

* The principle of "*De continenti et de contento*" is more specially applied by logicians to the *middle term*, which contains the *minor extreme*, and is contained in the *major extreme*. But if we take a larger view of the matter, and consider a series of syllogisms, we shall see that not only the middle term of a single syllogism, but all terms, contain and are contained. Let us take A, B, C, and suppose B to the middle term; B would contain and be contained. But B may be also a major or a minor extreme, and A or C a middle term, in another syllogism.

tions and syllogisms, and these latter are only a development of the elementary theory of terms realized as *genus* and *species*, or as *quantities* either containing or being contained in other quantities.

Now the complex of these forms and operations constitutes Method, which, as we have stated, is a mere *subjective organon* of knowledge, an *ensemble* of rules guiding the mind in the discovery of Truth, but being neither Truth itself, nor having any *objective* relation with it; so that when we reason, define, divide, &c., we perform operations which lead the mind to the knowledge of things, but which possess no existence whatever without the mind, nor bear in any manner upon the nature of the things themselves. Now the condition of all thought and knowledge is that these should not deny or (as it were) destroy themselves. Consequently, to the above rules and principles must be added the *principle of Contradiction*, called also (by Kant) the "principle of Identity," which may be enunciated as follows: "A thing must be identical to itself," or "A thing cannot be other than itself at the same time and in the same respect"—a principle which is held out as the highest criterion of knowledge and truth.

These are the main features and principles of old Logic, of the Logic which claims Aristotle for its founder—with what reason we shall see hereafter—which has been for ages and is still officially taught, and forms the frame-work of all logical writings published until Hegel's *Logic*, whatever may be the difference in their external arrangement and some secondary points.

§ 3. *Is Aristotle the founder of Formal Logic?*

Though this question has only an historical and extrinsic value, yet, owing to the greatness of the name, to the influence which his writings exercise, and will exercise in future ages, and to the fact that his logical disquisitions are and will be the starting-point of all logical studies, it is important for the guidance of the student, as well as for historical truth and for science's sake, to bring this point to its proper light, and to see what is Aristotle's true notion of Logic.

That Aristotle did not clearly perceive either the object of Logic, or the link which connects this with other sciences—

with Metaphysics, for instance; that there is a tendency in his theories to reduce all logical principles and operations to the empty formulas and figures of formal Logic, I will readily admit. But it does not follow therefrom that the Greek philosopher considered Logic as a mere science of *subjective forms*, absolutely separating it from what has been subsequently called Ontology and Metaphysics. For the most cursory glance at his writings will convince the reader, that, pursuing, like Plato, the unity of knowledge, he applied himself to connecting Logic with Metaphysics, by placing them on a common ground, and by attributing to them the same order of researches. Thus, after having, in his Logic, laid down the *Categories* as principles of *Thought*, in his Metaphysics he considers them as attributes of *Being*. It is the the same relation he has in view when in both the same writings he examines *the principle of Contradiction*, or when he introduces in his *Analytics* as well as in his *Book of the Soul* his *theory of the Intellect*, which is intimately connected with his theory of Being or Essence—*Entelechia*. Indeed, within the limits of Logic we find Aristotle occupied in defining and enlarging the object of this science, and inquiring into the material and objective meaning of its laws. For after having analyzed the Proposition in its general and indeterminate form, he analyzes it in its more determinate and more objective meaning (in his theory of *Modal*); and after having considered the *middle term* as *Species*, and in its *quantitative* relation with the *extremes* (*First Analytics*), he considers it from the point of view of *Cause* and *Essence* (*Second Analytics*), connecting here also Logic with his ontological theories, and pointing out the *essence* of things as the absolute *middle term* or principle of demonstration, in which the demonstration and the thing demonstrated, the *form* and the *matter* of thought, are intimately blended and raised to the identity of their nature.

This is Aristotle's real conception of Logic, as it is proved by his writings; and those who appeal to him to justify the separation of Logic and Metaphysics, do it either from obstinacy, or from ignorance and want of an accurate and comprehensive survey of his writings.

CONCERNING A PRETENDED RIGHT TO LIE FROM MOTIVES OF HUMANITY.

Translated from the German of IMMANUEL KANT, by A. E. KROEGER.

In the work, "*France in the Year 1797*," Sixth Part, No. 1, "*Concerning Political Reactions*," by Benjamin Constant, the following passage occurs on page 123:

"The moral principle, that it is a duty to tell the truth, would, if taken unconditionally and separately, make all society an impossibility. Of this we have a proof in the very immediate consequences which a German philosopher has drawn from this principle; he going so far as to maintain, that a lie—told to a murderer, who asks us whether a friend of ours, whom he is persecuting, has not hidden himself in our house—would be a crime."*

On page 124, the French philosopher refutes this principle in the following manner:

"It is a duty to tell the truth. The conception of duty is inseparable from that of right or law. A duty is that which corresponds in one being to the rights of another. Where there are no rights there are no duties. Hence it is a duty to tell the truth, but a duty only towards him who has a right to the truth. But no man has a right to a truth which harms others."

The πρῶτον ψεῦδος, or first error, lies here in the proposition "*that it is a duty to tell the truth, which we owe only to him who has a right to the truth.*"

It is to be remarked, first, that the expression "to have a right to a truth" is a phrase without any sense. One ought rather to say that man has a right to his own veracity, i.e. to the subjective truth in his person. For that I have a right objectively to a truth means: I depend—altogether as in the mine and thine—upon my *will* whether a given proposition is to be true or false; which would establish a strange logic.

Now the first question is, whether a man has the authority, or the right, to be untruthful in cases where he cannot escape answering by either Yes or No. The second question is, whether he is not even obliged to be untruthful in that state-

* I hereby acknowledge that I really said this in some sentence, which I cannot, however, now recall to mind.—I. KANT.

ment, which an unjust compulsion forces him to make, for the purpose of preventing a threatened crime to be committed upon either him or another.

Truthfulness in statements which we cannot avoid making is the formal duty which each one owes to all men,* no matter how great a disadvantage may result therefrom to him or to another; and although I inflict no wrong upon the person who unjustly compels a statement from me, by falsifying it, I yet by such a falsification—which may, therefore, be also called a lie, though not in a legal sense—commit a general wrong. Namely, in this: I do all in my power to bring about a state of things wherein no statement whatever any longer finds belief, hence wherein all rights based upon agreements crumble away and lose their power, which is a wrong committed upon mankind in general.

Hence the lie, defined simply as a wilful untrue statement made to another man, needs not the additional definition that it must inflict harm upon another, as the lawyers define it: *mendacium est falsiloquium in prejudicium alteris.* For it always hurts another; and if not another man, at least mankind in general by making the source of all right useless.

This good-humored lie may, however, become punishable, by accident (*casus*), under civil law, since that which escapes punishment merely by accident can also be adjudged a wrong by external laws. For instance: if you by telling a lie have prevented some one, who intended to commit murder, from the deed, then *you* are legally responsible for all the consequences that may arise from your lie; whereas, if you keep strictly to the truth, public justice can prefer no charge against you, let the unforseen results be what they may. It is quite possible, that, after you have honestly replied to the murderer, upon his asking whether his intended victim is in your house, by saying Yes, the person may have escaped from your house unobserved and thus avoided the murderer, in which case the deed would be prevented; whereas, if you had told a lie and said that the person was not in

* I do not like here to carry the principle so far as to say: *untruthfulness* is a violation of the duty one owes to himself. For this duty belongs to morality; but here we speak only of a legal duty. Morality considers in every wrong only the turpitude which the liar draws upon himself.

your house, whilst he has really escaped—although unknown to you—and the murderer had met and killed him, you could justly be charged with the death of the victim. For if you had stated the truth to the best of your knowledge, the murderer, in looking up his victim in your house, might have been caught by the arrival of some of your neighbors, and the deed might thus have been prevented. Hence whosoever *lies*—no matter with what good intention—is legally amenable to and must suffer the consequences of his lie before a civil tribunal, however unforseen these consequences may have been. For truthfulness is a duty which must be considered as the basis of all duties that are based upon agreements, the law of which agreements would become utterly uncertain and useless if the least exception were admitted.

Hence it is a holy—unconditionally commanding, and by no conveniences to be limited—Imperative of reason to be *truthful*—that is, honest—in all our statements. Quite just and at the same time correct is M. Constant's remark concerning the decrial of such strict principles, of which it is said that they lose themselves in impracticable ideas, and should, therefore, be discarded. He says:

"Whenever a principle, that has been proved to be true, seems to be inapplicable, it is because we do not know the *middle principle*, which contains the means of application."

He cites the doctrine of Equality, as forming the first link of the social chain, thus:

"No man can be bound by other laws than those which he has assisted to frame. Nevertheless, although in a very limited society this principle can be immediately applied, and needs no middle or mediating principle in order to become universal, still in a very numerous society must be added a new and mediating principle, namely, that the individual men can assist in the framing of laws either in their own person *or by representatives*. Whosoever should try to apply the first principle to a numerous society without adding the other mediating one, would inevitably bring about the ruin of that society. Yet this circumstance would prove only the ignorance or inability of the legislator, but would prove nothing against the principle itself."

M. Constant concludes thus:

"A principle that has been recognized as true must, therefore,

never be abandoned, no matter what apparent danger it seems to incur."

And yet the good man had just before repudiated the unconditional principle of truthfulness on account of the danger it seemed to threaten society, and only because he could discover no middle principle which might seem calculated to prevent this danger, and because really there is no such middle principle to be inserted here.

Adopting M. Constant's terminology, the "French philosopher" mistook the act whereby some one harms (*nocet*) another in telling a truth which he cannot avoid stating, with an act whereby he wrongs (*lædit*) another. It was simply an accident (*casus*) that the truthfulness of the statement harmed the refugee of the house, and it was in no manner a free *deed*, in legal meaning. For a pretended right to demand of another that he should lie for my benefit, would involve results opposed to all justice. But every man has not only a right but the strictest duty to be truthful in his statements, and this duty he cannot avoid whether it harms him or others. Hence he himself does not inflict harm upon whomsoever may suffer from that truthfulness; the harm is *caused* by accident. For he who acts is not free to choose; truthfulness being his unconditional duty, if he is bound to speak at all.

Hence the "German philosopher" cannot admit this proposition: "To tell the truth is a duty only towards him who has a right to the truth"; firstly, because its formula is not clear, since truth is not a possession to which we may deny the right to one and admit it to the other; but, secondly and chiefly, because the duty of truthfulness—of which alone we speak here—makes no distinction between persons to whom we may owe this duty and those toward whom we may repudiate it, but is an *unconditioned* duty which is valid in all circumstances.

Now, in order to proceed from a *Metaphysic of Rights*—which abstracts from all conditions of experience—to a *Fundamental Principle of Policy*—which applies the conceptions of that *metaphysic* to cases of experience—and thus to arrive at the solution of the problem of such a *policy* which shall be

conformable to the *Metaphysic of Rights*, the philosopher must furnish:

1. *An Axiom*—that is, an apodictically certain proposition —which results immediately from the definition of External right. In other words, a harmony of the freedom of each individual with the freedom of every one according to a general law.

2. *A Postulate*—of the external public law, as the united will of all according to the principle of *Equality*, without which there would be no freedom of any single individual.

3. *A Problem*—what must, therefore, be done in order to establish harmony, according to the principles of freedom and equality, in ever so large a society; that is, by means of a representative system.

This result or means would then become the fundamental principle of policy or politics, and the establishment and regulation whereof, obtained from an empirical knowledge of men, would have in view only the mechanism of the administration of law, and how that might be best effected. Right must never be made to conform to policy, but policy must always be made to conform to right.

M. Constant says: "A principle recognized as 'true'—and I add, an *à priori* recognized and hence apodictic principle— "must never be abandoned, no matter how apparently it incurs danger."

But here we ought to interpret the word "danger" as relating not to any—accidental—*harm*, but, generally, to *doing wrong*. The latter would occur if I were to make the duty of truthfulness, which is altogether unconditioned and which in statements is the supreme legal condition, a conditioned and subordinate duty. But furthermore, although by telling a certain lie I may really not do any one any wrong, yet I violate thereby the principle of right *generally* in regard to all absolutely necessary statements—I do a wrong *formaliter*, though not *materialiter*—which is much worse than to do an injustice to somebody, since such an injustice does not always presuppose an intention in principle on the part of the subject.

Whoever does not listen, with indignation at the expressed

suspicion that he might be a liar, to an inquiry whether in his now-to-be-made statement he intends to be truthful or not, but rather asks for permission to consider whether there might not be possible exceptions to his truthfulness, is already a liar *in potentia;* since he shows that he does not recognize truthfulness as a duty in itself, but keeps in mind exceptions to a rule which in its nature admits of no exceptions, since in admitting them it would directly contradict itself.

All legal-practical principles must contain strict truth, and the here so-called middle principle can contain only a closer determination of their application to occurring cases according to rules of policy, but never exceptions, since exceptions annihilate that universality on account whereof alone they are called *principles.*

THE REJECTED LOVER.

By John Albee.

I heard that in this land were many poor,
Therefore I sought them out from door to door.

Methought I had a gift would comfort give,
And make them wish on earth to longer live.

My gift I offered freely everywhere
To those who some deep want did seem to bear,

But all in vain; for only ampler store
Of gold they wished whereby to heap up more.

My gift was love—which they must needs pass by
Since it exacts the largest usury.

LECTURES ON THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW.

By James Hutchison Stirling.

II.

Freedom of the Will and Idea of Property.

Gentlemen:—At our last meeting we saw the *Notion* of Hegel, and in its connection with Kant; for I still believe Hegel to affiliate himself in the main *directly* to Kant. Let him owe what he may, principally by way of suggestion, whether to Fichte or Schelling, it is really Kant's substance that Hegel carries further. We saw that an excellent clue to that Notion was explanation as explanation. Explanation, namely, as explanation, is a reduction to self-consciousness, and it follows that we have reached *the* ultimate when we have reduced self-consciousness to *its* ultimate. Now, that *is* the Notion. Or, *the* notion is an act of self-consciousness *as such*—the perfect *generalization* of such act. This, then, is the creative germ of all and everything; and, as such evidently it can be no blank self-identity: it must possess, in its own self, difference; and it must return from this its difference into that its identity again. No act of self-consciousness whatever but is seen to exemplify this abstract description. Self-consciousness so constituted, then, is conceived to develop itself, in obedience to its own inner law, first into its own *inner* system. This, the realization of the logical *notion*, is, and in connection with that notion, the logical *idea*. The idea now, as completed *inner* system, sunders, in Nature, into the *externalization* of its own self and of all its constituents—into a chaos, then, of infinite *physical difference* and infinite *physical contingency*. This chaos, however, re-collects itself, and returns in Spirit (Mind) to the Universal again. Mind now, or Spirit, appears in a succession of faculties, and rises through its subjective and objective forms into its absolute form—into Absolute Spirit. Subjectively, more particularly, it reaches, through stages of Perception, Conception, Thought, the full fruition of theoretical intelligence, and it is at the transition of this into Practical Spirit, into Will, that we have now arrived.

This transition it will not be difficult to understand, if we shall but fairly realize to ourselves what the completion of *theory* is. Theory when complete, that is, has converted its objects into itself. The objects of theory are indeed outer, but when it *understands* them it has fairly made them inner: all that they truly are, all that they substantially are, is now within. It has abolished their alienation, their foreignness; it has made them *its*—it has determined them *its*—it has *determined* objects as *its*. But intelligence that *determines* objects is Will. This is Hegel's transition from what we know in common parlance as the *intellectual powers* to what we know in the same parlance as the *active powers*, or this is Hegel's transition from theory to practice, from what he calls theoretical spirit or intelligence to practical spirit or will. We see at once that it is ingenious—that it is ingeniously figurative. Theory surveys an object, and *enjoys* its survey; but the *result* of such survey is to make the outward inward; and, if the outward is inward, it is theory's own, it is *determined* by theory, which is now will, and its *enjoyment* has become an *act*. Hegel, of course, does not expect us to see in this transition an actual fact in time, but only the *potential* connection of intelligence and will, only their connection *sub specie æternitatis*. And viewed so, it is perfectly credible; for intelligence and will are not in reality different, but the same: they are but action and counter-action of the same common life. Where the one is, the other is: will is but thought in act, thought is but will *in potentia*. It is, therefore, true in an absolute, or perfectly general, reference, that thought *of itself* determines itself into will, remaining at the same time the *substance* of it—of will. This, I think, will be seen to be true from the very nature of the case, and apart from the ingenious figurativeness of Hegel's steps, which are again briefly these: To think an object is to understand it. The thinking of an object, then, is the birth of a new object out of or in the old object. But this new object belongs to thought; and this new object is at the same time all that is true in the old object. This new object is all that the old object really is—this new object is, in fact, the old object. But thought has thus manifested itself to determine an object, and thought that determines an object is will.

Will, then, is thought determining itself out of its own self into objects, or, as we more generally figure it, into action on objects—a difference of phrase, however, that makes no difference in the facts; for, as we have just seen, our *action* on objects is to determine these objects as our own, They are, indeed, outer to us; but, in that we understand them, we enter into them, we participate in them, we establish a community between them and us; that is, we make them ours.

But, though there be this intimate connection between them, it is certain that will does not, in the first instance, *appear* as thought—appear, that is, on the stage of existence. Will, as we first *find* it, is, like everything else, *in a state of nature*. Will, as we so find it, even in man, is rather an instinct than a rational thought. The needs and greeds of the mere animal are the matter in which it first asserts itself. Nevertheless, man is essentially reason, and, even in yielding to these needs and greeds, it is reason that comes gradually to the front. For example, will cannot yield even to these needs and greeds without *reflection*, and reflection once begun can only end in full-fledged reason. The needs and greeds are compared with their objects and the means of obtaining these. They are compared with each other. They are compared, however vaguely at first, with the chief end of man—thought, reason—which, in all cases, is always at least *implicitly* present. The result of this comparison on the part of reflection is a subordination and classification of the various needs and greeds, of the various desires—a subordination and classification that can only end in System. This system now is what we call happiness, and the needs and greeds, accordingly as they variously contribute in quality and quantity to happiness, are variously arranged and valued. But, after all, this arrangement never becomes perfect, never becomes satisfactory. The needs and greeds are even infinite; subject differs from subject in regard to them; according to times and seasons, subject differs from his own self in regard to them; the whole quest of what is called happiness manifests itself to be indefinite, obscure, and contingent; and let it end in what criterion it may, this criterion remains always an *enjoyment*, something subjective and contingent, something limited. In this way, then, it becomes plain that will can

never content itself with what is called happiness as a final aim, and that there must be found for it an object wider, deeper, and more essential. This object can only be its own self. The only satisfactory final object to will can only be will. This is one of those expressions that is peculiarly perplexing and distressing to the English reader of the philosophical Germans. The difficulty, however, is only in the phrase and not in its import. As we have already seen, will is identical with thought, with reason; and when we substitute these synonyms in the phrase that "will only can, only *will* will," all ambiguity vanishes. That the object of the will should be will: this may appear an empty phrase, but it is not so when we say the object of *reason* is reason. Reason, we know, has realized itself in the world around us, in God's world; and it does not seem strange, with that fact before us, to say reason seeks reason. But reason has also realized itself in the world of man, in its body of laws, in its code of morals, in the general arrangements of what is called the State. Now when we know that it is will which has realized reason in law, morals, and state, it will no longer appear absurd to say will realizes its own self; the object of will is will, or will wills will. It will at once suggest itself to us, then, that the will so spoken of is thinking will, and thinking will is free-will.

Of course, as we are all now educated in Great Britain, this is considered by all of us, or all but all of us, an absurdity; the supposition of free-will is an absurdity. Most modern English authorities are of this opinion, and they really have brought their public to the *same* opinion. Now, this state of opinion on the part whether of author or reader, results from *making judicious play* with what are called *motives*. We never act, it is said, but from a *motive;* this motive presents itself to us by *necessity of the case*, and it involves us in a like necessity. Some few writers seem to doubt this, and not to be sure that they cannot act without motives. Mr. Alexander, not long since, fairly posed Mr. Mill by asking him, "Having touched the left side of your nose, do you not *feel* that you *could* have touched the right instead?" Notwithstanding the fairness of the question, and the earnestness of the "Yes" or "No" with which it was followed up, Mr.

Alexander, it appears, so far as I have learned, did not succeed in coaxing an answer from Mr. Mill. But, of course, we all *feel* that it is quite free to the great bulk of us at present to touch either side of our nasal prominence we please. Not that it will be altogether possible for us to exclude, *even in such a case as this*, what may be called the play of motives. Whether we elect to touch the right side or to touch the left side, it will be difficult to banish from our mind's eye what might be called a motive—and a motive not a bit too trivial when compared with the action. We do not generally act without a motive, and, in fact, we feel ourselves in no circumstances at a greater loss than when that is required of us. Your socks lie there for you to put on of a morning, and it is really, for the most part, quite indifferent to you which shall be made right and which left. There is no doubt you *can* put either on the right foot, and you are really quite willing to *put* either on it; but you feel it a bore that such a question should have at all turned up. You sit there with your feet naked, feeling that but for the question they would have been clothed, and, motive, or no motive, without difficulty. You are glad to compound for a motive by making right the sock nearest to the right foot, by closing your eyes and taking the first you catch, or even by tossing up to settle first choice. All this shows, however, how habitually man acts by motives; how impossible it is for him to act without motives, even in circumstances the most trivial and indifferent. Rather than act without a motive, we *shut our eyes*, or we *toss up*.

Now the true light on the matter is just a reversal of what is usually believed in England on this question. To act *by* motive is to act *freely*, to act without motive is to act *under necessity*. Possibly some of you may object here: We know that distinction already, but we remain unconvinced; for though *moral* necessity is not *physical* necessity, it is still *a* necessity, and compels obedience. But my answer is briefly: Physical necessity (and I beg you to observe that physical means *natural*—what is of mere *nature*)—physical necessity is the only necessity, and moral necessity is freedom. That only is free which is amenable solely to its own self; but in obeying moral motive it is my own self—my own inmost, deepest, truest self I obey; and therefore, it is, that in the

very obeying of it I am free, and all the more free the more thoroughly moral it is—the more thoroughly it is my own self. In the case of the socks no motive was present, and I was not free; to free myself I had to shut my eyes, I had to toss up, or I had arbitrarily to invent a motive and take the sock nearest. Now, what I call being bound in regard to the socks, is what would be generally stated in England as a proof of freedom; whereas what would appear very generally a proof of necessity in England would possibly, according to the views which I adopt, be used as a proof of freedom. Thus, as regards the socks, I should be held free in England so long as I was *without motive*, and bound only when, in *obedience to a motive*, I put the *one* rather than the *other* on the right foot. Now my way is to reverse this. Should I discover, for example, that the one sock had been worn on the right foot the day before, and decide, from economical motives, to give it the benefit of a change and wear it on the left foot to-day, I should really be acting in freedom, for I should be acting according to reason—I should have *a reason* for my action, I should have *a motive* for my action.

Really Kant and Hegel have completely determined this question. Kant is nowhere more convincing than precisely here, and it is precisely here that he is ever eloquent. What fine pictures he gives us in this connection of how a man acquires the esteem of others, acquires his own esteem, just in proportion to the completeness with which he tramples on *commodity*, on self-interest, and yields to the universal—to moral motive—and that without hope, without chance of reward! Accordingly, it is quite clear to Kant that, besides *empirical* motives—that is, *sensuous* motives, or, as he otherwise calls them, *material* motives, *pathological* motives—there are motives of *ideas*, motives from *within* and not from without, *actual prescripts of reason unto its own self*. If motives were only empirical, he argues, action would be only *hypothetically conditioned*, that is, the action would be viewed only as a means to an end. Reason in such circumstances could only assist in the discovery of the *advisable:* it could not command the *obligatory*. There would result only *prudential rules*, not laws of duty—directions, prescripts *technical* merely, suggestive of an *art* to be

*ac*quired rather than a course of *conduct* to be categorically *re*quired. Where motive is empirical, will can only receive a *maxim*, not an *imperative command;* for an *empirical* object must act on *appetition*, on desire, must presuppose a craving subject under the influence of pathological feelings—inclination or aversion, &c. Maxims, then, are only subjective: and the most general expression for a subjective maxim is *self-love*, the general object of which again is felicity, happiness, one's own satisfaction. But felicity, as already said, though naming a *whole* of satisfaction, and though, in such generality, an ascension over the random contingency of particular desire cannot furnish a *law*, it is but a general title over infinite diversity: no two, as we saw, are agreed on happiness; but even were there agreement among us as to the object of happiness, the foundation would still be pathological and contingent, devoid of the necessity of a law. In fact, it is plain that Kant sees happiness, though a general name, to be still—as its aim is *enjoyment*—a *particular* desire. There *is*, then, a will that takes no note of happiness, that respects itself and is respected, just as it tramples down happiness, just as it tramples down self-love. This will, independent of all sensuous motive, obedient only to its own self in its own reason, to its own law, to its own categorical imperative, is free-will. And how such pure rational *form*, free from all sensuous *matter*, should be adequate to objective commands, *à priori* binding and universally necessary, to categorical injunctions good for all rational beings, it is not difficult to understand. Were it not so—were there not a practical voice of reason, unmistakable, irresistible, clear, intelligible even to the commonest—it is plain to Kant that morality would be destroyed. I may mention here one or two of Kant's illustrations in his general support—"Labor when young not to starve when old": here plainly there is a *condition* offered you, and the prescript is only *hypothetical*. This is not so, however, in the case of such a proposition as "You must not promise falsely": there the command is categorical and direct. Kant asks, too, "Under penalty of death, would you, at command of the king, give false witness for the destruction of an innocent man?" and points out that your own state of mind will prove that you *can* die rather than so act, as it is

clear there that you at all events *ought* to. In this way, Kant shows the eye of duty to be bent forward to work only, and never thrown backward to consequences. That active duty is attended by a sense of doing what is right, which may be called satisfaction, cannot be doubted; but it is not for this satisfaction—it is not for the satisfaction expected—it is only for the command given that duty acts. Many a one has died for duty, at the stake or on the wheel, with scarcely a feeling but that of the physical suffering, knowing only that it was *necessary* for him so to do. It is absurd, then, to convert *moral satisfaction* into *pleasure* (eudæmonism), and assert the same to be the sole rule of action. That man must have a disinterested nature—that man must be thankful for small mercies, who can see in such cases (as death on the wheel or at the stake) a *satisfaction* for the *enjoyment* of which he would readily die! It is thus, then, that Kant, contrasting subjective, empirical, contingent, hypothetical maxims, dependent on pathological, material desire, with objective, pure, apodictic, categorical imperatives, dependent on absolute form of reason—it is thus, I say, that Kant in the existence of the latter makes good the fact of free-will.

In this matter Hegel only follows Kant, bringing ultimate abstraction to all, ultimate completion, ultimate system, ultimate support. He, too, accentuates free-will; that to Hegel, also, is the whole ground and basis of the practical world. "The object of the science of Right," he tells us, "is the human will, with special reference to the relation of the *particular* to the *universal* will"; and free-will, accordingly, is that will which hears the universal only—which implicitly obeys the universal, let the interest of the particular be what it may. He contrasts the phenomena of will with those of physical nature, and insists on the inapplicability of the law of causality to the former. In this law, he observes the cause but *repeats* itself in the effect—the motion in the ball is the same motion that was in the bat, the water on the street is the same water that was in the rain-cloud—but we see no such identity between the *motive* and the *act* of will. The *motive* does not repeat itself in the *act:* the act is the expression not of the *nature of the motive*, but of the *nature of the agent*, who is simply roused to put *himself* into operation. Here it is no

mere effect that we see passively repeating the necessity that lay in the cause, but a wholly new power in act, a power that meets actively what comes to it as motive, that changes its direction, that modifies it, and can even *negate* it. "Circumstances and motives," exclaims Hegel, "master a man only so far as *he yields to* them. . . . . He who appeals *for excuse* to such influences only degrades himself into a thing of *nature:* his act is his own, not that of somebody else, not the effect of something external to him." But Hegel goes systematically to work here, and displays at large the nature of the will, and according to every movement of the notion. The will, in fact, is an excellent illustration of the notion, for the will is concrete, the will just *is* the notion. The will is the Begriff, that that ideally be-grips or be-grasps all, that that ideally involves or implies all; or it is that in whose pure negativity, in whose pure self to self-ideality, the whole foison of the universe potentially lies. *So* it is specially in its own form proper; *so* it is specially *universal.* Will can retire into its own self, will can abstract from all and everything, will is the possibility of pure universality. It is this possibility that is the condition of volition itself: without this power of reflection, without this power of abstraction, it would be in vain to talk of volition at all, which only *is* if it *can* keep itself indefinite. This, then, is the moment of universality in will in which it abstracts from every determinate state of its own self, and, under every determination, remains indeterminate and equal to itself. Man can abstract, in suicide, from his very life: the beast cannot, whatever anecdotes to the contrary may be told to amuse us.

But the will cannot remain abstract, it must *realize* itself; *universal* will must pass into *particular* will, and the question now is, *What* shall be willed? If only the gratification of our sensuous needs and greeds, then evidently what is willed is something foreign to will itself, something limited, something contingent. Will, even there, knows itself not the particular greed, and capable of denying such. This is freedom, but it is only freedom *in form*, only *formal* freedom; it is not *material* freedom, not freedom *in matter:* and without freedom in matter, there can be no true freedom, no free-will. To that it is necessary that will should will its own

self. And this is the *singular*, this is the moment of singularity: here will is present only with its own self, and so free. But how shall will will its own self? How otherwise than by willing its own thought. Will is but thought, thought is but will. Free-agency is the realization of one's own self; but that is thought, and the realization of thought as thought can only take place in ethical institutions—in Law, Morality, and the State.

In exposition and illustration of these three moments of will much can be alleged, and, by Hegel, has been alleged. A word or two in regard to this must now suffice however.

As regards universality, for example, that is really just one aspect of man as capable of generalization as the power that generalizes. The focus, the *punctum vitale*, in man is simply generalization, which is only another word for thought. But to generalize thought is the same thing as to universalize will. The *beast* is driven ever by an *individual conception*, by an *individual* motive; but man in both respects will be controlled—ultimately—only by the *universal*. And what a difference this makes one can see without difficulty. To *have* a habit—as a beast may have—is one thing, but to *know* I have a habit is quite another thing. In this latter case reflection has set in; the habit is not only known, but, what is other to it, its opposite is known, and a judgment that may negate the habit becomes at once possible. The particular, in short, is now received into the universal, and may disappear there. There are times when such disappearance becomes the one historical fact. During the French Revolution, it was the *universal* of will alone functioned. Every *particular*, accordingly, was nought—even the particulars, particular after particular, then and there suggested—and madness ruled the hour, destruction was the lord of all. Not a single particular, not one *difference* could be tolerated, whether rank, or birth, or fortune, or talent, or virtue, or even beauty. That will can withdraw itself into the abstract universal, and become *actively* the universal void, is here evident, just as it is evident that it can become also—in the worship of Brahma, for example—the *passive* void.

As concerns will in *particularity* again, that form is familiar to all of us, for it is will as each of us, for the most part,

uses it. This is the form that is commonly either opposed or defended as free-will, and, as we have seen, both opposers and defenders are equally beside the point. Suffice it to say here that man certainly receives from nature a variety of desires, and that, as a *natural* being, he obeys these. That he should so obey, however, is not for him a necessity: man is also a *rational* being, and *can* receive every particular at the bar of the universal. It is his, then, to raise the desires of nature into motives of reason—to convert them into the rational system of social life; and when he obeys them, then he but obeys his own self. However limited, contingent, subjective, our desires may be, it is certain that they can be freed, articulated, and objectified, into an organic whole—Law, Morals, and the State. This is the "*liberty* of a wise *restraint*," this is the "*necessity* in duty that will make us *free*"; and the man who knows not so to restrict and restrain himself, will never come to anything. Only he who can accept the limit will ever reach the true illimitable.

This limitation, in fact, is the true concrete will, the particularized universal, will in the moment of singularity (and singularity here has not the meaning of individuality). This, in a word, is the true free-will. For what is this but thinking will—will, then, that wills its own implement, its own self? And it is certain that to be a free being it is only necessary to be a thinking being: the right of freedom is but the privilege of reason. What Hegel calls objective spirit is but the *realization* of free-will—of will, rational will, thinking will, substantiating itself in actual outward fact. *That* actual outward fact is the world of Right, the rational system of observances, legal, moral, and political, into which a community of reasoning beings, by very nature, and that is *by very nature of the notion*, sunders. So, however, will only works itself free from its own individuality—its state of *nature*—emancipates itself *from* nature into reason—realizes itself into the substantial freedom of organized universality. What we have here, in fact, is the great distinction—in a *moral* reference—between subjectivity and objectivity. When I think what is *mine* only, when I do what is *mine* only, I think a mere subjectivity, I do a mere subjectivity, which in *rerum natura*, which in the universe of things is simply noth-

ing and nowhere and of no account; but when I think and do what *all* in thinking and doing can appropriate and call theirs, then I think and do an objectivity, a concrete and a permanent that actually functions in fact. To such a word as *mine*, subjectivity and objectivity give a double accent. What is *mine* subjectively, as of this special particular passing individual who now speaks, I must *italicize;* but what is MINE objectively, I must write in small capitals; for that mine is MINE as belonging to my essence, which is humanity as humanity, reason as reason. The italicized *mine* is what sunders and separates and isolates us, each from the other, as so many uncommunicating and incommunicable individual, distinct atoms; whilst the MINE with a double accent, the MINE in small capitals, is what brings us all together into a concrete unity, into a living universal. And it is here that we can discern our only duty, which is to raise subjectivity into objectivity, the contingent individual into the necessary universal. Almost, we might say, our only duty is twice to italicize "mine," or our only duty is in this way to negate the negation. To italicize "mine" once is to set subjectivity, to destroy "mine," really to negate it; but to italicize "mine" twice, is to set objectivity, and negate the negation. Now this is the one object of education—or this is what ought to be that one object; for education is not a mere chattering of vocables. *Nature* is a system of mechanical necessity; every one member of it is in blind interdependence with and on all the rest, and none is for itself. This, too, is the case with man so far as what is called *nature* in him is concerned. Nature in man, in that sense, is his needs and greeds, and in these man is bound and not free; but there is in him the possibility of freedom: he can reflect, he can retire into his universal and negate nature—nature in the sense that it is the individual particular. Reflection does not remain by the particular that is presented to it, but opposes to it another—opposes to it its own contrary. Now precisely this is the business proper of education—to rouse reflection, to convert *instinctive* action into *reflective* action, and reflective action into *free* action—into the free action of the *emancipated universal.* So it is that our needs and greeds, our vanities and vainglories, and all that holds of mere nature in us, are controlled—

our own essential will, our free-will realized. "Education," says Hegel, "has for object to raise man into a self-dependent being, that is, into a being of free-will. With this intention many restrictions are imposed on the inclinations of children. They must learn to obey, so that their individual or special will in its dependence on sensuous needs and greeds may be sublated, and their true will freed."

In man, then, evidently, there is a possibility that lies not in the lower animals: *his* will *may* be raised from a will of nature, a will of the particular, into a will of reason, a will of the universal; but there exists in *this* world no power that could raise *their* wills so. The lower animal is adequate to a *particular* only: its motives are *individual* incitement after *individual* incitement, each of which it only blindly obeys; universal it has none. On the other hand, *it is the single antithesis of universal and particular that makes the whole world of man:* that *cross* is the foundation of his science; that *cross* is the foundation of his law, morals, politics, art; that *cross* is the foundation of his religion. The antagonism that lies in this *cross* is the pulse of history, each beat of which is but the conversion of the lower into the higher. This antithesis or cross has hardly yet been looked at by any man in full consciousness, as it were, with his eyes open, perfectly aware of the importance of what he looked at. Nevertheless, it is the ultimate and absolute secret: it is the *Notion*, the *concrete notion*. No highest philosopher for centuries will have anything to do but to make this notion *explicit*, bring it into full consciousness. Free-will, as we have seen, is but another name for it, and free-will is but a will according to conscious motives. Those then, as we have seen already, who have hitherto discussed this question have simply mistaken the hinge on which it turned, whether they supposed themselves to attack, or whether they supposed themselves to defend. It is as erroneous to say, on the one side, man must act by motive and is bound, as to say, on the other side, man can act without motive and is free. Man *must* act by motive, and it is the very necessity of that *must* that frees him. If man *could* act without motive, he were not free, but bound. It is the existence of conscious motive that proves the existence of the universal, and in the subordination of the particu-

lar motive to the universal motive lies freedom. As Hegel points out, then, that man is free because he can do what he likes, is a conception very wide of the mark. In short, man is free because he cannot do what he likes: man is free because he must obey motive—man, that is, in reference to the universal in him. Similar blunders are not rare in philosophy. There is subjective idealism, for example. Well, because in the relation of a subject and an object there is no possible way of the former *knowing* the latter but *within*, it is argued that the latter also must *be* within. That is, the very reasons I allege for knowing an object *without* are used by subjective idealism for *not* knowing an object without. That that alone renders a knowledge of externality possible —the very condition in which that knowledge roots—is used for the annihilation of all possibility of its own progeny! We see the same thing again in regard to a substance and its qualities; a substance can only make itself *known* by its qualities. Such is the temper of the day, that, because that is the case, it is supposed to be philosophy to say, though it is only in consequence of its qualities that a substance is *known*, it is also only in consequence of its qualities that a substance is *not* known, and just because it is only in consequence of its qualities that it *is* known! Here again we see the very condition of knowledge is made the very reason of ignorance—the reasoner looking very grave at the result; pulling his collar up, and calling himself a philosopher. As it is in these cases, then, so it is in that of free-will. It is only in consequence of sensation that we *can* know an external world, and therefore it is only in consequence of sensation that we can*not* know an external world. It is only through qualities that a substance is known, and therefore it is only through qualities that a substance is *not* known. It is only through motives that a free-will is possible, and therefore it is only through motives that a free-will is *im*possible. It is really marvellous how long very respectable men, how long the whole world, will allow itself to be stultified by such transparent hocus-pocus.

It is not moral necessity but moral freedom that we should say of will then; for in truth the necessity of will is the only freedom. All outward things, all things of nature, have their

very essence in mechanical necessity; but all inward things again, all things of reason, have their very essence in freedom, and so it is that the two worlds are opposed. Will is universal; there is no object *its* that it does not make its; it can abstract from everything. Will, then, wills its own self, and therefore is it free. The will that wills its own self must not be conceived as self-will however. The will that must indulge itself in every motive it wills, is a vain, weak, spoiled, sensuous will, and is generally named self-will, or caprice. That is a will given up to mere *nature*, and is not free but bound. There is a will again which we name *wilfulness;* a will, that is, that will not give up what *it* wills, and for no other reason than that it is *it* wills. Such wilfulness is sometimes regarded as constituting strength of character; but without the universal it is as weak as the will that I have called *spoiled will*, and certainly, for the most part, far more dangerous. It is neither the indulgence of spoiled will, then, nor the stubbornness of wilfulness that makes freedom; it is only the universal, and in the universal lies the *community* of mankind. *All* take part in an action, *all* approve or disapprove, for each in will feels himself universal, and through that universality reflected in the other. This subject of free-will—which, as has more than once transpired, is the root of law, and which I have been obliged somewhat to lean on as the very principle and centre of the philosophy of law—this subject cannot be better closed than by a sentence or two direct from Hegel:

"Of no idea is it so generally known that it is indefinite, ambiguous, liable to the greatest misconstructions, and in reality, consequently, subjected to them, than of the idea of free-will, and none is in current use with so little intelligence. But, as we may express ourselves, the *free* spirit being the *actual existent* spirit, or the spirit that actually prevails in human affairs being the spirit of free-will, misconstructions in regard to it are of the most enormous consequence; for when persons and peoples are once for all possessed by the abstract notion of freedom as such, freedom on its own account, no other has such irresistible power, and just because it is the very inmost being of spirit—its very actuality and self. Entire quarters of the globe, Africa, and the East, have never had, and have not yet, this idea. The Greeks and Romans, Plato and Aristotle and the Stoics, had it not. On the

contrary, they conceived only that a man by his birth (as Athenian or Spartan citizen, &c.), or by strength of character, by education, by philosophy (the wise man is free even when a slave or in chains), only so did they conceive a man to be free. This idea came into the world through Christianity, in which it is that the individual, *as such*, has an *infinite* worth, as being aim and object of the love of God, and destined, consequently, to have his absolute relation to God as spirit, to have this spirit dwelling in him. Christianity it was, namely, that revealed man *in himself* to be destined to supreme freedom. . . . . This idea, then, is the very actuality of man, and not that he *has* it, but that he *is* it. *Christianity* has made it the very actuality of its adherents — the very actuality of its adherents, not to be a slave for example. If reduced to slavery, if the control over their property is to depend on caprice, and not on laws and courts of justice, then they find the very substance of their being violated. This volition of freedom is no longer an impulse, an instinct that demands its gratification; it is now *character* — a spiritual consciousness that is above impulse, that is above instinct. But this freedom, this free-will, and free-agency, that possesses such implement, such filling, such aims and ends, cannot remain as notion only, as mere principle of the mind or the heart; it must unclose itself into objectivity—into an organic actuality, legal, moral, political, and religious."

This, then, is the position we have now reached: that man, as free-will, is the objective spirit, and must realize himself in the institutions, legal and other, by which society lives. In one word, then, the matter of law is our own free-will, and its existence in the state is but its *realization.* It is the course which this realization, in obedience to its very principle, takes that we have now to see.

Free-will, then, is the root of all, and freedom, liberty itself, must constitute the contents of Right or of Law. But free will, at first, taken just so, is abstract, is without this development of its contents into its own concrete system—is, as yet, but *notion;* it is not yet *idea.* So it is, as yet, but direct or immediate to itself and us; it is, as yet, but one and single. Thus immediate, direct, single, *one*, it is a *Person.* But free-will is essentally an action, and that action is essentially a movement from within *outwards.* Now, the *nearest* outer to its own self is *another — another person.* The first prescript of Right, then, is, Be a person, and respect others as persons. It is plain, also, that in this abstraction there are no other

interests present—no variety of concrete interests as under morality. There is no concrete with its various composing members or interests to disturb beside it. There is no interest in question but the single interest of free-will, no command but that will is to be free. But, as between persons, that amounts only to a *prohibition*—obstruct not the free-will of the person. This prohibition is also *categorical;* it gives no reasons for itself; it interposes no conditions; it is categorical, and not hypothetical. It does not require, as is required in morals, the other person to follow it with intelligence, assent, conviction; it never asks for any motive or design or intention on the part of the other person. It simply says, categorically, Infringe not the free-will of the person, or violate not personality. These consequences really flow directly from the nature of the case. So it is, then, that this division of Right—the first—is but formal, abstract, without any concrete feeling, implement of humanity as such. Or personality gives the *capacity* for legal rights; it is the foundation from which all abstract formal right arises, but even as such it is only abstractly universal. There is no *particularity* in it as in morals, no special interest that concerns me as an individual, say. It has no thought of my individual advantage or welfare; and is wholly indifferent to my agreement with it, to my convictions in its regard, or to my designs and intentions in the realization of it. The very abstractness of the universality here has its own limitations, then. To be a person is, in one sense, to be what is highest; but to be a person is to let all our other concrete humanity fall, and be also what is lowest, or, at all events, *least.* So it is that we find the individual who is only a person, the individual who only fixes himself in his *right*, for the most part so thin and narrow. We see, also, that it is generally the rude and unformed man who so stubborns himself in his abstract right, while the richer, fuller nature has an eye for every side of the interest at stake, and has no difficulty in complete resignation of his abstract right. An exalted sense for formal right may prove in the end but mere *wilfulness*, indeed—a formal will that in its own intensely pure formality can only remain blind to every concrete consideration beside it. I recollect of a case, indeed, where a poor man nearly ruined himself by the consistency

of his faith in formal or abstract right. He was the landlord of a workshop; and the tenant, without consent asked or given, took it upon him to enlarge the old windows in this workshop, and open new ones. "The workshop is mine," said the landlord, and you have infringed my rights." "But what I have done," said the tenant, I have done at my own expense, and what I have done is an improvement to the property." "I admit that," said the landlord, "but you had no right to make alterations in *my* property without *my* consent, and I will take you to law there*for*." Accordingly, this landlord did take this tenant to law; he lost his case before judge after judge, and he was just on the point of taking it to the House of Lords, when death kindly stepped in, and by *its* abstraction did justice to *his*. Here was a true instance of exalted devotion to abstract right, but the *concrete* injury did not stop there; for the tenant, disgusted with the doings of the landlord, neglected his business, neglected the property, allowed a valuable boiler to burst, became in the end bankrupt, and left a workshop that was worth a great deal to the *landlord* worth next to nothing to his *heirs*. So much for the worship of formality. The higher nature, then, may, in view of other and more concrete interests, let its formal right fall.

And it is very subtle on the part of Hegel to point out, accordingly, that formal right is only a possibility; for a possibility, as he expressly defines it here, "is a *Seyn*, a being, an existent something, that has the import also not to be," and we can see *that* in the interest before us. My abstract right *is*, but how often is it also *not?* as I think it not worth while to assert it. That is, abstract right, beside concreter interests, has only the significance of a possibility, and it has its own felicity when Hegel remarks further, that, accordingly, the legal assignment here is only an *Erlaubniss* or a *Befugniss*, which, I suppose, I may translate by *permission* and *title*—the meaning being that such rights may remain empty, and be nothing but a permission *to*, a title *to*. Nevertheless, though such be the dangers of formal or abstract right, the importance of the position must not be lost sight of. Neither individuals nor nations are even *concretely* advanced until they have reached a knowledge of the stage of abstract personality. Such advance must be allowed to have been largely

an achievement of the Romans, of whom it may be said, in reference to their legal assignments, that their greatest feat, even in the very acme of their development, was to perfect this consciousness—to perfect the inviolability of the person as person; for the particular individual, if richer, more concrete, is so mostly on the *natural* side, and it is consideration of the universal individual, the person, that brings freedom. "In personality, indeed, it lies that I, as, on all sides of me, in inward desire, need, greed, and appetition, and in direct outward existence, *this* perfectly limited and finite individual, am yet—as person that is—pure self-reference, and know myself, even in my finitude, as what is infinite, universal, and free."

In abstract Right, then, it is the mere universal will that is considered, without respect to the individual in his further concrete interests, or in his (moral) convictions and intentions: it has no object but the human free agent as such. In short, free-will respects only its own self. Even in the other it respects only its own self. So it is that each is a person, and so it is also that all the *edicts* of law here are *interdicts*—all its positive *commands* are in ultimate instance *inhibitions*. This by reason specially of the very abstractness of the person. I may add here that, if in respecting other persons we respect also ourselves, it is very important to see that in respecting ourselves we respect also them; and this is a profound lesson to that morbid self-contempt that, in these days of loudness and superficiality, is so common in the quieter and the deeper.

But the Person cannot *remain* abstract: he must *realize* his freedom, obtain objective existence for it; the *notion* must become *idea*. So abstractly immediate, so abstractly direct to its own self as will on this stage is—and at the same time so abstractly inner to its own self—for *plurality*, the consideration of *persons*, makes no difference here, each is but *a person*, and as empty and abstract as the other—so abstractly immediate, though inner, then, what different thing will can here realize itself in, will be itself immediately and externally abstract—a thing, an external thing. But for will to realize itself in an external thing is to take *possession* of it—is to enter into its *Property*.

Of course, gentlemen, you see what all this amounts to. In this mode of statement, when one part of a subject is completed, and it is now necessary to go to a new part, this new part must *introduce itself*, and not be *just turned to.* Thus we saw how, the intellectual powers having been discussed, and the turn of the active powers being now arrived, these latter were not just tacked on to the former, but the former actually *became* the latter. Theory, by a turn of the hand, *became* practice; intelligence, will. Now will, thus come upon, is as yet undeveloped, and so it can be figured as still something *single*, *one*, *internal to its own self*, *abstract*, &c. But will that can be so described *corresponds to the definition* of a Person, and *is* therefore a Person. Again, this abstract personality must *realize* itself, but, being so *abstract* and *internal* itself, the *other*, in which only it can realize itself, must, on *its* side, be *externally* abstract, &c.—that is, an outward material thing—Property. I am not sure that you will yet altogether relish this new mode of proof; but I think you will now see something of its nature.

We have now once for all arrived at Property; and Property, Contract, and Penalty, shall be the themes of our two remaining lectures.

PEDAGOGICS AS A SYSTEM.

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Translated by ANNA C. BRACKETT.

SECOND PART.

The Special Elements of Education.

SECOND DIVISION.

INTELLECTUAL EDUCATION.

SECOND CHAPTER.

The Logical Presupposition or Method.

§ 103. The logical presupposition of instruction is the order in which the subject-matter develops for the consciousness. The subject, the consciousness of the pupil, and the activity of the instructor, interpenetrate each other in instruction, and constitute in actuality one whole.

§ 104. (1) First of all, the subject which is to be learned has a specific determinateness which demands in its representation a certain fixed order. However arbitrary we may desire to be, the subject has a certain self-determination of its own which no mistreatment can wholly crush out, and this inherent immortal reason is the general foundation of instruction.

—To illustrate; however one may desire to manipulate a language in teaching it, he cannot change the words in it, or the inflections of the declensions and conjugations. And the same restriction is laid upon our inclinations in the different divisions of Natural History, in the theorems of Arithmetic, Geometry, &c. The theorem of Pascal remains still the theorem of Pascal, and will always remain so.—

§ 105. (2) But the subject must be adapted to the consciousness of the pupil, and here the order of procedure and the exposition depend upon the stage which he has reached intellectually, for the special manner of the instruction must be conditioned by this. If he is in the stage of perception, we must use the illustrative method; if in the stage of conception, that of combination; and if in the stage of reflection

that of demonstration. The first exhibits the object directly, or some representation of it; the second considers it according to the different possibilities which exist in it, and turns it around on all sides; the third questions the necessity of the connection in which it stands either with itself or with others. This is the natural order from the stand-point of the scientific intelligence: first, the object is presented to the perception; then combination presents its different phases; and, finally, the thinking activity circumscribes the restlessly moving reflection by the idea of necessity. Experiment in the method of combination is an excellent means for a discovery of relations, for a sharpening of the attention, for the arousing of a many-sided interest; but it is no true dialectic, though it be often denoted by that name.

—Illustration is especially necessary in the natural sciences and also in æsthetics, because in both of these departments the sensuous is an essential element of the matter dealt with. In this respect we have made great progress in charts and maps. Sydow's hand and wall maps and Berghaus's physical atlas are most excellent means of illustrative instruction; also Burmeister's zoölogical atlas.—

§ 106. The demonstrative method, in order to bring about its proof of necessity, has a choice of many different ways. But we must not imagine, either that there are an unlimited number, and that it is only a chance which one we shall take; or that they have no connection among themselves, and run, as it were, side by side. It is not, however, the business of Pedagogics to develop different methods of proof; this belongs to Logic. We have only to remember that, logically taken, proof must be analytic, synthetic, or dialectic. Analysis begins with the single one, and leads out of it by induction to the general principle from which its existence results. Synthesis, on the contrary, begins with a general which is presupposed as true, and leads from this through deduction to the special determinations which were implicit in it. The regressive search of analysis for a determining principle is *Invention;* the forward progress of synthesis from the simple elements seeking for the multiplicity of the single one is *Construction.* Each, in its result, passes over into the other; but their truth is found in the dialectic method, which in each

phase allows unity to separate into diversity and diversity to return into unity. While in the analytic as well as in the synthetic method the mediation of the individual with the general, or of the general with the individual, lets the phase of particularity be only subjectively connected with it in the dialectic method, we have the going over of the general through the particular to the individual, or to the self-determination of the idea, and it therefore rightly claims the title of the genetic method. We can also say that while the inventive method gives us the idea (notion) and the constructive the judgment, the genetic gives us the syllogism which leads the determinations of reflection back again into substantial identity.

§ 107. (3) The active mediation of the pupil with the content which is to be impressed upon his consciousness is the work of the teacher, whose personality creates a method adapted to the individual; for however clearly the subject may be defined, however exactly the psychological stage of the pupil may be regulated, the teacher cannot dispense with the power of his own individuality even in the most objective relations. This individuality must penetrate the whole with its own exposition, and that peculiarity which we call his *manner*, and which cannot be determined *à priori*, must appear. The teacher must place himself on the stand-point of the pupil, i.e. must adapt himself; he must see that the abstract is made clear to him in the concrete, i.e. must illustrate; he must fill up the gaps which will certainly appear, and which may mar the thorough seizing of the subject, i.e. must supply. In all these relations the pedagogical tact of the teacher may prove itself truly ingenious in varying the method according to the changefulness of the ever-varying needs, in contracting or expanding the extent, in stating, or indicating what is to be supplied. The true teacher is free from any superstitious belief in any one procedure as a sure specific which he follows always in a monotonous bondage. This can only happen when he is capable of the highest method. The teacher has arrived at the highest point of ability in teaching when he can make use of all means, from the loftiness of solemn seriousness, through smooth statement, to the play of jest—yes, even to the incentive of irony, and to humor.

—Pedagogics can be in nothing more specious than in its method, and it is here that charlatanism can most readily intrude itself. Every little change, every inadequate modification, is proclaimed aloud as a new or an improved method; and even the most foolish and superficial changes find at once their imitators, who themselves conceal their insolence behind some frivolous differences, and, with laughable conceit, hail themselves as inventors.—

THIRD CHAPTER.

Instruction.

§ 108. All instruction acts upon the supposition that there is an inequality between present knowledge and power and that knowledge and power which are not yet attained. To the pupil belong the first, to the teacher the second. Education is the act which gradually cancels the original inequality of teacher and pupil, in that it converts what was at first the property of the former into the property of the latter, and this by means of his own activity.

I. *The Subjects of Instruction.*

§ 109. The pupil is the apprentice, the teacher the master, whether in the practice of any craft or art, or in the exposition of any systematic knowledge. The pupil passes from the state of the apprentice to that of the master through that of the journeyman. The apprentice has to appropriate to himself the elements; journeymanship begins as he, by means of their possession, becomes independent; the master combines with his technical skill the freedom of production. His authority over his pupil consists only in his knowledge and power. If he has not these, no external support, no trick of false appearances which he may put on, will serve to create it for him.

§ 110. These stages—(1) apprenticeship, (2) journeymanship, (3) mastership—are fixed limitations in the didactic process; they are relative only in the concrete. The standard of special excellence varies with the different grades of culture, and must be varied that it may have any historical value. The master is complete only in relation to the journeyman and apprentice; to them he is superior. But on the

other hand, in relation to the infinity of the problems of his art or science, he is by no means complete; to himself he must always appear as one who begins ever anew, one who is ever striving, one to whom a new problem ever rises from every achieved result. He cannot discharge himself from work, he must never desire to rest on his laurels. He is the truest master whose finished performances only force him on to never-resting progress.

§ 111. The real possibility of culture is found in general, it is true, in every human being; nevertheless, empirically, there are distinguished: (1) Incapacity, as the want of all gifts; (2) Mediocrity; (3) Talent and Genius. It is the part of Psychology to give an account of all these. Mediocrity characterizes the great mass of mechanical intelligences, those who wait for external impulse as to what direction their endeavors shall take. Not without truth, perhaps, may we say, that hypothetically a special talent is given to each individual, but this special talent in many men never makes its appearance, because under the circumstances in which it finds itself placed it fails to find the exciting occasion which shall give him the knowledge of its existence. The majority of mankind are contented with the mechanical impulse which makes them into something and impresses upon them certain determinations.—Talent shows itself by means of the confidence in its own especial productive possibility, which manifests itself as an inclination, as a strong impulse, to occupy itself with the special object which constitutes its content. Pedagogics has no difficulty in dealing with mechanical natures, because their passivity is only too ready to follow prescribed patterns. It is more difficult to manage talent, because it lies between mediocrity and genius, and is therefore uncertain, and not only unequal to itself, but also is tossed now too low, now too high, is by turns despondent and over-excited. The general maxim for dealing with it is to remove no difficulty from the subject to which its efforts are directed.—Genius must be treated much in the same way as Talent. The difference consists only in this, that Genius, with a foreknowledge of its creative power, usually manifests its confidence with less doubt in a special vocation, and, with a more intense thirst

for culture, subjects itself more willingly to the demands of instruction. Genius is in its nature the purest self-determination, in that it lives, in its own inner existence, the necessity which exists in the thing. But it can assign to the New, which is in it already immediately and subjectively, no value if this has not united itself to the already existing culture as its objective presupposition, and on this ground it thankfully receives instruction.

§ 112. But Talent and Genius offer a special difficulty to education in the precocity which often accompanies them. But by precocity we do not mean that they early render themselves perceptible, since the early manifestation of gifts by talent and genius, through their intense confidence, is to be looked at as perfectly legitimate. But precocity is rather the hastening forward of the human being in feeling and moral sense, so that where in the ordinary course of nature we should have a child, we have a youth, and a man in the place of a youth. We may find precocity among those who belong to the class of mediocrity, but it is developed most readily among those possessed of talent and genius, because with them the early appearance of superior gifts may very easily bring in its train a perversion of the feelings and the moral nature. Education must deal with it in so far as it is inharmonious, so that it shall be stronger than the demands made on it from without, so that it shall not minister to vanity; and must take care, in order to accomplish this, that social naturalness and lack of affectation be preserved in the pupil.

—Our age has to combat this precocity much more than others. We find e.g. authors who, at the age of thirty years, in which they publish their collected works or write their biography, are chilly with the feelings of old age. Music has been the sphere in which the earliest development of talent has shown itself, and here we find the absurdity that the cupidity of parents has so forced precocious talents that children of four or five years of age have been made to appear in public.—

§ 113. Every sphere of culture contains a certain quantity of knowledge and ready skill which may be looked at, as it were, as the created result of the culture. It is to be wished

that every one who turns his attention to a certain line of culture could take up into himself the gathered learning which controls it. In so far as he does this, he is professional. The consciousness that one has in the usual way gone through a school of art or science, and has, with the general inheritance of acquisition, been handed over to a special department, creates externally a beneficial composure which is very favorable to internal progress. We must distinguish from the professional the amateur and the self-taught man. The amateur busies himself with an art, a science, or a trade, without having gone through any strict training in it. As a rule, he dispenses with elementary thoroughness, and hastens towards the pleasure which the joy of production gives. The conscious amateur confesses this himself, makes no pretension to mastership, and calls himself—in distinction from the professional, who subjects himself to rules—an unlearned person. But sometimes the amateur, on the contrary, covers over his weakness, cherishes in himself the self-conceit that he is equal to the heroes of his art or science, constitutes himself the first admirer of his own performances, seeks for their want of recognition in external motives, never in their own want of excellence; and, if he has money, or edits a paper, is intoxicated with being the patron of talent which produces such works as he would willingly produce or pretends to produce. The self-taught man has often true talent, or even genius, to whose development nevertheless the inherited culture has been denied, and who by good fortune has through his own strength worked his way into a field of effort. The self-taught man is distinguished from the amateur by the thoroughness and the industry with which he acts; he is not only equally unfortunate with him in the absence of school-training, but is much less endowed. Even if the self-taught man has for years studied and practised much, he is still haunted by a feeling of uncertainty as to whether he has yet reached the stand-point at which a science, an art, or a trade, will receive him publicly—of so very great consequence is it that man should be comprehended and recognized by man. The self-taught man therefore remains embarrassed, and does not free himself from the apprehension that he may expose some weak point to a professional, or he falls into the other ex-

treme—he becomes presumptuous, steps forth as a reformer, and, if he accomplishes nothing, or earns only ridicule, he sets himself down as an unrecognized martyr by an unappreciative and unjust world.

—It is possible that the amateur may transcend the stage of superficiality and subject himself to a thorough training; then he ceases to be an amateur. It is also possible that the self-taught man may be on the right track, and may accomplish as much or even more than one trained in the usual way. In general, however, it is very desirable that every one should go through the regular course of the inherited means of education, partly that he may be thorough in the elements, partly to free him from the anxiety which he may feel lest he in his solitary efforts spend labor on some superfluous work—superfluous because done long before, and of which he, through the accident of his want of culture, had not heard. We must all learn by ourselves, but we cannot teach ourselves. Only Genius can do this, for it must be its own leader in the new paths which it opens. Genius alone passes beyond where inherited culture ceases. It bears this in itself as of the past, and which it uses as material for its new creation; but the self-taught man, who would very willingly be a genius, puts himself in an attitude of opposition to things already accomplished, or sinks into oddity, into secret arts and sciences, &c.—

§ 114. These ideas of the general steps of culture, of special gifts, and of the ways of culture appropriate to each, which we have above distinguished, have a manifold connection among themselves which cannot be established *à priori.* We can however remark that Apprenticeship, the Mechanical Intelligence, and the Professional life; secondly, Journeymanship, Talent, and Amateurship; and, finally, Mastership, Genius, and Self-Education, have a relationship to each other.

II. *The Act of Learning.*

§ 115. In the process of education the interaction between pupil and teacher must be so managed that the exposition by the teacher shall excite in the pupil the impulse to reproduction. The teacher must not treat his exposition as if it were a work of art which is its own end and aim, but he must al-

ways bear in mind the need of the pupil. The artistic exposition, as such, will, by its completeness, produce admiration; but the didactic, on the contrary, will, through its perfect adaptation, call out the imitative instinct, the power of new creation.

—From this consideration we may justify the frequent statement that is made, that teachers who have really an elegant diction do not really accomplish so much as others who resemble in their statements not so much a canal flowing smoothly between straight banks, as a river which works its foaming way over rocks and between ever-winding banks. The pupil perceives that the first is considering himself when he speaks so finely, perhaps not without some self-appreciation; and that the second, in the repetitions and the sentences which are never finished, is concerning himself solely with *him*. The pupil feels that not want of facility or awkwardness, but the earnest eagerness of the *teacher*, is the principal thing, and that this latter uses rhetoric only as a means.—

§ 116. In the act of learning there appears (1) a mechanical element, (2) a dynamic element, and (3) one in which the dynamic again mechanically strengthens itself.

§ 117. As to the mechanical element, the right time must be chosen for each lesson, an exact arrangement observed, and the suitable apparatus, which is necessary, procured. It is in the arrangement that especially consists the educational power of the lesson. The spirit of scrupulousness, of accuracy, of neatness, is developed by the external technique, which is carefully arranged in its subordinate parts according to its content. The teacher must therefore insist upon it that work shall cease at the exact time, that the work be well done, &c., for on these little things many greater things ethically depend.

—To choose one's time for any work is often difficult because of the pressure of a multitude of demands, but in general it should be determined that the strongest and keenest energy of the thinking activity and of memory—this being demanded by the work—should have appropriated to it the first half of the day.—

§ 118. The dynamical element consists of the previously

developed power of Attention, without which all the exposition made by the teacher to the pupil remains entirely foreign to him, all apparatus is dead, all arrangement of no avail, all teaching fruitless, if the pupil does not by his free activity receive into his inner self what one teaches him, and thus make it his own property.

§ 119. This appropriation must not limit itself, however, to the first acquisition of any knowledge or skill, but it must give free existence to whatever the pupil has learned; it must make it perfectly manageable and natural, so that it shall appear to be a part of himself. This must be brought about by means of Repetition. This will mechanically secure that which the attention first grasped.

§ 120. The careful, persistent, living activity of the pupil in these acts we call Industry. Its negative extreme is Laziness, which is deserving of punishment inasmuch as it passes over into a want of self-determination. Man is by nature lazy. But mind, which is only in its act, must resolve upon activity. This connection of Industry with human freedom, with the very essence of mind, makes laziness appear blameworthy. The really civilized man, therefore, no longer knows that absolute inaction which is the greatest enjoyment to the barbarian, and he fills up his leisure with a variety of easier and lighter work. The positive extreme of Industry is the unreasonable activity which rushes in breathless chase from one action to another, from this to that, straining the person with the immense quantity of his work. Such an activity, going beyond itself and seldom reaching deliberation, is unworthy of a man. It destroys the agreeable quiet which in all industry should penetrate and inspire the deed. Nothing is more repulsive than the beggarly pride of such stupid laboriousness. One should not endure for a moment to have the pupil, seeking for distinction, begin to pride himself on an extra industry. Education must accustom him to use a regular assiduity. The frame of mind suitable for work often does not exist at the time when work should begin, but more frequently it makes its appearance after we have begun. The subject takes its own time to awaken us. Industry, inspired by a love and regard for work, has in its quiet uniformity a

great force, without which no one can accomplish anything essential. The world, therefore, holds Industry worthy of honor; and to the Romans, a nation of the most persistent perseverance, we owe the inspiring words, "*Incepto tantum opus est, cætera res expediet*"; and, "*Labor improbus omnia vincit.*"

—"Every one may glory in his industry!" This is a true word from the lips of a truly industrious man, who was also one of the most modest. But Lessing did not, however, mean by them to charter Pharisaical pedantry. The necessity sometimes of giving one's self to an excess of work injurious to the health, generally arises from the fact that he has not at other times made use of the requisite attention to the necessary industry, and then attempts suddenly and as by a forced march to storm his way to his end. The result of such over-exertion is naturally entire prostration. The pupil is therefore to be accustomed to a generally uniform industry, which may extend itself at regular intervals without his thereby overstraining himself. What is really gained by a young man who has hitherto neglected time and opportunity, and who, when examination presses, overworks himself, perhaps standing the test with honor, and then must rest for months afterwards from the over-effort? On all such occasions attention is not objective and dispassionate, but rather becomes, through anxiety to pass the examination, restless and corrupted by egotism; and the usual evil result of such compulsory industry is the ephemeral character of the knowledge thus gained. "Lightly come, lightly go," says the proverb.

—A special worth is always attached to study far into the night. The student's "midnight lamp" always claims for itself a certain veneration. But this is vanity. In the first place, it is injurious to contradict Nature by working through the night, which she has ordained for sleep; secondly, the question is not as to the number of hours spent in work and their position in the twenty-four, but as to the quality of the work. With regard to the value of my work, it is of no moment whatsoever whether I have done it it in the morning or in the evening, or how long I have labored, and it is of no conse-

quence to any one except to my own very unimportant self. Finally, the question presents itself whether these gentlemen who boast so much of their midnight work do not sleep in the daytime!—

§ 121. But Industry has also two other extremes: seeming-laziness and seeming-industry. Seeming-laziness is the neglecting of the usual activity in one department because a man is so much more active in another. The mind possessed with the liveliest interest in one subject buries itself in it, and, because of this, cannot give itself up to another which before had engrossed the attention. Thus it appears more idle than it is, or rather it appears to be idle just.becuse it is more industrious. This is especially the case in passing from one subject of instruction to another. The pupil should acquire such a flexibility in his intellectual powers that the rapid relinquishment of one subject and the taking up of another should not be too difficult. Nothing is more natural than that when he is excited he should go back to the subject that has just been presented to him, and that he, feeling himself restrained, shall remain untouched by the following lesson, which may be of an entirely different nature. The young soul is brooding over what has been said, and is really exercising an intensive activity, though it appears to be idle. But in seeming-industry all the external motives of activity, all the mechanism of work, manifest themselves noisily, while there is no true energy of attention and productivity. One busies himself with all the apparatus of work; he heaps up instruments and books around him; he sketches plans; he spends many hours staring into vacancy, biting his pen, gazing at words, drawings, numbers, &c. Boys, under the protection of so great a scaffolding for work erected around them, often carry on their own amusements. Men, who arrive at no real concentration of their force, no clear defining of their vocation, no firm decision as to their action, dissipate their power in what is too often a great activity with absolutely no result. They are busy, very busy; they have hardly time to do this thing because they really wish or ought to do that; but, with all their driving, their energy is all dissipated, and nothing comes from their countless labors.

III. *The Modality of the Process of Teaching.*

§ 122. Now that we have learned something of the relation of the teacher to the taught, and of the process of learning itself, we must examine the mode and manner of instruction. This may have (1) the character of contingency: the way in which our immediate existence in the world, our life, teaches us; or it may be given (2) by the printed page; or (3) it may take the shape of formal oral instruction.

§ 123. (1) For the most, the best, and the mightiest things that we know we are indebted to Life itself. The sum of perceptions which a human being absorbs into himself up to the fourth or fifth year of his life is incalculable; and after this time we involuntarily gain by immediate contact with the world countless ideas. But especially we understand by the phrase "the School of Life," the ethical knowlege which we gain by what happens in our own lives.

—If one says, *Vitæ non scholæ discendum est*, one can also say, *Vita docet.* Without the power exercised by the immediate world our intelligence would remain abstract and lifeless.—

§ 124. (2) What we learn through books is the opposite of that which we learn through living. Life *forces* upon us the knowledge it has to give; the book, on the contrary, is entirely passive. It is locked up in itself; it cannot be altered; but it waits by us till we wish to use it. We can read it rapidly or slowly; we can simply turn over its leaves—what in modern times one calls reading;—we can read it from beginning to end or from end to beginning; we can stop, begin again, skip over passages, or cut them short, as we like. To this extent the book is the most *convenient* means for instruction. If we are indebted to Life for our perceptions, we must chiefly thank books for our understanding of our perceptions. We call book-instruction "dead" when it lacks, for the exposition which it gives, a foundation in our perceptions, or when we do not add to the printed description the perceptions which it implies; and the two are quite different.

§ 125. Books, as well as life, teach us many things which we did not previously intend to learn directly from them. From foreign romances e.g. we learn, first of all, while we read them for entertainment, the foreign language, history

or geography, &c. We must distinguish from such books as those which bring to us, as it were accidentally, a knowledge for which we were not seeking, the books which are expressly intended to instruct. These must (*a*) in their consideration of the subject give us the principal results of any department of knowledge, and denote the points from which the next advance must be made, because every science arises at certain results which are themselves again new problems; (*b*) in the consideration of the particulars it must be exhaustive, i.e. no essential elements of a science must be omitted. But this exhaustiveness of execution has different meanings according to the stand-points of those for whom it is made. How far we shall pass from the universality of the principal determinations into the multiplicity of the Particular, into the fulness of detail, cannot be definitely determined, and must vary, according to the aim of the book, as to whether it is intended for the apprentice, the journeyman, or the master; (*c*) the expression must be precise, i.e. the maximum of clearness must be combined with the maximum of brevity.

—The writing of a text-book is on this account one of the most difficult tasks, and it can be successfully accomplished only by those who are masters in a science or art, and who combine with great culture and talent great experience as teachers. Unfortunately many dabblers in knowledge undervalue the difficulty of writing text-books because they think that they are called upon to aid in the spread of science, and because the writing of compendiums has thus come to be an avocation, so that authors and publishers have made out of text-books a profitable business and good incomes. In all sciences and arts there exists a quantity of material which is common property, which is disposed of now in one way, now in another. The majority of compendiums can be distinguished from each other only by the kind of paper, printing, the name of the publisher or bookseller, or by arbitrary changes in the arrangement and execution. The want of principle with which this work is carried on is incredible. Many governments have on this account fixed prices for text-books, and commissioners to select them. This in itself is right and proper, but the use of any book should be left optional, so that the one-sidedness of a science patronized by

government as it were patented, may not be created through the pressure of such introduction. A state may through its censorship oppose poor text-books, and recommend good ones; but it may not establish as it were a state-science, a state-art, in which only the ideas, laws and forms sanctioned by it shall be allowed. The Germans are fortunate, in consequence of their philosophical criticism, in the production of better and better text-books, among which may be mentioned Koberstein's, Gervinus', and Vilmar's Histories of Literature, Ellendt's General History, Blumenbach's and Burmeister's Natural History, Marheineke's text-book on Religion, Schwegler's History of Philosophy, &c. So much the more unaccountable is it that, with such excellent books, the evil of such characterless books, partly inadequate and partly in poor style, should still exist when there is no necessity for it. The common style of paragraph-writing has become obnoxious, under the name of Compendium-style, as the most stiff and affected style of writing.—

§ 126. A text-book must be differently written according as it is intended for a book for private study or for purposes of general circulation. If the first, it must give more, and must develop more clearly the internal relations; if the second, it should be shorter, and proceed from axiomatic and clear postulates to their signification, and these must have an epigrammatic pureness which should leave something to be guessed. Because for these a commentary is needed which it is the teacher's duty to supply, such a sketch is usually accompanied by the fuller text-book which was arranged for private study.

—It is the custom to call the proper text-book the "small" one, and that which explains and illustrates, the "large" one. Thus we have the Small and the Large Gervinus, &c.—

§ 127. (3) The text-book which presupposes oral explanation forms the transition to Oral instruction itself. Since speech is the natural and original form in which mind manifests itself, no book can rival it. The living word is the most powerful agent of instruction. However common and cheap printing may have rendered books as the most convenient means of education—however possible may have become, through the multiplication of facilities for intercourse and

the rapidity of transportation, the immediate viewing of human life, the most forcible educational means, nevertheless the living word still asserts its supremacy. In two cases especially is it indispensable: one is when some knowledge is to be communicated which as yet is found in no compendium, and the other when a living language is to be taught, for in this case the printed page is entirely inadequate. One can learn from books to understand Spanish, French, English, Danish, &c., but not to speak them; to do this he must hear them, partly that his ear may become accustomed to the sounds, partly that his vocal organs may learn correctly to imitate them.

§ 128. Life surprises and overpowers us with the knowledge which it gains; the book, impassive, waits our convenience; the teacher, superior to us, perfectly prepared in comparison with us, consults our necessity, and with his living speech uses a gentle force to which we can yield without losing our freedom. Listening is easier than reading.

—Sovereigns e.g. seldom read themselves, but have servants who read to them.—

§ 129. Oral instruction may (1) give the subject, which is to be learned, in a connected statement, or (2) it may unfold it by means of question and answer. The first decidedly presupposes the theoretical inequality of the teacher and the taught. Because one can speak while many can listen, this is especially adapted to the instruction of large numbers. The second method is either that of the catechism or the dialogue. The catechetical is connected with the first kind of oral instruction above designated because it makes demand upon the memory of the learner only for the answer to one question at a time, and is hence very often and very absurdly called the Socratic method. In teaching by means of the dialogue, we try, by means of a reciprocal interchange of thought, to solve in common some problem, proceeding according to the necessary forms of reason. But in this we can make a distinction. One speaker may be superior to the rest, may hold in his own hand the thread of the conversation and may guide it himself; or, those who mingle in it may be perfectly equal in intellect and culture, and may each take part in the development with equal independence. In this latter case, this

true reciprocity gives us the proper dramatic dialogue, which contains in itself all forms of exposition, and may pass from narration, description, and analysis, through satire and irony, to veritable humor. When it does this, the dialogue is the loftiest result of intelligence and the means of its purest enjoyment.

—This alternate teaching, in which the one who has been taught takes the teacher's place, can be used only where there is a content which admits of a mechanical treatment. The Hindoos made use of it in very ancient times. Bell and Lancaster have transplanted it for the teaching of poor children in Europe and America. For the teaching of the conventionalities—reading, writing, and arithmetic—as well as for the learning by heart of names, sentences, &c., it suffices, but not for any scientific culture. Where we have large numbers to instruct, the giving of the fully developed statement (the first form) is necessary, since the dialogue, though it may be elsewhere suitable, allows only a few to take part in it. And if we take the second form, we must, if we have a large number of pupils, make use of the catechetical method only. What is known as the conversational method has been sometimes suggested for our university instruction. Diesterweg in Berlin insists upon it. Here and there the attempt has been made, but without any result. In the university, the lecture of the teacher as a self-developing whole is contrasted with the scientific discussion of the students, in which they as equals work over with perfect freedom what they have heard. Diesterweg was wrong in considering the lecture-system as the principal cause of the lack of scientific interest which he thought he perceived in our universities. Kant, Fichte, Schelling, Schleiermacher, Wolf, Niebuhr, &c., taught by lectures and awakened the liveliest enthusiasm. But Diesterweg is quite right in saying that the students should not be degraded to writing-machines. But this is generally conceded, and a pedantic amount of copying more and more begins to be considered as out of date at our universities. Nevertheless, a new pedantry, that of the wholly extempore lecture, should not be introduced; but a brief summary of the extempore unfolding of the lecture may be dictated and serve a very important purpose, or the lecture may be copied. The

great efficacy of the oral exposition does not so much consist in the fact that it is perfectly free, as that it presents to immediate view a person who has made himself the bearer of a science or an art, and has found what constitutes its essence. Its power springs, above all, from the genuineness of the lecture, the originality of its content, and the elegance of its form: whether it is written or extemporized, is a matter of little moment. Niebuhr e.g. read, word for word, from his manuscript, and what a teacher was he!—The catechetical way of teaching is not demanded at the university except in special examinations; it belongs to the private work of the student, who must learn to be industrious of his own free impulse. The private tutor can best conduct reviews.—The institution which presupposing the lecture-system combines in itself original production with criticism, and the connected exposition with the conversation, is the *seminary*. It pursues a well-defined path, and confines itself to a small circle of associates whose grades of culture are very nearly the same. Here, therefore, can the dialogue be strongly developed because it has a fixed foundation, and each one can take part in the conversation; whereas, from the variety of opinions among a great number, it is easily perverted into an aimless talk, and the majority of the hearers, who have no chance to speak, become weary.—

§ 130. As to the way in which the lecture is carried out, it may be so arranged as to give the whole stock of information acquired, or, without being so exact and so complete, it may bring to its elucidation only a relatively inexact and general information. The ancients called the first method the esoteric and the second the exoteric, as we give to such lectures now, respectively, the names *scholastic* and *popular*. The first makes use of terms which have become technical in science or art, and proceeds syllogistically to combine the isolated ideas; the second endeavors to substitute for technicalities generally understood signs, and conceals the exactness of the formal conclusion by means of a conversational style. It is possible to conceive of a perfectly methodical treatment of a science which at the same time shall be generally comprehensible if it strives to attain the transparency of real beauty. A scientific work of art may be correctly said

to be popular, as e.g. has happened to Herder's *Ideas on the Philosophy of the History of Mankind.*

—Beauty is the element which is comprehended by all, and as we declare our enmity to the distorted picture-books, books of amusement, and to the mischievous character of "Compendiums," so we must also oppose the popular publications which style themselves *Science made Easy*, &c., in order to attract more purchasers by this alluring title. Kant in his *Logic* calls the extreme of explanation Pedantry and Gallantry. This last expression would be very characteristic in our times, since one attains the height of popularity now if he makes himself easily intelligible to ladies—a didactic triumph which one attains only by omitting everything that is profound or complicated, and saying only what exists already in the consciousness of every one, by depriving the subject dealt with of all seriousness, and sparing neither pictures, anecdotes, jokes, nor pretty formalities of speech. Elsewhere Kant says: "In the effort to produce in our knowledge the completeness of scholarly thoroughness, and at the same time a popular character, without in the effort falling into the above-mentioned errors of an affected thoroughness or an affected popularity, we must, first of all, look out for the scholarly completeness of our scientific knowledge, the methodical form of thoroughness, and first ask how we can make really popular the knowledge methodically acquired at school, i.e. how we can make it easy and generally communicable, and yet at the same time not supplant thoroughness by popularity. For scholarly completeness must not be sacrificed to popularity to please the people, unless science is to become a plaything or trifling." It is perfectly plain that all that was said before of the psychological and the logical methods must be taken into account in the manner of the statement.—

§ 131. It has been already remarked (§ 21), in speaking of the nature of education, that the office of the instructor must necessarily vary with the growing culture. But attention must here again be called to the fact, that education, in whatever stage of culture, must conform to the law which, as the internal logic of Being, determines all objective developments of nature and of history. The Family gives the child his first

instruction; between this and the school comes the teaching of the tutor; the school stands independently as the antithesis of the family, and presents three essentially different forms according as it imparts a general preparatory instruction, or special teaching for different callings, or a universal scientific cultivation. Universality passes over through particularizing into individuality, which contains both the general and the particular freely in itself. All citizens of a state should have (1) a general education which (*a*) makes them familiar with reading, writing, and arithmetic, these being the means of all theoretical culture; then (*b*) hands over to them a picture of the world in its principal phases, so that they as citizens of the world can find their proper status on our planet; and, finally, it must (*c*) instruct him in the history of his own state, so that he may see that the circumstances in which he lives are the result of a determined past in its connection with the history of the rest of the world, and so may learn rightly to estimate the interests of his own country in view of their necessary relation to the future. This work the elementary schools have to perform. From this, through the *Realschule* (our scientific High School course) they pass into the school where some particular branch of science is taught, and through the Gymnasium (classical course of a High School or College) to the University. From its general basis develop (2) the educational institutions that work towards some special education which leads over to the exercise of some art. These we call Technological schools, where one may learn farming, mining, a craft, a trade, navigation, war, &c. This kind of education may be specialized indefinitely with the growth of culture, because any one branch is capable in its negative aspect of such educational separation, as e.g. in foundling hospitals and orphan asylums, in blind and deaf and dumb institutions. The abstract universality of the Elementary school and the one-sided particularity of the Technological school, however, is subsumed under a concrete universality, which, without aiming directly at utility, treats science and art on all sides as their own end and aim. *Scientia est potentia*, said Lord Bacon. Practical utility results indirectly through the progress which Scientific Cognition makes in this free attitude, because it collects itself out of

the dissipation through manifold details into a universal idea and attains a profounder insight thereby. This organism for the purpose of instruction is properly called a University. By it the educational organization is perfected.

—It is essentially seen that no more than these three types of schools can exist, and that they must all exist in a perfectly organized civilization. Their titles and the plan of their special teaching may be very different among different nations and at different times, but this need not prevent the recognition in them of the ideas which determine them. Still less should the imperfect ways in which they manifest themselves induce us to condemn them. It is the modern tendency to undervalue the University as an institution which we had inherited from the middle ages, and with which we could at present dispense. This is an error. The university presents just as necessary a form of instruction as the elementary school or the technological school. Not the abolition of the university, but a reform which shall adapt it to the spirit of the age, is the advance which we have to make. That there are to be found outside of the university men of the most thorough and elegant culture, who can give the most excellent instruction in a science or an art, is most certain. But it is a characteristic of the university in its teaching to do away with contingency which is unavoidable in case of private voluntary efforts. The university presents an organic, self-conscious, encyclopædic representation of all the sciences, and thus is created to a greater or less degree an intellectual atmosphere which no other place can give. Through this, all sciences and their aims are seen as of equal authority—a personal stress is laid upon the connection of the sciences. The imperfections of a university, which arise through the rivalry of external ambition, through the necessity of financial success, through the jealousy of different parties, through scholarships, &c., are finitudes which it has in common with all human institutions, and on whose account they are not all to be thrown away.—Art-academies are for Art what universities are for Science. They are inferior to them in so far as they appear more under the form of special schools, as schools of architecture, of painting, and conservatories of music; while really it may well be supposed that Architecture,

Sculpture, Painting, Music, the Orchestra, and the Drama, are, like the Sciences, bound together in a *Universitas artium*, and that by means of their internal reciprocal action new results would follow.—Academies, as isolated master-schools, which follow no particular line of teaching, are entirely superfluous, and serve only as a *Prytaneum* for meritorious scholars, and to reward industry through the prizes which they offer. In their idea they belong with the university, this appearing externally in the fact that most of their members are university professors. But as institutions for ostentation by which the ambition of the learned was flattered, and to surround princes with scientific glory as scientific societies attached to a court, they have lost all significance. They ceased to flourish with the Ptolemies and the Egyptian caliphs, and with absolute monarchical governments.—In modern times we have passed beyond the abstract jealousy of the so-called Humanities and the Natural Sciences, because we comprehend that each part of the totality can be realized in a proper sense only by its development as relatively independent. Thus the *gymnasium* has its place as that elementary school which through a general culture, by means of the knowledge of the language and history of the Greeks and Romans, prepares for the university; while, on the other hand, the *Realschule*, by special attention to Natural Science and the living languages, constitutes the transition to the technological schools. Nevertheless, because the university embraces the Science of Nature, of Technology, of Trade, of Finance, and of Statistics, the pupils who have graduated from the so-called high schools (*höhern Bürgerschulen*) and from the *Realschulen* will be brought together at the university.—

§ 132. The technique of the school will be determined in its details by the peculiarity of its aim. But in general every school, no matter what it teaches, ought to have some system of rules and regulations by which the relation of the pupil to the institution, of the pupils to each other, their relation to the teacher, and that of the teachers to each other as well as to the supervisory authority, the programme of lessons, the apparatus, of the changes of work and recreation, shall be clearly set forth. The course of study must be arranged so

as to avoid two extremes: on the one hand, it has to keep in view the special aim of the school, and according to this it tends to contract itself. But, on the other hand, it must consider the relative dependence of one specialty to other specialties and to general culture. It must leave the transition free, and in this it tends to expand itself. The difficulty is here so to assign the limits that the special task of the school shall not be sacrificed and deprived of the means of performance which it (since it is also always only a part of the whole culture) receives by means of its reciprocal action with other departments. The programme must assign the exact amount of time which can be appropriated to every study. It must prescribe the order in which they shall follow each other; it must, as far as possible, unite kindred subjects, so as to avoid the useless repetition which dulls the charm of study; it must, in determining the order, bear in mind at the same time the necessity imposed by the subject itself and the psychological progression of intelligence from perception, through conception, to the thinking activity which grasps all. It must periodically be submitted to revision, so that all matter which has, through the changed state of general culture, become out of date, may be rejected, and that that which has proved itself inimitable may be appropriated; in general, so that it may be kept up to the requirements of the times. And, finally, the school must, by examinations and reports, aid the pupil in the acquirement of a knowledge of his real standing. The examination lets him know what he has really learned, and what he is able to do: the report gives him an account of his culture, exhibits to him in what he has made improvement and in what he has fallen behind, what defects he has shown, what talents he has displayed, what errors committed, and in what relation stands his theoretical development to his ethical status.

—The opposition of the *Gymnasia* to the demands of the agricultural communities is a very interesting phase of educational history. They were asked to widen their course so as to embrace Mathematics, Physics, Natural History, Geography, and the modern languages. At first they stoutly resisted; then they made some concessions; finally, the more they made the more they found themselves in contradiction

with their true work, and so they produced as an independent correlate the *Realschule.* After this was founded, the gymnasium returned to its old plan, and is now again able to place in the foreground the pursuit of classical literature and history. It was thus set free from demands made upon it which were entirely foreign to its nature.—The examination is, on one side, so adapted to the pupil as to make him conscious of his own condition. As to its external side, it determines whether the pupil shall pass from one class to another or from one school to another, or it decides whether the school as a whole shall give a public exhibition—an exhibition which ought to have no trace of ostentation, but which in fact is often tinctured with pedagogical charlatanism.

§ 133. The Direction of the school on the side of science must be held by the school itself, for the process of the intellect in acquiring science, the progress of the method, the determinations of the subject-matter and the order of its development, have their own laws, to which Instruction must submit itself if it would attain its end. The school is only one part of the whole of culture. In itself it divides into manifold departments, together constituting a great organism which in manifold ways comes into contact with the organism of the state. So long as teaching is of a private character, so long as it is the reciprocal relation of one individual to another, or so long as it is shut up within the circle of the family and belongs to it alone, so long it has no objective character. It receives this first when it grows to a school. As in history, its first form must have a religious character; but this first form, in time, disappears. Religion is the absolute relation of man to God which subsumes all other relations. In so far as Religion exists in the form of a church, those who are members of the same church may have instruction given on the nature of religion among themselves. Instruction on the subject is proper, and it is even enjoined upon them as a law—as a duty. But further than their own society they may not extend their rule. The church may exert itself to make a religious spirit felt in the school and to make it penetrate all the teaching; but it may not presume, because it has for its subject the absolute interest of men, the interest which is

superior to all others, to determine also the other objects of Education or the method of treating them. The technical acquisitions of Reading, Writing and Arithmetic, Drawing and Music, the Natural Sciences, Mathematics, Logic, Anthropology and Psychology, the practical sciences of finance and the municipal regulations, have no direct relation to religion. If we attempt to establish one, there inevitably appears in them a morbid state which destroys them; not only so, but piety itself disappears, for these accomplishments and this knowledge are not included in its idea.

—Such treatment of Art and Science may be well-meant, but it is always an error. It may even make a ludicrous impression, which is a very dangerous thing for the authority of religion. If a church has established schools, it must see to it that all which is there taught outside of the religious instruction, i.e. all of science and art, shall have no direct connection with it as a religious institution.—

§ 134. The Church, as the external manifestation of religion, is concerned with the absolute relation of man, the relation to God, special in itself as opposed to his other relations; the State, on the contrary, seizes the life of a nation according to its *explicit totality*. The State should conduct the education of all its citizens. To it, then, the church can appear only as a school, for the church instructs its own people concerning the nature of religion, partly by teaching proper, that of the catechism, partly in quite as edifying a way, by preaching. From this point of view, the State can look upon the church only as one of those schools which prepare for a special avocation. The church appears to the State as that school which assumes the task of educating the religious element. Just as little as the church should the state attempt to exercise any influence over Science and Art. In this they are exactly alike, and must acknowledge the necessity which both Science and Art contain within themselves and by which they determine themselves. The laws of Logic, Mathematics, Astronomy, Morals, Æsthetics, Physiology, &c., are entirely independent of the state. It can decree neither discoveries nor inventions. The state in its relations to science occupies the same ground as it should do with relation to the freedom of self-consciousness. It is true that the church teaches man,

but it demands from him at the same time belief in the truth of its dogmas. It rests, as the real church, on presupposed authority, and sinks finally all contradictions which may be found in the absolute mystery of the existence of God. The state, on the contrary, elaborates its idea into the form of laws, i.e. into general determinations, of whose necessity it convinces itself. It seeks to give to these laws the clearest possible form, so that every one may understand them. It concedes validity only to that which can be proved, and sentences the individual according to the external side of the *deed* (overt act) not, as the church does, on its internal side—that of *intention.* Finally, it demands in him consciousness of his deed, because it makes each one responsible for his own deed. It has, therefore, the same principle with science, for the proof of necessity and the unity of consciousness with its object constitute the essence of science. Since the state embraces the school as one of its educational organisms, it is from its very nature especially called upon to guide its regulation in accordance with the manifestation of consciousness.

—The church calls this "profanation." One might say that the church, with its mystery of Faith, always represents the absolute problem of science, while the state, as to its form, coincides with science. Whenever the state abandons the strictness of proof—when it begins to measure the individual citizen by his intention and not by his deed, and, in place of the clear insight of the comprehending consciousness, sets up the psychological compulsion of a hollow mechanical authority, it destroys itself.—

§ 135. Neither the church nor the state should attempt to control the school in its internal management. Still less can the school constitute itself into a state within the state; for, while it is only one of the means which are necessary for developing citizens, the state and the church lay claim to the whole man his whole life long. The independence of the school can then only consist in this, that it raises within the state an organ which works under its control, and which as school authority endeavors within itself to befriend the needs of the school, while externally it acts on the church and state indirectly by means of ethical powers. The emancipation of the school can never reasonably mean its abstract isolation,

or the absorption of the ecclesiastical and political life into the school; it can signify only the free reciprocal action of the school with state and church. It must never be forgotten that what makes the school a school is not the total process of education, for this falls also within the family, the state, and the church; but that the proper work of the school is the process of instruction, knowledge, and the acquirement, by practice, of skill.

—The confusion of the idea of Instruction with that of Education in general is a common defect in superficial treatises on these themes. The Radicals among those who are in favor of so-called "Emancipation," often erroneously appeal to "free Greece" which generally for this fond ignorance is made to stand as authority for a thousand things of which it never dreamed. In this fictitious Hellas of "free, beautiful humanity," they say the limits against which we strive to-day did not exist. The histories of Anaxagoras, Protagoras, Diagoras, Socrates, Aristotle, Theophrastus, and of others, who were all condemned on account of their "impiety," tell quite another story.—

§ 136. The inspection of the school may be carried out in different ways, but it must be required that its special institutions shall be embraced and cared for as organized and related wholes, framed in accordance with the idea of the state, and that one division of the ministry shall occupy itself exclusively with it. The division of labor will specially affect the schools for teaching particular avocations. The prescription of the subjects to be studied in each school as appropriate to it, of the course of study, and of the object thereof, properly falls to this department of government, is its immediate work, and its theory must be changed according to the progress and needs of the time. Niemeyer, Schwarz, and others, have made out such plans for schools. Scheinert has fully painted the *Volkschule*, Mager the *Bürgerschule*, Deinhard and Kapp the *Gymnasium*. But such delineations, however correct they may be, depend upon the actual sum of culture of a people and a time, and must therefore continually modify their fundamental Ideal. The same is true of the methods of instruction in the special arts and sciences. Niemeyer, Schwarz, Herbart, in their sketches of Pedagogics, Beneke in

his *Doctrine of Education*, and others, have set forth in detail the method of teaching Reading, Writing and Arithmetic, Languages, Natural Science, Geography, History, &c. Such directions are, however, ephemeral in value, and only relatively useful, and must, in order to be truly practical, be always newly laid out in accordance with universal educational principles, and with the progress of science and art.

—The idea that the State has the right to oversee the school lies in the very idea of the State, which is authorized, and under obligation, to secure the education of its citizens, and cannot leave their fashioning to chance. The emancipation of the school from the State, the abstracting of it, would lead to the destruction of the school. There is no difficulty in Protestant States in the free inter-action of school and church, for Protestantism has consciously accepted as its peculiar principle individual freedom as Christianity has presented it. For Catholic States, however, a difficulty exists. The Protestant clergyman can with propriety oversee the *Volkschule*, for here he works as teacher, not as priest. In the Protestant church there are really no Laity according to the original meaning of the term. On the contrary, Catholic clergymen are essentially priests, and as such, on account of the unconditional obedience which, according to their church, they have to demand, they usurp the authority of the State. From this circumstance arise, at present, numberless collisions in the department of school supervision.—

HAMLET.

By D. J. Snider.

In our last essay we attempted to give the essential elements of Hamlet's character. Upon this character a series of external circumstances are brought to bear, the object of which is to incite him to action. The course of the drama is therefore to exhibit these circumstances and their influence upon Hamlet, and consequently we have now to take the poem in hand and to watch its gradual development. We shall consider these different influences separately, and try to

point out their order and gradation. Possibly, too, there may be often found between them a logical connection.

The first of these external influences which are brought to bear upon Hamlet is the conduct of his mother. Her marriage, especially with such a man as Claudio, so soon after her husband's death, has touched to the very core the profound ethical nature of Hamlet, who feels that therein the family relation is essentially annihilated. He has to deny to his own mother all true womanhood, and hence the moral world seems to him to be falling into chaos. As Hamlet's whole being is wrapped up in this moral world, he feels that he possesses no bond which can tie him to existence; hence he is continually contemplating suicide, from which however that same ethical nature holds him back. Besides, he has, as before stated, a foreboding of something still worse which is soon to be revealed.

The second of these external influences which come upon Hamlet is the Ghost, for which preparation is made in the very first scene of the play. It tells the terrible tale of his father's murder, and enjoins the still more terrible revenge. The motives for action are now complete, presentiment has become knowledge. But just here arises a question which is probably destined to be a matter of doubt, and hence a subject of discussion as long as the play is read by human eyes. What is the significance of the Ghost? The easiest way of getting rid of the difficulty is no doubt to take the apparition just as it is, without further troubling ourselves about the matter. But as one cannot well suppose that Shakspeare believed in ghosts, every thinking man must demand some explanation. It may be held that it is employed as a species of poetical machinery, somewhat as Virgil used the Grecian Mythology. Still this will not do. Nearly all close readers of Shakspeare have the firmest faith that he never introduces supernatural forms without a profound spiritual signification. Another theory is that the Ghost was gotten up by somebody, say Horatio, or the soldiers or persons not mentioned in the play; and there are several passages which, being read with such an opinion in view, are sufficient to excite an impression to this effect. Again, it is supposed by some that the Ghost is a typical representation

of Hamlet's suspicion, or possibly that of the people; an objectification of the vague and ghost-like doubts, hintings, rumors of the time. Besides special objections against each of these views, there lies the general objection against all of them: there is no adequate ground stated for the employment of the Ghost. The poet has himself given us no solution of the difficulty, when a mere hint would have been sufficient. We may suppose therefore that he intended to leave his audience in the dark about the matter; that he designed to have them see just what Hamlet sees and no more. He simply represents the Ghost as one of those external influences which are to spur Hamlet on to action. This is its function in the play, but the secret of its origin must remain forever untold.

Our consideration of this subject, therefore, will take a somewhat different turn. We shall not neglect to ascertain the meaning of the Ghost, as was attempted in the above-mentioned theories, but at the same time we shall accept it in its present form and undertake to place the employment of it upon a rational basis. Here is a great mediation in an unusual way; what justification for its use? The simple question then is, why is the Ghost taken? Its reality must be carefully observed: it speaks the truth, it tells what is nowhere else told in the drama, it gives the pathos to Hamlet, furnishes the basis of his action; it acts quite the same in this respect as if it were no ghost. There is no hint that it has falsified, and in fact the entire course and purport of the drama rest upon its statements in reference to the murder of the King and faithlessness of his wife. We think that the character of Hamlet determines the fact that this news takes the form of a ghost. It has already been stated how he melts all reality into his own subjective shapes; how he conjures up all sorts of relations, doubts, possibilities, excuses, which may be called the ghosts of Reflection. Now Hamlet lived in this unreal, subjective world, where true existence turns to a shadow. The Ghost here means just this, an unreal form of a reality. It is the way in which a fact reveals itself to such a mind—a fact whose actual nature is entirely changed and colored by the mental medium through

which it passes, and its real character is transformed into the unreal, ghostly.

This apparition is the leading motive of the play. It furnishes Hamlet the basis of his action, gives him his end which is to slay the King. But the murder of his father was a deed; here he enters the realm of shadows; for how does the deed appear to a deedless man? No doubt as a ghost. How, then, can it work as a spur to him? Because Hamlet, as an intellectual man, knows of action and its necessity; hence his longing for it, his seeking for it like something lost, which however he cannot find. He cannot *realize* this knowledge, hence it can be to him only an unreality, a spectre. The question with the poet is, what objective form can I get to represent Hamlet's view of such a deed? The ghost is most happily chosen, for it means that the form is not a substantial one, has no objective validity; it may be comprehended but not realized.

There are therefore two elements in the Ghost, both of which must be kept distinctly before the mind, the real and the unreal. On the one hand, it represents occurrences which actually took place; its utterances are true, and are taken throughout the play just as if they had been spoken by an ordinary character. Hamlet, to be sure, hesitates in one place to accept its statements, but that is only an excuse for deferring action. On the other hand, its form is unreal, as being a ghost, which form results, as before explained, from the nature of Hamlet's mind.

But how does the opinion here presented consist with the fact that others see the Ghost besides Hamlet? It is specially to be noted with what care the poet guards the objectivity of the Ghost as one of its essential elements; for it is not only seen by others, but it is seen by others before it is seen by Hamlet himself. Not the least hint is given of its secret in the whole play, and its objective nature is most rigorously preserved. So great and so striking is the precaution of the poet in this respect, that we cannot help attributing it to the most careful design. But what ground is there for such a procedure? A most excellent ground, and one that exhibits the profoundest conception of tragic art. *The poet wishes to*

involve his audience in the same doubts and conflicts as his hero. He designs the apparition for us too; we are to look upon it as it were with Hamlet's eyes, and hence must not know anything more about it than Hamlet himself. To be sure, we may not regard it with his trust; we may disbelieve entirely in ghosts; but thus the nature of his mind is revealed, and the chasm between his consciousness and our own is made manifest. Still further, the audience must have the same problem before them as Hamlet, they must be assailed by the same difficulty, must be required to solve the enigma of the ghost. Thus a character becomes tragic to the spectators when they are rent by the same contradiction which destroys the hero. If the audience stands above the hero, and comprehends all his complications and mistakes, we begin to enter the realm of comedy.

Suppose the subject were treated otherwise. The poet might have dispensed with the Ghost, and had the news of the murder told to Hamlet, in a separate scene, by some spy who had secreted himself in the garden; but then we would lose the objective form which exhibits Hamlet's mind, though he might still be portrayed as vacillating. Again, the poet might have let the spectators into the mystery of the Ghost, while he kept it a secret to Hamlet; then the whole pathos of the character would be destroyed, for this depends upon the audience sharing in the same struggle as the hero. Such are the grounds upon which rests the justification of the poet in giving strong objective validity to the Ghost; for these reasons, so many people in the play see it besides Hamlet; his mental characteristics are thus shown as they could be by no other means; finally, in this way the tragic element is brought out in its fullest significance, since the audience must solve the same problem and is involved in the same contradiction as Hamlet.

The third external influence is the company of actors. The connection of this part with the preceding is by no means remote. For the drama also is not the reality, but only the representation of the reality. The Ghost is the dim uncertain subjective representation of the deed, the primitive conception; the drama is the clear objective representation of the deed in an ideal form, yet is not the real action itself. Now the whole course of the play is to show the influences

which spur Hamlet on to do the deed first enjoined by the Ghost, namely, to revenge his father's murder. Revenge means like for like; Hamlet is to do to the King what the King did to his father. But he will first represent it on the stage, and then, he thinks, act it himself. Hence this play within the play is an intermediate link between the Ghost and the ultimate deed. It is also very characteristic of Hamlet that he is fond of the drama; it pictures action, but requires none from him. So in his mind he loves to contemplate action, but hates to act.

His changed demeanor has already excited the suspicion of the court, and all the mediatorial characters of the play—Polonius, Rosencrantz, Guildenstern, and Ophelia—are set to work in order to worm out his secret. How they are baffled at every point need not here be detailed, though it forms by itself a most interesting study. In the mean time the players arrive; Hamlet calls for a favorite speech, entitled "The Slaughter of Priam." But why is this lengthy and apparently irrelevant declamation brought in here? Its point lies in the inconsolable grief of Hecuba, wife of Priam, who has just beheld the murder of her husband. Hence Hamlet calls for it as furnishing a soothing contrast to the conduct of his faithless mother. Thus it is seen that this long insertion is in the deepest harmony with the subject of the tragedy, and bears as a motive directly upon Hamlet. But that which sets him on fire is the action of the player, who seems to be more influenced by a mere fiction than he himself by the most fearful actual occurrence. Bitter self-reproach follows with apparently a new resolution. But a doubt rises, a reflection enters—the Ghost *may* be a deception; hence there is another deferment till he can catch the conscience of the King in a play. Nor can he do otherwise, for what is the deed to Hamlet but a shadowy spectre? Hence he doubts the deed which has been done, and doubts the deed which he is to do.

But the matter cannot rest here. The keen reflective mind of Hamlet must know its own state. Already he has shown misgivings in respect to his ability to accomplish his work. Hence when we next meet him—it is in the far-famed soliloquy on suicide—he is perfectly aware of his mental condition, and seems to regard it as final, as something which cannot

be helped. We have already pointed out the motive for self-murder, which was frequently hovering before his mind. The subject again comes up in this connection, as he has now become conscious of his irresolution, and still is pressed on by the most fearful injunctions. What is he to do? Kill himself. Let us first cast up the debit and credit side of death. Death relieves us from all the natural shocks that flesh is heir to, from all wrongs, in general from the whips and scorns of time; so much is clear gain. But hold! there is a dream-world beyond; there 's the rub:

> "For in that sleep of death, what dreams *may* come
> When we have shuffled off this mortal coil
> Must give us pause."

Upon this bare possibility we shall forego all the acknowledged advantages of death. Hamlet has already declared that the external world was too strong for his frail individuality; he cannot resist the slings and arrows of outrageous fortune, but is prone to passively suffer all which collides with him. He sees that death is the only destiny of such a person. But what deters him from the act? The future state, which, whatever else may be said about it, is the land of shadows, of unrealities, to the living man, for the simple reason that he has not yet realized that state, and cannot do so till after death. This realm being so perfectly void is a fine field for the imagination, since there is absolutely nothing in the way. Let no one think that by these remarks we are doubting or denying the great doctrine of immortality; but this rests upon quite other grounds, namely, the rationality of man, and cannot be given by imagination. Hamlet, true to his character, assigns the greater validity to this spectre of unreality. Whatever the future state may be to others, to him it is and can only be the land of possibilities. But the principal thing to be observed is, that he is now aware of his own condition, and gives it expression:

> "And thus the native hue of resolution
> Is sicklied o'er with the pale cast of thought."

Moreover, his moral nature also rebels at the thought of suicide as it did at the thought of murder:

> "Thus conscience does make cowards of us all."

But the word "conscience" may have here a much broader signification than its present usage allows. The struggle of Hamlet against the King has thus become internal, against himself. The destruction of Claudio was enjoined upon him as the most sacred duty, yet he cannot bring himself to its performance, and is now conscious of the fact. What does he think of himself? "If I have not strength of individuality enough to do such a duty, then I have not strength enough to live; I am too weak to assert myself in this world of rude buffeting tempests." Such is his conclusion. But he can no more kill himself than he can kill the King, and for the same reason. It would be a contradiction if he could. Hence we see the same unreality, the same spectral excuses coming up to forestall action in the latter case as in the former. Hence Hamlet remains still a living being with the same conflicts as before, which are now renewed with increased fury.

The play within the play succeeds perfectly, but has also had another result not so favorable to Hamlet. If the latter has now perfect evidence, the King also has become aware of the fact that Hamlet is apprised of his guilt. Consequently more decisive measures must be taken to get rid of the dangerous dissembler. Preparations are accordingly made to despatch him to England and there murder him. But this play has struck another chord in the King's character, which on one or two occasions hitherto has shown some signs of life —conscience. The attempt at prayer by the King forms the counterpart to Hamlet's soliloquy on suicide. The King here has done the deed; his desire is that it should be undone. Note the steps, for we have in this piece the most complete exposition of the noblest Christian doctrine, and it is worth more than many volumes of Theology. He attempts prayer, which means he tries to place himself in harmony with the divine Being, the rational principle of the Universe. But that Being he has offended to the last degree by his conduct, hence there seems to be no reconciliation. But is there no hope? Yes, there is mercy for even the greatest criminal. How? First, by a complete repentance in spirit for the act; secondly, by surrendering all its advantages. That is, *you must make that undone which you have done, as far as lies*

in your power. You cannot restore the dead, it is true, nor call back the past, but you can do justice to the living by ample restitution. The Spirit of man has this power, it can heal its own wounds; the Will can withdraw itself from its deed and say, "It is no longer mine." Such is subjective repentance. But this is not enough. There must be an objective correspondence, else it is not complete; the *deed* must be reversed; all gains and advantages must be unconditionally surrendered. Hence the King feels that he cannot be forgiven as long as he is still possessed

> "Of those effects for which I did the murder,
> My crown, mine own ambition, and my queen."

Verily there is no way out but to make a clean breast of the matter, as we say with true metaphor. And furthermore, he cannot buy off his own conscience, "there is no shuffling"; what remains? Only the bitter demands of repentance. This he tries, and moreover essays formal prayer, but without success; he cannot repent. His crimes are too monstrous for him to retrace his steps. Can he give up his queen, his throne, confess the murder of his brother, renounce his plans against young Hamlet? It were to demand too much of poor human nature to expect it, yet such is the only way of salvation. Here we see the contrast between the two: conscience keeping back Hamlet, yet spurring on the King; the one seeks to do, the other to undo, with the same inefficiency. In the one case, the deed smothers conscience; in the other, conscience the deed. Their actions pertain to the same matter: the murder of the father, the marriage of the mother, the exclusion of the son from the throne. Hamlet is invoked to visit justice upon the man who has done these things, the King is urged by conscience to make them undone. The King refuses, so does Hamlet.

Perhaps there is no passage in Shakspeare equal to this one in grandeur of thought, and in clearness and exhaustiveness of statement. The heart is kindled, and the mind is excited to the highest intensity by its marvelous power. It may be called the Northern or Teutonic interpretation of Christianity, in distinction from the Southern or Romanic. That interpretation insists upon the moral content of religion as distinguished from its external ceremonies and abstract

dogmas. These are considered of no validity unless they make men good, determine their conduct. That a person can be a Christian and immoral at the same time is almost inconceivable to the Northern mind. But if we turn to Calderon, the greatest dramatist of Southern Europe, we shall find quite the opposite interpretation. In his drama called *Purgatorio di San Patricio*, there is a direct contrast between these principles. Two characters are portrayed, one of which is good and upright, the other is the most desperate villain that can be imagined; he has been guilty of adultery, murder, seduction of nuns, in fact of quite every conceivable crime. Still he has Faith and is ready to lose his life in its defence, and as a consequence Heaven has vouchsafed to him many marks of special favor. Both these characters, though morally direct opposites, are still Christians:

> "Pues aunque somos Christianos
> Los dos, somos tan opuestos
> Que distamos quanto va
> Desde ser malo á ser bueno."

Here the antithesis is openly stated; it is not necessary to be moral in order to be a good Christian; Christianity and morality are divorced totally. In another drama, *El Príncipe constante*, there is portrayed the collision between Christianity and Mohammedanism. These two forms of faith are not made the basis of a distinction in character; on the contrary, the Moorish prince possesses all the qualities which command honor and respect in an equal or even greater degree than the Spanish prince. Now it may be fairly stated that this would be no collision at all in Shakspearian art or for the Northern consciousness. A Spanish audience would no doubt applaud the devotion to an abstract dogma which is represented in this play; but an English or German audience would say, "If Christianity cannot make better men than Mahommedanism, it has no advantage; we would just as lieve be one as the other." Herein lies the immense difference between Calderon and Shakspeare. The latter brings all religion back to its spiritual basis, and never rests in mere externality. How does it affect the character and conduct of men when they seize these religions as ends in life and realize them in their actions? asks Shakspeare. His treatment

of this theme can be best seen in the *Merchant of Venice*, in the characters of Shylock and Antonio, where there is also portrayed a religious collision, that between Judaism and Christianity. But Calderon's main question is, "Infidel or Christian?" or perhaps it is more narrow still, "Catholic or Non-catholic?" If a man only believes in the true doctrine, he possesses the privilege of moral delinquency; for he has the absolute end of man, faith in a dogma: morality is quite a subordinate, even indifferent matter. But Shakspeare reverses these elements—religion is subordinate to morality, or rather has morality for its content. In the hands of Calderon, the act of formal prayer on the part of the guilty King would have been an ample repentance; but Shakspeare demands something profounder than a mere genuflection.

The fourth external influence is Fortinbras marching against the Polack. The connection between this occurrence and what has just preceded is to be carefully noted. The player exhibited the ideal world of action before Hamlet, but the representation was unable to incite him forward to the deed. There still remains the real world of action which now appears in the person of the young Fortinbras. What influence will this produce upon him? For it would seem to be the climax of incitement. Fortinbras is the man of action, and this element is brought into greater prominence by the small value of its object. The prize is a litte patch of ground not worth a rental of five ducats, yet here is a youth who defies fortune to the utmost for its possession. The contrast strikes Hamlet in the most forcible manner. He has a father murdered, a mother debauched, a throne despoiled,—still he does not act. He resolves anew to perform the deed, but, as the sequel shows, with the same result as before. Here again he states his difficulty with all the energy of self-reproach; it is thinking too precisely on the event, while Fortinbras makes mouths at the invisible event; he confesses that he has strength and means to carry out his end; he can give no good reason to himself for his delay, but is inclined to ascribe it to cowardice, to his anxiety about consequences. It is the strongest example that could be presented to him, and we may suppose that from the impression which it made upon him he afterwards selects Fortinbras as the fittest suc-

cessor to the throne. For we can well imagine that Hamlet now has the highest appreciation of a man of action.

The introduction of Fortinbras has been condemned by Goethe as an unnecessary part of the drama, but its presence can be justified on the strictest logical grounds. Fortinbras is the man of action, but something more; he is the man of action as the head of the State. He is inspired in the highest degree with the sense of nationality; the elder Hamlet had contracted the bounds of his country, which it is the first grand object of his ambition to win back, but he is overborne by higher authority. There remains the expedition against the Polack, to vindicate some ancient right or avenge some wrong, from which he returns victorious just at the death of Hamlet. Thus he is seen on all sides asserting his own nationality against all other countries which in any way collide with the same; he seeks the full recognition of his people abroad, and is quite ready to subjugate other lands to the strong national spirit which he has aroused. Such a man is a ruler, at least in the most essential sense; he obtains absolute respect for his country without, and strengthens the national spirit within. Herein he stands in direct contrast to Hamlet and the King. They employ their time at home in plotting each other's murder, yet both are afraid to perform the act. The house of Denmark, therefore, goes down in its effete representatives, and the true ruler takes their place.

Thus the play has a positive solution. Most tragedies end with the death of the colliding characters, a merely negative result, which would be the case here were the part of Fortinbras left out. The Danish princes perish because they are unworthy of their dignity, and are succeeded by one who has shown himself to be a sovereign in the highest sense. The play therefore begins with Fortinbras at the second scene, and ends with Fortinbras; his activity is the frame in which its whole movement is set. Thus the poet has portrayed him as the absolute contrast to Hamlet, and made him triumphant at the close as the man of action. How much therefore must the thought of the poem lose by the absence of this character? When we consider also the additional reason for its introduction, that it forms the culmination of that series of external influences which it is the plan of the drama to unfold, the

objection of Goethe would seem to be entirely groundless. For Hamlet must have also the real world of action come up before him to incite him to the deed. Hence this character is an integral and indispensable part of the play.

It would now be advantageous to turn back and review for a moment the four external influences which have been mentioned, and observe their gradation. The hasty marriage of the mother is the first one, wherein Hamlet only surmises; in the second, which is the Ghost, the whole affair is revealed. The declamation of the actor on the subject of Hecuba, and the subsequent play, constitute the third; it must not be forgotten that the matter is something feigned, not real; the story is a myth — instead of action, it is action represented. The fourth influence, the expedition of Fortinbras, is the deed itself, which now appears before him in its full reality. But neither the representation nor the reality can bring him to the point of action. It is evident that the last and highest effort has been expended, and, from now on, the nature of the influences and the character of Hamlet must change.

What is he to do? Kill himself — but that is impossible; he can no more kill himself than kill the King. The question of suicide was settled, as will be remembered, in the well-known soliloquy on that subject. He can only let come what comes, defending himself perhaps against the attempts of others; but the great aggressive act which includes all acts must remain unperformed. But what is about to come? The consequences of even what he has already done, are rapidly returning upon him; the King, goaded by suspicion, has resolved upon his destruction; Laertes, the avenger of Polonius's murder, is near at hand, and crying for his blood. The external influences are no longer mere examples brought forward to incite him to action, but he is now involved in their meshes; they seize hold of him and carry him along irresistibly in their movement. Hence he must also experience the bitter fact that he is controlled by something outside of his own intelligence upon which hitherto he has had the firmest reliance.

First comes the capture of Hamlet by the pirates and his sudden return. It is a most strange occurrence, and has always given great difficulty. Accident, contrary to the general

rule of the poet, seems to determine the course of things in the most startling manner, and the whole poem to be made to rest upon a most improbable event. Hamlet is sent to England—a pirate pursues his ship and grapples with it—he boards the strange vessel, when it suddenly cuts loose with Hamlet alone, and afterwards puts him safely on shore. The whole proceeding is so suspicious, that, were such an event to occur in real life, everybody would think at once of collusion. This impression is much strengthened by the confidence with which he speaks of his ability to foil all the machinations of the King in sending him to England:

> "Let it work,
> For 'tis the sport to have the engineer
> Hoist with his own petar; and 't shall go hard
> But I will delve one yard below their mines
> And blow them at the moon."

Indeed he rejoices in the prospect:

> "O, 'tis most sweet
> When in one line two crafts directly meet."

Note how absolute his trust still is in his intelligence. Such confidence seems to be begotten of preparation. One is inclined, therefore, to explain the occurrence in this way: Hamlet hired the pretended pirate, and gave to its officers his instructions before he left port; indeed he most probably had also some understanding with the officers of the royal ship which was to convey him. Yet this view, apparently so well-founded, we must at once abandon when we read Hamlet's account of the affair (Act V., Scene 2). In that he ascribes his action wholly to instinct; there was no premeditation, no planning at all. But, what is more astonishing, he has come to prefer unconscious impulse to deliberation; he has renounced intelligence as the guide of conduct. Yet before this event how he delighted in his skill, in his counterplots, in his intellectual dexterity? Now, what is the cause of this great change in his character? In the first place, it ought to be observed that the expressions above quoted were uttered by him when there might be still some hope of being brought to action, before the last and strongest influence, the appearance of Fortinbras, revealed to him that his case was desperate. But the great cause of his conversion was this startling event, in which he saw that Accident or some exter-

nal power was mistress over the best matured plans of men. Here is an element which had never been included in his calculations upon which heretofore he had placed so great reliance; suddenly they are swept down by this unknown force. He sees that it is objectively valid in the world, but he knows that he himself is not, for he cannot do the deed; hence he must believe in it more than in himself. Hamlet thus becomes a convert from Intelligence to Fate, from self-determination to external determination. So must every person without will be to a greater or lesser extent a disbeliever in will, for his sole experience is that man is controlled from without. Thus it can be seen that the introduction of this accident is based upon the weightiest grounds, and is in the completest harmony with the development of the drama. Accident appears here in a manner which is legitimate in Art, not to cut a complicated knot or to create a sudden surprise, but to determine character.

Now follows another most remarkable yet strictly logical transition. This man, whose irresolution has become an intellectual conviction—who has even renounced his belief in action and made himself the puppet of chance—who has thus as near as possible, without suicide, stripped himself of a real existence in the world,—where next shall we find him? In the grave-yard, alive; for, as before stated, he cannot destroy himself. Thus he is brought to the very abode of death without entering the door. The grave is that bit of earth which contains man when he absolutely ceases to act; he is laid away in it when his body can no longer assert itself, but becomes the prey of the elements. Reality ends there and possibility begins.

But Hamlet is still alive, and hence not yet ready for this final resting place. Now, for the living, the grave-yard, above all other localities, is the home of meditation; every one feels this influence within its borders; each small mound calls up an infinitude of possibilities. The hum of the actual world is removed, and the future here strikes into the present and absorbs us into itself for the moment. But the future cannot be *realized*, for when it is real it is the present. Hence Hamlet, with his subjective contemplative nature, must find in this spot a most congenial theme for his reflection; he will

not be annoyed by the bustling activity of the world, nor pushed on by any necessity to do his deed.

But even the grave-yard, the end of activity, has still an activity of its own, and must also furnish a contrast to Hamlet which will be seen to disturb him. It is an humble calling, though none the less real — we allude to the grave-diggers. They seem to have an air of indifference and nonchalance which ill accord with the character of the place and even grate somewhat upon the feelings. But this is just the point; grave-digging is their daily occupation which they go about unhesitatingly, and again Hamlet beholds men who practically fulfil their calling, however humble and repulsive it may be. Thus the common laborer is also brought in with his lesson, for the low estate of these grave-diggers appears to be strongly emphasized by the poet. To their simple minds the great forms of the world are quite devoid of content or meaning; they talk of Christianity and Law with the most grotesque formality, which becomes the more ridiculous by their attempted adherence to formal Logic. One is inclined to say, a fit place for all such forms when they have lost their inner substance—the grave-yard. It is here shown how the ignorant rabble must regard the highest concrete truth; it loses its entire spirit and degenerates into an empty formalism. So these grave-diggers exhibit their mode of viewing the great questions of the world; but they soon come down to the more congenial element of banter and jest, and at last to the gross appetite in a stoup of liquor. One of them is humming a ditty of youthful love, while at work, when Hamlet appears. O the harsh contrast! "Hath this fellow no feeling of his business that he sings at grave-making?" No, Mr. Hamlet; that is his business which he goes to work at and does without thinking anything more about the matter. Another blow is given to Hamlet by the grave-digger. The man who confounded and befooled the court with his quibbles is now beaten at his own game by one of the humblest of mortals. He has proscribed his own intellect, its brightness must wane.

It was stated that the grave-yard is the home of meditation. The mind looks in two directions and feeds itself upon its own contemplations: forward into the future when it pictures to

itself the world to come, and backward into the past when its principal theme will be the transitoriness of human power and glory. The former has been fully considered by Hamlet in the soliloquy on suicide, and hence cannot be repeated here. The latter, transitoriness, comes now in its turn, and consequently we find Hamlet indulging in those gloomy reflections in which his melancholy and contemplative nature takes so great pleasure. He is in the presence of extinct individualities; imagine what they were, behold what they are. He runs through the scale, dwelling upon the lawyer with sarcastic delight, and loading him with quibbles and gibberish as if to smother him with his own lumber; also recounting with exquisite pathos his boyish remembrances of the clown Yorick. Mark the difference of style between these two passages, and see how absolutely Shakspeare adapts the form to the subject. Finally Alexander and Cæsar, the mightiest men of action of the past, are called up, judged merely by their transient bodily existence, and found to be — dust. We need not speak of the positive and eternal principle in these towering individualities, that they are now living, and will live forever by their deeds in the history of the world; but this is a fact which the contemplation of Hamlet must ignore, since it dwells upon the negative finite element of humanity. Hamlet has thus passed from the presence of the living hero Fortinbras to the presence of the dead hero Alexander, and a corresponding transition is made in his own character. For if Fortinbras with the pressure of the real world cannot excite him to activity, if his conviction is that man is swayed solely by external forces, then there remains nothing for him but the grave-yard, whither he may go and dwell in contemplation, and finally have his deedless body stowed away there in the earth. This last state, we may rest assured, cannot now be far off.

With Alexander and Cæsar he must stop, he cannot go higher; hence at this convenient moment there passes by the funeral procession of Ophelia. The old affection rouses in him the dormant man, and impulse sways him once again. Moreover, her death is an indirect consequence of his conduct; nemesis begins to work. But what shall we say to this grave-scene? It is certainly extravagant, but perhaps justifiable

through the participating characters. Laertes, in accordance with his hasty nature, leaps into the grave of his sister, and indulges in the wildest grief. But Hamlet follows him and even surpasses him in extravagance! Hamlet here again acts from his emotions and impulses; the love for Ophelia and the circumstances of her death return upon him like the rush of an overwhelming ocean, and bear down all moderation. He, for once, is mad, as every such man is momentarily mad. It is our opinion that he does not here feign madness, the motives thereto are all gone; the King knows his secret designs, and he must know that the King knows them. It is the love and death of Ophelia which furnish the cause for this extraordinary spectacle. There is another contrast in this scene which is too striking to be omitted. Every one speaks with the greatest tenderness and affection of the sweet Ophelia; she is embalmed in love and peace in the memories of all. But there is one exception—the priest. He has no share in the general sorrow; he would even exclude from the rites of decent burial the frail maiden who had lost reason and life together. He is thus placed with the clownish gravediggers, not only in the character of adherence to empty form, but also in the special subject of conversation, for their discussion is about the Christian burial of one that has committed suicide. Thus Ophelia is laid to rest; Hamlet's acts are beginning to return upon him in his intense sorrow; but a deeper thrust is at hand, for he has already been brought face to face with the avenger.

Next comes the conversation in which Hamlet tells Horatio the circumstances of his escape. He attributes his action wholly to instinct and presentiment, and now for the first time he indicates the great change which has come over himself. He ascribes to accident, and not to any prearranged plan, the rescue by the pirates. On board the vessel he acted from a secret, irresistible impulse; behold the result. This event has changed his whole view of the world. Hitherto his faith in intelligence was unbounded, his confidence in his own ability to counteract all hostile schemes had never failed; even when he is told that he must go to England, he with exultation declares

> "But I will delve one yard below their mines
> And blow them at the moon."

But this strange accident upon the sea has changed his entire way of thinking. Now he believes that often indiscretion serves better than the profoundest deliberation; that destiny rules the hour; that there is an extra-human agency which overrules the activity of man:

> "There 's a divinity that shapes our ends
> Rough-hew them how we will."

In a later passage, just before he goes to fence with Laertes, he enunciates the same doctrine in a stronger form. Thus Hamlet abjures intelligence, which he thinks has been so baneful to him; he resigns himself into the hands of Fate, which is the divinity above mentioned; he is now ready to obey the first promptings of his soul. We have before attempted to show that this conversion of Hamlet to a belief in destiny was a necessary consequence of his intellectual point of view, for he has now become acquainted with something possessing objective validity, of which his subjective spirit is able to give no adequate account, and which it does not possess. Hence he comes to believe in external determination, in action without forethought. Thus under impulse he commits the forgery which sends to death the two royal messengers; but, true to his old character, he can still ask the question whether he ought in conscience to slay that king, whom, in addition to the other crimes against him, he has just caught laying a snare for his destruction.

But the final consummation, the last transition. that from the grave-yard to the grave, is at hand. Osrick, in the absence of Rosencratz and Gildenstern, comes to invite Hamlet to fence with Laertes. This courtier is described in full, more fully perhaps than his importance warrants. Hamlet we see here at his old tricks, with his love of sly, obscure satire which confounds his victim and comes near confounding his reader. We cannot get his exact meaning, but we do perceive very distinctly the drift; it is directed against the person at hand, who is too dull to comprehend it, as was seen in the case of Polonius. Osrick exhibits the hollowness and formalism into which everything had fallen; it is a drossy age which has lost all substantial worth, contrasting thereby with the deep moral nature of Hamlet. But the match is agreed on, though Hamlet has still presentiments. Here he falls into the trap;

and one thinks if he had been as shrewd now as upon former occasions, he would not have been caught. Undoubtedly the plan against Hamlet is not more profound than many others which he has seen through; why, then, should it succeed? For the reason that Hamlet's view of the moral order of things is changed; he no longer believes that man can determine anything, one act is as good as another for bringing about a result; whether he goes or declines is all the same in the eye of Fate. Hence he resigns himself to destiny, and the cautious Hamlet blindly proceeds to what comes first. Yet in reality he could no longer delay.

The two combatants are brought together. Hamlet begs pardon of Laertes, and declares that all the wrongs done by him to Laertes were the result of madness. This means merely impulse, the momentary absence of reason, else we must suppose Hamlet guilty of wanton falsehood, and, besides, destroy the whole meaning of the poem. Here is found the motive for Laertes' generous candor at death, when he discloses the infamous scheme of the King. So they are reconciled, yet they fall by each other's hand—they are incited not so much by *personal* grievances against each other as they are the avenging instruments of Wrong. Nor must we omit to mention the absolute logical precision and necessity of this mutual destruction, for the poet himself has reminded us of the fact lest it might escape our notice. Hamlet the son is seeking revenge for a father slain. But he slays Polonius, who is also a father, and thus commits the very crime whose punishment is his sole object. In being an avenger, he calls up an avenger against himself, who is therefore the son of Polonius, Laertes. The execution of his will thus involves his own destruction, and moreover the special manner of his destruction. But Laertes too must perish, for he also has willed murder.

It will be observed that these deaths at the end of the play seem to be accidental, though to a certain extent mediated by the plan of the King and Laertes. They too are involved—a result which they did not expect. But the sensuous side must have always an element of accident, because it is externality. What we must look for is the logic of these deaths. Have the persons done that which justifies their fate? Do

their deeds imply destruction when taken in an universal sense? In other words, have they only been overtaken by justice, by the irrevocable consequences of their acts? For Art must exhibit the deed in its completeness, in its return to itself. If we examine the actions of the various persons swept away in the course of this play, we shall find that all have done something which deserved death; that the idea of Retribution is imprinted on every character. Each one has willed that which by logical necessity involves his own destruction. Nor has the poet failed to express this thought repeatedly. Laertes seems so impressed with the notion of Retribution that he states it three times:

> *Osrick.* How is 't, Laertes?
> *Laertes.* Why as a woodcock to mine own springs
> I'm justly killed with mine own treachery.

Again:

> "The foul practice
> Hath turned itself on me; lo, here I lie
> Never to rise again."

Speaking of the King—

> "He is justly served;
> It is a poison tempered by himself."

But even here Hamlet can only act under the spur of impulse; angered by what Laertes tells him, he rushes up and stabs the King just as he slew Polonius. Hamlet perishes, and we see impulse in its results. Rational action alone can be moral, for it can distinguish its objects. Hamlet confesses that he was wrong in killing Polonius and regrets it, still he must bear the consequences of his deed. It is now brought home to him through the son, Laertes.

Hamlet's dying request to Horatio is to report his cause aright that a wounded name might not live behind him. Thus at the very last breath we see a manifestation of that beautiful moral nature, which desires that its motives be set right before the world. Moreover he gives his dying voice for Fortinbras, the man of action, as the sovereign most suitable for ruling his country. And we hope that it will not seem wholly fanciful to the reader if we point out a deeper signification in this last injunction to Horatio: it means the writing of this drama. For how else can the desire of Hamlet be fulfilled, to have his story told to the world? The poem, therefore,

accounts for itself; Horatio is to be poet, and he even states the argument of his work in his conversation with Fortinbras. Thus ends the greatest of plays, with Fortinbras and Horatio, ruler and poet, master of the actual world and master of the ideal world; the former is chief actor who moulds the reality, the latter is the thinking artist who transmutes that reality into the transparent forms of Beauty. In this way Shakspeare has given a positive solution to the collision, and has also accounted for his drama.

The subordinate characters, most of which are only inferior to Hamlet in power and grandeur of delineation, must be reserved for a final essay.

PHILOSOPHY IN EUROPE.

Prospectus for the new volume of the Philosophische Monatshefte.

[The following Prospectus, issued by Dr. Bratuscheck, editor of the *Philosophische Monatshefte*, since Dr. Bergmann became Professor at Königsberg will be interesting to our readers as an indication of the zeal that accompanies philosophical undertakings in Germany. The translation is by Mr. Arthur Amson. —Ed.]

The newly awakened philosophical movement in Germany, to gain unity and power, needs a central organ, which *shall not represent any particular school,* but, on one hand, give to all tendencies an opportunity to express themselves and to measure themselves with each other; on the other hand, to represent impartially and purely objectively the development of German philosophy, at the present time, in all its expressions.

The *Philosophische Monatshefte*, as the programme printed at the beginning of the first number shows, endeavored from its first establishment to accomplish this object. They began their work four years ago, and since that time have cleared a way for themselves, although the storms of the mighty political events were not very favorable for the development of philosophical tendencies.

The blessings of peace have added new vigor to the undertaking; it will be possible to carry out the original programme with more variety and regularity. The Contributions are offered in such number, and the matter to be treated has so accumulated, that it has become necessary to increase the corps of editors, which heretofore had consisted of the founder of the Journal, Dr. Bergmann, only; for this reason Dr. F. Ascherson and the undersigned have undertaken to share with him the business of editing. The undersigned from this date is the Corresponding Editor. But besides this

it seemed necessary to lay before all our contributors the present plan of our common work, to lead to an *organized division of labor* on this basis. If in this prospectus the editors lay this plan before the *whole philosophical public*, it is done with a view to calling on all friends of philosophy to an active coöperation, for it is only by such common interest that the object of the journal can be *entirely* accomplished.

The *first object* of the *Monatshefte* is—to afford the different tendencies of philosophy a vehicle for free expression and mutual criticism; this object will be accomplished by the publication of *treatises* calculated to represent those tendencies on all important sides. As these treatises will evidently relate to such questions as are not capable of being dealt with at all, or at least not at present, in separate treatises, it will be desirable for the author himself to invite readers of the most opposite views to contribute their criticisms. In regard to the contents of their treatises, it is of course desirable to touch upon as many of the departments of philosophy as possible in each number of the journal. In order to attain this, but above all to incite competition among the different tendencies, the editors will not be able at once to print every essay received by them; but information will be sent to the author within four weeks concerning its acceptance and time of publication. It would be very desirable for authors to announce their works as soon as they begin them, since a proper division can then be more easily accomplished.

The treatises published up to the present time have related not only to general philosophical questions, but have also partly offered criticisms of particular philosophical schools, or have weighed the views of particular philosophers. With these are connected the criticisms of particular productions, whether lectures, articles in other journals, or books. In this species of criticism, too, the *Philosophische Monatshefte* must give the different tendencies full play by reserving the right, in every case, of accepting corrections from the opposite side. The reviews therefore, as a rule, can only be printed with the name of the author attached. Reviews will doubtless form the most extensive and difficult side of the common work, and we shall therefore feel especially thankful for all contributions of this nature. We will reject—always giving the reasons—only such essays as, in our minds, either misrepresent the facts, or transgress the bounds of legitimate criticism, or do not enter sufficiently upon the actual contents of the productions under review. Besides this, we shall take the liberty of adding a brief summary of the contents of works under review in case the review does not contain such a summary.

It is particularly important that productions in any particular branch of philosophy should be reviewed by those conversant with this branch, and we therefore call particular attention to this. Those gentlemen who wish to undertake the reviewing of any new book, noticed in the bibliographical summary to be published hereafter in every number of the *Monatshefte*, will find a copy at their disposal, if the same have not already been requested by some one else.

A part of the essays published up to the present time have treated, from a philososophical stand-point, questions of the times out of the region of other

sciences, art, politics, and social life. To represent this practical side of the philosophic movement as it deserves must be one of the chief aims of the journal, since philosophy can regain its full power only when it enters into mutual interaction with the entire life of the nation.

Besides giving philosophical productions and criticisms, which form one side of our undertaking, our journal will also give a complete outline of the philosophical movement itself. It will therefore exhibit the different tendencies of this movement in a series of articles which shall be strictly of the nature of reports, in which, of course, the contest of opposing views must be mentioned, although only by way of statement.

The said articles will appear about in the following order: (1) Materialism and Sensualism; (2) Spinozism; (3) Influence of the Empirical Sciences upon the Development of Philosophy; (4) Influence of former German Systems and Transformation of the same—(*a*) Kant, (*b*) Schelling, (*c*) Fichte, (*d*) Hegel, (*e*) Herbart, (*f*) Krause, (*g*) Baader, (*h*) Schopenhauer, (*i*) Beneke, (*k*) Leibnitz; (5) Influence of Positive Religion upon the present Philosophic Movement; (6) The Influence of Political and Social Relations: (7) Historical Tendency of Philosophy.

Besides this, we shall endeavor to exhibit the movements of philosophy outside of Germany, especially in their relation to German philosophy.

The editors will furnish these articles; they hope, by putting themselves in connection with the representatives of different views, to be able to give a complete and correct resumé of the facts. Corrections will at all times be attended to.

Besides the diverging tendencies of philosophy, the progress of the work in the different branches must be represented. For this purpose summary statements respecting the present state of particular investigations must form the basis, in which will be shown what investigators are active in different fields, what problems engross their attention, and what methods are employed for their solution. Such expositions can only be comprehensive and accurate when they are written by scholars in the special branch, or at least with their coöperation. And in that case they will have a very special value. Through them criticism will obtain an objective standard. In that part of the journal devoted simply to statements of facts and movements, criticism is replaced by notices. The bibliography will be furnished, as before, by Dr. F. Ascherson; the completeness and accuracy of his summaries have been recognized in the third edition of Ueberweg's *Outlines of the History of Modern Philosophy*.

Henceforth we will also publish a list of all extended reviews of philosophical works from other journals, and we ask all persons to call our attention to any incompleteness. In addition to this, it is intended to publish extracts from noteworthy philosophical articles in this and in foreign countries. In this case a division of the work would be very advantageous. The editors undertake to furnish reports concerning the contents of the few philosophical journals published in Germany, which they can do without hesitation since the *Philosophische Monatshefte* will in no way enter into competition with those journals representing a particular tendency or branch of philosophy. The extracts from other journals will appear all the

more punctually if they are furnished by regular readers of particular journals. We already have assurances of such assistance, and expect by inquiries which we have made in all directions, as well as by the impulse intended to be given by this prospectus, to be able to organize this department of our work satisfactorily. Treatises on the writings and lectures in universities and academies would have to be treated in a similar manner. We likewise ask for notices of interesting philosophical lectures and assemblies.

Notices by the authors of their new works, or of works not yet printed, will also be classed among our reports.

It is worthy of special consideration, that, in all empirical sciences and in all the fields of national life, philosophical efforts, which arise as a natural consequence from the nature of those departments, are becoming more and more valid. It is desirable to have these efforts exhibited in detail.

Finally, the *Philosophische Monatshefte* will also notice all personal and external relations and events which pertain to philosophy and its representatives. To this class belong personal items about philosophers, reports of philosophical societies and other institutions for the advancement of philosophy, prize essays, celebrations, addresses, resolutions, &c. To establish a firm basis for the knowledge of persons, we will publish in our eighth volume biographical notices of all living representatives of philosophy in Germany. We confidently hope that the said gentlemen will be kind enough either to furnish the materials themselves, or to designate reliable sources.

If the philosophical movement of the present time is represented to this extent in all directions and conditions, the *Philosophische Monatshefte* may certainly count upon a large circle of readers. Although the number of the subscribers is steadily but slowly increasing, yet with the comparatively low subscription price the income does not cover the expense of publication. We may therefore be allowed to express the wish, that, since the journal is no longer the property of the editor, but has passed into the possession of the present publisher, our contributors will for the present, like the editors, claim no compensation. The publisher, Mr. F. Henschel, is endeavoring, in the most unselfish manner, to advance the interests of the journal. As soon as the deficit in the income shall have been covered, which we expect will shortly be the case, all contributions will receive proper compensation, and, if there be any surplus, a part will always be devoted to enlarging the journal.

ERNST BRATUSCHECK.

BERLIN, May 1st, 1872.

CIRCULAR OF INQUIRY.

I. 1. Do you wish to publish a treatise in the *Philosophische Monatshefte?*
On what subject?
Of what length?
About what time could you send in the manuscript?
2. Are you willing to furnish reviews?
a. Continuously on an entire branch of philosophical literature and on which?
b. On single works?

(N. B.—At your request, we will send you a copy, for review, of any of the newly published works reported in the Bibliographical Notices of the "*Philosophische Monatshefte.*")

c. On essays in journals?

II. 3. Would you furnish continuous reports on any branch of philosophy?
   a. Logic and Theory of Knowledge?
   b. Metaphysics?
   c. Nature-Philosophy?
   d. Psychology?
   e. Ethics and Philosophy of Law?
   f. Philosophy of History?
   g. Philosophy of Religion?
   h. Æsthetics?
   i. History of Philosophy?
4. Are you willing to furnish extracts from
   a. Philosophical articles of any native or foreign journals of which you are a subscriber? and of which?
   b. University treatises and addresses?
5. Will you furnish a notice of one of your works, and when?
6. We beg you to send us the material for a biographical notice of yourself, or to inform us from what reliable source we can obtain the same.

THE EDITORS OF THE "PHILOSOPHISCHE MONATSHEFTE."
DR. BRATUSCHECK,
Head-Master at the University.

BERLIN, Weinmeisterstrasse 4.

BOOK NOTICES.

Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Philosophische-Kritik, im Vereine mit mehreren gelehrten herausgegeben von Dr. J. H. v. Fichte, Prof. der Phil. in Stuttgart, Dr. Hermann Ulrici, Prof. der Phil. an der Universität Halle, und Dr. J. U. Wirth, Evangel. Pfarrer zu Winnneden. Neue Folge. LIX. Bandes, zweites Heft. Halle: E. E. M. Pfeffer. 1871.

The contents of the first number of this volume have already been given (Jour. Sp. Phil., vol. vi. p. 188). The contents of the second are as follows:

Moritz Carriere, Aphorisms upon Hartmann's "Aphorisms on the Drama"; *H. Ulrici*, on the Sources of Legal Right and of Legal Ideas; *Arthur Richter*, Book Notices of (1) Max Maywald's "Doctrine of Two-fold Truth —An Attempt at the Separation of Theology and Philosophy in the Middle Ages"; (2) A Lecture by J. Vahlen on Lorenzo Valla; (3) Theodor Vogt's Life of Rousseau; (4) Dr. Fr. Zelle on "The Difference of Kant's Idea of Logic from that of Aristotle"; (5) Johannes Huber's Minor Writings; *Dr. Brentano* on F. F. Kampe's "Aristotle's Theory of Knowledge"; *Fr. Hoffmann* on Porphyry's "Four Books on Continence: a Picture of the Manners in the time of the Roman Emperors—translated from the Greek by Edward Baltzer; *H. Ulrici*, on Moritz Müller's "Anti Rudolf Gottschall and Julius Frauenstädt: A Defence of the Doctrine of Personal Conscious Duration after Death"; *G. Knauer*, Reply to Dr. F. v. Reichlin-Meldegg's Review of the work "Contrary and Contradictory," &c., in vol. lxv. of the Zeitschrift für Phil.; Reichlin-Meldegg's Answer to the foregoing; *A. Horwicz*, "Anti-critique on the Elements of a System of Æsthetics by A. Horwicz."

LX. Bandes, erstes Heft:—*H. Siebeck*, "The Doctrine of Aristotle con-

cerning Life and the Soul of the Universe"; *E. Sigwart*, on Dilthey's Life of Schleiermacher; *J. U. Wirth*, on Moritz Carriere's "Art in connection with the development of Culture and the Ideal of Humanity; *F. Brentano*, on F. F. Kampe's "Aristotelian Theory of Knowledge": *Reichlin-Meldegg*, on A. Spir's Essay on Truth; *Werner Luthe*, on the Logical Question: with special reference to Ueberweg's System of Logic and Drobisch's "New Exposition of Logic."

Zweites Heft: —*A. Horwicz*, on the Methodology of Psychology; *F. A. v. Hartsen*, against "Determinismus": *Moritz Carriere*, on C. H. Weisse's System of Æsthetics as edited by Rudolph Seydel; *Dr. Wirth*, (1) on F. Harms's Contributions to Systematic Philosophy; (2) on Ludwig Weis's Lectures on Antimaterialism; (3) F. A. Müller's Letters on the Christian Religion; (4) on K. C. Planck's Treatise on Soul and Spirit, or the Origin, Nature and Forms of Activity of the Psychical and Spiritual Organization as developed from the Basis of Natural Science; *Arthur Richter's* Contributions to the History and Criticism of Philosophy—(1) C. Grapengiesser's Explanation and Defence of the Kritik of Pure Reason against the so-called "Explanations by J. H. v. Kirchman"; (2) Schelling's Life, in his Correspondence: *F. A. v. Hartsen*, (1) on Beale's "Mystery of Life"; (2) Newmann's "An Essay in Aid of a Grammar of Assent"; (3) Pierre Doubelet's "De la Methode Scientifique"; *H. Siebeck*, on G. H. Lewes's History of Ancient Philosophy [German translation]; *Reichlin-Meldegg*, on J. E. Alaux. "La Religion progressive"; *H. Ulrici*, "Compendium der Logik."

God-Man. By L. T. Townsend, D.D., Professor in the School of Theology, Boston University. Search and Manifestation. Boston: Lee & Shepard. 1872.

This volume belongs to the series of works called out in response to *Ecce Homo*. Its table of contents: I. SEARCH—(*a*) *Comparative Theology*, including a discussion of the Brahmin, Buddhist, Greek and Roman, Israelite and Ishmaelite, and Aboriginal American phases of Theology; (*b*) *Essential Theology*, including a discussion of the topics—God-idea, Mediator, Incarnation, Sacrifice, Authority of Essential Theology, Origin and Significance of Essential Theology. II. MANIFESTATION—(*a*) *New Era;* (*b*) *Records;* (*c*) *Humanity of Jesus;* (*d*) *Divinity of Jesus.* Numerous appendices are added illustrating different topics touched upon in the course of the discussions.

On Primary Instruction in Relation to Education. By Simon S. Laurie, A.M. Wm. Blackwood & Sons: Edinburgh and London, 1867.

Contents:—I. The Function of the Primary Schoolmaster, and the Subjects and General Method of his Teaching; II. Methods of Teaching; III. The Secondary Subjects of the Parochial School; IV. Organization of the School; V. School Discipline; VI. Direct Moral Instruction; VII. The Teaching of Religion.—An excellent discussion of the subjects of classical and scientific education closes the volume. Mr. Laurie's works on the Philosophy of Ethics and Moral Theories have sufficiently proved his title to a high rank as an educator. The present volume is eminently sound and practical.

Lucretius on the Nature of Things. Translated into English verse by Charles Frederick Johnson, with Introduction and Notes. New York: DeWitt C. Lent & Co. 1872.

In an age of materialism, what more welcome book than a new translation of Lucretius? The poetic translations of Mason Good and Thomas Busby and the prose one of Watson have not sufficed to make this author widely read by the people. Mr. Johnson's version may be more fortunate. In the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries Lucretius enjoyed an immense fame among the Latin peoples. Traces of his influence on the style of the greatest English poets are frequently found. How great a genius a poet must possess to make a work of art out of such materials as the following dry list of topics treated of in his several books exhibits! Book I: Invective against Superstition [hence the destruction of Mythology and with it of Allegory and all sensuous embodiment of ideas]; First Principles—Nothing can come from Nothing, Matter Eternal, the Atom and the Void, Repudiation of Heraclitus and his doctrine of Fire [or the Principle of Energy or Force], the Infinitude of Space, &c. Book II: Atoms—their form, number and development into life and sensation; growth and decay. Book III: Soul and Body Inseparable; no Immortality—Consolations thereon. Book IV: The Senses, their perception explained by images; Sleep, Dreams, and Love. Book V: [the most poetic book because it deals with organic wholes] Origin of the World and Rise of Human Institutions. Book VI: Natural Phenomena, Meteoric and Geologic. And yet these prosy topics are so illuminated with wit and satire, and elevated by the sublimest imagery, that they become very attractive. Democritus and Epicurus find in Lucretius their surest hold on immortality. But why should one speak of immortality in this connection? The soul dies with the body, he tells us.

That psychological phase of thinking wherein the theory of Atoms is relied upon to explain the universe has been much investigated by modern German philosophers. It is found to succeed the first stages of sensuous perception. Experience having taught us that what lies immediately before us is in a process of constant change, we seek to explain it by positing atoms behind it—small enough to be invisible, themselves unchangeable in shape and size, the variations in the world perceived being due to their change in position and arrangement. But this theory removes from each atom all trace of self-determining force. Each atom must be moved from without. Each atom being the minimum particle of matter and practically indivisible and impenetrable, it cannot originate motion. For if this were possible, it must be accomplished by the contraction of the external surface upon the interior, or by the expansion of the latter against the surface, and producing in either case a change in the size of the atom; a change which would imply that the atom was composed of other atoms, and the explanation of the change would have to begin *de novo*. Hence force must be presupposed from without, and this force cannot be itself material and composed of atoms for the reason above stated—that it must be extra-atomic, or else the atoms cannot move at all, and without motion they are useless for purposes of explaining phenomena of change. But so soon as one posits force he is entirely beyond the necessity of the hypothesis of atoms; for he can explain

all matter to be a synthesis of forces, an atom in fact being a synthesis of repulsion and attraction.

The jugglery of Reflection in making such hypotheses as the Atomic theory is herein manifest. It simply generalizes the difficulty present before its sensuous perception, and then places this generalization unsolved behind the immediate facts as their explanation. In this instance it finds before it change and permanence. The atom is conceived as the permanent and the change is conceived as the external and unessential element of combination and position. Thus in the atomic explanation we have a restatement of the problem: how can change and the permanent be united? For we are left utterly in the dark as to the whence of the motion which produces the change in position of the atoms. The thinking activity has gone through the form of explanation, but has uttered only a tautology: this special change which we behold here, in which a new form has arisen and the general properties of matter remain, is caused by atoms and movement, or by giving a new form to matter. The self-deception of such tautology continues until the mind perceives the necessity of positing self-determination as the fundamental principle. In fact the tautology itself is only one phase of the category of self-determination, and the other phase—that of difference—is unconsciously presupposed and kept out of sight.

That this stage of philosophy, first enunciated by Democritus, is a phase that perennially reappears in the history of thought, makes the study of Lucretius indispensable to the thinker. Every man who will ascend from the naïve thinking of reflection to speculative insight must pass through the atomic theory.

The Blazing Star, with an Appendix treating of the Jewish Kabbala. Also, a Tract on the Philosophy of Mr. Herbert Spencer, and one on New England Transcendentalism. By Wm. B. Greene. Boston: A. Williams & Co. 1872. Price $1.50.

The treatise on the Blazing Star occupies twenty-four pages, while the appendix on the Kabbala takes up eighty-four, the tract on Herbert Spencer thirty-six pages, and the one on Transcendentalism as many more. The writer seems to have read mystical works to some purpose. He canvasses the significance of the five-pointed and the six-pointed stars, the former the symbol of man, and the latter the symbol of the union of the Divine and Human. This investigation leads him on through the Kabbala. More interesting to the general reader will be found his tracts on Spencer and Trascendentalism, both of which are devoted to the Facts of Consciousness, and to establishing the personality and immortality of man, against the materialism of Spencer as well as against the pantheistic absorption which he finds to be the outcome of transcendentalism.

He discusses at length the inconsistencies of Spencer's First Principles and the absurdity of the claims put forth to the effect that in the latter writer's work on Psychology is found a "refutation of materialism by philosophic reasoning and not by appeals to vulgar prejudice." He quotes copiously from the East Indian literature to show the antiquity of much that is set forth by the materialists and transcendentalists. After an exposition of the Buddhist doctrines he says, in closing his book: "The Bud-

dhist theory denies that there is any true God other than the impersonal aboriginal Abyss which is the one ground of all visible things. The counter theory affirms the self-consciousness of the Supreme, and teaches that the personality of God is a necessary condition, without which the Abyss cannot be. Shall He who is the author of all consciousness and of all life be Himself devoid of self-consciousness and not alive!"

Hypotheses. By F. J. Finois. New York: Sigismund Voytits. 1872.

Propositions: (1) The Senses Perceive Motions; (2) Motions are Spontaneous and Communicated; (3) Force, Matter, and Space, are the self-existent elements of Motion; (4) The action of Forces is synthetic and analytic; (5) The composition and disintegration of Forms are the result of Motions. The "hypotheses" relate to I. Siderial Phenomena; II. Sidero-terrestrial Phenomena; III. Terrestrial Phenomena; IV. Intellectual Phenomena; V. Mental Phenomena; VI. Social Phenomena.

A Treatise on the Common and Civil Law as embraced in the Jurisprudence of the United States. By Wm. Archer Cocke, author of the Constitutional History of the United States. New York: Baker, Voorhis & Co. 1871.

Half-hour Recreations in Popular Science. No. 4. Spectrum Analysis Discoveries, showing its application in microscopical research, and to discoveries of the physical constitution and movements of the Heavenly Bodies. From the works of Schellen, Young, Roscoe, Lockyer, Huggins, and others. Boston: Lee & Shepard.

Consumption, its Pathology and Treatment; to which is appended an Essay on the Use of Alcohol in the Treatment of Consumption. By Wade Minor Logan, M.D. Robert Clarke & Co., Cincinnati, Ohio. Price $1.00.

As Regards Protoplasm. By James Hutchison Stirling. New and Improved Edition, completed by the addition of Part II. in reference to Mr. Huxley's *Second Issue* and of Preface in reply to Mr. Huxley in "*Yeast.*" London: Longmans, Green & Co. 1872. [To be obtained of Scribner, Armstrong & Co., New York.]

Part I. of this remarkable pamphlet treats "The First (Physiological) Issue, or the 'Plunge' into the 'Materialistic Slough'"; Part II. treats "The Second (Philosophical) Issue, or the Escape from Materialism through the Modern Idealism of Ignorance." The Preface is an annihilating reply to the last rejoinder of Mr. Huxley. Indeed the pamphlet as a whole is one of the most powerful polemics ever written.

Problema dell' Assoluto. Per A. Vera, Professore di Filosofia nella Università di Napoli, etc. Parte I. Napoli, 1872.

Professor Vera's activity in spreading the Philosophy of Hegel has been frequently alluded to in this Journal. In the present work he essays to clear up certain difficulties and doubts which hang about the thought of the ABSOLUTE IDEA as Hegel uses the term. After unfolding the more abstract phases of the subject, he investigates the relation of the same to the doctrines of Kant and Fichte, and finally makes an elaborate estimate of Von Hartmann's Philosophy of the Unconscious.

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PEDAGOGICS AS A SYSTEM.

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Translated by ANNA C. BRACKETT.

SECOND PART.

The Special Elements of Education.

THIRD DIVISION.

PRAGMATICS (EDUCATION OF THE WILL).

§ 137. Both Physical and Intellectual Education are in the highest degree practical. The first reduces the merely natural to a tool which mind shall use for its own ends; the second guides the intelligence, by ways conformable to its nature, to the necessary method of the act of teaching and learning, which finally branches out into an objective national life, into a system of mutually dependent school organizations. But in a narrower sense we mean by practical education the methodical development of the Will. This phrase more clearly expresses the topic to be considered in this division than others sometimes used in Pedagogics [*Bestrebungs vermögen*, conative power]. The will is already the subject of a science of its own, i.e. of Ethics; and if Pedagogics would proceed in anywise scientifically, it must recognize and presuppose the idea and the existence of this science. It should not restate in full the doctrines of freedom of duty, of virtue, and of conscience, although we have often seen this done in empirical

works on Pedagogics. Pedagogics has to deal with the idea of freedom and morality only so far as it fixes the technique of their process, and at the same time it confesses itself to be weakest just here, where nothing is of any worth without a pure self-determination.

§ 138. The pupil must (1) become civilized; i.e. he must learn to govern, as a thing external to him, his natural egotism, and to make the forms which civilized society has adopted his own. (2) He must become imbued with morality; i.e. he must learn to determine his actions, not only with reference to what is agreeable and useful, but according to the principle of the Good; he must become virtually free, form a character, and must habitually look upon the necessity of freedom as the absolute measure of his actions. (3) He must become religious; i.e. he must discern that the world, with all its changes, himself included, is only phenomenal; the affirmative side of this insight into the emptiness of the finite and transitory, which man would so willingly make everlasting, is the consciousness of the *absolute* existing in and for itself, which, in its certainty of its truth, not torn asunder through the process of manifestation, constitutes no part of its changes, but, while it actually presents them, permeates them all, and freely distinguishes itself from them. In so far as man relates himself to God, he cancels all finitude and transitoriness, and by this feeling frees himself from the externality of phenomena. Virtue on the side of civilization is Politeness; on that of morality, Conscientiousness; and on that of religion, Humility.

FIRST CHAPTER.

Social Culture.

§ 139. The social development of man makes the beginning of practical education. It is not necessary to suppose a special social instinct. The inclination of man to the society of men does not arise only from the identity of their nature, but is also in certain cases affected by particular relations. The natural starting-point of social culture is the Family. But this educates the child for Society, and by means of Society the individual passes over into relations with the world at large. Natural sympathy changes to polite behavior, and

this to the dexterous and circumspect deportment, whose truth nevertheless is first the ethical purity which combines with the wisdom of the serpent the harmlessness of the dove.

§ 140. (1) The Family is the natural social circle to which man primarily belongs. In it all the immediate differences which exist are compensated by the equally immediate unity of the relationship. The subordination of the wife to the husband, of the children to their parents, of the younger children to their elder brothers and sisters, ceases to be subordination, through the intimacy of love. The child learns obedience to authority, and in this it gives free personal satisfaction to its parents and enjoys the same. All the relations in which he finds himself there are penetrated by the warmth of implicit confidence, which can be replaced for the child by nothing else. In this sacred circle the tenderest emotions of the heart are developed by the personal interest of all its members in what happens to any one, and thus the foundation is laid of a susceptibility to all genuine or real friendship.

—Nothing more unreasonable or inhuman could exist than those modern theories which would destroy the family and would leave the children, the offspring of the anarchy of free-love, to grow up in public nurseries. This would appear to be very humanitarian; indeed these socialists talk of nothing but the interests of humanity—they are never weary of uttering their insipid jests on the institution of the family, as if it were the principle of all narrow-mindedness. Have these fanatics, who are seeking after an abstraction of humanity, ever examined our foundling-hospitals, orphan asylums, barracks, and prisons, to discover in some degree to what an atomic state of barren cleverness a human being grows who has never formed a part of a family? The Family is only one phase in the grand order of the ethical organization; but it is the substantial phase from which man passively proceeds, but into which, as he founds a family of his own, he actively returns. The child lives in the Family in the common joy and grief of sympathy for all, and, in the emotion with which he sees his parents approach death while he is hastening towards the full enjoyment of existence, experiences the finer feelings which are so powerful in creating in

him a deeper and more tender understanding of everything human.—

§ 141. (2) The Family rears the children not for itself but for the civil society. In this we have a system of morals producing externally a social technique, a circle of fixed forms of society. This technique endeavors to subdue the natural roughness of man, at least as far as it manifests itself externally. Because he is spirit, man is not to yield himself to his immediateness; he is to exhibit to man his naturalness as under the control of spirit. The etiquette of propriety on the one hand facilitates the manifestation of individuality by means of which the individual becomes interesting to others, and on the other hand, since its forms are alike for all, it makes us recognize the likeness of the individual to all others and so makes their intercourse easier.

—The conventional form is no mere constraint; but essentially a protection not only for the freedom of the individual, but much more the protection of the individual against the rude impetuosity of his own naturalness. Savages and peasants for this reason are, in their relations to each other, by no means as unconstrained as one often represents them, but hold closely to a ceremonious behavior. There is in one of Immerman's stories, "The Village Justice," a very excellent picture of the conventional forms with which the peasant loves to surround himself. The scene in which the townsman who thinks that he can dispense with forms among the peasants is very entertainingly taught better, is exceedingly valuable in an educational point of view. The feeling of shame which man has in regard to his mere naturalness is often extended to relations where it has no direct significance, since this sense of shame is appealed to in children in reference to things which are really perfectly indifferent externalities.—

§ 142. Education with regard to social culture has two extremes to avoid: the youth may, in his effort to prove his individuality, become vain and conceited, and fall into an attempt to appear interesting; or he may become slavishly dependent on conventional forms, a kind of social pedant. This state of nullity which contents itself with the mechanical polish of social formalism is ethically more dangerous

than the tendency to a marked individuality, for it betrays emptiness; while the effort towards a peculiar differentiation from others, to become interesting to others, indicates power.

§ 143. When we have a harmony of the manifestation of the individual with the expression of the recognition of the equality of others we have what is called deportment or politeness, which combines dignity and grace, self-respect and modesty. We call it when fully complete, Urbanity. It treats the conventional forms with irony, since, at the same time that it yields to them, it allows the productivity of spirit to shine through them in little deviation from them, as if it were fully able to make others in their place.

—True politeness shows that it remains master of forms. It is very necessary to accustom children to courtesy and to bring them up in the etiquette of the prevailing social custom; but they must be prevented from falling into an absurd formality which makes the triumph of a polite behavior to consist in a blind following of the dictates of the last fashion-journal, and in the exact copying of the phraseology and directions of some book on manners. One can best teach and practise politeness when he does not merely copy the social technique, but comprehends its original idea.

§ 144. (3) But to fully initiate the youth into the institutions of civilization one must not only call out the feelings of his heart in the bosom of the family, not only give to him the formal refinement necessary to his intercourse with society; it must also perform to him the painful duty of making him acquainted with the mysteries of the ways of the world. This is a painful duty, for the child naturally feels an unlimited confidence in all men. This confidence must not be destroyed, but it must be tempered. The mystery of the way of the world is the deceit which springs from selfishness. We must provide against it by a proper degree of distrust. We must teach the youth that he may be imposed upon by deceit, dissimulation, and hypocrisy, and that therefore he must not give his confidence lightly and credulously. He himself must learn how he can, without deceit, gain his own ends in the midst of the throng of opposing interests.

—Kant in his Pedagogics calls that worldly-wise behavior by which the individual is to demean himself in opposition

to others, Impenetrability. By its means man learns how to "manage men." In Lord Chesterfield's letters to his son, we have pointed out the true value of egotism in its relation to morals. All his words amount to this, that we are to consider every man to be an egotist, and to convert his very egotism into a means of finding out his weak side; i.e. to flatter him by exciting his vanity, and by means of such flattery to ascertain his limits. In common life, the expression "having had experiences" means about the same thing as having been deceived and betrayed.—

SECOND CHAPTER.

Moral Culture.

§ 145. The truth of social culture lies in moral culture. Without this latter, every art of behavior remains worthless, and can never attain the clearness of Humility and Dignity which are possible to it in its unity with morality. For the better determination of this idea Pedagogics must refer to Ethics itself, and can here give the part of its content which relates to Education only in the form of educational maxims. The principal categories of Ethics in the domain of morality are the ideas of Duty, Virtue, and Conscience. Education must lay stress on the truth that nothing in the world has any absolute value except will guided by the right.

§ 146. Thence follows (1) the maxim relating to the idea of Duty, that we must accustom the pupil to unconditional obedience to it, so that he shall perform it for no other reason than that it is duty. It is true that the performance of a duty may bring with it externally a result agreeable or disagreeable, useful or harmful; but the consideration of such connection ought never to determine us. This moral demand, though it may appear to be excessive severity, is the absolute foundation of all genuine ethical practice. All "highest happiness theories," however finely spun they may be, when taken as a guide for life, lead at last to Sophistry, and this to contradictions which ruin the life.

§ 147. (2) Virtue must make actual what duty commands, or, rather, the actualizing of duty is Virtue. And here we must say next, then, that the principal things to be considered under Virtue are (*a*) the dialectic of particular virtues, (*b*) renunciation, and (*c*) character.

§ 148. (*a*) From the dialectic of particular virtues there follows the educational maxim that we must practise all virtues with equal faithfulness, for all together constitute an ethical system complete in itself, in which no one is indifferent to another.

—Morality should recognize no distinction of superiority among the different virtues. They reciprocally determine each other. There is no such thing as one virtue which shines out above the others, and still less should we have any special gift for virtue. The pupil must be taught to recognize no great and no small in the virtues, for that one which may at first sight seem small is inseparably connected with that which is seemingly the greatest. Many virtues are attractive by reason of their external consequences, as e.g. industry because of success in business, worthy conduct because of the respect paid to it, charity because of the pleasure attending it; but man should not practise these virtues because he enjoys them: he must devote the same amount of self-sacrifice and of assiduity to those virtues which (as Christ said) are to be performed in secret.

—It is especially valuable, in an educational respect, to gain an insight, into the transition of which each virtue is empirically capable, into a negative as well as into a positive extreme. The differences between the extremes and the golden mean are differences in quality, although they arrive at this difference in quality by means of difference in quantity. Kant has, as is well known, attacked the Aristotelian doctrine of the ethical μεσοτες, since he was considering the qualitative difference of the mind as differentiating principle; this was correct for the subject with which he dealt, but in the objective development we do arrive on the other hand at the determination of a quantitative limit; e.g. a man, with the most earnest intention of doing right, may be in doubt whether he has not, in any task, done more or less than was fitting for him.

—As no virtue can cease its demands for us, no one can permit any exceptions or any provisional circumstances to come in the way of his duties. Our moral culture will always certainly manifest itself in very unequal phases if we, out of narrowness and weakness, neglect entirely one virtue while

we diligently cultivate another. If we are forced into such unequal action, we are not responsible for the result; but it is dangerous and deserves punishment if we voluntarily encourage it. The pupil must be warned against a certain moral negligence which consists in yielding to certain weaknesses, faults, or crimes, a little longer and a little longer, because he has fixed a certain time after which he intends to do better. Up to that time he allows himself to be a loiterer in ethics, Perhaps he will assert that his companions, his surroundings. his position, &c., must be changed before he can alter his internal conduct. Wherever education or temperament favors sentimentality, we shall find birth-days, new-year's day, confirmation day, &c., selected as these turning-points. It is not to be denied that man proceeds in his internal life from epoch to epoch, and renews himself in his most internal nature, nor can we deny that moments like those mentioned are especially favorable in man to an effort towards self-transformation because they invite introspection; but it is not to be endured that the youth, while looking forward to such a moment, should consciously persist in his evil-doing. If he does, we shall have as consequences that when the solemn moment which he has set at last arrives, at the stirring of the first emotion he perceives with terror that he has changed nothing in himself, that the same temptations are present to him, the same weakness takes possession of him, &c. In our business, in our theoretical endeavors, &c., it may certainly happen that, on account of want of time, or means, or humor, we may put off some work to another time; but morality stands on a higher plane than these, because it, as the concrete absoluteness of the will, makes unceasing demand on the whole and undivided man. In morality there are no vacations, no interims. As we in ascending a flight of stairs take good care not to make a single mis-step, and give our conscious attention to every step, so we must not allow any exceptions in moral affairs, must not appoint given times for better conduct, but must await these last as natural crises, and must seek to live in time as in Eternity.—

§ 149. (*b*) From Renunciation springs the injunction of self-government. The action of education on the will to form habits in it, is discipline or training in a narrower sense.

Renunciation teaches us to know the relation in which we in fact, as historical persons, stand to the idea of the Good. From our empirical knowledge of ourselves we derive the idea of our limits; from the absolute knowledge of ourselves on the other hand, which presents to us the nature of Freedom as our own actuality, we derive the conception of the resistless might of the genuine will for the good. But to actualize this conception we must have practice. This practice is the proper renunciation. Every man must devise for himself some special set of rules, which shall be determined by his peculiarities and his resulting temptations. These rules must have as their innermost essence the subduing of self, the vanquishing of his negative arbitrariness by means of the universality and necessity of the will.

—In order to make this easy, the youth may be practised in renouncing for himself even the arbitrariness which is permitted to him. One often speaks of renunciation as if it belonged especially to the middle ages and to Catholicism; but this is an error. Renunciation in its one-sided form as relying on works, and for the purpose of mortification, is asceticism, and belongs to them; but Renunciation in general is a necessary determination of morals. The keeping of a journal is said to assist in the practice of virtue, but its value depends on how it is kept. To one it may be a curse, to another a blessing. Fichte, Göthe, Byron, and others, have kept journals and have been assisted thereby; while others, as Lavater, have been thwarted by them. Vain people will every evening record with pen and ink their admiration of the correct course of life which they have led in the day devoted to their pleasure.—

§ 150. (*c*) The result of the practice in virtue, or, as it is commonly expressed, of the individual actualization of freedom, is the methodical determinateness of the individual will as Character. This conception of character is formal, for it contains only the identity which is implied in the ruling of a will on its external side as constant. As there are good, strong and beautiful characters, so there are also bad, weak, and detestable ones. When in Pedagogics, therefore, we speak so much of the building up of a character, we mean the mak-

ing permanent of a direction of the individual will towards the actualization of the Good. Freedom ought to be the character of character. Education must therefore observe closely the inter-action of the factors which go to form character, viz., (α) the temperament, as the natural character of the man; (β) external events, the historical element; (γ) the energy of the Will, by which, in its limits of nature and history, it realizes the idea of the Good in and for itself as the proper ethical character. Temperament determines the Rhythm of our external manifestation of ourselves; the events in which we live assign to us the ethical problem, but the Will in its sovereignty stamps its seal on the form given by these potentialities. Pedagogics aims at accustoming the youth to freedom, so that he shall always measure his deed by the idea of the Good. It does not desire a formal independence, which may also be called character, but a real independence resting upon the conception of freedom as that which is absolutely necessary. The pedagogical maxim is then: Be independent, but be so through doing Good.

—According to preconceived opinion, stubbornness and obstinacy claim that they are the foundation of character. But they may spring from weakness and indeterminateness, on which account one needs to be well on his guard. A gentle disposition, through enthusiasm for the Good, may attain to quite as great a firmness of will. Coarseness and meanness are on no account to be tolerated.—

§ 151. (3) We pass from the consideration of the culture of character to that of conscience. This is the relation which the moral agent makes between himself as manifestation and himself as idea. It compares itself, in its past or future, with its nature, and judges itself accordingly as good or bad. This independence of the ethical judgment is the soul proper of all morality, the negation of all self-deception and of all deception through another. The pedagogical maxim is: Be conscientious. Be in the last instance dependent only upon the conception which thou thyself hast of the idea of the Good!

—The self-criticism prompted by conscience hovers over all our historical actuality, and is the ground of all our ra-

tional progress. Fichte's stern words remain, therefore, eternally true: "He who has a bad character, must absolutely create for himself a better one."—

THIRD CHAPTER.

Religious Culture.

§ 152. Social culture contains the formal phase, moral culture the real phase, of the practical mind. Conscience forms the transition to religious culture. In its apodeictic nature, it is the absoluteness of spirit. The individual discerns in the depths of its own consciousness the determinations of universality and of necessity to which it has to subject itself. They appear to it as the voice of God. Religion makes its appearance as soon as the individual distinguishes the Absolute from himself as personal, as a subject existing for itself and therefore for him. The atheist remains at the stage of insight into the absoluteness of the logical and physical, æsthetic and practical categories. He may, therefore, be perfectly moral. He lacks religion, though he loves to characterize his uprightness by this name, and to transfer the dogmatic determinations of positive religion into the ethical sphere. It belongs to the province of religion that I demean myself towards the Absolute not only as toward that which is my own substance, and that in relation to it not I alone am the subject, but that to me also the substance in itself is a personal subject for itself. If I look upon myself as the only absolute, I make myself devoid of spiritual essence. I am only absolute self-consciousness, for which, because it as idea relates only to itself, there remains only the impulse to a persistent conflict with every self-consciousness not identical with it. Were this the case, such a self-consciousness would be only theoretical irony. In religion I know the Absolute as essence, when I am known by him. Everything else, myself included, is finite and transitory, however significant it may be, however relatively and momentarily the Infinite may exist in it. As existence even, it is transitory. The Absolute, positing itself, distinguishing itself from itself in unity with itself, is always like to itself, and takes up all the unrest of the phenomenal world back again into its simple essence.

§ 153. This process of the individual spirit, in which it rises out of the multiplicity of all relations into union with the Absolute as the substantial subject, and in which nature and history are united, we may call, in a restricted sense, a change of heart [Gemuth]. In a wider sense of the word we give this name to a certain sentimental cheerfulness (light-heartedness), a sense of comfort—of little significance. The highest emotions of the heart culminate in religion, whose warmth is inspired by practical activity and conscientiousness.

§ 154. Education has to fit man for religion. (1) It gives him the conception of it; (2) it endeavors to have this conception actualized in him; (3) it subordinates the theoretical and practical process in fashioning him to a determinate stand-point of religious culture.

—In the *working out* or detailed treatment of Pedagogics, the position which the conception of religion occupies is very uncertain. Many writers on Education place it at the beginning, while others reserve it for the end. Others naively bring it forward in the midst of heterogeneous surroundings, but know how to say very little concerning it, and urge teachers to kindle the fire of religious feeling in their pupils by teaching them to fear God. Through all their writing, we hear the cry that in Education nothing is so important as Religion. Rightly understood, this saying is quite true. The religious spirit, the consciousness of the Absolute, and the reverence for it, should permeate all. Not unfrequently, however, we find that what is meant by religion is theology, or the church ceremonial, and these are only one-sided phases of the total religious process. The Anglican High-Church presents in the colleges and universities of England a sad example of this error. What can be more deadening to the spirit, more foreign to religion, than the morning and evening prayers as they are carried on at Oxford and Cambridge with machine-like regularity! But also to England belongs the credit of the sad fact, that, according to Kohl's report, there live in Manchester, Liverpool, Birmingham, and London, thousands of men who have never enjoyed any teaching in religion, have never been baptized, who live absolutely without religion in brutal stupidity. Religion must form the cul-

minating point of Education. It takes up into itself the didactical and practical elements, and rises through the force of its content to universality.

I. *The Theoretical Process of Religious Culture.*

§ 155. Religion, in common with every content of the spirit, must pass through three stages of feeling, conception, and comprehension. Whatever may be the special character of any religion it cannot avoid this psychological necessity, either in its general history or in the history of the individual consciousness. The teacher must understand this process, partly in order that he may make it easier to the youth, partly that he may guard against the malformation of the religious feeling which may arise through the fact of the youth's remaining in one stage after he is ready for another and needs it. Pedagogics must therefore lay out beforehand the philosophy of religion, on which alone can we found the complete discussion of this idea.

§ 156. (1) Religion exists first as religious feeling. The person is still immediately identical with the Divine, does not yet distinguish himself from the absoluteness of his being, and is in so far determined by it. In so far as he feels the divine, he is a mystery to himself. This beginning is necessary. Religion cannot be produced in men from the external side; its genesis belongs rather to the primitive depths in which God himself and the individual soul are essentially one.

—The educator must not allow himself to suppose that he is able to make a religion. Religion dwells originally in every individual soul, for every one is born of God. Education can only aid the religious feeling in its development. As far as regards the psychological form, it was quite correct for Schleiermacher and his followers to characterize the absoluteness of the religious feeling as the feeling of dependence, for feeling is determined by that which it feels; it depends upon its content. But in so far as God constitutes the content of the feeling, there appears the opposite of all dependence or absolute emancipation. I maintain this in opposition to Schleiermacher. Religion lifts man above the finite, temporal and transitory, and frees him from the control of the phenomenal

world. Even the lowest form of religion does this; and when it is said that Schleiermacher has been unjustly criticized for this expression of dependence, this distinction is overlooked.—

§ 157. But religious feeling as such rises into something higher when the spirit distinguishes the content of this religious feeling from any other content which it also feels, represents it clearly to itself, and places itself over against it formally as a free individual.

—But we must not understand that the religious feeling is destroyed in this process; in rising to the form of distinct representation, it remains at the same time as a necessary form of the Intelligence.—

§ 158. If the spirit is held back and prevented from passing out of the simplicity of feeling into the act of distinguishing the perception from what it becomes, the conception—if its efforts towards the forming of this conception are continually re-dissolved into feeling, then feeling, which was as the first step perfectly healthy and correct, will become morbid and degenerate into a wretched mysticism. Education must, therefore, make sure that this feeling is not destroyed by the progress of its content into perception and conception on the side of psychological form, but rather that it attains truth thereby.

§ 159. (2) Conception as the ideally transformed perception dissects the religious content on its different sides, and follows each of these to its consequence. Imagination controls the individual conceptions, but by no means with that absoluteness which is often supposed; for each picture has in itself its logical consequence to which imagination must yield; e.g. if a religion represents God as an animal, or as half animal and half man, or as man, each of these conceptions has in its development its consequences for the imagination.

§ 160. We rise out of the stage of Conception when the spirit tries to determine the universality of its content according to its necessity, i.e. when it begins to think. The necessity of its pictures is a mere presupposition for the imagination. The thinking activity, however, recognizes not only the contradiction which exists between the sensuous, limited form of the individual conception, and the absolute nature of its

content, but also the contradiction in which the conceptions find themselves with respect to each other.

§ 161. If the spirit is prevented from passing out of the varied pictures of conception to the supersensuous clearness and simplicity of the thinking activity—if the content which it already begins to seize as idea is again dissolved into the confusion of the picture world, then the religion of imagination, which was a perfectly proper form as the second step, becomes perverted into some form of idolatry, either coarse or refined. Education must therefore not oppose the thinking activity if the latter undertakes to criticize religious conceptions; on the contrary, it must guide this so that the discovery of the contradictions which unavoidably adhere to sensuous form shall not mislead the youth into the folly of throwing away, with the relative untruth of the form, also the religious content in general.

—It is an error for educators to desire to keep the imagination apart from religious feeling, but it is also an error to detain the mind, which is on its formal side the activity of knowing, in the stage of imagination, and to desire to condemn it thence into the service of canonical allegories. The more, in opposition to this, it is possessed with the charm of thinking, the more is it in danger of condemning the content of religion itself as a mere fictitious conception. As a transition-stage the religion of imagination is perfectly normal, and it does not in the least impair freedom if, for example, one has personified evil as a living Devil. The error does not lie in this, but in the making absolute these determinate, æsthetic forms of religion. The reaction of the thinking activity against such æsthectic absolutism then undertakes in its negative absolutism to despise the content also, as if it were a mere conception.—

§ 162. (3) In the thinking activity the spirit attains that form of the religious content which is identical with that of its simple consciousness, and above which there is no other for the intelligence as theoretical. But we distinguish three varieties in this thinking activity: the abstract, the reflective, and the speculative. The Abstract gives us the religious content of consciousness in the form of abstractions or dogmas, i.e. propositions which set up a definition as a universal, and

add to it another as the reason for its necessity. The Reflective stage busies itself with the relation of dogmas to each other, and with the search for the grounds on which their necessity must rest. It is essentially critical, and hence skeptical. The explanation of the dogmas, which is carried on in this process of reasoning and skeptical investigation, is completed alone in speculative thinking, which recognizes the free unity of the content and its form as its own proper self-determination of the content, creating its own differences. Education must know this stage of the intelligence, partly that it may in advance preserve, in the midst of its changes, that repose which it brings into the consciousness; partly that it may be able to lead to the process of change itself, in accordance with the organic connection of its phases. We should prevent the criticism of the abstract understanding by the reflective stage as little as we should that of the imagination by the thinking activity. But the stage of reflection is not the last possibility of the thinking activity, although, in the variety of its skepticism it often takes itself for such, and, with the emptiness of mere negation to which it holds, often brings itself forward into undesirable prominence. It becomes evident, in this view, how very necessary for man, with respect to religion, is a genuine philosophical culture, so that he may not lose the certainty of the existence of the Absolute in the midst of the obstinacy of dogmas and the changes of opinions.

§ 163. Education must then not fear the descent into dogmatic abstraction, since this is an indispensable means for theoretical culture in its totality, and the consciousness cannot dispense with it in its history. But Education has, in the concrete, carefully to discern in which of these stages of culture any particular consciousness may be. For if for mankind as a race the fostering of philosophy is absolutely necessary, it by no means follows that this necessity exists for each individual. To children, to women, e.g. for all kinds of simple and limited lives, the form of the religion of the imagination is well suited, and the form of comprehension can come only relatively to them. Education must not, then, desire powerfully and prematurely to develop the thinking activity before the intelligence is really fully grown.

—The superficial thinking which many teachers demand in the sphere of religion is no less impractical than the want of all guidance into rightly ordered meditations on religious subjects. It is natural that the lower form of intelligence should, in contrast with the higher, appear to be frivolous, because it has no need of change of form as the higher has, and on this account it looks upon the destruction of the form of a picture or a dogma as the destruction of religion itself. In our time the idea is very prevalent that the content itself must change with the changing of the psychological form, and that therefore a religion in the stage of feeling, of conception, and of comprehension, can no longer be the same in its essence. These suppositions, which are so popular, and are considered to be high philosophy, spring from the superficiality of psychological inquiry.—

§ 164. The theoretical culture of the religious feeling endeavors therefore with the freedom of philosophical criticism to elevate the presupposition of Reason in the religious content to self-assured insight by means of the proof of the necessity of its determinations. This is the only reasonable pedagogical way not only to prevent the degeneration of the religious consciousness into a miserable mysticism or into frivolity, but also to remove these if they are already existent.

—External seclusion avails nothing. The crises of the world-historical changes in the religious consciousness find their way through the thickest cloister walls; the philosopher Reinhold was a pupil of the Jesuits, the philosopher Schad of the Benedictines.—

II. *The Practical Process of Religious Culture.*

§ 165. The theoretical culture is truly practical, for it gives man definite conceptions and thoughts of the Divine and his relation to him. But in a narrower sense that culture is practical which relates to the Will as such. Education has in this respect to distinguish (1) consecration—religious feeling in general,—(2) the induction of the youth into the forms of a positive religion, and (3) his reconciliation with his lot.

§ 166. (1) Religious feeling presupposes morality as an indispensable condition without which it cannot inculcate its

ideas. But if man from a merely moral stand-point places himself in relation to the idea of Duty as such, the ethical religious stand-point differs from it in this, that it places the necessity of the Good as the self-determination of the divine Will and thus makes of practice a personal relation to God, changing the Good to the Holy and the Evil to Sin. Education must therefore first accustom the youth to the idea, that in doing the Good he unites himself with God as with the absolute Person, but that in doing Evil he separates himself from him. The feeling that he through his deed comes into contact with God himself, positively or negatively, deepens the moral conduct to an intense sensibility of the heart.

§ 167. (2) The religious sense which grows in the child that he has an uninterrupted personal relation to the Absolute as a person, constitutes the beginning of the practical forming of religion. The second step is the induction of the child into the objective forms of worship established in some positive religion. Through religious training the child learns to renounce his egotism; through attendance on religious services he learns to give expression to his religious feeling in prayer, in the use of symbols, and in church festivals. Education must, however, endeavor to retain freedom with regard to these forms, so that they shall not be confounded with Religion itself. Religion displays itself in these ceremonies, but they as mere forms are of value only in so far as they, while externalities, are manifestations of the spirit which produces them.

—If the mechanism of ceremonial forms is taken as religion itself, the service of God degenerates into the false service of religion, as Kant has designated it in *Religion within the Limits of Pure Reason.* Nothing is more destructive to the sensibility to all real religious culture than the want of earnestness with which prayers, readings from the Bible, attendance on church, the communion, &c., are often practised by teachers. But one must not conclude from this extreme that an ignorance of all sacred forms in general would be more desirable for the child.—

§ 168. (3) It is possible that a man on the stand-point of ecclesiastical religious observances may be fully contented; he may be fully occupied in them, and perfect his life there-

by in perfect content. But by far the greater number of men will see themselves forced to experience the truth of religion in the hard vicissitudes of their lot, since they carry on some business, and with that business create for themselves a past whose consequences condition their future. They limit themselves through their deeds, whose involuntary-voluntary authors they become; involuntary in so far as they are challenged to the deeds from the totality of events, voluntary in so far as they undertake them and bring about an actual change in the world. The history of the individual man appears therefore on the one hand, if we consider its material, as the work of circumstances; but on the other hand, if we reflect on the form, as the act of a self-determining actor. Want of freedom (the being determined through the given situation) and freedom (the determination to the act) are united in actual life as something which is exactly so, and cannot become anything else as final. The essence of the spiritual being stands always over against this unavoidable limitation as that which is in itself infinite, which is beyond all history, because the absolute spirit, in and for itself, has no history. That which one calls his history is only the manifesting of himself, and his everlasting return out of this manifestation into himself an act which in absolute spirit coincides with the transcending of all manifestation. From the nature which belongs to him there arises for the individual spirit the impulse towards a holy life, i.e. the being freed from his history even in the midst of its process. He gratifies this impulse negatively through the considering of what has happened as past and gone, as that which lives now only ideally in the recollection; and positively through the positing of a new actual existence in which he strives to realize the idea of freedom which constitutes his necessity, as purer and higher than before. This constant new-birth out of the grave of the past to the life of a more beautiful future is the genuine reconciliation with destiny. The false reconciliation may assume different forms. It may abstain from all action because man through this limits himself and becomes responsible. This is to despair of freedom, which condemns the spirit to the loss of itself since its nature demands activity. The abstract quietism of the Indian penitents, of the Buddhists, of the fa-

natical ascetics, of the Protestant recluses, &c., is an error of this kind. The man may become indifferent about the ethical determinateness of his deeds. In this case he acts; but because he has no faith in the necessary connection of his deeds through the means of freedom, a connection which he would willingly ascribe to mere chance, he loses his spiritual essence. This is the error of indifference and of its frivolity, which denies the open mystery of the ruling of destiny. Education must therefore imbue man with respect for external movements of history and with confidence in the inexhaustibleness of the progressive human spirit, since only by producing better things can he affirmatively elevate himself above his past. This active acknowledgment of the necessity of freedom as the determining principle of destiny gives the highest satisfaction to which practical religious feeling may arrive, for blessedness develops itself in it—that blessedness which does not know that it is circumscribed by finitude and transitoriness, and which possesses the immortal courage to strive always anew for perfection with free resignation at its non-realization, so that happiness and misery, pleasure and pain, are conquered by the power of disinterested self-sacrifice.

—The escape from action in an artificial absence of all events in life, which often sinks to a veritable brutalizing of man, is the distinguishing feature of all monkish pedagogics. In our time there is especial need of a reconciliation between man and destiny, for all the world is discontented. The worst form of discontent is when one is, as the French say, *blasé*: though the word is not, as many fancy, derived originally from the French, but from the Greek βλαζειν, to wither. It is true that all culture passes through phases, each of which becomes momentarily and relatively wearisome, and that in so far one may be *blasé* in any age. But in modern times this state of feeling has increased to that of thorough disgust —disgust which nevertheless at the same time demands enjoyment. The one who is *blasé* has enjoyed everything, felt everything, mocked at everything. He has passed from the enjoyment of pleasure to sentimentality, i.e. to rioting in feeling; from sentimentality to irony with regard to feeling, and from this to the torment of feeling his entire weakness

and emptiness as opposed to these. He ridicules this also, as if if it were a consolation to him to fling away the universe like a squeezed lemon, and to be able to assert that in pure nothingness lies the truth of all things. And yet nevertheless this irony furnishes the point on which Education can fasten, in order to kindle anew in him the religious feeling, and to lead him back to a loving recognition of actuality, to a respect for his own history. The greatest difficulty which Education has to encounter here is the coquetry, the miserable eminence and self-satisfaction which have undermined the man and made him incapable of all simple and natural enjoyment. It is not too much to assert that many pupils of our *Gymnasia* are affected with this malady. Our literature is full of its products. It inveighs against its dissipation, and nevertheless at the same time cannot resist a certain kind of pleasure in it. Diabolical sentimentality!

III. *The Absolute Process of Religious Culture.*

§ 169. In comparing the stages of the theoretical and practical culture of the religious feeling their internal correspondence appears. Feeling, as immediate knowledge, and the consecration of the sense by means of piety; imagination with all its images, and the church services with their ceremonial observances; finally, the comprehending of religion as the reconciliation with destiny, as the internal emancipation from the dominion of external events—all these correspond to each other. If we seize this parallelism all together, we have the progress which religion must make in its historical process, in which it (1) begins as natural; (2) goes on to historical precision, and (3) elevates this to a rational faith. These stages await every man in as far as he lives through a complete religious culture, but this may be for the individual a question of chance.

§ 170. (1) A child has as yet no definite religious feeling. He is still only a possibility capable of manifold determinations. But, since he is a spirit, the essence of religion is active in him, though as yet in an unconscious form. The substance of spirit attests its presence in every individual, through his mysterious impulse toward the absolute and towards intercourse with God. This is the initiatory stage

of natural religion, which must not be confounded with the religion which makes nature the object of worship (fetishism, &c.)

§ 171. (2) But while the child lives into this in his internal life, he comes in contact with definite forms of religion, and will naturally, through the mediation of the family, be introduced to some one of them. His religious feeling takes now a particular direction, and he accepts religion in one of its historical forms. This positive religion meets the precise want of the child, because it brings into his consciousness, by means of teaching and sacred rites, the principal elements which are found in the nature of religion.

§ 172. (3) In contradistinction to the natural basis of religious feeling, all historical religions rest on the authoritative basis of revelation from God to man. They address themselves to the imagination, and offer a system of objective forms of worship and ceremonies. But spirit, as eternal, as self-identical, cannot forbear as thinking activity to subject the traditional religion to criticism and to compare it as a phenomenal existence. From this criticism arises a religion which satisfies the demands of the reason, and which, by means of insight into the necessity of the historical process, leads to the exercise of a genuine toleration towards its many-sided forms. This religion mediates between the unity of the thinking consciousness and the religious content, while this content, in the history of religious feeling, appears theoretically as dogma, and practically as the command of an absolute and incomprehensible authority. It is just as simple as the unsophisticated natural religious feeling, but its simplicity is at the same time master of itself. It is just as specific in its determinations as the historical religion, but its determinateness is at the same time universal, since it is worked out by the thinking reason.

§ 173. Education must superintend the development of the religious consciousness towards an insight into the necessary consequence of its different stages. Nothing is more absurd than for the educator to desire to avoid the introduction of a positive religion, or a definite creed, as a middle stage between the natural beginning of religious feeling and its end in philosophical culture. Only when a man has lived through

the entire range of one-sided phases—through the crudeness of such a concrete individualizing of religion, and has come to recognize the universal nature of religion in a special form of it which excludes other forms—only when the spirit of a congregation has taken him into its number, is he ripe to criticize religion in a conciliatory spirit, because he has then gained a religious character through that historical experience. The self-comprehending universality must have such a solid basis as this in the life of the man; it can never form the beginning of one's culture, but it may constitute the end which turns back again to the beginning. Most men remain at the historical stand-point. The religion of reason, as that of the minority, constitutes in the different religions the invisible church, which seeks by progressive reform to purify these religions from superstition and unbelief. It is the duty of the state, by making all churches equal in the sight of the law, to guard religion from the temptation of impure motives, and, through the granting of such freedom to religious individuality, to help forward the unity of a rational insight into religion which is distinct from the religious feeling only in its form, not in its content. Not a philosopher, but Jesus of Nazareth freed the world from all selfishness and all bondage.

§ 174. With this highest theoretical and practical emancipation, the general work of education ends. It remains now to be shown how the general idea of Education shapes its special elements into their appropriate forms. From the nature of Pedagogics, which concerns itself with man in his entirety, this exposition belongs partly to the history of culture in general, partly to the history of religion, partly to the philosophy of history. The pedagogical element in it always lies in the ideal which the spirit of a nation or of an age creates out of itself, and which it seeks to realize in its youth.

LECTURES ON THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW.*

By James Hutchison Stirling.

III.

Gentlemen:—In our last lecture, we saw the realization of free-will into a person on the one hand, and property on the other. Free-will itself was the terminal result into which all that held of theory had collapsed—a result which, simply as that and no more, was necessarily undeveloped. But this undevelopedness gives free-will, as we so have it, a character of singleness and oneness; or this undevelopedness and firstness, so to speak, give it a character of abstractness; for that is abstract—as sweetness, whiteness—that is in isolated self-identity only. And we can see that if whiteness is abstract in consequence of its isolatedness to self, for the same reason the broken-off hand of a watch, or a separated main-spring, is also abstract. In short, any one member of a concrete is, being isolated, abstract: so any one moment of the notion, or of *a* notion—the universal, the particular, or the singular—being isolated, is abstract. Free-will then, as it first emerges, has, being undeveloped, this character of singleness, oneness, and abstractness. But a will, a free-will, single, one, and abstract—that is a person. This personality now must *realize* itself; for if overtly, explicitly abstract, it is also latently, implicitly concrete, and that for no other reason than that it is will—thinking will. But realization takes place always through something else or other; now, to such an abstract *inner*, what can be *other* but a similarly abstract *outer?* and that is an external thing, property.

These considerations are hard, for they are wholly peculiar and wholly new—in this peculiarity and strangeness they may not carry conviction either—still they will be allowed to possess their own subtlety and felicity. Again, it must not escape notice that the machine engaged in the manipulation and working up of all this is the *notion:* we have but a single substance, a single material, all through, passing from roller to roller of the various moments. Will, coming to us as bare result, is the undeveloped universal that, *in itself*, or

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implicitly, concrete, must strive forward into its correspondent particular, and thence further into its correspondent singular. This is the march everywhere, and, so far at least, we may acknowledge in the person a moment of universality as in property a moment of particularity.

The most common sense passage I can find in Hegel bearing on these points is this: "All things are capable of being made man's property, because man is free-will, and, as such, in and for himself" (that is, responsible, amenable only to his own self); "but what is opposed to him has not this quality. Every man has the right, then, to set his will in the things of existence, to sublate them, and make them his; for they, as external, have no self-end; they are not the infinite reference of self to self" (which every subject is); "they are even to *themselves* externalities. The lower animals, even, are such externalities, and, so far, things. Only will is infinite, absolute to all else, whilst all else is only relative. To make them mine is at bottom, consequently, only to manifest the dignity of my will as compared with external things, and demonstrate that they are not in and for themselves, or have no self-end. The manifestation itself takes place in this way that I set in the particular thing another end than that which it immediately had. I give to the lower animal another soul than what it had. I give it my soul." It is in this way that Hegel places us in presence of free-will and of an outer world in which it is to realize itself; and he really believes that he never makes a single step in advance without its own *deduction.* We are once for all arrived, then, at the notions of person and property: the one, the abstract self-*in*ternal, immediate; the other, the abstract self-*ex*ternal, immediate. This word *immediate* I have used before, and it always gives a certain difficulty; but what is separated, isolated, secluded to its own self, what is abstracted (or abstracted from) is something taken out of all its *bemediating* connections and relations, and so, therefore, something immediate and direct.

Hegel treats the subject of a philosophy of right under the three great divisions of Abstract Right, Morality, and what he calls *Sittlichkeit;* and the principle that guides him in this is, as always and everywhere, the notion. The first division that is, is but right in its universality; the second,

right, in its particularity; and the third, right in its singularity. But, though such is the succession in Hegel, we are not to suppose that the latter members depend upon the former as earlier in time or superior in dignity. That they are *members* is what we must not allow to escape us, and that the truth consequently is the one concrete whole. Still, for all that, Hegel is not quite without an *historical* consideration here—say, in the transition from abstract law to subjective morality. Law, as treated elsewhere, is very often referred to a moral basis: while here, in Hegel, morals, on the contrary, would appear to be referred to a legal basis. Now that is not without a certain *historical* support. It cannot be denied that what Hegel means by morality was represented—fairly represented—nay, very perfectly represented—in the person of Socrates; while what he means by abstract right did not reach full historical development till under the Roman empire. Still it is not in Socrates, but in Christianity, that Hegel acknowledges the veritable historical first of subjective morality, or the law of conscience, inner righteousness, on the one hand, and of the law of love on the other. And surely these are correct ideas—surely it was only after Christianity that the individual, and not isolatedly, but in connection with the whole community, came to know the full import of what is named moral experience. Christianity it was that wrought as a purifying ferment in the souls of men, abasing all the greeds of sense, shaming the lusts and prides and vanities of self, awakening repentance, chastening the heart, and leading the soul generally into candor and simplicity and humility and love. Now that is precisely the position of subjective morality, and as opposed to abstract right. Under the latter the requisite is only to do the right, no matter whether you agree with it or not, and no matter what your motives, intentions, or general spirit, may be. But morality is plainly an internalization of such a stand-point, of such a material. While the standard under law was without, it is now under morality within—it has become conscience. And really the one step may be regarded as having led to the other: only after men had long mechanically and unreflectingly obeyed law did they come to make its prescripts their own principles, did they come to see that these prescripts were but what

their own nature, and no mere external authority, commanded. But the moment the faintest edge of such an experience as that was received into the heart, morality had begun. Morality, then, is but a particularization of law, or it is but law in the moment of particularity. Law, namely, as we have seen, is wholly universal. Its prescripts are directed only to the abstract person, only to free-will as free-will. But there is an advance in concretion now: the person has become a subject, or better, a neighbor. And the very word neighbor opens a vista into a sphere of concrete interests infinitely richer and more complicated than that connected with the abstract rights of a person.

What Hegel means by *Sittlichkeit*, again, is a still higher advance in concretion. This word really means simply morality. The *Sitte* is but the Greek *ἦθος*, the Latin *mos*, our own *custom*. What Hegel sees in it, however, is the substantial custom that has sprung from objective reason, and is fixed, established, stereotyped in the conscience and practice of a people. So it is that I translate it *observance*, sometimes *instinctive*, sometimes *substantial observance*. And these words, I think, will pretty well convey the meaning, though it must be confessed that the task of a translator here is excessively puzzling. One *wrong* translation I will refer to. I have seen the word *Sittlichkeit* translated *conventionality*. But that is a mistake. Early in one's studies, no doubt, such a translation has its own temptations; but it is entirely to miss the matter in hand to yield to them. What we mean by conventionalities are temporary customs, mere arbitrary agreements. Thus it is a convention when leaving home and desirous that your friends should call on you when you return, that you pay them a visit to say good-bye, or, in their absence, leave a card for them with P.P.C. (*pour prendre congé*) written on it. That is a convention. Again, it used to be a custom that when the representatives of a family made their periodical and ceremonious call on another family, the gentleman, in handing in the card for himself and wife, bent in a corner of it with his thumb. Now that is something purely and simply conventional. But such conventionality is very remote indeed from the Hegelian *Sitte*. By it we are to understand something not subjective but

objective, not contingent but necessary, not arbitrary but rational — something fixed, permanent, established — something looked upon as sacred and springing from a sacred source. I have tried all manner of English words for it, and once thought I had got over the difficulty by translating *Sittlich*, *Sittlichkeit*, and *Sitte*, respectively by the terms *ritual*, *rituality*, and *rite*, but had to give them up too, what they suggested being either too ecclesiastical or too externally ceremonial. Were we to reserve the Latin *morality* for Hegel's *Moralität*, and the Greek *ethicality* for Hegel's *Sittlichkeit*, the end so far would be pretty well attained, but we should still want a word for *Sitte*. It is this word *Sitte* that I propose to render by *observance*, and I really have been quite unable to find any single English term that would suit better. Could we use *custom*—the commonest term of all—that indeed would be preferable; but I think that your ears will tell you that that is impossible, at all events at first.

If we consider it well, there is an abstractness, a one-sidedness observable in will, whether as manifested in right, or as manifested in morality; whereas in observance will is concrete, and any such defect disappears. In right, for example, will is realized in something merely external, while in morality, again, it is realized only internally in the contingent individual subject. This is not so, however, in regard to the *Sittlich*, the observational, where what is inner is also outer, and what is outer is also inner. Take filial obedience, for example; *there* is a *Sitte*, a sacred usage, a civil custom, a substantial observance, and we can see it to be no less real as an outward act than as an inward sentiment, and no less real as an inward sentiment than as an outward act. Societary usage that is as well societary sentiment, or societary sentiment that is as well societary usage—that, then, is *Sittlichkeit*—that, then, is *observance*. In such usage we see society to be in enjoyment of what we may call the second or higher nature; such usage, or the system of such usages, we can see also to be capable of being named the substance of free-will, a substance which each individual free-will, each member of the society knows to be that individual member's own proper substance. *He* then possesses virtue, ethical personality, whose whole nature is permeated and pervaded

by this substantial life; who regards, accordingly, his particular place in the system as not negative to him, but peacefully accepts it, trusting implicitly in the whole, and ready to sacrifice himself to it; and this is so, not as regards the State only, but as regards every one of its subordinate particular institutions.

We see, then, the nature of Hegel's threefold division of the science of right, and we see more particularly that this division has been prescribed by the notion. The first division, abstract right, or what we may call legality, is will in the universality of the person; the second, morality, is will in the particularity of the neighbor; and the third, *Sittlichkeit*, ethicality, or we may even say politicality, is will in the singularity of the citizen or political subject. Of course, the series legality, morality, politicality, as well as the series person, neighbor, citizen, can only correspond to the series universality, particularity, singularity, when the words of each are precisely understood as Hegel understands them. Understood as we understand them, *person*, *neighbor*, for example, are perhaps each less universal than *citizen*. Both words, indeed—*neighbor* and *citizen*—are, as used here, my own, and there must be seen in them only Hegel's notions. The same principle that conditions the general classifications contions also the subordinate ones; and when legality or abstract right is divided into Property, Contract, and Penalty, it is still the march of the notion through its moments that Hegel sees and would have us see. What respects form, however, will perhaps be still more intelligible when we draw into preciser consideration the matter discussed.

The essence of property then, as we have seen, is that a physical object—an object without will—is transformed from its own brute externality and meaninglessness into an embodiment of free-will. In property, accordingly, there is a union of two factors, of free-will on the one hand, and of an external object on the other, and this union is as necessary to the one as to the other. If the object acquires meaning and function only when it is taken up into the life of the person, this person for his part can become manifestible only through the object. Singly and in disunion either element is abstract; only in union, only together, are they both con-

crete. From this, then, we see at once the tautology of the prescript that what I can take as property must be *res nullius*—that *va sans dire;* for what already expresses free-will is already my will, and no longer an alien object that only waits embodiment. Again, the will, as we have it in the person, is, as has already been discussed, very evidently single; what it takes into possession must be single also. It cannot take possession, then, of genera, or of the elements. The person, in his singleness, cannot take possession of the genus vegetable or of the element air. Being single, he cannot make private property of what is universal. Even to make good his right of community in what is universal, this universal itself must be converted into singles, as into breaths of air and draughts of water. We are to perceive here, then, that it is the nature of the person rather than that of the object that is the dictating element; just as it is this person's will, and not the fact merely of his being *first*, that enables him to make anything his. It would be idle for free-will to make its what were already its; and to make mine what is his is to negate free-will, is to negate my own will. For property is an absolute assignment, and no mere result of mutual agreement. *This* is not *mine* simply because of my acknowledgment that *that* is *yours*. This is mine, that is yours, because free-will as free-will has set itself into either. Free-will is embodied in property, and through property is the intercourse of free-will with free-will mediated. But as this is so, or as it is the possession of property that gives objective reality to my free-will, it is my duty to possess property—property, I say, and not such and such property. What and how much property I may possess are not considerations that belong to our present sphere, where we are confined to the abstract right of the person. Of that person, however, it is certainly not only the right, but also the duty, to be a possessor of property. And here I may point out the importance of the lesson indicated. It used to be very much the fashion to run down riches and cry up poverty—especially wherever and whenever it was supposed that the young were in hearing. The bliss of poverty and the bale of riches —this was set us in every copy-line. No page of any primer but was sonorous with it, and it was rounded into our ears in

every new tongue we came to—Latin, or Greek, or French, or German. We heard it in church too, just as we heard it at home, or as we heard it in school. And when we came to the university we were assured by the Professor of Morals that that was philosophy—that that was wisdom. Then we read it in the ancients and we read it in the moderns: Cicero and Horace and the seven wise men, Simonides and Phocylides and the rest, were for ever talking of it; and even in these very days our last great man asserted, as by an authority *de par le roi*, that if he had a true man to bring up with the heart of a man in him, he would say rather let him be poor! It may seem very bold, then, should I at all hint disagreement here with an opinion that has been so long, so variously, and so authoritatively sanctioned. Nevertheless it does seem to me that the effects of this opinion have not been always good. I fear that too many a bright young literary soul has been led away by it, despising money as money, and undervaluing the honest industry that was to bring it, marrying improvidently, living *au jour le jour*, believing that every mouth brought its own bite with it, and trusting quite unmisgivingly to the future, till, having piped his best all his summer of youth like the grasshopper, he was refused food by the ants and told only to dance his best in the winter of his old age. Of course, I would not for a moment have it supposed that I take the opposite extreme, and counsel the pursuit of riches as man's sole business. These very days of ours are not less full of the futility of that vulgarity than of the disappointment and regret that are the end of the former delusion. What I have only to point out here is that it is the duty of man as man to possess property. In truth no man is a man till he is also a proprietor. Then it is only that he has entered into the concrete life of the state, and is of any true value; then it is only that he has attained life—a concrete life for himself. He is a person now, a citizen, a neighbor; no nerve or artery of the whole but meets in him; he lives the whole and enjoys the whole, and feels, in short, that only now properly can he say that he lives at all. How different the young literary enthusiasts who will not make money, but will only pipe! These, after all, live only an abstract life, and they feel themselves in the end, not as their

fellows, but isolated and apart, lonely, useless, miserable. This, then, is the lesson here, that it is about the first duty of manhood to respect property, knowing that only through property does a man enter into the state and become one with the concrete. So it will be advisable that all those young literary enthusiasts who threaten to live only abstract lives should undergo apprenticeship in a lawyer's office. There probably sooner than anywhere else will they be brought to sanity as regards property.

It is the duty, then, of every free-will, of every person, to possess property; and so far all free-wills, all persons, are *equal*. And here it is we get the true light on that equality that is so current among certain political parties now-a-days. All human beings, that is, in so far as they are persons, are not only free but equal. Equality and freedom are by no means convertible terms, however; they are not even in direct, but rather in inverse proportion. Hegel's own expressions in this reference are among his happiest and most exoteric, and I think you will not ask me to beg pardon for following them here pretty closely.

Hegel commences by admitting that it is not incorrect to regard the main interests of a constitution as centering in what the words Freedom and Equality imply; but he complains that, as generally used, they are abstract, and can only lead to the destruction of the concrete that the state is. This concrete itself, the state, is precisely what on one side introduces inequality and must introduce inequality; for the distinctions of rulers and subjects, of ranks and classes, of authorities and of those amenable to these, are inseparable from it. To carry equality rigorously out, then, would be to put an end to these and the state itself. Then it is said, all men are equal by nature; but it is quite plain that, when physical nature is meant, all men are rather unequal by nature; while, by nature the notion being meant, all men are indeed so far equal, but not to the exclusion of infinite inequality otherwise. That we should be pronounced equal as persons, as men—and not, as in Greece and Rome, because we happen to be certain men, and not certain other men—this is not the product of nature but of the consciousness of the deepest principle in our spiritual structure, and of the long

and laborious evolution of this consciousness into its present universality.

Again, as said, equality as persons does not exclude infinite inequality otherwise. That all citizens are equal before the law, has no extension beyond that legal equality of the person; otherwise, or the person apart, we are not more equal before the law than away from the law. It is precisely according to that inequality away from the law that the law itself indeed taxes us. In regard to taxes, it would plainly be monstrous injustice in the law to regard us all as equal, though, at the same time, it must and can be led only by what it sees equal in us in regard to property, age, ability, sex, &c.

As regards freedom, again, it ought not to be taken abstractly as the freedom of subjective self-will. Legal restriction ought to be seen to be the true freedom; and formerly precisely such restrictions used to be called *the* freedoms, *the* liberties. In effect, every veritable law is a freedom, a liberty, for it is a result of objective reason. In the best sense, it is not true, then, that the state is but the mutual limitation of each other's liberties; in the best sense, on the contrary, the state is a realization of liberty; for, in reality, to restrain particular or formal will is to emancipate universal and substantial will. We see but a similar mistake when it is said, too, that modern nations are more susceptible of equality than liberty; what is in question here is but abstract equality and abstract liberty, and it is only right that abstract presuppositions in regard to liberty, as these are, should be found to *break* on the realm of reality and fact as more rational and powerful in its concretion than they in their abstraction. It is more correct in this reference to say, on the contrary, that the high development of the modern state introduces the greatest concrete individual *inequality;* while, on the other hand, the deeper rationality and the firmer stability of the laws lead to a proportionally greater liberty, which also they can more readily concede and endure. The very word "liberty," moreover, implies a certain antithesis to equality, and the more firmly established liberty is as the security of person and property, as opportunity to develop and make available talent and other advantages, the less there is of equality,

and the more of liberty itself even in a subjective sense, as that of the will of the individual.

These are excellent reflections, gentlemen, and they readily suggest important applications. It is that cry of equality that is the dominant phenomenon of the day now, and we may understand it in its true light by the assistance of these observations of Hegel. The workmen find themselves as good as their masters, the servants as their mistresses, our wives as their husbands; and they all cry equality, meaning only an abstract identity that is utterly impossible. So much does the cry continue extending, nevertheless, that we may presently expect to meet a demand for the equality of children with parents, or to hear the tailor complain that it is very unjust he should be a tailor, the dancing-master similarly rebel against his vocation, and grocers and haberdashers and linen-drapers, and even perhaps lawyers *and* lecturers, all complain that they are very ill-used individuals, and insist on the original identity which is their birthright. That word *identity*, indeed, mirrors the whole matter, and we simply see that the *differences* are tired of being differences, and would fain sink to rest together in the negation of the blank identity which were the only equality. In short, it is the old story of the revolt of the members, the state being snbstituted for the belly as that that is to be destroyed. It seems indeed to be the creed of the highest enlightenment now-a-days that what is called a state is but an expensive superfluity; that society, civilization, is nothing but the raising of commodities and the exchange of them, and that no control is required there but that of the policeman to keep the workman quiet. Accordingly, with this end in view, we are exhorted to doctor and parson ourselves, and I suppose I may add, lawyer ourselves and lecture ourselves. If we could cure the evil, we must cure it in the root, however; that is, we must quash the raising of commodities itself; for it is quite certain that from that root the whole ramified and overshadowing calamity springs. To raise a single commodity, taking the commodity as a commodity, and not as a single cabbage or a single potato, supposes the whole iniquitous system — supposes workmen and food and clothes and ships and railroads and steam-engines—supposes science, and all the rest, in short;

and all the rest, as the concrete differences, can only be kept together in the single concrete identity, in the single concrete life that is the state. Common sense would seem to suggest, then, that we should be far better employed in telling the story of Menenius now-a-days than in exhorting the hands not to carry and the teeth not to chew.

In further connection with the subject of equality, Hegel refers to the proposal of an equal division of property, and convicts its "emptiness and superficiality" from the very nature of the case. "Not only external nature in its contingency but the entire round of spirit in its infinite individual developments, though under a rational organic whole, falls into *particularity;*" and, in saying as much, Hegel intimates that existence, whether physical or metaphysical, must obey the law that lies in the moment of the notion named the *particular*, and inequality is inevitable—not only so, that is, but we must thankfully see it to be so, and that it is only "an empty superficial *understanding*" which, in its abstractions, can blind itself to it. It is but the same blind understanding, too, that complains of the injustice of nature in the inequality of her distributions; for nature, as without freedom, is neither just nor unjust. As for its being the right of every man to have a sufficiency, Hegel remarks that this, so vaguely spoken, "is only a well-meant (but as what is well-meant generally is) non-objective moral *wish;* the question at all of sufficiency, besides, not falling to be discussed under property, but under civil society." It is but in harmony with such views that we find Hegel referring to the Agrarian laws and pointing to the triumph—though at some cost to right otherwise—of the more rational moment in the struggle that took place in their regard betweeen public and private property in land. Family Pacts, and *Fidei commissa* in the same connection, Hegel also mentions here as opposed to the right of personality, and consequently to that of property. In regard to Plato's republic, he remarks that it fails in the moment of particularity, and is unjust to the person in making him incapable of private property; and as for pious benevolent brotherhoods for a community of goods, we are told that such an idea may present itself without difficulty to a moral imagination that misunderstands the nature of right, free-

will, of spirit, in its moments, and reminds us that Epicurus objected to some friends of his who had made such proposals that, in the moral and religious reference, they are bad, for they manifest mistrust; and those who mistrust each other are not friends. "Further," observes Hegel, "the equality which might be introduced as to distribution of goods, would, depending as these do on industry, speedily dissolve itself again. But what is not to be done, neither shall it be tried to be done. For men are indeed equal, but only as persons, only as regards the principle of possession. By virtue of that principle it is the duty of every one to possess property. If we will speak of equality, this, then, we must regard as the only one. But the question of particularity, what and how much I may possess, that belongs elsewhere; and the allegation is false that right demands equality of property for all of us, for right demands only that each of us shall have property. Rather it expressly is in particularity that inequality has its place, and equality there were unright." In short, private property is a necessity of reason. Free-will must realize itself; that is, necessarily in an outer as outer. Will as will is also singular or individual. Property, therefore, is personal—is *this* particular property—is mine—is this particular property of this particular me. "Seizure is the enunciation of the judgment that a thing is mine. My will has subsumed it—given it that predicate of mine. It is the right of will so to subsume in itself all external things whatever, for it is in itself the universal; while they, not referent of themselves to themselves, are only under necessity and not free. It is in right of this relation that man takes to himself all outer things, and makes of them other things than they are. He treats them so only in accordance with their veritable nature." Hegel considers this to be the case even as regards the body and life itself: those, "like all other things," he says, "I possess only *in so far as it is my will*"; and he adds, "the brute cannot mutilate or put an end to itself—only man can. The brute has itself indeed in possession; its soul possesses its body; but it has no right to its own life, because it does not will it." Of course, if it is as will-less that external things are capable of being taken into possession, the same reason applies to the lower animals, and

we may reconcile ourselves to the whole position, it being premised as a necessary and indispensable condition that there shall be no cruelty, that they shall be with us happier even than they would have been with nature. As for the putting of them to death, that, as far as it is only that, is not cruelty. An animal reflects not, it knows nothing of death, thinks nothing of death; its life is as it were infinite, an infinite affirmation; for of the two negatives, birth and death, between which this affirmation hangs, it knows nothing; its life, consequently, is fairly infinite, and death is no diminution to it. How different with us!

> "We look before and after,
> And pine for what is not;
> Our sincerest laughter
> With some grief is fraught:
> Our sweetest songs are those
> That tell of saddest thought."

Man's life alone of all below is to its own self a life of limitation, a life of finitude: all other lives, even those of what is inorganic, if we may figure its existence so, are to their own selves infinite; for to their own selves they begin not, and neither do they end. Strange, too, it is the very finitude of them that makes their infinitude; it is man's very infinitude —the infinitude of his thought—that makes the finitude of his life. And this may be regarded as, in its way, an argument for the immortality of the individual soul; only such immortality were justice to man, for the privilege of reason is but a privilege of pain.

To Hegel, then, even the body—nay, the mind itself—requires to be taken possession of to become in actuality ours. Culture, education, is required for both. The body, in the immediacy of its existence, is inadequate to the soul, and must be *made* its ready organ and its animated tool. The mind, too, is at first, as it were, immersed in nature, and requires enfranchisement. "This enfranchisement is in each subject the *hard labor* against mere subjectivity of action, and against the immediacy of appetite, as against the subjective vanity of feeling, and the arbitrariness or caprice of self-will. But through this labor it is that subjective will attains to objectivity, and becomes capable and worthy of being the *actuality of the idea.* For so particularity is wrought into

universality, and through universality becomes the concrete singular."

My body, as mine, must be to another sacred, then; for violence is done my will when violence is done my body. *My* freedom is my body's freedom, and I cannot be degraded into a beast of burden. It is this immediacy of body to mind that makes the difference between an offence to the person and an offence to one's more external property. As regards monstration of possession, the human shape divine is for personality alone ample credentials and authenticity enough; but it is otherwise in regard to external things generally, for the possession of which monstration is indispensable. It is only children, as Hegel points out, who allege bare will as proof of property and as against monstration; and it is certainly not uncommon to find one child trying to prevent another from seizing something by calling out, "It's mine." Mere will will not suffice men, however; for them monstration of some kind is imperatively necessary, and rationally so, for an outward objectivity can alone guarantee the inward subjectivity. The setting of will in an object is certainly the notion of property, but there is required also a realization of this.

Seizin, seizure, occupation, possession, or the taking into possession, appropriation, &c.—the mode of this varies, and must vary, according to infinite conditions bearing on the nature of the object and the power of the individual. As a general rule, it may be said that the more I introduce formation into anything, the more I make it mine. It does not follow, however, that, so to speak, only *mine* in it is mine; that is, that the form alone is mine. If the form is mine, so also is the matter; and it is a mere idle subtlety on the part of Fichte to suggest that the gold cup which I have made a cup is only my cup, and that it is another's to take the gold if he can. Truly, if he can! A substance without qualities is an empty abstraction, and for the rest it is in the substance that I have set my will, and the formation is only a sign thereof. In such cases there is really nothing, then, that, as masterless, another may take. Hegel treats the whole subject of possession under the three heads of Seizure, Use, and Alienation, and affects still to see in this the moments of the notion. We may say, for example, that the affirmation of will in an object

corresponds to the moment of simple apprehension, while *will* that only uses an object only *negates* it—a process, as it were, of judgment; and *will* that alienates an object, returns out of externality into its own self, which may be regarded so far as a moment of reason. For I may remark here, as I have remarked already, in the manipulation of the moments, it is often a convenience to substitute the concreter moments of simple apprehension, judgment, and reason, for the more abstract ones of universality, particularity, and singularity—a substitution for the rest that throws its own light on the nature of the general ideas involved, which, however, I hope my first lecture demonstrated at full. To correlate seizure, use, and alienation, with the moments of the notion, is nevertheless, I fear, somewhat forced—a remark that must be extended perhaps to Hegel's immediate division here of Appropriation into Bodily Seizure, Formation, and Designation. In that triplet Hegel also affects to see an adumbration of the moments of the notion, and points out that they are—which indeed they are—a rise in generalization, a rise from individuality to universality.

I know not that it is worth while for me to enter at length into all that may be said on these three forms of appropriation. Knowing that I have to say so much in these lectures that is hard to understand, there is a certain temptation to expatiate on what at length will prove universally intelligible, and so get credit, as it were, for having said something at last; but it appears to me to belong far more nearly to my duty to occupy myself rather with what is difficult, and so do at least some actual work in the way of explanation. Of the natural limitations of *bodily seizure*, of its extension by inference to what is in connection with the amount seized, or of its extension in actual fact through artificial means—of all that I think I need say nothing, for a little reflection will suggest it to every one. As regards what is referred to as *connections*, for example, there are conterminous rivers, seas, lakes, pastures, and hunting grounds—there are rocks and minerals—there are alluvial deposits, strandings and wreckings, waifs and strays, flotsam, jetsam, game, &c. As concerns such things, it is the *understanding* that

decides with its *grounds* and *counter-grounds*, and not the notion with its moments of reason.

What concerns *formation* is as exoteric as what concerns bodily seizure, and may be perfunctorily passed with quite as little scruple. It is evidently a more perfect form of monstration as a more permanent and complete one. The cultivation of the soil, the planting of trees, the raising of cattle, must all be regarded as instances of it. The protection of game may also be regarded as a species of formation, and so also may the pasturing, hunting, and fishing of nomads, or other people that come and go, though, so far as monstration is concerned, they are less perfect. I add also that no formation can make a slave, can make property of a human being; and the reason lies not in any expediency of the understanding, but in reason itself, in the notion: man is free-will, and must be respected as such. It is to be allowed, however, that in certain past times slavery was not so wholly unjustifiable, so far, that is, as many men then had not yet taken possession of themselves, had not yet formed themselves into free-will, but were, so to speak, in mere undeveloped externality and naturality, creatures simply of instinct and brute nature. Now, however, that the seat of industry is the ethical state, slavery is no longer possible, for the ethical state is but the realized idea of liberty.

As for the remaining mode of occupancy, *designation*, or the employment of signs, it is pleasant to see that such a man as Hegel, even with such an infallible touchstone and test in hand as the notion, must have had considerable difficulty in deciding as to what he was to say of it, whether he was to say that it was more perfect or less perfect than the others. Understanding—and with all the mooning madness that his unintelligible dialect and dialectic have attached to him, Hegel's understanding is really about the toughest and soundest going—understanding seems to have led him to say, in the first instance, as to his pupils at Nürnberg, that "occupancy by mere designation of the object is imperfect." And really the attachment of a mere sign, some mere badge, some mere ticket, to an article, appears at first sight about the most partial, perishable, and feeble way of seizing that

one can well imagine. So it is we find Hegel remarking in those Nürnberg days: "The sign, token, or ticket, that does not constitute, as formation does, at the same time the thing itself, is an object that has a signification which lies not in its own nature, but is foreign to it; while, on the other hand, that which is signified again, has a nature alien to *its* nature. Designation is therefore arbitrary. What a thing shall be the sign of, is more or less a matter of convenience." Even in the text of the *Rechtsphilosophie*, something of hesitation as to the relative ranks of the three modes of seizure still unmistakably betrays itself. There bodily seizure is spoken of as "on the sensuous side the completest mode, though otherwise only subjective, temporary, and restricted." "Formation" is called "the seizure the most adequate to the idea, as bringing to unity in itself both the subjective and the objective element." Nay, in the *Rechtsphilosophie* it is directly said of designation itself that it is "very indefinite." It is in what are called the *Zusätze*, the additions after his death from public lectures, as supplied by students or his own manuscripts, that we find Hegel at last doing designation the justice of acknowledgment which he had all along done it of position: it was always third. There he points out the rise in generalization represented by the three modes in their relative places, which I have alreaded alluded to; characterizes designation as essentially intellectual, and therefore easily applicable to an entire whole; and finally concludes thus: "Occupancy by means of designation is the most perfect of all, for the other kinds of it are also more or less of the nature of a sign. When I seize a thing, or form a thing, the ultimate import is always a sign that, to the exclusion of others, I have set my will in the thing. The notion of a sign is namely this, that a thing does not stand for what it is, but for what it signifies. A cockade signifies, for example, the nationality of a man, though the color has no connection whatever with the nation, and exhibits not itself but the nation. By this, that he can give a sign, and by its means acquire, man shows his sovereignty over things."

Here, then, we see that Hegel is led to the truth at last, even by his own notion; for there is no doubt but that designation, as intellectual, is the preferable mode of seizure.

Thus it is that the mark, the token, the ticket, however insignificant, becomes significant. It is a great help and a welcome encouragement to us poor mortals, however, to see our own weaknesses and hesitations reflected in a Hegel, and to know thus that we possess a common nature even with him.

The transition from seizure to use is very characteristic of Hegel, and, of course, accomplished through the *notion*. It is impossible to express this better than Hegel does; but unfortunately it is also impossible to find direct equivalents in English for Hegel's German terms. I must content myself with some faint adumbration of it. In seizure, will has made a thing *its*. The will is thus as it were *positive* in the relation, and the thing *negative*. But the will thus particularly determined by the thing is will in a particular volition, or particular will in a desire, and the negative thing further is at the same instant determined as only *for* it and *serving* it, *ministering* to it. We have thus a particular will *using* a particular thing. If any one will take the trouble to analyze this, he will find that our last result has simply been put into the power of the Notion as so much material to grind, which it accomplishes through its successive rollers of the universal, the particular, and the singular moments. The illustration of Hegel's general procedure, and the source and true nature of its figurativeness contained here, is, as it appears to me, exceedingly telling.

The definition of use that is evidently the consequent result is this: "Use is the realization of my desire through the alteration, destruction, consumption of the thing, the selflessness of whose nature is thus manifested, and which accordingly accomplishes thus its destiny." Hegel is said to have exclaimed once at table when the dishes were long of coming, "Only let them come—we will soon achieve on them their own destiny." He must, plainly, have had then in mind this sentence of his own composition.

Hegel remarks of use that it is the *real* side of property, and that the perception of this lies at the bottom of the pretext put forth often in cases of wrongful occupation, that what is so occupied was unused. Nevertheless he decides that property is the universal, use the particular, and that, in the *first* instance, it is the former must be deferred to.

Still he observes further, that formation, designation, &c., are in themselves *external*, unless will, actually present, give them meaning and value. Property, then, become masterless, as devoid of actual will, may be lost or acquired, in lapse of time, through prescription—which has thus a philosophical basis, and not one of mere expediency. For will to have, it is necessary for will to manifest itself. National monuments are national property, so long as the national honor and memory live in them: when these cease, they become the prey of him who likes. The extinction of copyright depends on the same principle, though in an inverse manner: literary productions become in lapse of time a universal property, and pass into contingent private possession. Mere *land*, as burying ground, or otherwise privileged to non-use, involves a simply arbitrary unactual will, by infringement of which no veritably real interest is injured, and respect for which, therefore, cannot be guaranteed. Hegel has several very fine observations here on attempted distinctions between property and use, on partial and temporary use, value, &c.; but at present I can only refer you to them. It is in this connection that he remarks, "It is more than fifteen hundred years since the liberty of the person through Christianity began to flourish, and became a universal principle for a part—a small one indeed—of the human race. The liberty of property, however, has only since yesterday, we may say, been here and there recognized as a principle. An example from universal history of the length of time required by Spirit for its advance in self-consciousness—and a rebuke to the impatience of foolish opinion."

At our next meeting I shall finish the general subject, and make some remarks on books.

HEGEL'S SCIENCE OF ABSOLUTE SPIRIT.

By G. S. Hall.

WHAT IS TO BE UNDERSTOOD BY HEGEL'S SCIENCE OF ABSOLUTE SPIRIT?

Psychology is the substructure of ethics. The latter treats of the idea of the Good as it becomes the problem of the human will. The Good, as idea, is absolute, as Hegel has expressly admitted in his doctrine of ideas in the *Logic*. It would, therefore, be a mistake to suppose that he ascribed only a relative content to right, to morality, and to ethics. He has designated the entire sphere of the practical mind as objective, because man himself must produce the good, and is unavoidably linked with finitude in his action.

Human labor has, first of all, as its end, man's enfranchisement from the limitations of finitude.

Man is brought into negative relation to nature, in order, through its transformation, to impart to it an ethical organization as the organ of his freedom. Freedom itself has only itself as its content, but the form of this content is capable of improvement, and has therefore a finite side. The world which it produces for itself in the state is indeed the objective expression of the Good; it is in so far good, but it must always progress toward the better. The laws of a people correspond to a stage in their development, but they become inadequate with progressive knowledge of the good. They need to be reformed; new laws must be added to the old; history never reaches a state of repose. Likewise, too, the individual can never arrive at an ultimate conclusion for himself, but must forever morally renew, reform, purify himself.

It would be a very sad thing if the ethical man did not, even in his struggles, enjoy the consciousness that he was in the Absolute. There is no more pitiable virtue than that which expects blessedness as a result external to, and separable from, the conflict itself, or as a reward distinct from freedom. From this miserable eudemonism, which seeks to make virtue at last a means for arriving at a state of existence which involves a sensuous well-being, with however fine

phrases it may be concealed, Hegel can decidedly be acquitted, as well as from that misconception which apprehends freedom as something other than the characteristic activity of man. That, therefore, which he calls absolute spirit has this productivity as its condition, but is distinguished by the fact that the unrest of the conflict is sublated. In art, religion, and science, man exalts himself above the historical process to absolute reconciliation with the absolute. As phenomenon these elements of the absolute mind belong to the historical process. They are also perfectible, but in their manifestation they negate at the same time the finite part of the national and personal individuality which pertains to them. The beautiful, in whatever form it presents itself, enchants us at once by its harmony. Religion, however much of error is mingled with it, exalts man above all the tumult of history, above all the narrowness of his personal interests, above all the good and ill of fortune into the earnestness of eternity. Science, finally, has the conception of the True as its object, which belongs exclusively to no people and to no time. The fact that in a right-angled triangle the square of its hypotheneuse equals the square of the other two sides is and absolute truth independent of all history and of all men. We now call it the Pythagorean theorem, that we may be gratefully reminded of the man who first uttered the knowledge of this truth; yet the name of Pythagoras is indifferent as far as the truth itself is concerned. That which science produces among a people at a particular period is acquired as the possession of all humanity and for all time. The scientific form with Hegel is the last and highest of the forms of the absolute mind, because it contains the mediated unity of truth and its certainty. Art requires for its development a sensuous material; religion possesses indeed the substance of the true, but it only *believes* it at first. Belief (faith) represents the absolute in forms more or less addressed to the phantasy, while thinking advances to conception, the simple logical forms of which admit of transformation to no higher or simpler form.

It admits of no doubt that Hegel understood by the expression Absolute Spirit, only the human mind as it raises itself to the absoluteness of existence. It might naturally be ex-

pected that under this designation he would understand that which we men are wont to name God—the Absolute as absolute-subject. Yet it cannot be denied that Theology proper is not found in Hegel's system, and that he rather laid stress upon carrying the idea of God through all parts of Philosophy. There is one point in his system where the reader cannot but expect that he will admit the above expressly. This is the metaphysical foundation of the Christian religion, which he declares absolute, faith in which he makes to coincide in content with the philosophical conception of God. It may be observed from his interpretation of the notion "God," as Father, Son, and Spirit, that he identifies the Father with the logical idea that under the sonship of God he subsumes nature and the finite mind, and that by the name "Spirit" (mind) he understands mankind as it is realized in the church, in which the atonement of man with God is achieved. With special emphasis he here inculcates that God is real spirit (mind) only by virtue of the fact that he exists as spirit *for* spirit; i.e. he affirms the incarnation of God as an eternal act, as an immanent determination of his essence, and uses therefore for the description of spirit (mind) the term *return of the absolute into itself.* We might acknowledge ourselves satisfied with this if the subjectivity of God, as soon as we come to speak of it, were not confounded with that which Hegel loved to name with emphasis "conception." If we ask e.g. why Nature exists, Hegel answers that it is the nature of conception [or Idea] to distinguish itself from itself as reality. This merely logical determination does not satisfy us when we contemplate the vast universe with its millions of worlds.

If we posit reason as unconsciously active in matter, which first comes to consciousness in man, then there exists no God as subject in and for himself. It remains inconceivable how, in unthinking matter, thought, without being thought of, can be active.

If we presuppose a God as special subject of the world, he must not only carry the conception of nature in distinction from its existence in his own being, but he must also produce its reality, which transition we call creation.

It cannot be doubted that the latter was the view of Hegel

when it is considered that he made the logical idea the *prius* of nature, and affirmed that it emits itself freely to its other (θάτερον), to nature. If we find the exposition of the conception of creation at the close of the Logic under the category of the absolute method, we find ourselves for the moment entirely at fault. With Hegel we must not merely have the totality of his system ever in view, but we must also not forget that life, truth, goodness, as well as will, are predicates of his logical idea. They bore for him the significance of God *in statu abscondito*, who must first reveal himself as God through nature and history. It may be allowed, moreover, to remember the express declaration which Hegel has given concerning the personality of God in the previously mentioned critique of Jacobi in the Heidelberg Year-Book.

DIFFICULTIES WHICH ARISE FROM HEGEL'S DIVISION OF THE SCIENCE OF ABSOLUTE SPIRIT.

We must distinguish a twofold presentation of the spheres of absolute mind by Hegel. One is given in the Encyclopedia, the other in an extensive development of art, religion and philosophy which he presented in the form of lectures, and which have been published by his scholars. The textbook paragraphs of the former were clearly only a brief abstract of that which the last chapters of the Phenomenology had presented upon these subjects. They alone would have left us in great obscurity had they not been completed and elucidated by the more extended expositions of the lectures. We are surprised at their richness, their manifoldness, and their originality. The depth and breadth to which Hegel had elaborated each of these domains astonishes us. Each one of these expositions was of itself sufficient to insure to their author an undying fame. It might have been thought that by the Phenomenology, the Logic, and the Philosophy of Right, he would be exhausted; but now there appeared an Æsthetics, a Philosophy of Religion, and a History of Philosophy, of fully equal merit.

The division of these spheres of the Absolute affords two different stand-points, which in and for themselves must coincide; that of content, and that of form. According to content, it is the ideas of the beautiful, of the good, and of

the true; and on the side of form, it is the differences of theoretical intelligence as sensuous intuition, representation [or conception], and thought.

In the doctrine of ideas, in the Logic, Hegel defined and determined the conception of the idea (1) as life; (2) as knowledge; (3) as absolute idea. The idea of knowledge he has analyzed in the theoretical as the True, and in the practical as the Good. The idea of the Beautiful is wanting. In the introduction of the Æsthetics he developed the Beautiful as the unity of the theoretical and practical idea, according to which it would occupy the place of the absolute idea; i.e., according to Hegel, that of the absolute method. In the Encyclopedia æsthetics, under the name of art-religion, precedes revealed religion (Christianity) and philosophy. When we now inquire the relation of the idea of the Good, we find that its realization falls within the sphere of ethics in the science of the objective mind. Hegel plainly affirms that the Good is the condition for the spheres of absolute mind. When we take a retrospective view of the entire doctrine of ideas, it seems to be full of indistinctness and confusion.

It is not so easy, however, to dispose of Hegel. We must acknowledge that the eudemonism with which the Psychology ends is sublated by the conception of freedom and by the idea of the Good. Knowledge of the Good is the condition of its realization. Virtue rests upon no instinct where it can become a custom. If we compare the idèas, we shall find that that of the Good stands higher than that of the Beautiful—higher even than that of the True, so far as we understand by it the scientific knowledge of the idea. The Beautiful is essentially concerned with the harmony of form, and it appears in relation to the True and the Good as a sort of superfluity. When Schiller, in his masterly letters upon the culture of the human race, proposed to mediate freedom through beauty, he made an error which, though itself beautiful, was quite natural for a poet. As idea, the True, the Good, and the Beautiful, are coördinated with one another.

In other words, the entire doctrine of ideas, as it subsisted from the time of the Greeks to that of Kant and Hegel, has fallen into disuse, and the concrete conceptions of Reason, Nature, and of Mind, have taken its place. This is the ground

of Hegel's distinction of the domain of absolute mind according to its psychological side of form as art, religion, and philosophy. In the system of science, he concludes with its absolute conception or notion. With this apprehension of the subject many difficulties arise. These may all be reduced to the fact that art presupposes religion. It is art which brings the notions of the religious consciousness to sensuous intuition. Art builds temples, carves statues of the gods and of the saints, paints mythical stories, and makes hymns and pæans. So far it seems to be dependent upon religion and must follow it. But the principle of art does not lie in religion, which as such can dispense with art. A grove or a mountain-top may serve as a temple, a rude stone as altar, and deity may be imaged within. When Ulysses in his extremity prayed to Pallas, he called up her image within. And when she appeared to him, she assumed manifold forms which suited the time and occasion, and not the form which a Phidias had given her. Religion is the higher presupposition of art, so to speak, progressively; regressively, it is ethics which is premised as its condition. Æsthetics must here anticipate, just as psychology furnishes presupposition to higher spheres. When Hegel, first in the Phenomenology and then in the Encyclopedia, apprehended art as art-religion, he was led aside by Grecian traditions.

It may also be remembered that it is art which, by the artistic and poetic elaboration of religious notions, prepares the ground for science. Artists become æsthetic interpreters of faith and thereby aid the elevations of figurative conceptions into thoughts; but the principle of science does not lie in art nor in the Beautiful, but in thought which struggles after the unity of certainty and truth. It is doubt which distinguishes it from religion.

The Hegelian classification into art, religion, and science, must however remain; for religion stands above art by virtue of its contents; and philosophy, which, according to Hegel, has the same content as revealed religion, transcends it in form, in subjective mediation of conviction which no longer requires authority. The idea of the Good does not suffice for the conception of religion, but it is the idea in its absoluteness, the idea as absolute mind, which is concerned

in the conception. It is the relation of the temporal to the absolute mind, to God, by which the spheres of religion are established. The Good becomes here the Holy. In the laws of a people concerning personal freedom, property, taxes, courts, war, &c., no direct reference need be made to God. In religion the entire realm of finitude enters, with all its defects and errors, in order to be sublated. The state, however high it may stand, can afford to man no absolute reconciliation; this is possible only in personal contact of spirit with spirit. The state can punish crime, or it can mitigate or entirely remit punishment, but it cannot forgive sin. This is the divine prerogative. I sustain moral relations to the conception of duty in my conscience. This is a high standpoint; but my conscience can only reproach me for the offences, errors, vices, baseness into which I have relapsed, but it cannot free me from the consciousness of their guilt. This burden I can cast off only in so far as I raise myself absolutely above my entire empirical existence, and, in unity with God, let all imperfection, all misery, and all sin, fall as something unessential.

In religion first we find the deepest deep; the difference between it and philosophy, therefore, subsists only as a formal one without thereby jeopardizing the independence of science. Hegel often said that all philosophy was theology, and that philosophy, when it had attained its true conception, had but to look back upon the development behind it. Thus it appears as if this final step has no special content, and really it seems very barren under Hegel's treatment, as though, having already arrived at the highest, he had known nothing more to say, or as though, as in the second edition of the Encyclopedia, he needed to help himself by a citation from Aristotle's Metaphysics. But we need to conceive the retrospect as made in the same manner in which he had treated absolute knowledge in the last division of the Phenomenology, and the error of such a judgment would become at once clear.

The retrospect may be conceived as subjective and objective. As subjective it presents the history of philosophy as the side of absolute confirmation of truth; as objective it furnishes a series of definitions of the absolute as they begin

with the abstract and go on to the concrete. (1) Reason is God; (2) Nature is God; (3) Spirit is God: (*a*) Man is God, (*b*) Humanity is God, (*c*) Absolute Spirit is God. These several definitions are the foundation of as many lines of proof for the existence of God. Hence are presented three different stand-points: 1. Logotheism; 2. Naturalism; 3. Anthropologism. From these are developed (1) the ontological, (2) the cosmo-physico-teleological, (3) the anthropological; the latter of which is again divided into the proofs from perfectability, from morality, and from the *argumentum à consensu gentium*. The presentation of the essence of God is here united with the proof of his existence which results from the conception of his essence. The definitions are inadequate until they arrive at the conception of the pure and simple absolute. The first, i.e. "Reason is God," is changed rather into the proposition, God is reason. As special subject he not only is reason, but has reason; as rational God, as Logos, he creates Nature. He is not Nature, but he posits it as his absolute object, as his other. In nature as such he does not come back to himself; first, when through its mediation man is posited, God becomes object for finite spirit, which exalts itself to him, and in this process He himself first becomes real spirit. Of Himself alone, without a world of mind, he would be only a mindless mind.

With the apprehension here indicated, the final division of the system became a vital, pregnant recapitulation and a summary higher reconstruction, a speculative theology; and all those misconceptions of the Hegelian philosophy which imagined atheism, materialism, and pantheism, to be necessarily involved in it, were made an end of. It can admit of no doubt that the need of such a theology was impressed more and more vividly upon Hegel's mind. We find a proclivity to the Philosophy of Religion in lectures which he undertook upon the proofs of the existence of God with the twofold intention, first of giving in them elucidation of the Logic, and then of opposing the prejudices which since Kant's Critique of Pure Reason had grown so strong against proofs of the existence of God, because current opinion had come to fancy in them only the antiquated trash of an empty scholasticism. Hegel here opened a way by which to pass

from the cosmological argument to the physico-teleological, and from this to the ontological, because this is the psychological-historical course of the human mind in its elevation to the thought of God.

It sounds incredible, but it is literally true, that in all the innumerable and barren quarrels which have arisen concerning the theological character of Hegel's system, neither Hegelians, if I except myself, nor the opponents of Hegel have taken into consideration this admirable work. From the dialectic stand-point it may be affirmed that Hegel has never written anything in which depth and clearness, rigor of thought, and fantastic illustration of it, have been so clearly painted as here. It remains a matter of regret that he could not himself have completed this subject, and that for the ontological proof a completion must be borrowed from copied manuscripts. Its great significance for science lies historically in the fact that it constitutes the antithesis of the dialectics by which Kant thought he had destroyed speculative theology.

Although at the close of the Encyclopedia such a concrete totality and resumption as we have indicated is wanting, we must not imagine that he has not presented the conception of the idea of God expressly within his system. This is done in the Philosophy of Religion at the beginning of the treatment of the Christian religion, in the division which bears the title, "The Metaphysical Idea of God."

ÆSTHETICS.

Our age has become political. The æsthetic interest has retreated behind the great impulse which the state has received since the July revolution, and still more since that of February. Our æsthetic culture is now so moderate that we are scarcely able to regulate facts of daily life æsthetically. In Hegel's time it was otherwise. Although the greatest political catastrophes were then taking place, interest in the productions of art and in æsthetic theories was very general and vital. The enjoyment and the criticism which the works of Goethe and Schiller furnished occasion for could not be dispensed with. The Romantic school had disseminated the study of English, Italian and Spanish literature, and by

Hammer-Purgstall Arabic and Persian poetry had been drawn into this circle. It should therefore excite no surprise that Hegel was exceedingly well-read in this field, and had a most intimate acquaintance with all the prominent art-phenomena, for he resided six years at Jena, the chief seat of the Romantic school, and near Weimar, the æsthetic capital. His Æsthetics is replete with all the elements which that period produced.

In order to designate its stand-point it may be regarded as the continuation of Schiller's idea of the difference between the naïve and the sentimental in poetry; through his predilection for the Hellenic, Hegel stood fast by his classico-antique ideal which Schiller had characterized as naïve. The highest beauty is to him the absolute unity of the spiritual content as the internal, with the sensuous form as the external. The statue, as the perfect accommodation of the internal with the external, from which all the casualty of motion and all the limitation of individual existence is elevated to eternal significance, and purified to absolute ideal form, must consequently seem to Hegel as the highest achievement of art. This mean, however, has a *prius* and a *posterius*. The *prius* is the search after it, mere symbolic beauty, in which the external corresponds to the internal, but not adequately. The *posterius*, conversely, is the form in which the interior becomes superior to the exterior, which does not suffice to express its depth. This is the Romantic, ideal, called by Schiller the sentimental.

In this lies all the peculiarity of Hegel's æsthetics. With fine dialectics, with many-sided erudition, and with imposing sequence, he construes the doctrine of the symbolic, classic, and romantic ideal, while he arranges the system of arts upon this conception.

I. The Ideal in general. II. The Ideal in special: (1) symbolical (oriental); (2) plastic or classic (antique); (3) Romantic (Christian). III. The Ideal in the unification of the system of arts: (1) symbolic art—architecture; (2) classic art—sculpture; (3) Romantic art—(*a*) painting, (*b*) music, (*c*) poesy.

The result of this construction is a very strong accentuation of the historical process of art and great profundity in

showing the connection of art with religion. Although much that is admirable and surprising has been accomplished by this method, yet the defects and the one-sidedness which must result thus cannot be overlooked. The labors of Weisse, Vischer, and Carrière, have striven to obviate this defect, and to give to the æsthetics that completeness which distinguishes Germans above all others in this department, which, without Hegel's all-embracing labor, which has brought the most stubborn materials into rhythm, would have been impossible.

The idea of the beautiful had not been developed by Hegel in the speculative doctrine of the Idea, so that this remained to be done at the beginning of the Æsthetics; and here Hegel began with it, but in a very curt, inaccessible way. He confined himself to a few general determinations concerning the unity, symmetry and proportion of æsthetic form, together with a brief discussion of natural beauty, in order to exclude it from æsthetics. According to Hegel's method, however, (1) the conception of the idea of the Beautiful; (2) the negative, i.e. the conception of the disagreeable; (3) the conception of the sublation of the disagreeable and its emancipation to beauty in the comical,—must be exhibited. The Comic, under the category of the ludicrous, is generally treated far too narrowly, and as the antithesis of the Tragic or of the Sublime, while its conception has quite another origin and a much wider significance.

The idea of the beautiful is realized by art. Its conception constitutes, therefore, the second part of the Æsthetics. As a problem of production it becomes ideal. It is the artist who by his genius and his technical virtuosity, brings the ideal to existence in single concrete works of art. (1) The objective side of the ideal and (2) the subjective side of artistic production unite in (3) the work of art. The work of art, however, requires at once a determination of the material of its presentation, whether it is to appear in space for the eye, in time for the ear, in imagination by word addressed to the phantasy. Thus arises (1) constructive, (2) musical, (3) poetic art, which unites all arts in the theatre as dramatic. By the rigid definition of his ideal forms Hegel has been compelled to confusion and *tours de force;* to confusions, e.g., of style-

forms, by which the severe or sublime is made the analogue of the symbolical ideal, the beautiful of the classical, the charming of the romantic; but in and for itself the latter has a quite, general significance. Hegel has thus identified the ideal forms with the Oriental, the Antique, and the Christian. They must, however, be taken as quite general conceptions. The Romantic is the subjective inwardness of disposition which loses itself with ardent longing in the infinite. Although it culminates in Christianity it may be observed elsewhere, where it will not be wanting in the element of adventure, which, in the varied complication of events and their surprising contrasts, is often the result of such a disposition. How can the old Arabic poetry and the new Persian be called other than Romantic? Firdusi's Shah Namah is often much more truly Romantic than the stories of our mediæval epics of Iwein, Lancelot, Wigalois, Wigamur, &c., which have sprung from Celtic sagas. How can we help calling the Indian poetry Romantic? Tieck once said he saw no reason why the Odyssey should not be called a Romantic poem; and none exists. All art strives for perfection of form, i.e. to become classical. Hegel's view should be so enlarged that the ideal may become national, and thus pervade all stages of the determination of form. Why should we hesitate to call Calidas the classical poet of India, since the Romantic ideal attained in him, in both content and form, its most perfect expression? The Christian ideal, æsthetically considered, is only a special, higher grade of the Romantic. The expression Oriental is, moreover, far too wide and indefinite to be exhausted by the term Symbolical. The Chinese, Indian, Persian, Hebraic, and Arabic, to say nothing of the Mahommedan ideal, are widely divergent.

Hegel has recourse to forced constructions, however, because he attempted the unnecessary limitation of æsthetic conceptions by his historical limitation of ideal forms. The dissolution of the classical idea thus leads to satire. "No other satire," he says, "has ever equalled Roman satire." Although it be granted that Horace, Persius and Juvenal are our masters in the poetic form which we call satire, yet the satirical is a quite general æsthetic conception, of which the idyllic and the elegiac are coördinate and related concep-

tions. Our judgment concerning Roman satire is inaccurate because we no longer possess the Grecian Iambographs and Sillographs; and yet the Romans, as artists, were scarcely more than imitators of the Greeks.

Forced constructions are still more manifest in the application of ideal forms in the system of arts. "Architecture," he says, "is symbolic"; certainly, but this general character does not prevent it from being at the same time classical and Romantic. The Greek temple, e.g., is classical because it indubitably indicates that a god dwells in it. Every other purpose is excluded by its form. The cathedrals of the middle ages are symbolic in the cruciform pattern of the nave, and in the opposition of choir and spire, &c.; but, at the same time, in pillars, arches, windows, and in their extent and the manifoldness of their details, they are Romantic.

When, finally, he calls the arts of painting, of music, and of poetry, Romantic, the error of his division becomes quite manifest in poesy, for this art more than the others can assume any stand-point and adopt any form. Hegel here contradicts what he had himself said concerning the identity of the Romantic and the Christian. The interest in Hegel's Æsthetics lies in the thorough sequence with which he has elaborated his ideal forms in contrast to the then common division. No one can deny that thus, not only for the history of art, but for a multitude of scientific definitions, he has presented insights and views which are quite new. He draws always from a well-filled mind. With the exception of music, of which he was intensely fond, but concerning his own knowledge of which he always spoke very modestly and unpretentiously. he showed a wonderful familiarity with an immense mass of material, all of which was perfectly at his command. If good taste consists in being able to distinguish the truly beautiful from all that is false, artificial, partial, or doubtful, with consciousness of the motivation of the judgment, then Hegel possessed a remarkably fine taste.

In style, the Æsthetics is incomparably fine. All which had previously existed in this field was surpassed by it. Schlegel, Jean Paul, Solger, and Schelling, have, in different respects, achieved great results in the presentation of the æsthetic idea; but such a perfect elaboration of the entire

domain of Art, with such uniform freshness, with so noble and soul-full penetration of tone, was unknown before Hegel. Simple-minded men still conceive of Hegel as an abstract metaphysician who was at home only in barren abstractions; but here it may be seen with what striking delineation, with what lively coloring, and with what power of poetic individualization, Hegel knew how to depict all the richness of phenomena.

His description of the condition of the heroic world as condition of the epic, his description of the painting of the Netherlands, of Mohammedan mysticism, of the gods of Olympus, of the colossal structures of the Orient, his defence of the unity of the conception of the Homeric poem, his presentation of the specific Christian ideal, &c., are distinguished from the rest as especially ornate passages. By the mild and friendly way in which Hegel here entered a domain of the most heterogeneous contents, he opened the way for successors to become acquainted with the phenomenal world in its fundamental conceptions. In the struggle to compel phenomena to manifest their essence in language, he is often venturesome, has often arrived at the borders of the doubtful; but he has avoided the error which we have subsequently found so distracting in the æsthetic domain, viz., that of joining predicates and verbs with subjects which belong to entirely heterogeneous domains; for such combinations, though allowed in poetry, are forbidden in prose.

Hegel has been reproached with ignoring the beauty of Nature and of sacrificing it to that of Art. This is by no means the case, for he devoted more attention to the forms of nature than, before him, had been customary in æsthetics. He had analyzed it from the crystal to the animal, and had not forgotten landscape beauty. Vischer and still more Köstlin have carried this thought further. The beauty of art reproduces the beauty of nature, removes all its meagreness and empirical contingency; for nature ceases with the production of life, and with it the æsthetic moment is subordinated to expediency. The reproduction of the natural form by art reveals as ideal the beautiful which is possible in nature. It will be best in the future to mention the beauty of nature only in a relative way, especially in a system of arts, in

treating the specific material of each of them, and to leave the treatment of natural science to morphology, for, in the transition from one step to another, form also advances.

Hegel's conception of humor has also been attacked in so far as he finds in it the limit of all art, and declares it appropriate only to poetry, and more specifically to Christian poetry. This is justly made a matter of reproach; but the theory of humor, as it has been formed for us by the abstraction of English and Spanish works of poetry, by German imitations, and especially by Jean Paul, influenced Hegel too strongly and made him consecrate humor as the modern, sacred *humanus*. Humor must, however, be conceived in connection with the complete idea of the beautiful. This is possible only when we are emancipated from false logic, with which the moments of the beautiful are generally treated, because antithesis and contradiction are confused the one with the other.

The conception of the Beautiful embraces antitheses which sublate themselves. The Beautiful, as such, has a formal and a real side. The former concerns the unity of the æsthetic figure, its symmetry, proportion, rhythm, and harmony. These are the elementary determinations of all beauty, in which the reality of the sublime and the pleasing stand in contrast. It is remarkable that ordinarily the comic is contrasted with the sublime. The sublime, like the pleasing, or the charming, is the antithesis of the Beautiful in itself, which sublates itself in the absolutely beautiful, in its dignity and its gracefulness, as Schiller has shown once for all. The case of æsthetic *contradiction*, the disagreeable, negative beauty, is quite otherwise.

Formlessness and deformity contradict the formal determinations as positive. Amorphism, unsymmetry, disproportion, and disharmony, are æsthetic contradictions.

The vulgar and the repulsive contradict the real determinations of the beautiful, the sublime, and the agreeable.

Absolute beauty is contradicted by caricature, which in its baseness still includes the possibility of becoming comic, because in its monstrous distortions it is related to the ideal.

The comic is the solution of the ugly, and hence is in itself the totality of the æsthetic idea. Aristotle, in his simple lan-

guage, has already justly said in his work on poesy, that the ludicrous is the ugly in a harmless form. The tragic may appear in the forms of the ugly when it passes over into despair, rage, distress and disgust, and calls up what is fearful, terrible, or dreadful. The essence of the comic requires that the ugly annihilate itself as something without content. Take, for instance, a stammerer—stammering is, without doubt, disagreeable. If a stammerer wishes to narrate what seems to him important intelligence, but only stutters the more as he waxes earnest, he becomes comic—presupposing, of course, that the substance of what he would say is of no great moment. The Tragic is only a species of the sublime, while the comic is a quite general idea which is founded on the ugly. It is remarkable how zealously the attempt is still made to consider the ugly as a necessary moment of the idea of the beautiful, because in life sickness, in truth error, and in good evil, is never forgotten. The comic integrates all elements of the æsthetic ideal, because it may become sublime, charming, vulgar, and distasteful; yet, as humor, it must rest upon the stand-point of absolute atonement which is victorious over all pessimism, and bears up not only against the disgust of commonplace, but against death and devil; and assures us that truth, beauty, and goodness, compose the eternal essence of the world, while pain at finitude and nothingness, though it cannot cease to exist, yet is annihilated in the free blessedness of this feeling. Without absolute earnestness and joviality humor becomes bald and empty, its sagacity degenerates into impertinence, its tenderness into morbid sensitiveness, and its wit into similitude with artificial egg-dancing.

INTRODUCTION TO SPECULATIVE LOGIC AND PHILOSOPHY.

By A. VERA.

CHAPTER II.

§ 1. *Formal Logic abstractly considered.*

But, whatever be Aristotle's conception of Logic, the question must be decided on its own merits, and independent of all extraneous argument and historical antecedent. We will, therefore, examine the logical theories first in themselves and abstractly considered, and then in some of their most important applications.

And to begin with Terms, we must ask what they are, and what is the precise meaning attached to them. If they are anything, they are only Ideas, as it will be shown in the course of this inquiry. But formal Logic excludes Ideas from its province, and removes all questions relating to Ideas either to Psychology or Metaphysics. We must then inquire what they are, and what they can be if they are not Ideas. Now the only thing which is left for them to be is to express either certain *qualities* or certain *quantities*, or *genera* and *species*. But, according to formal Logic, Terms and their relations, or rules, as they are called, cannot be *qualities;* for, as qualities belong to the nature of things and constitute a part of it, this would bring Logic on the ground of Ontology. Thus, for instance, the logical element would become a quality of *man*, of *being*, of *mortal*, &c. If terms are not *qualities*, are they *genera* and *species?* If so, they cannot be genera and species, such as the latter exist in nature, or such as we can conceive them to be, namely, endowed with the power of generation, or other kindred, real qualities; for they would cease thereby to be logical elements. If, then, they are genera and species, they are genera and species of another and peculiar kind. They are, and can only be, *quantities* of different magnitude, connected, as all quantities are, by the relation of *more* or *less;* or, as we have already stated, of two quantities, one of which is contained in the other. — A, B, C, D, &c., if they represent neither *Being* (*Ens*) nor *Quality*, must represent *Quantity*, unless they are = 0. Thus formal

Logic is, as we have already stated, the *Logic of Quantity.* But the science of Quantity is Mathematics, and thus either Logic would be a part of Mathematics, or Mathematics a part of Logic, or Logic and Mathematics would be one and the same science under different names. This is the point where the two sciences meet, and which has led some to consider them as one and the same science, or to borrow from Mathematics the method for philosophical inquiries, and consider it as the absolute method of knowledge. In fact, if A, B, C, D, &c., are mere quantities, they are numbers, or numerical symbols, and their relation is of a quantitative kind. Thus B, *genus*, will contain A, *species*, as 2 contains 1; and C, being a *genus* with reference to *B*, will contain B which is become a *species*, as 3 contains 2, &c. And if we apply the same criterion to syllogism, we shall arrive at the same result. Suppose A, B, C to be the three terms of a syllogism; suppose A to be the major, C the minor extreme, and B the middle term. According to the fundamental principle of the syllogistic theory, B is a middle term because it is so constituted as to contain C, and to be contained in A. Now, this is nothing else than a numerical proportion; that is to say, C is in B as B is in A, or 2 : 4 :: 4 : 8. What prevents the student from perceiving the identity of the two formulas is either that the principle is represented in logical treatises by letters, to which no precise definition is attached, or that when the principle is enunciated by words, as in the following formulas, "*that what belongs to the whole must belong also to the part of this same whole,*" or "*what belongs to the genus must belong also to the species of this same genus*"; here, too, what is meant by *whole* and *part*, by *genus* and *species*, is left in the dark. Had these terms been carefully analyzed and their possible meaning inquired into, it would have been perceived that they can only represent quantities and numbers. But what conceals the inanity of the rule is, above all, the example attached to it. For as the example is borrowed from concrete and real objects, one is led to think that the rule is embodied in the example. However, such is not the case. For if you strip the terms of all quality, i.e. of what does not belong to the province of Logic, the only thing, the only entity and reality left, will be this quantity. Thus

when the example,

> All men are mortal.
> Europeans are men:
> Therefore, &c.

is quoted, one thinks that he has to do with something rational and some reality. But it ought to be borne in mind that formal Logic does not in any way concern itself with the reality of things, so that whether *man*, *mortal*, *European*, &c., exist either separately or conjointly, whether they possess such and such a quality or not, these are matters excluded from its province; and the only point left to its investigation is that *if these terms or things exist, if they possess such and such a quality and relation*, they may be combined according to certain *laws or rules of quantity*.

In order to place the matter beyond doubt, let us analyze the above example.

In the theory of Proposition it is taught, that in the *universal affirmative proposition the attribute is taken particularly*, or distributed; i.e. such a part of the attribute is taken as belongs to the subject. In fact, the attribute being a *Genus*, and the *Genus* containing several *species* or *parts*, the only part of the *genus* that can be taken is that which belongs to the corresponding species. Thus in the proposition, "All men are mortal," *mortal* being taken *particularly*, we have only a part of *mortal*, the part belonging to *all men*, or to *man;* i.e. we have two species, or two equal quantities, $4=4$. Now, what takes place in the *propositio major* takes place also in the *propositio minor*. Here the middle term, which was the *subject*, or species, in the major, becomes *attribute* or *genus* in the minor premise, and consequently is taken particularly as the attribute of the major premise. But here the part of the attribute being determined by a smaller subject, "European," we have another identical proposition differing from the first only in this, namely, that it contains a smaller quantity, say $2=2$. Thus we have two propositions identical:

$$4=4$$
$$2=2.$$

The middle term being taken *particularly* in the minor premise, cannot be what it was in the major premise where

it was taken *universally;* so that if we consider the quantitative value of the terms, either in each proposition separately, or in the two propositions jointly, we have two identical propositions, i.e. a syllogism in which the middle term $4+2$ is equal to the two extremes $4+2$, which means that there is no middle term nor any syllogism at all. In fact, as the attribute of the affirmative proposition must be taken particularly, the middle term can neither contain nor be contained, and consequently the fundamental principle of the syllogistic structure falls to the ground. When therefore, to justify the rule, an example is brought forward objectively and materially correct, its correctness is independent of the logical rule, and rests upon other grounds. That all men are really mortal, and that Europeans being men are also mortal—these and similar propositions are derived either from experimental or from metaphysical knowledge, and their truth and necessity are founded upon the *quality* and *nature* of terms, and nowise upon their *quantity*.

It will perhaps be said that to consider in Proposition and Syllogism the *quantity* only, and not to comprehend the *quality* therein, is to take a narrow and erroneous view of formal Logic; and that, in order to form a correct notion of the subject, one ought to embrace and combine both quantity and quality. Thus in the propositions, "Man is mortal," "The rose is red," &c., "mortal" and "red" ought to be considered with reference both to quantity and to quality; for with reference to *quantity* they constitute a *genus* which embraces the *species*, and with reference to *quality* they constitute a character or attribute *inherent* in the subject. Consequently, in syllogism the relations of the three terms must be considered not only with reference to their quantity, but to their quality also; so that, if we consider the middle term as a quality common to the extremes, we shall see that these latter must, as a consequence, be connected together; and thus the syllogistic theory will be justified.

That in terms and proposition the Quality should be taken into account, I am far from denying; indeed it is Quality which, in logical as well as in all other scientific researches, ought to be more carefully investigated and defined than quantity, as it is quality that comes the nearest to the very

essence of things; and it may be affirmed that had Logicians given a closer attention to the quality of logical laws and operations, they would have formed a different notion of Logic, and rested it on a broader and higher basis. But of this more fully hereafter. Here I will confine myself to pointing out the failures and inconsistencies brought to light by the consideration of quality in logical theories as they now stand. In fact, by contrasting quantity and quality as they are combined in proposition, we shall easily perceive that they are at variance and cannot be reconciled with each other. For, according to quantity, it is the subject that would be contained in the attribute; and according to quality, it is the attribute that would be contained in the subject. According to quantity, the attribute or genus would contain several subjects or species; according to quality, it is the subject or the species that would contain several attributes or genera: and in order to see the bearing of this inconsistency, and how far it vitiates the whole logical structure, let us throw a retrospective glance over its various parts, and examine them in their mutual relation.

It is plain that the syllogistic theory rests entirely on the theory of Terms. For, as I have shown, the combination of Terms in Proposition and the combination of Propositions in Syllogism is made according to the elementary constitution of Terms. Now, we are taught in the theory of Terms that these are constituted in such a manner as to form a sequence, a progression in which the lower and narrower term — the species — is contained in the higher and wider — the genus; which means, if it means anything, that the genus is superior to the species, and consequently that the genus, rather than the species, ought to be the principle of demonstration. But, contrary to our expectation, we find in Syllogism the species furnishing the middle term and playing the principal part. Why it should be so, is not stated. It may be said that the Species, being something intermediate between the individual, or the inferior species, and the genus, is the only term that can supply the middle term. But then the theory of Terms falls to the ground, and with the theory of Terms the theory of Syllogism, as a syllogism cannot be made up unless the Species is contained in the genus. This is not all. For

if, in a syllogism, taken singly, it is the species that stands higher than the genus, then we find that in a series of syllogisms it is the genus that retains the higher rank. Thus, when the species requires demonstration, it is the genus that is brought forward. For instance, supposing that the major premise of the syllogism,

All Europeans are mortal.
The French are Europeans, &c.,

should be demonstrated, the middle term of the new syllogism would be the genus, *all men;* and if we want to prove this second argument, we must bring forward some still higher genus—*all corporeal beings*, or *all created beings*, for instance. Thus in the theory of Terms the genus is superior to the species, in the theory of Syllogism it is sometimes subordinate and sometimes superior to the species; it is subordinate in a single syllogism and it resumes its former rank in a series of syllogisms: all this not according to any fixed rule or to rational Logic, but to the arbitrary proceedings and requirements of formal Logic.

To give another instance of the manner in which this science is dealt with in some of the most popular books, I will conclude these remarks by quoting a passage from Dr. Whately's Logic, which embodies, as it were, the common method of similar treatises. After having defined Logic as the science of *Reasoning*, and not of *Reason*—which means that Logic has nothing in common with Metaphysics—the author, when arrived at the theory of Terms, states that, amongst the terms, there are some which express the *Essence* of things. (Now, what is Metaphysics but the science which inquires into the essence of things?) Then he goes on to say that the term which expresses the *whole essence* is the Species, and that the *genus* and the *Differentia* express, the former the *material*, the latter the *formal* and *distinguishing* part of this essence; adding further that, in reality, it is not the GENUS that contains the Species but the *Species* that contains the genus, and that when the Genus is called a whole, and is said to contain the Species, this is only a *metaphorical expression* signifying that it comprehends the species in its more *extensive* signification; so that *man* is a more *full* and *complete* expression than *animal*, though less *extensive*

than *animal:* and the theory is wound up by saying that if MAN is more *full* and *complete* than the genus *animal*, the *individual* is, in its turn, more *full* and *complete* than the species *man.** This passage shows how fallacious, inconsistent, and artificial, formal Logic is. For it is plain that if the *Individual* is more full and complete than the Species and the Genus, the Individual ought to be the principle of demonstration. But, then, what becomes of Syllogism, and of the *universal proposition* which is the *perfect form* of demonstration, nay, the only demonstration, and that upon which, as it were, turns the whole Logic? Besides, what mean the words that the Genus is the *material* part of the essence of things? In the Aristotelian theories these words have a meaning, whatever be the value of these theories. For, according to Aristotle, all things consist of *Matter* and *Form*, and the Genus, being more indeterminate than the Species, expresses the *Matter*. But these considerations belong to Ontology and Metaphysics, and those who distinguish between Reason and Reasoning, and pretend that Logic has no connection whatever with Metaphysics, are debarred from introducing these expressions and theories into the province of Logic. Again, if the Genus comprehends only *metaphorically* the Species, then the subject of the major and the subject of the minor premises will be also contained only metaphorically in their attributes, and thus Syllogism will become a combination of metaphors. But what is still more startling is to find first stated that the *Species* expresses the *whole essence*, and a few lines below that the *Individual* is more *full* and *complete* than the Species. Now, can anything be possibly conceived *more full* and *more complete* than the *whole essence?*

§ 2. *The Principle of Contradiction.*

As everthing must be identical to itself, and cannot be conceived to be other than, or contrary to, itself, it follows that every proposition or thought in accordance with this criterion is true, and every proposition or thought at variance with it is false. And, as a consequence of this principle, it is thought that there cannot be any intermediate term between

* See Whately's Logic, pp. 129–31.

two opposite attributes, and that one of them must be necessarily affirmed and the other necessarily denied of the same subject. Such is the famous principle of *contradiction*, and *exclusi tertii*, which Logic holds out as the supreme and absolute test of truth. Now, I do not hesitate to affirm that it is this principle which begets the most obstinate and inveterate errors, and sets up a barrier against a comprehensive and really rational knowledge. And here, too, we find Logic falling into the same inconsistencies we have met with in the theories we have just examined; for after having laid down the principle, Logicians lose sight of it, and set forth theories quite at variance with it. How can, for instance, the *theory of Division* be reconciled with the principle of contradiction, when we find, as a fundamental rule of Division, that the genus must be divided into *irreducible species*, i.e. species the attributes of which are repugnant to each other. For it is plain that the opposite species coëxist in the genus, and, therefore, that one and the same subject may involve opposite qualities. *White* and *black* coëxist in the genus *Color*, *rational* and *irrational* in the genus *Animal;* so that *Color*, *Animal*, &c., are the *tertium quid*, the medium comprehending the contradiction. In fact, I do not know of any principle more at variance either with experimental or with speculative knowledge than the principle of contradiction; and its being received as a criterion of truth can be explained only by its not being properly understood. Let us, then, define its meaning—the meaning which is, and the meaning which must be, attached to it.

A thing, it is said, cannot be other than itself; i.e. cannot possess any quality contrary to another quality; to which it is added, that it cannot possess it at the same time and in the same respect. Thus, if a thing is white it cannot be black, and if a body is light it cannot be heavy, at the same time and in the same relation. This is the construction generally put on the principle of contradiction, and in this sense I admit it is correct; but it must be added that it has no scientific bearing—nay, it is puerile. For no one in his right mind would contend that a thing is not white while it is white; that the light is not the light, or the shade is not the shade; but the question

is whether the contradiction is a necessary law of things, a necessary principle governing the whole as well as the parts, and without which neither the whole nor the parts could possibly exist. For it little matters to know that the living is living whilst it is living, or that such and such individual is living; the important and decisive point being to determine whether, besides life, there is death, and if death is equally necessary, equally beneficial, equally conducing to the beauty, strength and harmony of things. Again, it would be puerile to say that man is not laughing whilst he is laughing, or that he is not sleeping whilst he is sleeping; but here, too, the question is whether mere opposition coëxists and must coëxist in man.

This is the truly scientific and rational meaning of the principle of contradiction, and when viewed in this light the fallacy of the construction put upon it by formal Logic will become manifest. For it will be seen that identity and non-contradiction, far from being the test of truth, are the reverse of it; that difference, opposition, and contradiction, constitute the universal law of things, and that there is no being, nothing on earth or in heaven—to use the Hegelian expression—that escapes this law. In Nature all is opposition and strife, and no being can be observed or conceived—from the imperceptible and obscure insect that crawls upon the earth up to the vast masses that revolve in space—which could exist without the presence and *stimulus* of conflicting elements, tendencies, and forces. In Mathematics we have opposition in numbers, in lines, in planes, in solids—the opposition of unity and duality, of even and odd, of entire and fractional numbers—of straight and broken, of horizontal and perpendicular lines—of centre and circumference, &c. In Morals we meet with the opposition of liberty and law, of antagonistic tendencies and motives. In Metaphysics, and other provinces of thought, we find the opposition of cause and effect, of substance and accident, of infinite and finite, &c. Finally, man is, as it were, made up of elements the most conflicting —body and soul, joy and grief, love and hatred, smiles and tears, health and sickness, &c.; of all mortal beings, he is the one in whom the contradictions and the struggles are the most intense; and he who will cast a deep and impartial look

into the nature of the Universe will see that, far from the absence of contradiction constituting the fundamental law of things, the more comprehensive, multifarious, and intense, the contradiction in a being, the higher its nature, the fuller its life, beauty, and perfection.

§ 3. *Applied Logic.*

If the principles and rules laid down by formal Logic are, abstractly considered, arbitrary and fallacious, it is evident that they must be equally so when applied to other provinces of knowledge, and that in general they must beget confusion of ideas, false habits of thought—or pervert and curtail the natural and real notions of things. And to begin with the principle of contradiction, if, as I have demonstrated, the Universe is, so to speak, an aggregate of contradictions, Logic, which teaches that the principle of contradiction is the test of truth, must set the mind in opposition to the very nature of things. In fact, if this principle should hold good, we could say, "Man is a being possessing the faculty of *laughing*"; but it would be illogical to say, "Man is a being possessing the faculty of *weeping*." And if in common things, and matters of fact, the contradiction is admitted in spite of and against the principle of contradiction, it must be borne in mind that it is not so in speculative questions, and in matters of a far higher importance, but remote from common use, and above the reach of general appreciation. For here, misled and blinded by this principle, we refuse to acknowledge the very contradiction which not only we have acknowledged in other instances, but with regard to which we should consider as not being in their right mind those who would not acknowledge it. And it does not require a great strain of thought to trace to this principle the origin of most of our erroneous opinions and theories. Thus, in political and social science all absolute theories are founded on the exclusion of contradiction. For if men be *equal*, and there is no *natural inequality* between them, it follows that the present organization of society, in which inequality is recognized and sanctioned, is against nature; and, consequently, those who claim equality of rights, a common level of power, of classes, and education, are the legitimate organs

of truth and nature. The opinion that absolute forms of government—either monarchical or democratic—are more perfect and rational than mixed, has no other foundation, all absolute forms excluding contradiction. Similar instances may be discovered in other branches of knowledge, in ethical, in physical and metaphysical sciences. Thus those who contend that man is a mere sensitive being, and that sensibility constitutes his whole nature, if consistent, will teach, in Ethics, that *Sensation* and *Pleasure* are the only principle and criterion of morals; as, on the contrary, those who contend that what they call Reason constitutes man, will hold out *Duty* and *Good* as the only legitimate motives of action. Again, in Metaphysics, those who hold that man is *absolutely free*, and those who hold the opposite doctrine, namely, that *necessity* is the universal law of things, both rest their doctrine on the principle of contradiction. In short, were we to admit this principle, we should, if consistent, either mutilate the nature of things,—suppress, as it were, the half of the universe, and substitute arbitrary, narrow, and distorted notions for comprehensive and concrete reality, or evade the difficulty by inconsistencies or by mere verbal contrivances: for instance, that the straight and the broken lines may be considered as identical, their difference being so small that it may not be taken into account; or that the unity can be neither multiplied nor divided, and then making up the sum or the fractional number of unities, or parts of unities, added or divided; or that shade and cold are not realities, but mere privations of light and heat, as though privation could exist without the real principle that produces it; or that the Absolute is free from all contradictions, holding, at the same time, that God is merciful and stern in his justice—that he is the God of peace, and the God of war—that He is the principle of life, and the principle of death—that He is absolutely free, and the absolute and immutable law;—thus admitting and denying at the same time the very same thing we have denied or admitted in other instances and in another form, and throwing thereby all thought and knowledge into the most inextricable confusion. So much for the present on the principle of contradiction.

Let us now examine the value of logical theories in

their application either to experimental or to speculative science.

With regard to the first, it will be easily seen that it is only by a surreptitious process, and by giving to its principles a higher bearing than they intrinsically possess—in fact, by overstepping its own boundaries—that Logic pretends to bring about experimental knowledge. For we have, on the one hand, the universal proposition laid down as the necessary condition of all demonstrative and strictly scientific knowledge, and on the other we have facts, individuals, single and isolated phenomena. If, then, the universal proposition (whether it be the conclusion as in the *inductive*, or the major premise as in the *deductive* argument) is considered as a mere *form* of thought, as a form having no objective or any consubstantial relation to the thing to be demonstrated, logical argument, when applied to experience, is nothing but a delusion. If between man as *individual* and man as a *species* there is only a subjective and formal connection, when I pretend to prove that *such a man* is really mortal because *all men* are mortal, or that *all men* are mortal because of *such and such a man* being mortal, I am only connecting together words or forms which do not affect in any way the nature of the thing I demonstrate, and consequently in reality and objectively I prove nothing. The argument, therefore, cannot be really conclusive, unless it be admitted that between the *individual* and the *universal*, the *fact* and the *principle*, there is a community of nature, an objective and consubstantial connection—a connection similar to that of *cause* and *effect*, of *substance* and *accidency*. But such a connection is beyond and above the reach of formal Logic—nay, it is the very connection that formal Logic expressly disclaims, as we have already noticed, and shall see more fully hereafter.

Passing now from inductive to deductive argument, and from experimental to metaphysical knowledge, we shall find here also Logic falling short of what it promises to accomplish, namely, to establish truth and principles by a correct and rational demonstration.

The supreme object of Metaphysics is, strictly speaking, the knowledge of the Absolute; and the Absolute, for the very reason that it is the Absolute, is the ultimate and most

evident principle of demonstration. This is the meaning of the expressions, "*God is the light of intellect; He is the Ideal of the Universe, the Thought, and the Being*, and that *nothing can exist or be conceived without Him.*" Now, all these and similar definitions of the Absolute necessarily imply the idea that the Absolute is also the absolute principle of demonstration, or, to use the more popular expression, that God is the Foundation of all demonstration. But it is not so with formal Logic; for were we to follow the rules laid down by it, the Absolute would be of no avail in syllogism and demonstration. In fact, the part the Absolute could fulfil in a syllogism would be either the part of minor or the part of major term, or that of middle term, or that of two of them. This is the circle of supposition we can form with regard to the Absolute. Now, it is evident that the Absolute cannot be the *minor* term, as the minor term is always demonstrated, and the Absolute is supposed to demonstrate and not to be demonstrated. Nor could it be the *major* term, as the major term is not the *middle* term; and it is the middle term that plays the highest part in syllogism. Nor is the *middle* term any better; for the middle term being the species, is contained in the genus and is inferior to it: so that neither the major term for not being the species or the middle term, nor the middle term for not being the genus or the major term, can constitute the absolute term of demonstration. It only remains, then, that the Absolute should be the union of both terms—of the species and the genus, or of the middle and major terms—so that when we say, for instance, *God* or *the Absolute is the Perfect Being*, or *possesses all perfections*, "God" and "all perfections" should be so intimately and so inseparably connected that one could neither exist nor be conceived without the other. But this supposition must likewise be rejected. In fact, are the two terms of the proposition absolutely identical? then there is in reality only one term, and their distinction is only a verbal one. Are they really and materially distinct? then, if united, their union must be effected by a third term, which, for the very reason that it unites them, would be superior to them, and in this case neither of them, but this third term would be the absolute.

Besides, in all propositions concerning the Absolute, the distinction or division into genus and species must be done away with as not being applicable to this province of knowledge. For instance, in the proposition, "The eternal and imperishable things are the principle of the temporary and perishable," which of the two terms would be the species, and which the genus? Shall we say that *temporary things* constitute the genus of the *eternal?* But this would be simply absurd. Shall we say, then, that it is the *eternal things* that constitute the genus of the *temporary?* But this would be in opposition to the fundamental rule of Logic, that the subject of a proposition should be the species, and the attribute the genus.

Finally, whether absolute propositions like these, "The Absolute Being is the source of all perfection," or "The Absolute Cause is the principle of all things," or "The Beautiful and the Good are the principle of all beauty and all good" —whether, I say, all these and the like propositions consist of genus and species or not, whether their terms be identical or different, they cannot supply the principle—the *propositio major*—of any demonstration, as it may be easily ascertained by trying to combine them in syllogism.*

The point the above remarks establish is that formal Logic cannot be reconciled with the principles which constitute the foundation—the *major principle* of all demonstration, and that no legitimate conclusion can be drawn from them.

If, now, we take up the counterpart of the question, or, so to speak, the question by the other end—by the conclusion—and show that no metaphysical knowledge or principle can

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* It may be said that the following argument—

The absolute cause is the principle of all things.
God is the absolute cause:
Therefore God is the principle of all things—

is *logically* and *formally* correct. But in reality it is no argument at all; nay, it is at variance with the rules of Logic itself. For—even granted that the terms "God" and "absolute cause" be distinct, inasmuch as *Causality* may be considered as an *attribute of God—absolute cause*, which is an attribute of God, could not be the *middle term* or the principle of demonstration, and God the *minor term* and that part of the proposition which is demonstrated. Rather the reverse would be the case; I mean that it is the *propositio minor* that ought to take the place of the *propositio major*. But, then, from a *propositio major* like this, "God is the absolute cause," no conclusion can be drawn.

be obtained through syllogism (in the conclusion), we shall complete the demonstration.

It has already been observed that all attempts to prove by syllogism, and on *à priori* argument—which, strictly speaking, is the only metaphysical and speculative demonstration* —the existence of God, have failed. The reason of this failure is very simple. Neither God, nor anything—attribute or perfection—appertaining to God, can be syllogistically demonstrated. For God, being the Absolute, demonstrates all, and is demonstrated by nothing; consequently, the Existence or the Being of God, who is *the Being*, cannot be demonstrated by any other Being; in other words, there cannot possibly be any middle term, or principle, by which God, or God's nature, could be demonstrated; for a principle demonstrating God would be something more perfect and higher than God, and thus God would not be the Absolute principle of demonstration. Thus all proofs of this kind are either mere verbal contrivances or circles, as may be ascertained by analyzing the famous argument drawn from the idea of the *Infinite of Perfect Being* when presented in the syllogistic form. And, to place the matter beyond doubt, let us examine this argument, upon which, as Kant has already observed, hang all *speculative* proofs and certainty of the existence of God.

The point to be demonstrated is the *Existence of God*, and the gist of the proof, nay, the whole proof, rests on the Idea of the *Infinite* or the *Perfect Being*. For it is out of this Idea and by analytical process that the three terms of the argument must be evolved. Now it may be seen at a glance, as it were, that a syllogism so constituted can be but a circle.

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* The really Metaphysical and Speculative proofs of the Existence of God are those deduced from a primordial and *pure* idea—the idea of the Infinite, of the Absolute, of the Perfect Being, &c.—considered in itself and apart from all experimental *data*. Inductive arguments, as for instance those known under the name of *physical proofs*, are not strictly demonstrative. Indeed they presuppose the Metaphysical proof, and the absolute notion upon which this proof is founded. In fact, from the apprehension of finite causes or effects, or of the beauty, proportion and harmony of the Universe, it would be impossible for us to raise our mind to the contemplation of an *Absolute Cause*, of an *Absolute Finality*, &c., were it not that these notions preëxist in the mind, and are—consciously or unconsciously—suggested by it.

In fact, in affirming the *Infinite*, either we affirm a *Reality*, a *Real Being*, or a mere subjective representation, a certain form of thought possessing no objective entity, no being corresponding to it. In the latter case there is no syllogism at all, for there is no more connection between the *real existence* of God and the *Idea* of the Infinite than between bear the animal and Bear the constellation. If, on the other hand, in affirming the Infinite we affirm a Reality, we affirm thereby the existence of the Infinite, or of the Infinite Being, and in this case the conclusion is contained, not virtually or implicitly, but actually and explicitly, in the major premise. In fact, when we state in the major premise that the "Infinite is the Being that possesses all perfections," we admit—and cannot but admit—at the same time, that the Infinite exists, otherwise there would be no meaning in the proposition.*

This completes the demonstration; for it shows that Logic is, so to speak, refused admittance into the domain of Metaphysics by both ends of the argument, namely, by the major premise and by the conclusion. By the major premise, from its being unable to avail itself of the Absolute as a principle of demonstration, as I have shown in the first instance; by

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* The argument is this:

The Infinite or the Perfect Being must possess all perfections.
The Existence is a perfection:
Therefore the Perfect Being exists, or the Existence belongs to the Perfect Being.

It will be observed that this syllogism is fallacious and *inconclusive* even according to the rules laid down by Logic, or according to the rational combination of terms; for it is a Syllogism of the 2d Figure with two *affirmative* premises, whilst we are taught that one of them must be negative. Now, even granted that in this particular case the two premises might, by exception, be affirmative, the conclusion could not be legitimately drawn from them; for the conclusion would be either, "The Perfect Being exists," or "The Existence belongs to the Perfect Being." In the first case, the subject of the conclusion would be the *Major extreme*, whilst it ought to be the *Minor extreme;* in the second case, it is only by inverting the natural position of terms, and putting language and thought to torture, that the conclusion would be obtained. For if the Existence be a perfection or an attribute of God, it must fill the place of the attribute and not that of the subject.

The remarks contained in this note and text equally apply to all *speculative proofs* of the existence and attributes of God—nay, to all argument which attempts to demonstrate the absolute, the ideas, and essence of things.

the conclusion, as it is unable to demonstrate the Absolute, as I have shown in the second instance.

§ 4. *Reason and Reasoning.*

This impotency of old Logic to reach Metaphysical knowledge has brought out the well-known and fallacious distinction between Reason and Reasoning. Unable to remodel Logic, in order to make it available in the highest field of scientific research, and feeling, at the same time, that there must be some connection between this universal organon of knowledge and metaphysical science, some philosophers, to solve the difficulty, have resorted to the above distinction, setting forth that there is the same connection and the same difference between Metaphysics and Logic as between the principle and the consequence, between affirming a principle and deducing consequences therefrom. Metaphysics, according to this opinion, inquiring into the absolute principle and ultimate causes of things, whilst Logic deduces consequences by applying them to secondary causes or effects and to particular objects.

The preceding investigation would suffice to show how clumsy and inadmissible this opinion is, as they establish irreversibly, I think, that not only Metaphysics and Logic—as this latter stands at present—are two distinct provinces of knowledge, but that they are irreconcilable; and, consequently, that this deduction of consequences by Logic out of Metaphysical principles is a bare assumption—nay, a mere delusion. However, in order to place this latter point in a more prominent light, let us grant, for a moment, that it may be so, and that we have here two sciences, one of which supplies the principles, and the other the consequences—the former being the product of a faculty called *Reason*, and the latter of a faculty called *Reasoning*.

Now if this theory possess any meaning, it means this, namely, that in syllogism *Reason* suggests the *major* premise, and *Reasoning* the *minor* premise as well as the relation of the latter to the former, from the perception of which relation it brings forth the conclusion. But then the *Reasoning faculty* would stand higher than *Reason*, and perform opera-

tions more important and more complete than the latter, which is contradictory to and against the supposition. For we suppose—and must admit—that the faculty which reveals to us the ultimate principle of things is the τὸ ἡγεμονικόν—the governing power to which all other faculties stand subordinate, as the soldier is subordinate to the general and the menial laborer to the architect. Now the above distinction inverts, so to speak, the rules, and sets forth Reason as a subordinate faculty. In fact, when we say that Reason propounds the principles and Reasoning deduces the consequences therefrom, we say, in reality, that the knowledge of Reason, or obtained through it, is confined to principles and forbidden to overstep these boundaries, whilst Reasoning embraces both principles and consequences. For, to deduce consequences from principles, the Reasoning faculty must apprehend both, and the principles more distinctly than the consequences and previous to them, as the latter are drawn from the former. Let us consider a syllogism.

All virtue comes from God.
Justice is a virtue:
Therefore, &c.

It is quite plain that all the terms and propositions as well as their relation must be perceived by one and the same faculty. Were they perceived by different faculties, one of which stops, as it were, at the major premise, whilst the other takes up the operation at the minor premise, without perceiving the principle as distinctly as the first faculty—nay, more distinctly, from the very fact that it draws inferences from it—the argument could never be made up. And the correctness of these remarks will become more manifest if we take the three terms of which syllogism consists and put them in this form,

A B C,

A being the minor, C the major, and B the middle term. For it will be seen that B, whose function it is to connect A and C, must be apprehended by one and the same faculty. But the B of which C is affirmed in the major proposition, is the same B which is affirmed of A in the minor. Consequently, it must be the same faculty that brings forth and affirms B in the two propositions. Again, the C of the major proposi-

tion is the C of the conclusion, and here also we have the same faculty perceiving C in both propositions. Lastly, if it be one and the same faculty which affirms B and C in the three propositions, it must necessarily be one and the same faculty that affirms B and C of A in the minor premise and in the conclusion. In other words, syllogism is a mental operation by which the connection of three terms is demonstrated. Now, even supposing that the performing of such operation should require the working of different faculties—that there should be, for instance, a faculty which supplies the terms and another faculty which supplies the propositions—there must be, at any rate, a superior and more comprehensive faculty by which all these elements—faculties, terms, and propositions—are connected together in the unity of syllogism. Hence it follows that the distinction between Reason and Reasoning which is to be the line of demarcation between Metaphysics and Logic vanishes before a close investigation of the matter, and consequently that either Metaphysics is a part of Logic or Logic a part of Metaphysics, or, if there be any distinction between them, it is a distinction of a different kind and founded upon other principles.

HAMLET.

By D. J. Snider.

In our last essay the external influences were detailed the object of which was to incite Hamlet to action. In them was seen the character of Hamlet reflected in a great variety of shapes, yet having always the same logical basis. Here is found undoubtedly the leading element of the play. But to this action there is a counter-action which must now be developed. We saw in the first great movement that Hamlet's obstacle was chiefly in himself, that he could not force himself to do the deed, though the most powerful impulsion from without was urging him forward. Now comes the external opposition, which seems trifling compared with the former. The King and the court are upon his track, yet how easily

are they baffled! He could sink them all were he at one with himself. Hence the internal collision is the main one in the play; but it is time for us to pass to the external collision.

The King is the person with whom Hamlet carries on this external conflict, the others are the instruments of the King. Hence we have here a series of characters, Polonius and his children, the Queen, Rosencrantz and Guildenstern, who have the same end as the King, or at least are all means for the execution of his purpose. Hence they are more or less remotely involved in the same destruction. Hamlet has no such instruments, for the reason that he must first make up his mind to accomplish the deed before he can employ them; which resolution is out of his power. Hence the only character on his side is Horatio, a friend from the University and a foreigner, whose chief function is to know the plans and motives of Hamlet and to be present at the leading events, since he is to be the poet of this drama and the vindicator of Hamlet's conduct. Thus he hovers over the poem from beginning to end without much definiteness of character, and without saying or doing hardly anything beyond what is necessary to indicate his presence. He acts thus as a foil to exhibit Hamlet's designs and motives; when the latter has not Horatio to talk with, he has to talk with himself about these matters, hence the predominance of soliloquy in this play.

It is otherwise with the King; he can act and has acted, and hence knows the use of instruments. The course of his action is twofold: first, to discover the cause of Hamlet's melancholy, and secondly, when he has made that discovery, to get rid of a man with such a dangerous secret. The presupposition of his conduct and in fact of the play itself is a previous crime, the murder of Hamlet's father, by which he came to the throne. The curse is at work from the start, suspicion against the son of the murdered king harasses his bosom, which suspicion is intensified by a strange demeanor. Here the struggle begins. To find out what is the matter with Hamlet, to discover whether he knows the secret of his father's murder, is the first grand object of Claudio; for this purpose the characters above mentioned are introduced. But they, too, are to be judged by their deeds, the law of respon-

sibility applies to them also. Hamlet on the contrary carefully avoids detection; to cover his thoughts and plans more effectually, he throws over them the night of lunacy. We have already shown in our first essay that this disguise was especially adapted to deceive Polonius, whom, on account of his reputation and position, the King was sure to set on Hamlet's track. It is to be observed that the King was shrewder than his minister; he did not believe that Hamlet was crazy from the start, though evidently putting a great deal of faith in Polonius. Thus arises that peculiar and dexterous struggle in which Hamlet seeks to conceal his thoughts and purposes, and the King tries to discover them. The second part of this counter-movement is when Hamlet by his "play within the play" shows that he is aware of the great secret. Here is the point where the conscience of the King is aroused; the most fearful struggle rends his bosom; he knows not whether to retrace his steps and repent of his old crime, or to retain his wife and realm by committing a new crime. At last he resolves upon the latter, and hence his object now is to get rid of Hamlet. For both these purposes he uses as instruments those persons whose characters are now to be given.

First in reference to the King. He is exhibited in no absolutely depraved light by the drama; in fact he seems to desire to live and reign honestly from this time forward, provided there is no reckoning for the past; Hamlet he has declared shall be his heir; also his calmness and self-possession in very trying circumstances win our favorable regard. Moreover he shows repeatedly strong compunctions of conscience for his crime; he wishes the act undone, if it occasions no loss to him. He is therefore an extreme example of that large class of people who seek to repent of their misdeeds, yet want to retain all the profits thereof. That he does not proceed openly with violence against Hamlet rests upon two grounds mainly: his fear of the people, who idolize the young Prince, and the affection of the Queen for her son. Thus the King has also two collisions, the external one with Hamlet and the internal one with himself. The latter is most powerful; he has committed a crime which he seeks yet is unable to make undone without its undoing himself; repentance involves his death, since he must confess his crime

to the world and surrender all its advantages, namely, his kingdom and his queen, and then submit to the penalty of the law. Repentance thus seems to him to annihilate the very end for which it exists, to become self-contradictory; for if it destroys men, thinks he, what is the use of their repentance? To repent is death, not to repent is death; he wills to do, yet not do. But he cannot stand still, his deed is upon him, he has to bolster it up by a new murder; hence he commences plotting against the life of Hamlet, who at last falls through his machinations. Thus crime begets crime. His retribution, however, comes in full; he perishes by the hand of him whose death he has sought, and whose father he has slain.

The leading instrument of the King against Hamlet is, very naturally, Polonius, whose whole life has been devoted to reading the secret thoughts and plans of others, and concealing his own. In him we see the shrewd diplomat, and we cannot help thinking that the poet drew this character from the Italian diplomacy of his own and preceding ages. The fundamental characteristic of Polonius is cunning, cunning as the absolute basis of conduct. Now cunning is not to be eschewed within its proper limitations; but when it is made the highest rule of action, it must necessarily assail and attempt to subordinate the moral principles of the world. For if it is the highest, Right, Morality, Religion are inferior, and must be disregarded. Such in general is the consciousness of Polonius, which age and long habit have so confirmed that it is seen in the most trivial affairs of life, and makes him often have a decidedly comic tinge. Cunning thus becomes anything but cunning, destroys itself. He does not believe in an ethical order of things, or rather is totally ignorant of the same; the world is governed wholly by adroit management, according to him; the external side of life, conventionalities are the most important element of knowledge. This is seen in the parting advice given to his son—excellent precepts for external conduct, but on the whole a system of selfishness whose germ is, "to thine own self be true," which here means the narrow individual. Note that there is no allusion to moral principles as the guides of hu-

man conduct; in fact we learn in another place that he would even be pleased to learn of the moral derelictions of his son as the "flash and outbreak of a fiery mind." Moreover he has no faith in the sincerity of Hamlet's love, or perhaps no faith in love at all; in his judgment, it is lust with ulterior designs. Such a man stands in direct opposition to Hamlet; the latter therefore has for him not only dislike, but also the most unqualified contempt. Hence Polonius has no comprehension of such a character. Hamlet worries him by dark sayings which have always a secret sting, and utterly confounds him at his own game. It would almost seem as if the poet meant to show the folly of cunning; how it completely contradicts and destroys itself. He sends Reynald to Paris to look after his son, and gives some very shrewd instructions. At first one is inclined to ask, if he cannot trust his own son, why should he trust his servant, and who is to watch the latter? For the basis of his conduct is distrust. But what is the use of the information when he gets it? None at all, for he allows to his son those very vices which he sent Reynald to observe. Also in the play we hear no more of the matter; this scene was therefore simply to show the trait of Polonius. His object then was espionage for its own sake, management not for any end but to be a managing; he thus plays with his own cunning. Polonius has now reached that interesting stage when he delights in cunning for its own sake, and seeks the most tortuous path when a straight one is at hand. This crookedness extends also to his language, which, before it comes to the point, takes a dart to one side and loses itself in its own prolixity. Now such a man is set to work to ascertain the secret of Hamlet, whose nature lies outside of his intellectual horizon. How completely he is befooled is evident enough, and even the old fellow is compelled to confess that his cunning has overreached itself in thinking that Hamlet's love for his daughter was fictitious, and he feels sorry that he had not "quoted him with better heed and judgment," for after all he was very willing for Hamlet to be his son-in-law. In this respect also it is curious to observe his duplicity towards the King, for to the latter he professes to have broken off the match for reasons of

state. Finally it is his own cunning which brings him to sudden death through his concealment behind the arras. Cunning thus destroys itself.

This brings us to consider the manner of his death, which is often thought to be harsh and repulsive, and in addition an unnecessary accident in the play. The first question to be asked, is, Has he done anything to merit such a fate? Undoubtedly, for he has shown himself the willing instrument of the King in all the schemes against young Hamlet, and it is hinted that his present influential position is owing to the hand he had in the conspiracy against the elder Hamlet. Polonius has therefore merited the Retribution which has come. But is Hamlet justified in killing him? Undoubtedly not; he acts upon impulse, makes a mistake which brings ultimately Retribution upon himself at the hands of Laertes. Though Polonius deserves death, yet Hamlet cannot rightfully be his executioner; hence guilt falls upon him. All this is expressed by Hamlet himself, who fully appreciates his situation and declares his repentance for the act:

> "For this same lord,
> I do repent, but Heaven hath pleased it so,
> To punish me with this and this with me
> That I should be their scourge and minister."

Here he states that he was the instrument for the punishment of Polonius, and that the murder of Polonius was the instrument of his own punishment. The death of Polonius is therefore not an accident in the play, in the sense that it is not motived beforehand; it also shows how Hamlet can act from impulse before reflection sets in, and that such action plunges him into the deepest guilt. Acting from impulse he slays the wrong one, but as a rational being he must be held responsible for his deed. Another distinction should be kept in mind, that Polonius is a subject and hence amenable to law, while the King as the fountain of justice is above law, and hence can be punished only by murder.

Thus punishment must be inflicted on Hamlet; but by whom? Here appears Laertes the son of Polonius, in accordance with the strictest Retribution; for Hamlet is seeking revenge for a father slain, and yet has himself slain a father, whose son, according to his own logic, must now rise up and

try to kill him. Laertes is a chip of the old block, with the difference of age. For what the young man tries to carry by storm and impulse, the old man tries to obtain through cunning. Both are equally devoid of an ethical content to their lives. How much they are alike, and how completely Hamlet's character lies outside of their comprehension may be seen in the advice which both give to Ophelia concerning Hamlet. The first fact which is brought to our notice about Laertes is his request to return to France, which fact is an offset to the desire of Hamlet to go back to Wittenberg. We have already shown the importance of this stroke in the life and character of Hamlet. Equally important and suggestive is the statement concerning Laertes. It indicates that he sought and possessed the French culture in contrast to the German culture of Hamlet. The French have been in all times noted for the stress they lay upon the externalities of life. In whatever pertains to etiquette, polite intercourse, and fashion, they have been the teachers of Europe, and have elaborated a language which most adequately expresses this phase of human existence. But it must be said that the perfection of the External has been attended with a corresponding loss of the Internal—that the graces have not only hidden but often extinguished the virtues. In this school Laertes has been educated, and herein is a striking contrast to the deep moral nature of Hamlet. He has therefore the advantage of not being restrained by any uncomfortable scruples, and here again the contrast with Hamlet is prominent. Laertes can act. Yet he proceeds from impulse, though he has sufficient cause for anger; hence he too is on the point of killing the wrong one, just as Hamlet did in the case of Polonius. That Laertes is ready to destroy the whole ethical order of the world in his revenge, that his nature is quite devoid of the great moral principles of action, is shown in the following words:

> "To Hell, allegiance! vows to the blackest devil!
> Conscience and grace, to the profoundest pit!
> I dare damnation. To this point I stand—
> That both the worlds I give to negligence,
> Let come what comes, only I'll be revenged."

No doubt he is now in a high passion, but this is just his characteristic. Here he openly abjures conscience, religion,

fidelity, the very basis upon which the moral system of things must rest. Yet we find that in the end he does acknowledge one controlling principle, the emptiest and most worthless of all—honor; which, however, does not prevent him from entering into a rather dishonorable conspiracy with the King against Hamlet. Such is Laertes; yet he is not without a generous, gallant element in his character: witness at his death the forgiveness which he asks of Hamlet. He dies because he has willed the death of Hamlet, which, though merited, he cannot inflict as an individual; he is a subject and must resort to the court of justice, hence has not the excuse of Hamlet for the murder of Claudio, since the King being the source of justice itself cannot well be subsumed under his own creature.

Ophelia also becomes an instrument against Hamlet through her father. She is one of the fairest of our poet's creations, whose very beauty lies in her frail and delicate nature. We feel from the first that she is too weak to endure the contradictions of life—that a flower so tender must perish in the first rude storm. The poet has given the logical basis of her insanity in the strictest manner. Her whole nature is embraced in one word—Love. She has no individuality of her own, she is wholly wrapped up in the father and lover; for the mother cannot well appear here, since it would only be a repetition of herself. Her reliance upon others is therefore absolute; now comes the rudest shock which can assail a woman; both props are torn from under her, and there remains nothing for her support. Her lover goes crazy (for that is her belief) and slays her father. Her mind has no longer any centre at all, because it has none in itself; insanity during a short time follows and ultimately death by accident, for she was dead in thought, but could only perish by accident, since she was crazy and hence irresponsible. Her snatches of old songs exhibit the working of memory and imagination, and other forms of mental activity, without the controlling principle of reason; hence she runs into licentious fancies superinduced no doubt by the previous conversations of Polonius, Hamlet, and Laertes. Here we have an undoubted case of destruction without guilt; but, as before remarked in the case of Hamlet, a certain degree of individu-

ality is the very condition of existence; no one can live who cannot endure the conditions of life. Ophelia perishes through her beauty—that which constitutes the strongest charm of her character is what makes her greatest weakness. We may contrast her with Portia, who possesses the side of individuality without losing her ethical character or true womanhood. But Ophelia is all trust, all dependence upon others; there is no trace of selfishness or self-reliance even—she can hardly think of herself; hence the sweetness, beauty, loveliness of her character, but alas! hence also its utter frailty. That Hamlet should fall in love with one whose ethical nature was so consonant with his own is a necessity.

Of quite a different character is the Queen. She has violated the very principle of womanhood, and has destroyed the ethical basis of female character. Excepting the charge of infidelity made by the Ghost and the intimations of Hamlet, we have no declaration of the exact nature of her crime. Considering the important part she plays in the action and the great influence which the King confesses she has over him, one is inclined sometimes to see in her a principal in the murder, a second Clytemnestra. But it must be confessed that the poet has left the precise nature and degree of her offences in great uncertainty, and assuredly with design; yet few readers, perhaps, have any doubt about her being an accomplice in some way or other in the murder of her husband. The reason why the poet has thrown a veil over her crimes, is that he was averse, in fact could not make Hamlet play the rôle of Orestes—the slayer of his own mother. It would not comport with the character of Hamlet, nor would it suit a modern audience; and, still more, it would disturb the course of the play, which demands the concentration of his revenge upon the King. If he could not kill the King, much less could he kill his own mother. Hence his revenge is to call up her conscience and emotional nature, to show the tremendous chasm between herself and the truly ethical woman; for thus she would be harassed by her own feelings more than by any punishment, since it is emotion which forms the leading characteristic of female nature. The Queen dies, for she has violated the principle of her rational existence—fidelity to the family relation. The man who cor-

rupted her purity mixed the draught which deprived her of life; and the former was more truly destructive than the latter. But she loves Hamlet with the affection of a mother: the maternal relation is more powerful than the marital.

In connection with the Queen, a question of some interest arises concerning the reason why she does not perceive the Ghost when it is seen and addressed by Hamlet (Act 3, Sc. 4). The common supposition seems to be that the poet desires to indicate that it is merely a subjective Ghost, and one commentator has gone so far as to recommend its entire banishment from the stage in this scene. The poet, however, introduces it and makes it address Hamlet in this very passage. We cannot think, therefore, that he intends to destroy all the work which he was so careful hitherto in doing, namely, the preservation of the objectivity of the Ghost. It seems to us that the poet merely intended to show that it does not lie in the character of the Queen to see ghosts. Such is the case however with Hamlet, and forms the great distinguishing element of his nature. Nobody besides himself ever sees the Ghost, if we except the soldiers and Horatio in the first Act, and they are made to see it for the purpose of rendering it real to the audience, and not to exhibit any fundamental principle of their character. The difficulty was to preserve the objectivity of the Ghost to the audience, and at the same time not let it appear to those whose characterization would be thereby distorted. That the Ghost lies wholly in Hamlet's imagination, if the Queen though present does not see it, is a very natural inference; but the point is, that the poet, instead of intending to call up that inference in the minds of his audience, would have it suppressed as far as possible. Otherwise we must grant an irreconcilable contradiction in his treatment of this subject. It ought also to be added that the purpose and character of this scene are incompatible with the Queen's seeing the Ghost of her injured husband.

In conclusion, let us summon before ourselves the total movement of the play. Its presupposition is the crime of Claudio, who has murdered the King, corrupted the mother, and usurped the realm; this calls up the son, who is to requite both the murderer and his faithless mother. It is the

object of the son first to discover the truth of the guilt, and secondly to avenge the same when discovered. It is the object of the King to find out the plans of Hamlet, and then to make way with him when he has found them out. Hamlet has the assistance of one friend—Horatio; the King has the assistance of a number of persons connected with his court. The previous crime is the central point from which the two counter-movements of the play take their origin; the action of the King and Hamlet respecting this crime gives the essence of their conduct and character. Both exhibit negative phases of the ethical deed: the one refuses to do it at all, and hence never reaches any positive act; the other commits a crime, that is, negates the Ethical, and then refuses to make the crime undone. It is at this point that we can see that the delinquency of both is the same: each refuses to perform the ethical deed—the one, because he will not act: the other, because he will not repent: or, to use a figurative contrast—the one, because he will not go forward; the other, because he will not go backward. Nor must we forget the other side which gives the internal collision. Both have a justification for the course which they pursue: the one, because through action he would be compelled to commit a crime; the other, because through repentance he would have to sacrifice his life. To force Hamlet to action, the External in the form of a series of influences is brought to bear upon him; to force the King to action, the Internal—Conscience—wields her power. But in the one case the External is baffled by the Internal in the shape of Reflection and Conscience: in the other case, the Internal is baffled by the External in the shape of worldly power, possessions, and ambition.

But we must leave it to the reader to complete these interesting contrasts and to work out the details of the drama. It is no doubt the profoundest of Shakspeare's plays in respect to its thought, and its collision seems to touch the very core of modern spirit. The Theoretical and the Practical, Intelligence and Will are here exhibited in their one-sidedness, and it is shown that neither is sufficient by itself. If the play has any moral, it would seem to be, that the man who refuses to translate his thought into deed is as great a

criminal, or at most possesses as little power of salvation within himself, as he who will not destroy his own deed when it is negative.

Moreover, this play stands alone in the fact that it quite touches the very limits of the drama itself. For the essence of the drama is to portray some form of action, but here that form is non-action. Hence the plan of the play and the necessity for those external circumstances which were detailed in a previous essay; for they must be external, since the character is passive. This work is thus the culmination of Shakspeare's poetical activity, and exhibits the broadest range of his genius. The rest of his dramas depict collisions of various kinds, but it is the nature of the collision to be between higher and lower forms of Will. But here he quite sweeps the whole field of the Will and makes it one of the colliding principles. He thus produces the most comprehensive of all dramas, and seems to exhaust the very possibilities of dramatic Art.

NOTES AND DISCUSSIONS.

Under this title we propose to introduce from time to time a variety of Philosophical miscellany possessing interest from its personal character or from its bearing on particular movements of the time. Scraps of correspondence, extracts from periodicals or books recently published, criticisms or strictures on articles published in this journal, short editorials, discussions of the methods, subjects and results of Speculative Philosophy, and of systems hostile to it,—these and like matters will find their place hereafter in this journal under the above heading. The attention of our readers is called to this "new departure," and their assistance solicited in making it an attractive and valuable feature of this journal.

The authorship of the several "notes and discussions" will be indicated by the signatures. EDITOR.

PROOFS OF IMMORTALITY.

Our strictures on Mr. Kroeger's remarks regarding the proofs of immortality (p. 91, Jour. Spec. Phil. for Jan. 1873), in his notice of Prof. Schliephake's article in the *Neue Zeit*, has drawn out the two following communications.—ED.

FROM MR. EMERY.

Editor of the Journal of Speculative Philosophy:

You have somewhere quoted the saying of Novalis, "Though Philosophy can bake no bread, yet she can procure for us God, Freedom, and Immortality." Your reply to Mr. Kroeger's remarks in the January number of the Journal would indicate that you believe Philosophy "can procure for us" the immortality of the individual *as* individual. Does this necessarily follow from the recognition of our essential immortality? The question of individual immortality, as Mr. Kroeger puts it, is, whether this bundle of experiences, held together by memory, which we call the soul of Tom, Dick, or Harry, will continue to live forever. Certainly this is not an empirical question, neither can it be answered empirically. Admit that one individual, once dead, has reappeared; does that prove anything as to other individuals, or as to a second death? Admit the affirmation of the "individual, empirical self-consciousness of an immortal will"; would that necessarily be anything more than a subjective fancy? Mr. Kroeger evidently means that the immortality of the individual cannot be proven at all, therefore it is idle to waste words about the matter. Your reply, however, insists upon the importance of answering the question à priori, and it certainly can be and ought to be so answered.

From your allusion to Mr. Kroeger's mistake, it must be inferred, that any one who appreciates fully "the significance of the category of Universality when applied to human consciousness" must see individual immortality; but Fichte, whom you quote as having properly characterized the "essence of reason," says (pp. 38 & 39 January No. Jour.), "We, therefore, utterly repudiate the separation of the individual into body and soul, and the composition of the individual out of these two pieces; a doctrine which perhaps even asserts that the soul alone will continue to exist after the decease of the body. * * * * The existence of a soul is, therefore, absolutely denied, and the whole conception of a soul repudiated as a miserable poetical invention." Is it not plain, then, that while Fichte appreciated the "essence of reason," he denied the immortality of the individual? Mr. Kroeger certainly did not intend to say that Reason could be except as person, or could exist except as individual. He intended only to intimate the unessentiality of any particular individual Tom, Dick, or Harry. Is there, then, any substantial difference between Fichte, Mr. Kroeger, and yourself? Is not this soul of Tom, Dick, or Harry, *considered as individual*, a growth of Time, and does it not partake of the finitude common to all things of Time? Do you mean that an investigation "of the determinations of the idea of Universality" will enable one to solve affirmatively the problem of individual immortality? If you do, ought you not to make your statement more explicit?

Quincy, Ills., April, 1873. SAM. H. EMERY, Jr.

FROM MR. KROEGER.

Editor of the Journal of Speculative Philosophy:

I have been requested to state, in the *most condensed shape*, my views of the proofs of immortality. In doing so, I desire to say in advance, that, in

denying the possibility of any other than a practical proof of immortality, I no more intend to deny immortality itself, than by denying the possibility of proving to any individual his existence by any other than a practical proof, I intend to deny his actual existence. It is simply because I deem it an inconsiderate waste of time, leading into a labyrinth of errors from which it is next to impossible to escape, that I oppose idle speculations on these subjects; and must needs hold the man who calls upon a philosopher to prove him his immortality, quite as foolish as the man who wants me to prove to him that he exists, or that he is free. To attempt such impossible proofs makes philosophy the laughing-stock of all who are naturally its opposers and enemies. Philosophy has, in my opinion, a far higher object than this.

I insist, therefore, that the only proof of immortality is as follows:

1. I feel myself impelled at every moment of my life to act or not-act in a certain manner, utterly regardless of the impulses of my physical nature and quite often in direct opposition to those impulses, which mode of acting is called moral acting; and could not feel myself so impelled did not the impulsion demand complete, absolute subjection to its dictate.

2. No individual can attain this complete and absolute subjection except at the completion of an infinite time.

3. Hence I cannot act morally at all unless I postulate for myself an infinite continuance of my individual life.

And I further insist that all other proofs of a theoretical or speculative character are based upon a fallacy, which may very concisely be expounded in this way:

Form of all Speculative Proofs of Immortality.

1. Substance is permanent.
2. I am a substance:
3. Hence I am immortal.

The fallacy lies in assuming the "permanent" of the major to be identical with the "immortal" of the conclusion, which it is not. If the major were to read, Substance is immortal, the syllogism would be correct; but of substance you cannot predicate immortality, *since the latter conception is attributable only to beings that have a beginning in time and pass through a physical death.*

The permanency of the substance, however, which in the above syllogism might be assigned to me in the conclusion, is not worth a farthing for purposes of immortality; seeing that it is no permanency in time and space, but simply of the idea of substance as the thought of the unity of accidences.

Every speculative proof of Immortality has this same failing of an assumption, the unjustifiable nature of which too often escapes superficial minds. I will undertake to show it up in every proof brought forward.

While engaged in this somewhat unscientific declaration of faith, I may be permitted to add the following:

To speak about the question of immortality as an insoluble problem, or to speak about any question as an insoluble problem, is sheerest stupidity. Whatever problem reason propounds is either reasonable and hence solva-

ble, or else absurd. To a man of sense there is no darkness whatever in any region of knowledge, but only purest clearness. If there seems to be darkness, be sure it is of your own making. It is most certainly unknowable whether tomorrow will find me here or there on this earth, and in proportion it is equally unknowable whether tomorrow will find me a living resident on earth or elsewhere. But it were absurd for me to ask for the solution of the latter problem as if it ought to be more answerable than the former. A man of sense, and a philosopher, will ask for the solution of neither problem, but await the morrow to bring it.

If, however, the problem be put in the shape as to whether tomorrow will find me a living resident anywhere—as to whether I am an immortal. deathless being—the answer is equally ready at hand, that to me as an agent of the moral world, as a "citizen of the city of God," in the words of Leibnitz and St. Augustine, the predicates of death and mortality are not applicable at all. I cannot die. This body may perish, as it does, indeed, every day; but a new one *must* be given me. Take the smallest pebble out of the physical universe and the whole physical universe collapses. Take me, the smallest moral agent in the moral world, out of it, and the whole kingdom of God plunges into nothingness.

St. Louis, Mo., April, 1873. A. E. KROEGER.

REMARKS BY THE EDITOR.

The practical proof of immortality—to wit, the *presupposition* thereof by all human institutions through which man becomes a distinctively *human* being and a somewhat higher than a brute animal—this practical proof is indeed strong enough to whosoever appreciates it in its full force. We heartily sympathize with Mr. Kroeger in the living faith which he expresses; and likewise with any one who believes in immortality on whatever grounds —the more rational the grounds, the deeper our sympathy. But knowledge is better than faith, and in this instance it is better to see the "universality and necessity of grounds" than merely their dependence upon something else whose true justification is to be sought in the doctrine for which we seek proofs. For, after all, it is immortality that justifies institutions and not the latter the former. The skeptic attacks institutions effectively with his denial of immortality, and his attack precludes the use of the practical argument on the ground of the "*petitio*." The spiritual nature of man must be established from more general grounds in order to satisfy the doubter. If one sees the "universality and necessity" of the "moral world" as Mr. Kroeger does, he sees immortality as a corollary; but otherwise the practical proof is a vicious circle.

Mr. Emery restates his question in a letter before us: "Can Freedom and Immortality be found on the plane of the Particular, or only on the plane of the Universal? Is there anything free or immortal about the individual man except the 'I am I' of universal self-consciousness?" In this quotation the terms Universal, Particular, and Individual, are used in such a way as to reveal the source of confusion in the author's mind. So long as a particular or individual is conceived *apart* from the universal, so long it is conceived as lacking substantiality or permanency.

When one rises to the conception of the *concrete* universal, he conceives the same as a self-related negative process which contains particularity as a phase or "moment" of it, and which process as a whole is well named *individual.* The universal which is a mere "general" or abstract somewhat is not this concrete universal at all. Plato knew it, and still better did Aristotle; and the one object kept always in view by them in their works is the exhibition of this concrete universal (as Hegel has shown: see Jour. Spec. Phil., vol. iv., p. 321, and vol. v., p. 74). The concrete universal is the vital principle of all speculative philosophy, although it is a veritable Proteus in concealing itself under different forms. Leibnitz's monads essentially express it; they each represent the entire universe. Spinoza's substance, notwithstanding it has been judged by the principle "*omnis negatio,*" &c., and declared to be an abstract universal, still contains pure activity, and is therefore a concrete universal in the highest sense of the term. Part fifth of "The Ethics" ought to make clear to the dullest reader of philosophy that Spinoza was a sound Aristotelian (with a Stoic direction), and that immortality and the personality of God were looked upon by him as the highest doctrines of his Philosophy. (See Ethics, Part V., Prop. XXIII. and Schol. XXV., XXIX., XXXI., and Schol. XXXIV., XXXV., XXXVI. and coroll., and Schol. XL. & XLI.) Descartes's "perfect being" contains his aperçu of the self-determined totality, the concrete universal.

Mr. Kroeger's reduction of the general *form* of all speculative proofs of immortality fails in the fact that he assumes that the idea of substance remains as abstract at the close of the demonstration as at the beginning. "Substance is permanent" may mean that some abstract category or negative unity, like Matter or Force or Vitality, is permanent. When substance is found by an exhaustive dialectical procedure to be *subject*, or, in other words, when it is discovered that no category or mode of Being or Essence is adequate to independent subsistence unless it be thinking Being—conscious personality—then the conclusion "immortal" may be substituted for the less specific "permanent" of the premise. The proof that "permanent" as predicate of substance necessarily means "immortal" because of the identity of true substance with mind need not here be undertaken, because so often and so variously accomplished by different systems of Philosophy from Plato and Aristotle down to Hegel. (In this Journal see vol. iv., pp. 97 et seqq.; vol. i., pp. 62, 119, 120, 187, 188.) What is required here is a further examination of the empirical relation of the historical individual, Dick or Harry, to the personality recognized by speculative philosophy as the highest principle. (See pp. 109–10, vol. iv. Jour. Spec. Phil.) In ourselves we find the "I am I" which Mr. Emery mentions. To say nothing of the presuppositions of the moral world, that form the "practical" proof which convinces Mr. Kroeger, there are presuppositions far more intimate —those of language, for example—and most unequivocal, the presupposition of Consciousness itself. The individual Dick or Harry is conscious of himself: here is the empirical basis, an empirical basis, however, which is likewise rational or à priori. For in the act of self-consciousness one realizes his identity with pure universality or Ego in general, inasmuch as his very

act of reflection upon himself is possible only through his exercise of absolute negative might, i.e. the cancelling of every particular determination of thought as such, and the spontaneous seizing of its own negative act as object. Thus self-consciousness is a perception and realization of absoluteness, an identifying of one's infinite particularity or personality with absolute universality (or active negation of determinations). This negative might of the universal is precisely what gives us our particular individuality, our certainty that we are independent self-subsisting entities.

Now a theory that held to a general persistence of consciousness in Humanity without individual immortality would fall into the same category with those theories that hold an abstract unity, a "negative unity," as the first principle. The general critique of the same is as follows: Force or Matter is a negative unity or an abstract category which is reached through the annulment of all special determinations or particular forms of matter or force. No particular form of matter or of force is adequate to the expression of the generality of matter or force. Hence each particular shape or form gives way to other potentialities and the particular perishes. The abstract highest principle when realized annuls the individual. But the dialectic of this annulment of individuals through their inadequacy to realize the abstract universal does not cease with the highest principle; it, too, is found inadequate; it is one side of an antithesis, and over against it is its realization. Since its complete attainment is its removal from reality altogether and thus the negation of its own activity, it can in nowise be a self-subsistent entity such as the highest principle should be. Whereupon it is clear that such abstract universal is only a phase of a higher or more concrete totality. It is a phase of a negative movement which returns to itself in every act of determination by which it gives rise to the particular. Thus all its forms are transparent, and it is self-determined and self-conscious. Self-consciousness underlies as a profounder presupposition the "Correlation of Forces." But what is the relation of the individual to self-consciousness? To the absolute or creative self-consciousness such particular somewhats as are not conscious are *quasi* individuals, and they originate or are annulled without persistence. They abide only in their purpose or "final cause." But to the conscious individual there is persistence for the reason that he is his own negative unity. The negative unity is outside individual things but inside conscious individuals. From the fact that conscious individuals are their own negative unity, they alone can remove their inadequateness to the generic or highest principle—of which all particular existence is but the realization. An external negative unity destroys the particular and it perishes; an internal negative unity lives in the very act of destroying its own particularity; this life is a process of development, and more than this, a spiritual growth. To a being that can progress by the removal of its own limitations, there is no higher finite being or stage of existence. He already transcends time and space, and is lord over them in his negative might as subject, although his determinations as results (*natura naturata*) are in time and space. The form of Recognition is, then, the form of relation between individual spirits and the Absolute Spirit. (See "Comprehension and Idea," Jour. Spec. Phil., vol. i.,

pp. 236–38.) The true monad is impenetrable by all else and unassailable. The rest of the universe exists for it only through its own proper activity, its "representation" of the same to itself. Nothing exists for the conscious being unless through its own activity. To realize in itself adequately the universe, to annul its own inadequacy, is its immortal task.

To suppose an Absolute Self-consciousness that created or posited conscious beings in order to reflect Itself in them, and then to cancel them in death, is to suppose a consciousness that failed adequately to realize itself, that could not attain to complete reflection into itself, and hence that failed of complete self-consciousness. For the only thing necessary to be fully understood here in order to see the utter impossibility of such a theory as we suppose, is the nature of consciousness as a form of reflection into itself through recognition. The reflection into itself must be mutual in order to be at all. The highest category of Philosophy, The IDEA, is that of mutuality as prevailing in Absolute Self-determination—the mystery of the Trinity when stated in the language of Religion.

Therefore a general Reason which swallowed up, like Saturn, its particular realizations, would, through the fact that it could act externally as negative unity on the particular individual, absolutely preclude the possibility of reflecting itself in the particular individual, for such reflection must necessarily demand free individuals who are their own negative unity. Hence such an external Reason would of necessity be unconscious, and hence not its own negative unity; but this is impossible, as the dialectic proves. Therefore the existence of conscious beings is of necessity the existence of immortal beings.

BOOK NOTICES.

Programm des Gymnasiums zu Meldorf, etc. Meldorf: 1873.

This Programme contains an able article discussing the question, "What reforms appear to be necessary in the present *status* and functions of Evangelical religious instruction in the Gymnasia?"

Im Lande der Denker! Philosophische Abhandlung bezüglich einer Neugestaltung unseres Culturideals. Von Moritz Müller. Zweite Ausgabe. Berlin: 1873.

In the first part of this volume the author discusses with his usual vigor the question of "Latin instruction in our common schools, and the honor paid to Greek and Roman culture." He quotes the remark of Oerstedt, "that general culture could be best obtained through an extensive study of the various branches of science and through a more intimate study of the mother-tongue, combined with a familiar and accurate acquaintance with foreign living languages." The remark of Schopenhauer should be quoted alongside: "A man who does not understand Latin is like one who walks through a beautiful region in a fog; his horizon is very close to him. He sees only the nearest things clearly, and a few steps away from him the

outlines of everything become indistinct or wholly lost. The horizon of the Latin scholar extends far and wide through the centuries of modern history, the middle ages, and antiquity." The Latin scholar, in fact, has become conscious of the traces of the Roman contribution to our civilization, the most considerable contribution that it has received. Our consciousness of justice, and of the necessity of formal, legal conventionalities in the dealing of man with man, has been inherited from Rome; without these formalities the selfishness of the individual could not be sifted out or clarified sufficiently to admit of civil freedom.

The second part of the book treats of "Instruction in our common schools and the study of German and French."

Such discussions will forward the cause of Educational Psychology by inciting educators to inquire into the exact function of the different branches of study. Mere tradition is not a sufficient ground on which to retain the disciplines of the course of study.

From Moritz Müller of Pforzheim we have received also the following articles:

Die Berufung auf Dr. Pfeiffer. A sociological discussion.

Mama Henne. A defence of his position on Materialism, &c.

Einiges gegen den Gottes-und Unsterblichkeitsläugner, David Strauss. (Some Words against the God and Immortality-denier, David Strauss.)

Trendelenburg und Hegel von Karl Rosenkranz. Published in *Die Gegenwart*, No. 28, August, 1872. Berlin.

This article is a contribution to the task of properly appreciating the position of Trendelenburg in the history of Philosophy, and especially his relation to Hegel.

Philosophische schriften von Franz Hoffmann. Dritter Band.

In the "Blätter für literarische Unterhaltung," Nos. 21 and 22, appears a contribution by Alexander Jung, devoted to a consideration of the above named work of Dr. Hoffmann; and also to his edition of a work, in three volumes, on "Popery in contradiction with Reason, Morals, and Christianity, exhibited in its history."

Indberetning om Bergens Observatorium i aarene 1868, 1869, og 1870. Af J. J. Astrand.—Also by same author, *Ny Interpolationsmethode.*

The Report of this distinguished Observatory is printed in Danish, with a German translation in parallel columns.

Half-hour Recreations in Popular Science. No. 3: Spectrum Analysis Explained. illustrating its uses to Science, and including the Theory of Heat, Light, and Color. By Profs. Schellen, Roscoe, and Huggins. Boston: Lee & Shepard. 1873. For sale by Soule, Thomas & Wentworth, St. Louis.

Same. Part 6. Unconscious Action of the Brain and Epidemic Delusions. By Dr. W. B. Carpenter, F.R.S. Boston: Estes & Lauriat. 1873. For sale by the St. Louis Book and News Company.

Same. No. 5. Nebulæ, Comets, Meteoric Showers; and the Revelations of the Spectroscope regarding them. By Prof. H. Schellen and others.—*Coral and Coral Islands.* By Prof. J. D. Dana. For sale by St. Louis Book and News Company.

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PEDAGOGICS AS A SYSTEM.

By Dr. Karl Rosenkranz, Doctor of Theology and Professor of Philosophy at the University of Königsberg.

Translated by ANNA C. BRACKETT.

THIRD PART.

Particular Systems of Education.

§ 175. The definite actuality of Education originates in the fact that its general idea is individualized, according to its special elements, in a specific statement which we call a pedagogical principle. The number of these principles is not unlimited, but from the idea of Education contains only a certain number. If we derive them therefore, we derive at the same time the history of Pedagogics, which can from its very nature do nothing else than make actual in itself the possibilities involved in the idea of Education. Such a derivation may be called an *à priori* construction of history, but it is different from what is generally denoted by this term in not pretending to deduce single events and characters. All empirical details are confirmation or illustration for it, but it does not attempt to seek this empirical element *à priori*.

—The history of Pedagogics is still in the stage of infancy. At one time it is taken up into the sphere of Politics; at another, into that of the history of Culture. The productions of some of the most distinguished writers on the subject are now antiquated. Cramer of Stralsund made, in 1832, an excellent beginning in a comprehensive and thorough history of

Pedagogy; but in the beginning of his second part he dwelt too long upon the Grecks, and lost himself in too wide an exposition of practical Philosophy in general. Alexander Kapp has given us excellent treatises on the Pedagogics of Aristotle and Plato. But with regard to modern Pedagogics we have relatively very little. Karl v. Raumer, in 1843, began to publish a history of Pedagogics since the time of the revival of classical studies, and has accomplished much of value on the biographical side. But the idea of the general connection and dependence of the several manifestations has not received much attention, and since the time of Pestalozzi books have assumed the character of biographical confessions. Strümpell, in 1843, developed the Pedagogics of Kant, Fichte, and Herbart.—

§ 176. Man is educated by man for humanity. This is the fundamental idea of all Pedagogics. But in the shaping of Pedagogics we cannot begin with the idea of humanity as such, but only with the natural form in which it primarily manifests itself—that of the nation. But the naturalness of this principle disappears in its development, since nations appear in interaction on each other and begin dimly to perceive their unity of species. The freedom of spirit over nature makes its appearance, but to the spirit explicitly in the transcendent form of abstract theistic religion, in which God appears as the ruler over Nature as merely dependent; and His chosen people plant the root of their nationality no longer in the earth, but in this belief. The unity of the abstractly natural and abstractly spiritual determinateness is the concrete unity of the spirit with nature, in which it recognizes nature as its necessary organ, and itself as in its nature divine. Spirit in this stage, as the internal presupposition of the two previously named, takes up into itself on one hand the phase of nationality, since this is the form of its immediate individualization; but it no longer distinguishes between nations as if they were abstractly severed the one from the other, as the Greeks shut out all other nations under the name of barbarians. It also takes up into itself the phase of spirituality, since it knows itself as spirit, and knows itself to be free from nature, and yet it does not estrange itself as the Jews did in their representation of pure

spirit, in reference to which nature seems to be only the work of its caprice. Humanity knows nature as its own, because it knows the Divine spirit and its creative energy manifesting itself in nature and history, as also the essence of its own spirit. Education can be complete only with Christianity as the religion of humanity.

§ 177. We have thus three different systems of religion—(1) the National; (2) the Theocratic; and (3) the Humanitarian. The first works in harmony with nature since it educates the individual as a type of his species. The original nationality endeavors sharply to distinguish itself from others, and to impress on each person the stamp of its uniform type. One individual is like every other, or at least should be so. The second system in its manner of manifestation is identical with the first. It even marks the national difference more emphatically; but the ground of the uniformity of the individuals is with it not merely the natural common interest, but it is the consequence of the spiritual unity, which abstracts from nature, and as history, satisfied with no present, hovers continually outside of itself between past and future. The theocratic system educates the individual as the servant of God. He is the true Jew only in so far as he is this; the genealogical identity with the father Abraham is a condition but not the principle of the nationality. The third system liberates the individual to the enjoyment of freedom as his essence, and educates the human being within national limits which no longer separate but unite, and, in the consciousness that each individual, without any kind of mediation, has a direct relation to God, makes of him a man who knows himself to be a member of the spiritual world of humanity. We can have no fourth system beyond this. From the side of the State-Pedagogics we might characterize these systems as that of the nation-State, the God-State, and the humanity-State. From the time of the establishment of the last, no one nation can attain to any sovereignty over the others. By means of the world-religion of Christianity, the education of nations has come to the point of taking for its ideal, man as determining himself according to the demands of reason.

FIRST DIVISION.

THE SYSTEM OF NATIONAL EDUCATION.

§ 178. The National is the primitive system of education, since the family is the organic starting-point of all education, and is in its enlargement the basis of nationality.

—Education is always education of the mind. Even unorganized nations, those in a state of nature, the so-called savage nations, are possessed of something more than a mere education of the body; for, though they set much value upon gymnastic and warlike practice and give much time to them, they inculcate also respect for parents, for the aged, and for the decrees of the community. Education with them is essentially family training, and its content is natural love and reverence. We cannot deny that the finer forms of those to which we are accustomed are wanting. Besides, education among all these people of nature is very simple and much the same, though great differences in its management may exist arising from differences of situation or from temperament of race.—

§ 179. National Education is divided into three special systems: (1) Passive, (2) Active, (3) Individual. It begins with the humility of an abstract subjection to nature, and ends with the arrogance of an abstract rejection of nature.

§ 180. Man yields at first to the natural authority of the family; he obeys unconditionally its behests. Then he substitutes for the family, as he goes on his culture, the artificial family of his caste, to whose rules he again unconditionally yields. To dispense with this artificialty and this tyranny, at last he abstracts himself from the family and from culture. He flees from both, and becoming a monk he again subjects himself to the tyranny of his order. The monks presents to us the mere type of his species.

§ 181. This absolute abstraction from nature and from culture, this quietism of spiritual isolation, is the ultimate result of the Passive system. In opposition to this, the Active system seeks the positive vanquishing of naturalness. Its people are courageous. They attack other nations in order to rule over them as conquerors. They live for the continuation of their life after death, and build for themselves on this account tombs of granite. They brave the dangers of the sea.

The abstract prose of the patriarchal-state, the fantastic chimeras of the caste-state, the ascetic self-renunciation of the cloister-state, yield gradually to the recognition of actuality; and the fundamental principle of Persian education consisted in the inculcation of veracity.

§ 182. But the nationality which is occupied with simple, natural elements—other nations, death, the mystery of the ocean—may revert to the abstractions of the previous stage, which in education often take on cruel forms—nay, often truly horrible. First, when the spirit begins not only to suspect its true nature, but rather to recognize itself as the true essence; and when the God of Light places as the motto on his temple the command to self-knowledge, the natural individuality becomes free. Neither the passive nor the active system understands the free self-distinction of the individual from the rest. In them, to be an individuality is a betrayal of the very idea of their existence, and even the suspicion of such a charge suffices utterly and mercilessly to destroy the one to whom it refers. Even the solitary individuality of the despot is not the one-ness of free individuality: he is only an example of his kind; only in his kind is he singular. Nationality rises to individuality through the free dialectic of its race, wherein it dissolves its own presupposition.

§ 183. Nevertheless individuality must always proceed from naturalness. Esthetically it seeks nature, but the nature of the activity itself, in order, by penetrating it with mind, to make of it a work of art; practically it seeks it, partly to disdain it in gloomy resignation, partly to enjoy it in excessive sensual ecstasy, demoniacally to heighten the extravagance of its own internal feeling in wild revels.

—The Germans were not savage in the common signification of this term. They were men each one of whom constituted himself willingly a centre for others, or, if this was not the case, renounced them in proud self-sufficiency. All the glory and all the disgrace of our race lies in the power of individualizing which is divinely breathed into our veins. As a natural element, if this be not controlled, it degenerates easily into intractableness, into violence. The Germans need therefore, in order to be educated, severe service, the imposition of difficult tasks; and for this reason they appropriate to them-

selves, now the Roman law, now the Greek philology, now Gallic usages, &c., in order to work off their superfluous strength in such opposition. The natural reserve of the German found its solvent in Christianity. By itself, as the history of the German race shows, it would have been destroyed in vain distraction. First of all, the German race, in the confidence of its immediate consciousness, ventured forth upon the sea, and managed the ship upon its waves as if they rode a charger.—

FIRST GROUP.

THE SYSTEM OF PASSIVE EDUCATION.

§ 184. All education desires to free man from his finitude, to make him ethical, to unite him with God. It begins therefore with a negative relation to naturalness, but at once falls into a contradiction of its aim, which is to convert the opposition to nature into a natural necessity. Spirit subjects the individual (1) to the rule of the family as naturally spiritual; (2) to the rule of the caste as to a principle in itself spiritual, mediated through the division of labor, which it nevertheless, through its power of being inherited, joins again to the family; (3) to the abstract self-determination of the monkish quietism, which turns itself away as well from the family as from work, and constitutes this flight from nature and history, this absolute passivity, into an educational ideal.

—We shall not here enter into the details of this system, but simply endeavor to remove from their differences the want of clearness which is generally found involved in any mention of them, so that the phrases of hierarchical and theocratical education are used without any historical accuracy.

I. *Family Education.*

§ 185. The Family, as the organic starting-point of all education, makes the beginning. The nation looks upon itself as a family. Among all unorganized people education is family-education, though they are not conscious of its necessity. Identical in principle with these people, but distinguished from them in its consciousness of it, the Chinese nation, in their laws, regulations, and customs, have constituted the family the absolute basis of their life and the only principle of their education.

§ 186. The natural element of the family is found in marriage and relationship; the spiritual, in love. We may call the nature of family feeling which is the immediate unity of both elements, by the name of Piety. In so far as this appears not merely as a substantial feeling but at the same time as law, there arises from it the subordination of the abstract obedience of the woman as wife to the husband, of children to the parents, of the younger children to the elder. In this obedience man first renounces his self-will and his natural roughness; he learns to master his passions, and to conduct himself with deferential gentleness.

—When the principle ruling the family is transferred to political relations, there arises the tyranny of the Chinese state, which cannot be fully treated here. We find everywhere in it an analogical relation to that of parents and children. In China the ruler is the father and mother of the country; the civil officers are representatives of a paternal authority, &c. It follows that in school the children will be ranked according to their age. The authority of parents over children is according to the principle entirely unconditional, but in actuality very mild. The abandonment of daughters by the poorest classes in the great cities is not objected to, for the government rears the children in orphan asylums, where they are cared for by nurses appointed by the state.—

§ 187. The distinction of these relations which are conditioned by nature takes on the external shape of a definite ceremonial, the learning of which is a chief element of education. In conformity with the naturalness of the whole principle all crimes against it are punished by whipping, which does not necessarily entail dishonor. In order to lead man to the mastery of himself and to obedience to those who are naturally set over him, education develops an endless number of fragmentary maxims to keep attention ever watchful over himself, and his behavior always fenced in by a code of prescriptions.

—We find in such moral sentences the substance of what is called, in China, Philosophy.—

§ 188. The theoretical education includes Reading, Writing—i.e. painting the letters with a brush—Arithmetic, and the making of verses. But the ability to do these things is

not looked at as means of culture but as ends in themselves, and to fit one therefore for the undertaking of state offices. The Chinese possess formally all the means for literary culture—printing, libraries, schools, and academies; but the worth of these is not great. Their value has been often overrated because of their external resemblance to those found among us.

II. *Caste Education.*

§ 189. The members of the Family are certainly immediately distinguished among each other as to sex and age, but this difference is entirely immaterial as far as the nature of their employment goes. In China, therefore, every man can attain any position; he who is of humblest birth in the great state-family can climb to the highest honor. But the progress of spirit now becomes so mediated that the division of labor shall be made the principle on which a new distinction shall arise in the family: each one shall perfect himself only in that labor which was allotted to him as his own through his birth into a particular family. This fatalism (caste-distinction) breaks up the life, but increases its tension, for spirit works on the one hand towards the deepening of its distinctions; on the other, towards leading them back into the unity which the natural determining directly opposes.

§ 190. The chief work of education thus consists in teaching each one the rights and duties of his caste so that he shall act only exactly within their limits, and not pollute himself by passing beyond them. As the family-state concerns itself with fortifying the natural distinction by a far-reaching and vigorous ceremonial, so the caste-state must do the same with the distinction of class. A painful etiquette becomes more and more endless in its requisitions the higher the caste, in order to make the isolation more sharply defined and more perceptible.

—This feature penetrates all exclusively caste-education. The aristocracy exiles itself on this account from its native country, speaks a foreign language, loves its literature, adopts foreign customs, lives in foreign countries—in Italy, Paris, &c. In this way man becomes distinguished from others. But that man should strive thus to distinguish himself has its justification in the mystery of his birth, and this is

assuredly always the principle of the caste-state in which it exists. The castes lead to genealogical records, which are of the greatest importance in determining the destiny of the individual. The Brahmin may strike down one of a lower caste who has defiled him by contact, without becoming thereby liable to punishment; rather would he be to blame if he did not commit the murder. Thus formerly was it with the officer who did not immediately kill the citizen or the common soldier who struck him a blow, &c.—

§ 191. The East Indian culture is far deeper and richer than the Chinese. The theoretical culture includes Reading, Writing, and Arithmetic; but these are subordinate, as mere means for the higher activities of Poetry, Speculation, Science, and Art. The practical education limits itself strictly by the lines of caste, and since the caste system constitutes a whole in itself, and each for its permanence needs the others, it cannot forbear giving utterance suggestively to what is universally human in the free soul, in a multitude of fables (Hitopadesa) and apothegms (sentences of Bartrihari). Especially for the education of princes is a mirror of the world sketched out.

—Xenophon's Cyropedia is of Greek origin, but it is Indian in its thought.—

III. *Monkish Education.*

§ 192. Family Education demands unconditional obedience towards parents and towards all who stand in an analogous position. Caste Education demands unconditional obedience to the duties of the caste. The family punishes by whipping; the caste, by excommunication, by loss of honor. The opposition to nature appears in both systems in the form of a rigid ceremonial, distinguishing between the differences arising from nature. The family as well as the caste has within it a manifold fountain of activity, but it has also just as manifold a limitation of the individual. Spirit is forced, therefore, to turn against nature in general. It must become indifferent to the family. But it must also oppose history, and the fixed distinctions of division of labor as necessitated by nature. It must become indifferent to work and the pleas-

ure derived from it. That it may not be conditioned either by nature or by history, it denies both, and makes its action to consist in producing an abstinence from all activity.

§ 193. Such an indifference towards nature and history produces the education which we have called monkish. Those who support this sect care for food, clothing, and shelter, and for these material contributions, as the laity, receive in return from those who live this contemplative life the spiritual contribution of confidence in the blessings which wait upon ascetic contemplation. The family institution as well as the institution of human labor is subordinated to abstract isolation, in which the individual lives only for the purification of his soul. All things are justified by this end. Castes are found no more; only those are bound to the observance of a special ceremonial who as nuns or monks subject themselves to the unconditional obedience to the rules of the cloister, these rules solemnly enjoining on the negative side celibacy and cessation from business, and on the positive side prayer and perfection.

§ 194. In the school of the Chinese Tao-tse, and in the command to the Brahmin after he has established a family to become a recluse, we find the transition as it actually exists to the Buddhistic Quietism which has covered the rocky heights of Thibet with countless cloisters, and reared the people who are dependent upon it into a childlike amiability, into a contented repose. Art and Science have here no value in themselves, and are regarded only as ministering to religion. To be able to read in order to mutter over the prayers is desirable. With the premeditated effort in the state of a monk to reduce self to nothing as the highest good, the system of passive education attains its highest point. But the spirit cannot content itself in this abstract and dreamy absence of all action, though it demands a high stage of culture, and it has recourse therefore to action, partly on the positive side to conquer nature, partly to double its own existence in making history. Inspired with affirmative courage, it descends triumphantly from the mountain heights, and fears secularization no more.

SECOND GROUP.

THE SYSTEM OF ACTIVE EDUCATION.

§ 195. Active Education elevates man from his abstract subjection to the family, the caste, asceticism, into a concrete activity with a definite aim which subjects those elements as phases of its mediation, and grants to each individual independence on the condition of his identity with it. These aims are the military state, the future after death, and industry. There is always an element of nature present from which the activity proceeds; but this no longer appears, like the family, the caste, the sensuous egotism, as immediately belonging to the individual, but as something outside of himself which limits him, and, as his future life, has an internal relation to him, yet is essential to him and assigns to him the object of his activity. The Persian has as an object of conquest, other nations; the Egyptian, death; the Phœnician, the sea.

I. *Military Education.*

§ 196. That education which would emancipate a nation from the passivity of abstraction must throw it into the midst of an historical activity. A nation finds not its actual limits in its locality: it can forsake this and wander far away from it. Its true limit is made by another nation. The nation which knows itself to be actual, turns itself therefore against other nations in order to subject them and to reduce them to the condition of mere accidents of itself. It begins a system of conquest which has in itself no limitations, but goes from one nation to another, and extends its evil course indefinitely. The final result of this attack is that it finds itself attacked and conquered.

—The early history of the Persian is twofold: the patriarchal in the high valleys of Iran, and the religio-hierarchical among the Medes. We find under these circumstances a repetition of the principal characteristics of the Chinese, Indian, and Buddhist educations. In ancient Zend there were also castes. Among the Persians themselves, as they descended from their mountains to the conquest of other nations, there was properly only a military nobility. The priesthood was subjected to the royal power which repre-

sented the absolute power of actuality. Of the Persian kings, Cyrus attacked Western Asia; Cambyses, Africa; Darius and Xerxes, Europe; until the reaction of the spiritually higher nationality did not content itself with self-preservation, but under the Macedonian Alexander made the attack on Persia itself.—

§ 197. Education enjoined upon the Persians (1) to speak the truth; (2) to learn to ride and to use the bow and arrow. There is implied in the first command a recognition of actuality, the negation of all dreamy absorption, of all fantastical indetermination; and in this light the Persian, in distinction from the Hindoo, appears to be considerate and reasonable. In the second command is implied warlike practice, but not that of the nomadic tribes. The Persian fights on horseback, and thus appears in distinction from the Indian hermit seclusion and the quietism of the Lamas as restless and in constant motion.

—The Family increases in value as it rears a large number of warriors. Many children were a blessing. The king of Persia gave a premium for all children over a certain number. Nations were drawn in as nations by war; hence the immense multitude of a Persian army. Everything—family, business, possessions—must be regardlessly sacrificed to the one aim of war. Education, therefore, cultivated an unconditional, all-embracing obedience to the king, and the slightest inclination to assert an individual independence was high treason and was punished with death. In China, on the contrary, duty to the family is paramount to duty to the state, or rather is itself duty to the state. The civil officer who mourns the loss of one of his family is released during the period of mourning from the duties of his function.—

§ 198. The theoretical education, which was limited to reading, writing, and to instruction, was, in the usages of culture, in the hands of the Magians, the number of whom was estimated at eighty thousand, and who themselves had enjoyed the advantages of a careful education, as is shown by their gradation into Herbeds, Moheds, and Destur-Moheds; i.e. into apprentices, journeymen, and masters. The very fundamental idea of their religion was military; it demanded of men to fight on the side of the king of light, and guard against the

prince of darkness and evil. It gave to him thus the honor of a free position between the world-moving powers and the possibility of a self-creative destiny, by which means vigor and chivalrous feeling were developed. Religion trained the activity of man into actualization on this planet, increasing by its means the dominion of the good, by purifying the water, by planting trees, by extirpating troublesome wild beasts. Thus it increased bodily comfort, and no longer, like the monk, treated this as a mere negative.

II. *Priestly Education.*

§ 199. War has in death its force. It produces this, and by its means decides who shall serve and who obey. But the nation that finds its activity in war, though it makes death its absolute means, yet finds its own limit in death. Other nations are only its boundaries, which it can overpass in fighting with and conquering them. But death itself it can never escape, whether it come in the sands of the desert—which buried for Cambyses an army which he sent to the oracle of the Libyan Ammon—or in the sea, that scorns the rod of the angry despot, or by the sword of the freeman who guards his household gods. On this account, that people stands higher that in the midst of life reflects on death, or rather lives for it. The education of such a nation must be priestly because death is the means of the transition to the future life, and consequently equivalent to a new birth, and becomes a religious act. Neither the family-state, nor the caste-state, nor the monkish nor military-state, are hierarchies in the sense that the leading of the national life by a priesthood produces. But in Egypt this was actually the case, because the chief educational tribunal was the death-court which concerned only the dead, in awarding to them or denying them the honor of burial as the result of their whole life, but in its award affected also the honor of the surviving family.

§ 200. General education here limited itself to imparting the ability to read, write, and calculate. Special education consisted properly only in an habitual living into a definite business within the circle of the Family. In this fruitful and warm land the expense of supporting children was very small. The

division into classes was without the cruel features of the Indian civilization, and life itself in the narrow Nile valley was very social, very rich, very full of eating and drinking, while the familiarity with death heightened the force of enjoyment. In a stricter sense only, the warriors, the priests, and the kings, had, properly speaking, an education. The aim of life, which was to determine in death its eternal future, to secure for itself a passage into the still kingdom of Amenth, manifested itself externally in the care which they expended on the preservation of the dead shell of the immortal soul, and on this account worked itself out in building tombs which should last for ever. The Chinese builds a wall to secure his family-state from attack; the Hindoo builds pagodas for his gods; the Buddhist erects for himself monastic cells; the Persian constructs in Persepolis the tomb of his kings, where they may retire in the evening of their lives after they have rioted in Ecbatana, Babylon, and Susa; but the Egyptian builds his own tomb, and carries on war only to protect it.

III. *Industrial Education.*

§ 201. The system of active education was to find its solution in a nation which wandered from the coast of the Red Sea to the foot of the Lebanon mountains on the Mediterranean, and ventured forth upon the sea which before that time all nations had avoided as a dangerous and destructive element. The Phœnician was industrial, and needed markets where he could dispose of the products of his skill. But while he sought for them he disdained neither force nor deceit; he planted colonies; he stipulated that he should have in the cities of other nations a portion for himself; he urged the nations to adopt his pleasures, and insensibly introduced among them his culture and even his religion. The education of such a nation must have seemed profane, because it fostered indifference towards family and one's native land, and made the restless and passionate activity subservient to gain. The understanding and usefulness rose to a higher dignity.

§ 202. Of the education of the Phœnicians we know only so much as to enable us to conclude that it was certainly various and extensive: among the Carthaginians, at least, that

their children were practised in reading, writing, and arithmetic, in religious duties; secondly, in a trade; and, finally, in the use of arms, is not improbable. Commerce became with the Phœnicians a trade, the egotism of which makes men dare to plough the inhospitable sea, and to penetrate eagerly the horror of its vast distances, but yet to conceal from other nations their discoveries and to wrap them in a veil of fable.

—It is a beautiful testimony to the disposition of the Greeks, that Plato and others assign as a cause of the low state of Arithmetic and Mathematics among the Phœnicians and Egyptians the want of a free and disinterested seizing of them.—

THIRD GROUP.

THE SYSTEM OF INDIVIDUAL EDUCATION.

§ 203. One-sided passivity as well as one-sided activity is subsumed under Individuality, which makes itself into its own end and aim. The Phœnician made gain his aim; his activity was of a utilistic character. Individuality as a pedagogical principle is indeed egotistic in so far as it endeavors to achieve its own peculiarity, but it is at the same time noble. It desires not to *have* but to *be*. Individuality also begins as natural, but it elevates nature by means of art to ideality. The solution of beauty is found in culture, since this renounces the charm of appearance for the knowledge of the True. The æsthetic individuality is followed by the practical, which has indeed no natural basis, but proceeds from an artificial basis as a state formed for a place of refuge. In order internally to create a unity in this, is framed a definite code of laws; in order externally to assure it, the invincible warrior is demanded. Education is therefore, more exactly speaking, juristic and military practice. The morality of the state is loosened as it reduces into its mechanism one nation after another, until the individuality, become dæmonic, makes its war-hardened legions tremble with weakness. We characterize this individuality as dæmonic because it desires recognition simply for its own sake. Not for its beauty and culture, not for its knowledge of business and its bravery, only for its peculiarity as such does it claim value, and in the effort to secure this it is ready to hazard life itself.

In its naturally-growing existence this individuality is deep, but at the same time without self-limit. The nations educate themselves to this individuality when they destroy the world of Roman world—that of self-limit and balance—which they find.

I. *Æsthetic Education.*

§ 204. The system of individual education begins with the transfiguration of the immediate individuality into beauty. On the side of nature this system is passion, for individuality is given through nature; but on the side of spirit it is active, for spirit must determine itself to restrain its measure as the essence of beauty.

§ 205. Here the individual is of value only in so far as he is beautiful. At first beauty is apprehended as natural, but then it is carried over into the realm of spirit, and the Good is posited as identical with the Beautiful. The ideal of æsthetic education remains always that there shall be also an external unity of the Good with the Beautiful, of Spirit with Nature.

—We cannot here give in detail the history of Greek Education. It is the best known among us, and the literature in which it is worked out is very widely spread. Among the common abridged accounts we mention here only the works of Jacobs, of Cramer & Bekker's "Charinomos." We must content ourselves with mentioning the turning-points which follow from the nature of the principle.—

§ 206. Culture was in Greece thoroughly national. Education gave to the individual the consciousness that he was a Greek and no barbarian, a free man and so subject only to the laws of the state, and not to the caprice of any one person. Thus the nationality was freed at once from the abstract unity of the family and from the abstract distinction of caste, while it appeared with the manifold talents of individuals of different races. Thus the Dorian race held as essential, gymnastics; the Æolians, music; the Ionics, poetry. The Æolian individuality was subsumed in the history of the two others, so that these had to proceed in their development with an internal antagonism. The education of the Dorian race was national education in the fullest sense of the word; in it the education of all was the same, and was open to all, even

including the young women; among the Ionic race it was also in its content truly national, but in its form it was varied and unlike, and, for those belonging to various great families, private. The former, reproducing the Oriental phase of abstract unity, educated all in one mould; the latter was the nursery of particular individualities.

§ 207. (1) Education in the heroic age, without any systematic arrangement on the subject, left each one perfectly free. The people related the histories of the adventures of others, and through their own gave material to others again to relate stories of them.

—The Greeks began where the last stage of the active system of education ended—with piracy and the seizure of women. Swimming was a universal practice among the sea-dwelling Greeks, just as in England—the mistress of the ocean—rowing is the most prominent exercise among the young men, and public regattas are held.—

§ 208. (2) In the period of state-culture proper, education developed itself systematically; and gymnastics, music, and grammatics, or literary culture, constituted the general pedagogical elements.

§ 209. Gymnastics aimed not alone to render the body strong and agile, but, far more, to produce in it a noble carriage, a dignified and graceful manner of appearance. Each one fashioned his body into a living, divine statue, and in the public games the nation crowned the victor.

—Their love of beautiful boys is explicable not merely by their interest in beautiful forms, but especially by their interest in individuality. The low condition of the women could not lie at the foundation of it, for among the Spartans they were educated as nearly as possible like the men, and yet among them and the Cretans the love of boys was recognized in their legislation. To be without a beloved (*δίτης*), or a lover (*εἴσπνηλας*), was among them considered as disgraceful as the degradation of the love by unchastity was contemptible. What charm was there, then, in love? Manifestly only beauty and culture. But that a person should be attracted by one and not by another can be accounted for only by the peculiar character, and in so far the boy-love

and the man-friendship which sprang from it, among the Greeks, are very characteristic and noteworthy phenomena.—

§ 210. It was the task of Music, by its rhythm and measure, to fill the soul with well-proportioned harmony. So highly did the Greeks prize music, and so variously did they practise it, that to be a musical man meant the same with them as to be a cultivated man with us. Education in this respect was very painstaking, inasmuch as music exercises a very powerful influence in developing discreet behavior and self-possession into a graceful naturalness.

—Among the Greeks we find an unrestricted delight in nature—a listening to her manifestations, the tone of which betrays the subjectivity of things as subjectivity. In comparison with this tender sympathy with nature of the Greeks —who heard in the murmur of the fountains, in the dashing of the waves, in the rustling of the trees, and in the cry of animals, the voice of divine personality—the sight and hearing of the Eastern nations for nature is dull.—

§ 211. The stringed instrument, the cithern, was preferred by the Greeks to all wind instruments because it was not exciting, and allowed the accompaniment of recitation or song, i.e. the contemporaneous activity of the spirit in poetry. Flute-playing was first brought from Asia Minor after the victorius progress of the Persian war, and was especially cultivated in Thebes. They sought in vain afterwards to oppose the wild excitement raised by its influence.

§ 212. Grammar comprehended Letters (*γράμματα*), i.e. the elements of literary culture, reading and writing. Much attention was given to correct expression. The Fables of Æsop, the Iliad, and the Odyssey, and later the tragic poets, were read, and partly learned by heart. The orators borrowed from them often the ornament of their commonplace remarks.

§ 213. (3) The internal growth of what was peculiar to the Grecian State came to an end with the war for the Hegemony. Its dissolution began, and the philosophical period followed the political. The beautiful ethical life was resolved into thoughts of the True, Good, and Beautiful. Individuality turned more towards the internal, and undertook to subject freedom, the existing regulations, laws and customs, to the criticism of reason as to whether these were in and for them-

selves universal and necessary. The Sophists, as teachers of Grammar, Rhetoric, and Philosophy, undertook to extend the cultivation of Reflection; and this introduced instability in the place of the immediate fixed state of moral customs. Among the women, the *Hetæræ* undertook the same revolution; in the place of the πότνια μήτηρ appeared the beauty, who isolated herself in the consciousness of her charms and in the perfection of her varied culture, and exhibited herself to the public admiration. The tendency to idiosyncrasy often approached wilfulness, caprice and whimsicality, and opposition to the national moral sense. A Diogenes in a tub became possible; the soulless but graceful frivolity of an Alcibiades charmed, even though it was externally condemned; a Socrates completed the break in consciousness, and urged upon the system of the old morality the pregnant question, whether Virtue could be taught? Socrates worked as a philosopher who was to educate. Pythagoras had imposed upon his pupils the abstraction of a common, exactly-defined manner of living. Socrates, on the contrary, freed his disciples—in general, those who had intercourse with him—leading them to the consciousness of their own individuality. He revolutionized the youth in that he taught them, instead of a thoughtless obedience to moral customs, to seek to comprehend their purpose in the world, and to rule their actions according to it. Outwardly he conformed in politics, and in war as at Marathon; but in the direction of his teaching he was subjective and modern.

§ 214. This idea, that Virtue could be taught, was realized especially by Plato and Aristotle; the former inclining to Dorianism, the latter holding to the principle of individuality in nearly the modern sense. As regards the pedagogical means—Gymnastics, Music, and Grammar—both philosophers entirely agreed. But, in the seizing of the pedagogical development in general, Plato asserted that the education of the individual belonged to the state alone, because the individual was to act wholly in the state. On the other hand, Aristotle also holds that the state should conduct the education of its citizens, and that the individual should be trained for the interest of the state; but he recognizes also the family, and the peculiarity of the individual, as positive powers, to which

the state must accord relative freedom. Plato sacrificed the family to the state, and must therefore have sacred marriages, nurseries, and common and public educational institutions. Each one shall do only that which he is fitted to do, and shall work at this only for the sake of perfecting it: to what he shall direct his energies, and in what he shall be instructed, shall be determined by the government, and the individuality consequently is not left free. Aristotle also will have for all the citizens the same education, which shall be common and public; but he allows, at the same time, an independence to the family and self-determination to the individual, so that a sphere of private life presents itself within the state: a difference by means of which a much broader sway of individuality is possible.

—These two philosophers have come to represent two very different directions in Pedagogics, which at intervals, in certain stages of culture, reappear—the tyrannical guardianship of the state which assumes the work of education, tyrannical to the individual, and the free development of the liberal state-education, in opposition to idiosyncrasy and fate.

§ 215. The principle of æsthetic individuality reaches its highest manifestation when the individual, in the decay of public life, in the disappearance of all beautiful morality, isolates himself, and seeks to gain in his isolation such strength that he can bear the changes of external history around him with composure—"ataraxy." The Stoics sought to attain this end by turning their attention inward into pure internality, and thus, by preserving the self-determination of abstract thinking and willing, maintaining an identity with themselves: the Epicureans endeavored to do the same, with this difference however, that they strove after a positive satisfaction of the senses by filling them with concrete pleasurable sensations. As a consequence of this, the Stoics isolated themselves in order to maintain themselves in the exclusiveness of their internal unconditioned relation to themselves, while the Epicureans lived in companies, because they achieved the reality of their pleasure-seeking principle through harmony of feeling and through the sweetness of friendship. In so far the Epicureans were Greeks and the Stoics Romans. With both, however, the beauty of manifes-

tation was secondary to the immobility of the inner feeling. The plastic attainment of the Good and the Beautiful was cancelled in the abstraction of thinking and feeling. This was the advent of the Roman principle among the Greeks.

§ 216. The pedagogical significance of Stoicism and Epicureanism consists in this, that, after the moral life in public and in private were sundered from each other, the individual began to educate himself, through philosophical culture, into stability of character, for which reason the Roman emperors particularly disliked the Stoics. At many times, a resignation to the Stoic philosophy was sufficient to make one suspected. But, at last, the noble emperor, in order to win himself a hold in the chaos of things, was forced himself to become a Stoic and to flee to the inaccessible stillness of the self-thinking activity and the self-moving will. Stoics and Epicureans had both what we call an ideal. The Stoics used the expression "kingdom"; as Horace says, sarcastically, "*Sapiens rex est nisi—pituita molesta est.*"

II. *Practical Education.*

§ 217. The truth of the solution of the beautiful individuality is the promise of the activity conformable to its purpose [i.e. teleological activity], which on the one hand considers carefully end and means, and on the other hand seeks to realize the end through the corresponding means, and in this deed subjects mere beauty of form. The practical individuality is therefore externally conditioned, since it is not its own end like the Beautiful, whether Stoical or Epicurean, but has an end, and finds its satisfaction not so much in this after it is attained as in the striving for its attainment.

§ 218. The education of this system begins with very great simplicity. But after it has attained its object, it abandons itself to using the results of æsthetic culture as a recreation without any specific object. What was to the Greeks a real delight in the Beautiful became therefore with the Romans simply an æsthetic amusement, and as such must finally be wearisome. The earnestness of individuality made itself in mysticism into a new aim, which was distinguished from the original one in that it concealed in itself a mystery and exacted a theoretically æsthetic practice.

§ 219. (1) The first epoch of Roman education, as properly Roman, was the juristic-military education of the republic. The end and aim of the Roman was Rome; and Rome, as from the beginning an eclectic state, could endure only while its laws and external politics were conformable to some end. It bore the same contradiction within itself as in its external attitude. This forced it into robbery, and the plebeians were related to the patricians in the same way, for they robbed them gradually of all their privileges. On this account education directed itself partly to giving a knowledge of the Law, partly to communicating a capacity for war. The boys were obliged to commit to memory and recite the laws of the twelve tables, and all the youths were subject to military service. The Roman possessed no individuality of native growth, but one mediated through the intermingling of various fugitives, which developed a very great energy. Hence from the first he was attentive to himself, he watched jealously over the limits of his rights and the rights of others, measured his strength, moderated himself, and constantly guarded himself. In contrast with the careless cheerfulness of the Greeks, he therefore appears gloomy.

—The Latin tongue is crowded with expressions which paint presence of mind, effort at reflection, a critical attitude of mind, the importance of personal control: as *gravitas morum*, *sui compos esse*, *sibi constare*, *austeritas*, *vir strenuus*, *vir probus*, *vitam honestam gerere*, *sibimet ipse imperare*, &c. The Etruscan element imparted to this earnestness an especially solemn character. The Roman was no more, like the Greek, unembarrassed at naturalness. He was ashamed of nakedness; *verecundia*, *pudor*, were genuinely Roman. *Vitam præferre pudori* was shameful. On the contrary, the Greek gave to Greeks a festival in exhibiting the splendor of his naked body, and the inhabitants of Crotona erected a statue to Philip only because he was so perfectly beautiful. Simply to be beautiful, only beautiful, was enough for the Greek. But a Roman, in order to be recognized, must have done something for Rome: *se bene de republica mereri.*—

§ 220. In the first education of children the agency of the mother is especially influential, so that woman with the Romans took generally a more moral, a higher, and a freer

position. It is worthy of remark that while, as the beautiful, she set the Greeks at variance, among the Romans, through her ethical authority, she acted as reconciler.

§ 221. The mother of the Roman helped to form his character; the father undertook the work of instruction. When in his fifteenth year the boy exchanged the *toga prætextata* for the *toga virilis*, he was usually sent to some relative, or to some jurist, as his guardian, to learn thoroughly, under his guidance, of the laws and of the state; with the seventeenth began military service. All education was for a long time entirely a private affair. On account of the necessity of a mechanical unity in work which war demands, the greatest stress was laid upon obedience. In its restricted sense education comprised Reading, Writing, and Arithmetic; the last being, on account of its usefulness, more esteemed by the Romans than by the Greeks, who gave more time to Geometry. The schools, very characteristically, were called *Ludi*, because their work was, in distinction from other practice, regarded simply as a recreation, as play.

—The Roman recognized with pride this distinction between the Greek and himself; Cicero's Introduction to his Essay on Oratory expresses it. To be practical was always the effort of the reflective character of the Romans, which was always placing new ends and seeking the means for their attainment; which loved moderation, not to secure beauty thereby, but respected it as a means for a happy success (*medium tenuere beati*); which did not possess serene self-limitation, or σωφροσύνη, but calculation *quid valeant humeri, quid ferre recusent;* but which, in general, went far beyond the Greeks in persistency of will, in *constantia animi.* The schools were at first held publicly in shops; hence the name *trivium.* Very significant for the Roman is the predicate which he conferred upon theoretical subjects when he called them *artes bonæ, optimæ, liberales, ingenuæ,* &c., and brought forth the practical element in them.—

§ 222. (2) But the practical education could no longer keep its ground after it had become acquainted with the æsthetic. The conquest of Greece, Asia Minor, and Egypt, made necessary, in a practical point of view, the acquisition of the Grecian tongue, so that these lands, so permeated with Grecian

culture, might be thoroughly ruled. The Roman of family and property, therefore, took into his service Greek nurses and teachers who should give to his children, from their earliest years, Greek culture. It is, in the history of education, a great evil when a nation undertakes to teach a foreign tongue to its youth. Then the necessity of trade with the Greeks caused the study of Rhetoric, so that not only in the deliberations of the senate and people, but in law, the ends might be better attained. Whatever effort the Roman government made to prevent the invasion of the Greek rhetorician was all in vain. The Roman youth sought for this knowledge, which was so necessary to them in foreign lands, e.g. in the flourishing school of rhetoric on the island of Rhodes. At last, even the study of Philosophy commended itself to the practical Roman, in order that he might recover for himself confidence amid the disappointments of life. When his practical life did not bring him any result, he devoted himself in his poverty to abstract contemplation. The Greeks would have Philosophy for its own sake; the ataraxy of the Stoics, Epicureans, and Skeptics even, desired the result of a necessary principle; but the Roman, on the contrary, wished to lift himself by philosophemes above trouble and misfortune.

—This direction which Philosophy took is noteworthy, not alone in Cicero and Seneca, but at the fall of the Roman empire, when Boethius wrote in his prison his immortal work on the consolations of Philosophy.—

§ 223. The earnestness which sought a definite end degenerated in the very opposite of activity with him who had no definite aim. The idleness of the wealthy Roman, who felt himself to be the lord of a limitless world, devoted itself to dissipation and desire for enjoyment, which, in its entire want of moderation, abused nature. The finest form of the extant education was that in *belles-lettres*, which also for the first time came to belong to the sphere of Pedagogics. There had been a degeneration of art in India and Greece, and also an artistic trifling. But in Rome there arose a pursuit of art in order to win a certain consideration in social position, and to create for one's self a recreation in the emptiness of a soul satiated with sensual debauchery. Such a seizing of art is

frivolous, for it no longer recognizes its absoluteness, and subordinates it as a means to subjective egotism. Literary *salons* then appear.

—In the introduction to his *Cataline*, Sallust has painted excellently this complete revolution in the Roman education. The younger Pliny in his letters furnishes ample material to illustrate to us this pursuit of *belles-lettres*. In Nero it became idiotic. We should transgress our prescribed limits did we enter here into particulars. An analysis would show the perversion of the æsthetic into the practical, the æsthetic losing thereby its proper nature. But the Roman could not avoid this perversion, because, according to his original aim, he could not move except towards the *utile et honestum*.—

§ 224. (3) But this pursuit of fine art, this aimless parade, must at last weary the Roman. He sought for himself again an object to which he could vigorously devote himself. His sovereignty was assured, and conquest as an object could no more charm him. The national religion had fallen with the destruction of the national individuality. The soul looked out over its historical life into an empty void. It sought to establish a relation between itself and the next world by means of dæmonic forces, and in place of the depreciated nationality and its religion we find the eclecticism of the mystic society. There were, it is true, in national religions certain secret signs, rites, words, and meanings; but now, for the first time in the history of the world, there appeared mysteries as pedagogical societies, which concerned themselves only with private things and were indifferent to nationality. Everything was profaned by the roughness of violence. Man believed no longer in the old gods, and the superstitious faith in ghosts became only a thing fit to frighten children with. Thus man took refuge in secrecy, which had for his satiety a piquant charm.

§ 225. The education of the mysteries was twofold, theoretical and practical. In the theoretical we find a regular gradation of symbols and symbolical acts through which one seemed gradually to attain to the revelation of the secret; the practical contained a regular gradation of ascetic actions alternating with an abandonment to wild orgies. Both raised one from the rank of the novice to that of the initiated. In

the higher orders they formed an ethical code of laws, and this form Pedagogics has retained in all such secret culture, *mutatis mutandis*, down to the Illuminati.

—In the Roman empire, its Persian element was the worship of Mithras; its Egyptian, that of Isis; its Grecian, the Pythagorean doctrines. All these three, however, were much mingled with each other. The Roman legions, who really no longer had any native country, bore these artificial religions throughout the whole world. The confusion of excitement led often to Somnambulism, which was not yet understood, and to belief in miracles. Apollonius of Tyana, the messiah of Ethnicism, is the principal figure in this group; and, in comparison with him, Jamblichus appears only as an enthusiast and Alexander of Abonoteichos as an impostor.

III. *Abstract Individual Education.*

§ 226. What the despair of the declining nations sought for in these mysteries was Individuality, which in its singularity is conscious of the universality of the rational spirit as its own essence. This individuality existed more immediately in the Germanic race, which nevertheless, on account of its nature, formed first in Christianity its true actualization. It can be here only pointed out that they most thoroughly, in opposition to nature, to men, and to the gods, felt themselves to be independent; as Tacitus says, "*Securi adversus homines, securi adversus Deos.*" This individuality, which had only itself for an end, must necessarily be destroyed, and was saved only by Christianity, which overcame and enlightened its dæmonic and defiant spirit. We cannot speak here of a system of Education. Respect for personality, the free acknowledgment of the claims of woman, the loyalty to the leader chosen by themselves, loyalty to their friends (the idea of fellowship),—these features should all be well-noted, because from them arose the feudalism of the middle ages. What Cæsar and Tacitus tell us of the education of the Germans expresses only the emancipation of individuality, which in its immediate crudeness had no other form in which to manifest itself than wars of conquest.

—To the Roman there was something dæmonic in the German. He perceived dimly in him his future, his mas-

ter. When the Romans were to meet the Cimbri and Teutons in the field, their commander had first to accustom them for a whole day to the fearful sight of the wild, giant-like forms.

LUDWIG TIECK ON RAPHAEL'S MADONNA SISTINA.

By C. L. Bernays.

So much that is disparaging has been said about the "*Ueberschwänglichkeit*" ["gushing" nature] of the German Romantic authors such as Tieck, Hölderlin, Schlegel and the Stolbergs, and that singular intoxication of their minds, which at the least touch of reality turned into an almost equally singular state of insipidity, has been so much harped upon that it seems to be a hazardous enterprise to vindicate certain very great merits of that school of literary men. It is not my purpose to do, in this respect, for the American public, what has been performed in Germany by many prominent authors of this epoch,—not only for want of time, but because, even if I should succeed in convincing my readers of the great value to the development of the German mind which their half mystical and half thoughtful, half ponderous and half petulant discriminations of every human sentiment undeniably had, it would scarcely have any observable influence upon the culture of this nation.

We are moving here on such an entirely different road, that I cannot see what might be gained if Americans knew that these Romantics were the first to bring Shakspeare to the consciousness of the German world; that they understood Albrecht Dürer and Raphael better than even the Classics who preceded them, and that it was they who found the source of every artistic creation in the devotion of the human heart.

My purpose is much narrower, and attaches itself rather to a practical object. Raphael's Madonna Sistina nowadays is almost a household picture in every cultured American family. And yet, although its wonderful outlines and graceful features most naturally delight every sensitive heart, to explain the motives for the different directions in which the three

principal figures are looking, has puzzled not only ordinary close observers, but even almost every professional art-critic. It was again one of these German Romantics, of whom it was scornfully said that they never look anything in its face, but prefer the discovery of what may be behind it,—who, in the most unassuming way, explained the seeming secret of that admirable picture. It was Ludwig Tieck, who as a young man stood before that picture in the Dresden gallery, and spoke of it in the following terms:

"We were standing in front of Raphael's so-called Madonna Sistina. It is difficult to say anything adequate of so eternal and perfect a creation; the more difficult because enthusiastic admirers and searching connoisseurs have dwelt on it often and with great minuteness.

"All agree that none of Raphael's pictures were painted with so thin colors, and that none were less elaborate. As it probably was very rapidly finished, it assumed almost the character of a fresco. Should we fix its rank, it stands, perhaps, in advance of all other works of this greatest of painters in simplicity and sublimity. It occurs to me that this sublime conception did not admit of the elaborateness bestowed on many other master-pieces, for this picture has the effect of a holy apparition. It is a pity that it was framed so negligently; for almost a hand's breadth of the upper part was bent inward, whereby the green curtain and upper light space are shortened. By adding in thought that missing portion of the picture, the whole figure of the Virgin appears to float downward, and is more distinct and more lovely than the figures of Sixtus and Santa Barbara. The vision of the three saints descends into the church. It appears above the altar, and the Virgin, with a serious-looking child in her arms, at the same time moves forward in her descent. This twofold movement explains the floating of the veil and the backward tendency of her blue garment. The transfigured pope, fervently praying, has been from the first in a kneeling position. Santa Barbara stands near the Virgin, blinded, however, by her majesty and almost frightened by the penetrating and thoughtful eyes of the Child. She sinks on her knees and turns away her face. Raphael enjoyed this combination of former and later movements; it is found in almost all his

pictures, and no one ever reached him in the art of carrying true life and spirit into his positions and groups.

"The angels, as heralds, have arrived earlier on the ground, and lean down on the altar as if taking rest. Ingenuously and with childlike sincerity they await the arrival of the saints, and the transparent frankness of childhood contrasts beautifully with the countenance of Christ and the severe earnestness of his eyes. I never could understand the remark of assuming critics who have found something worldly, or even coquettish, in the figure of Barbara. Others imagine that the picture would be still nobler if the Virgin appeared without any company. To very many, who yet love to speak about such things, completeness is a book with seven seals; and it is so, precisely for the reason that it is complete. The majority of men delight only in single features. Whenever in art or poetry something mighty and beautiful is offered to them, they at once endeavor to tear the work to pieces in order to assimilate to themselves this or that, either with coolness or with fervor. The cool ones are the so-called connoisseurs. They very often admire this or that accidental feature with such a flippancy that one becomes inclined to question whether it would not be better that no art and no poetry should confuse this world. The fervid ones sometimes screw themselves up into a passion in order to isolate with the greatest distinctness something really beautiful, which in fact forms an integral part of a work of art. And yet this part deserves their praise, and is reasonable only in case it be explained from the intrinsic nature and the totality of such a work, through which only a work of art deserves that name. Usually, neither the zealots nor the cautious and discreet critics have any understanding. This belief in completeness they condemn as downright superstition; they can admire a work only when they discover an incomplete similitude with that invisible, unintelligible and undetermined Ideal which in a foggy chaos hovers before them.

"It is remarkable how often extremes meet. This Madonna of Raphael should, perhaps, never have been copied; and yet no other picture has ever been drawn so often, or by less capable draughtsmen. The best of them has not had the spiritual eye which would enable him to reproduce the real

figure of the Virgin. Probably the creating master himself would never have succeeded in copying it. Some oil paintings representing only the whole figure of the Virgin have proved the worst. I know some painters who have succeeded in making of this sublime figure only something impudent and vulgar."

LEIBNITZ'S THEODICY.

Abridgment of the Controversy Reduced to Formal Arguments.

Translated from the French of G. W. LEIBNITZ, by A. E. KROEGER.

[In connection with the following article of Leibnitz, it may be serviceable to the reader to restate the various points made by Leibnitz in the articles heretofore published from his writings. They are as follows:

1. That the mechanical view of nature, or that view which looks upon all things as merely things in space, or as extended matter, is not sufficient to explain anything; and that, hence, the conception of a metaphysical something else, which is not extended, and which we may call force, must be added to that view.

2. That the insufficiency of explaining by the purely mechanical view arises from this, that every atom is again infinitely divisible, and hence offers no true unities from which alone multiplicity can be explained. Hence along with extended—infinitely divisible—matter we must assume unextended—indivisible—formal atoms, or forces, or entelechies, or souls, or monads, each one whereof is free; and thus, accompanied by or embodied in extended matter, gives to it, the passive, activity: sensation and desire.

3. That, however, we must not account for the phenomena of matter (of the non-Ego) from the conception of the monad (the Ego), but must view material nature altogether empirically, and from the conception of the Ego must derive merely general principles—meaning the universal categories and contemplations under which the empirically perceived phenomena of nature are then to be classified.

4. That the conceptions of beginning and end, birth and death, cannot be applied to the monads or souls, nay, not even to their organic machinery or bodies, since those conceptions furnish no explanation, but postulate miracles; that hence these souls and bodies are perennial and immortal, and that this permanency cannot be a metempsychosis or translation, but only a transformation or augmentation.

5. That the way in which the souls or monads operate upon their material bodies, and thus upon each other, cannot be explained by the category of cause and effect—since that category applies only to the material world—and can be solved only by positing it as an *absolute* mode of operation, or as a pre-established harmony.

6. That, amongst all the monads or souls, there is one class of a superior or moral order, for whose sake "everything else is made," their absolute (moral) activity having indeed an immediate causality over the whole world of nature,

the very changes of that world being so regulated as "to correspond with the felicity of the good and the punishment of the bad."

7. That it is this pre-established harmony between souls and bodies, and the moral and the physical universe, which, or the source of which, we call God.—*Tr.*]

Several intelligent persons have expressed a wish that I should make this supplement to my *Theodicy*, and I have been all the more inclined to follow their advice, as I thus get occasion to remove some other difficulties and to make some remarks on subjects that have not been sufficiently elaborated in that work.

OBJECTION FIRST.

Major—Whoever does not choose the best, lacks either power, or knowledge, or goodness.

Minor—God did not choose the best in creating this world.

Conclusion—Hence God lacks either power, or knowledge, or goodness.

ANSWER.

I deny the minor of this syllogism; and my adversary proves it by the following prosyllogism: "Whoever creates things with evil that could have been created without evil, or that need not have been created at all, does not make the best choice. But God has created a world wherein there is evil, and which might have been created without evil, or not created at all. Hence God has not made the best choice." To this prosyllogism I reply as follows: I concede the minor of it, for we must acknowledge that there is evil in the world which God has made, and that it would have been possible to create a world without evil, or not to create a world at all, since its creation depends upon the free will of God. But I deny the major, and I might content myself with asking for its proof; but, in order to clear the matter up better, I have concluded to support my denial of it by remarking, that the best way is not always that which tends to avoid the evil, since the evil might be accompanied by a greater deal of good. For instance: the general of an army will love a great victory with a slight wound more than no wound at all and no victory. I have established this more clearly in my work by showing, even in instances taken from mathematics and other sciences, that an imperfection in a part may be required for the greater perfection of the whole. In this I

have followed the opinion of St. Augustine, who has said a hundred times that God has permitted the existence of evil in order to draw from it a good—that is to say, a greater good—and the opinion of Thomas d'Aquinas, that the permission of evil tends to the good of the universe. I have also shown that the ancients called the fall of Adam *felix culpa* (a happy fall), since it was repaired by an immense advantage, the incarnation of the Son of God, which has given to the universe something more noble than all there would otherwise have been amongst the creatures without it. And for the sake of still greater light I have added, that, according to various good authors, it belonged to order and the general welfare that God should leave to certain creatures opportunity to exercise their freedom, even when He might foresee that they might turn it to evil—which He, however, could so easily redress—since it would not be proper that, in order to prevent sin, God should always act in an extraordinary manner. To overcome the above objection it is, therefore, sufficient to show that a world with evil may be better than a world without evil; but in my *Theodicy* I have gone still further, and shown that such a universe must be effectively better than any other possible universe.

OBJECTION SECOND.

Major—If there is more of evil than of good in intelligent beings, then there is more of evil than of good in God's whole creation.

Minor—But there is more of evil than of good in intelligent beings.

Conclusion—Hence there is more of evil than of good in God's whole creation.

ANSWER.

I deny the major and the minor of this conditional syllogism. As for the major, I do not concede it, because this pretended conclusion from a part as to the whole, from intelligent creatures to all creatures, presupposes tacitly and without proof that the creatures which are destitute of reason cannot enter into comparison and be placed on the same line with those which have reason. But why might it not be that the surplus of good amongst the non-intelligent creatures that fill the world recompenses and outweighs,

perhaps incomparably, the surplus of evil amongst the rational creatures? It is true that the value of the latter is greater, but, on the other hand, the former are much more numerous in comparison; and it is quite possible that the proportion of number and of quantity surpasses that of value and of quality.

As for the minor I deny it no less; that is, I deny that there is more evil than good amongst rational beings. I do not even need to concede that there is more evil than good in the human race, since it may be—and it is quite reasonable—that the glory and perfection of the Blessed is incomparably greater than the misery and imperfection of the Damned, and that thus the excellence of the total good in the smaller number surpasses the misery of the total evil in the greater number. The Blessed approach the Deity, by means of the Divine Mediator, as much as any of His creatures can do, and make a progress in this good which it is impossible that the Damned can make in evil, however close they approximate to the character of demons. *God is infinite, but the demon is limited; the Good can extend infinitely, but the evil has its limits.* It is possible, therefore, and to be believed, that in comparing the Blessed and the Damned the very reverse may happen of what we have said might chance in comparing the rational and the non-rational creatures; that is, it might chance, in comparing the happy and the unhappy, that the proportion of the degrees surpasses that of the number; and that in the comparison of the intelligent and the non-intelligent creatures the proportion of numbers surpasses that of the value.* I am justified in supposing that a thing might be, so long as it has not been proved to be impossible; however, what I have advanced here is more than a supposition.

But, in the second place, even if I should consider that there is more of evil than of good in the human race, I still have every reason to not concede that there is more of evil

* No attentive reader can fail to notice here the intimate relation between the philosophical and the mathematical theories of Leibnitz; and how the former necessarily arose—as Leibnitz himself frequently states—from the latter. The discovery of the Differential Calculus was the discovery of the Monadology.—*Note by Translator.*

than of good in all intelligent creatures. For there is an inconceivable number of *genii*, perhaps even of other rational creatures; and no adversary can prove to me that in the whole City of God, composed of so many spirits, as well as of numberless rational animals and an infinity of species, the evil overbalances the good. Moreover—although it is not necessary to answer an objection in order to prove that something is, when the simple possibility of its being suffices to overthrow that objection—I have taken pains to prove in this work, that the supreme perfection of the Sovereign of the Universe involves that the kingdom of God should be the most perfect of all possible kingdoms or governments, and that hence the little evil there is in it must be requisite for the overwhelming immensity of good it contains.

OBJECTION THIRD.

Major—If it is impossible always to avoid sinning, it is unjust always to punish.

Minor—But it is impossible always to avoid sinning, or, in other words, sinning is necessary.

Conclusion—Hence it is unjust always to punish.

The minor is proved by this prosyllogism:

Major—Everything that is predetermined is necessary.

Minor—Every event (hence also sinning) is necessary.

Conclusion—Every event (hence also sinning) is predetermined.

The minor of this prosyllogism is again proved thus:

Major—Everything that is of the future, that is foreseen, that which is contained in causes, is predetermined.

Minor—Every event is of that character.

Conclusion—Every event is predetermined.

ANSWER.

I concede in a certain sense the conclusion of the second prosyllogism, which is the minor of the first, namely, that every event is predetermined; but I deny the major of the first prosyllogism, which states that "everything that is predetermined is necessary"; understanding by the *necessity* to sin, for instance, or the impossibility not to sin, or to refrain from all action, that necessity whereof we speak here, namely, a necessity which is essential and absolute,

destroying the morality of an act and the justice of its punishment. For should anyone interpret it to mean any other kind of necessity or impossibility, that is, simply a moral or hypothetical necessity—which I shall explain directly—it is evident that I would deny also the major of the objection.

I might have contented myself with this answer and with a demand for the proof of that which I have denied; but I have desired to give also a reason for my opinion as expressed in this *Theodicy*—so as to throw more light on the matter—by explaining the necessity, which must be rejected, and the determination, which must be conceded to occur. This reason is as follows: that necessity, which is contrary to morality and must be denied, and which would make punishment unjust, is an unsurmountable necessity, a necessity which would render all opposition useless though we should try with all our heart to avoid such a necessary action and should make all possible efforts to avoid it. Now it is clear that this necessity is not applicable to voluntary action, since our actions would not be voluntary unless we chose to act. Thus their prevision and predetermination is not absolute, but presupposes a free will; if it is sure that we will do them, it is no less sure that we choose to do them. These voluntary actions and their consequences cannot occur whatever we do or will, unless we do and choose to do that which leads to them. This, indeed, is involved in their prevision and predetermination and constitutes their ground. Now this necessity of free action is called hypothetical condition or necessity, since it presupposes free will and all other requisites; whereas the necessity which cancels morality, and makes punishment unjust as well as rewards useless, is a necessity of things which will make them occur no matter what we do or wish to do. In one word, it is an essential necessity, or what we term an absolute necessity. Thus it serves nothing to plead extenuations or commandments in regard to that which is absolutely necessary; penalties or rewards, praise or blame, will be of no avail; whereas in voluntary actions and their results, precepts, endowed with the power to punish or reward, are often of service, and belong to the order of causes which bring the action into existence. It is for this reason that not only endeavors and efforts

but even prayers are of use, since God took these prayers into consideration before he ordered things, and paid that attention to them which was needful; and that the precept which says *ora et labora*—pray and work—holds good altogether. Hence not only those who pretend—under the vain pretext of a necessity of events—that we may neglect the cares which events demand, but even those who argue against prayers, fall into what the ancients called the Sophisms of Laziness; and the predeterminations of events, instead of destroying morality, rather contribute to it, the causes inclining the free-will without necessitating it. Thus it happens that the determination under discussion is not a necessitating. It is certain—to Him who knows all—that the effect will follow this inclination of the free-will, but the effect will not so follow by a necessary consequence, that is, by a conquence the contrary whereof would imply contradiction; and it is always by such an internal inclination that the free-will determines itself without there being any necessity in the matter. Supposing some one to have the greatest suffering in the world—say, a great thirst—and you will concede that the soul can find some reason to resist it, if it were only to show its power. Thus, although we are never in a state of perfect indifference or equilibrium, and have always a prevailing inclination for that action which we determine to do, this inclination never renders the resolution we determine upon absolutely necessary.

OBJECTION FOURTH.

Major—Whoever can prevent the sin of another and does not do so, but rather contributes to it though well cognizant of it, is an accomplice of such sin.

Minor—God can prevent the sin of intelligent creatures, but does not do so, and rather contributes to it by permitting it and by the occasions which he causes to arise, although he is well cognizant of it.

Conclusion—Hence God is, &c.

ANSWER.

I deny the major of this syllogism. For it might be that one could prevent a sin, but ought not to prevent it, because one could not do it without committing a sin one's self, or—when God is in question—without doing an unreasonable

action. I have set forth in my work instances and have applied them even to God himself. It might likewise happen that one abetted evil, and even sometimes opened the door to it, in doing things which one ought to do. But in doing things which one ought to do, or—speaking of God—doing that which, rightly considered, reason demands, one is not responsible for the results, even though one should foresee them. One does not desire these evil results, but simply lets them pass for the sake of a greater good which one could not reasonably refuse to prefer to other considerations. Hence this is a *consequent* will resulting from an antecedent will, whereby we will the good. I know that some persons, speaking of the antecedent and consequent will of God, have understood the former to mean God's will that all men should be saved; and the latter, that, in consequence of lasting sin, there should be some damned. But these are only illustrations of a more general notion, and we may on the same principle say, that God, by His antecedent will, wills that men should not sin, and by His consequent or final and imperative will—which is always followed by its effect—He wills to give permission to them to sin, the permission being a consequence of superior reasons. Indeed, one might say generally, that the antecedent will of God tends towards the production of good and prevention of evil, each taken in itself and, as it were, detached from the other—*particulariter et secundum quid**—according to the measure of the degree of each good or evil occurrence; but that the consequent, or final or total will of God tends to the production of as many good events and things as can be put together, the combination whereof thus becomes determined, and comprehends the permission of such evils and the conclusions of such good as the plan of the best world may require. Arminius in his *Antiperkinsus* has very nicely explained, that the will of God may be termed consequent not only in regard to the action of the creature considered beforehand in the divine understanding, but moreover in regard to other anterior divine desires. It is, however, sufficient to consider the above passage from Thomas Aquinas and that of Scotus,† in order to be

* Thomas I., qu. 19, : r 6.

† Scotus 1, dist. 46, qu. XI.

convinced that they regard this distinction just as I have presented it here. Still, if any one object to this usage of the terms chosen, let him substitute deliberating will in place of antecedent will, and final or decreeing will in place of consequent will. For I do not wish to dispute about words.

OBJECTION FIFTH.

Major—Whoever produces all that which is real in a matter is the cause of that matter.

Minor—God produces all that which there is of real in sin.

Conclusion—Hence God is the cause of sin.

ANSWER.

I might content myself with denying the major or the minor, since the term *real* has interpretations which might render these premises false; but, in order to explain myself better, I shall make the distinctions. "Real" signifies either simply that which is positive or absolute; or it comprehends, furthermore, that which is particular or limited. In the first case, I deny the major and concede the minor; in the second, I concede the major and deny the minor. I might rest the matter here, but I am quite willing to go further and give the grounds for this distinction. Hence it gives me great pleasure to call attention to this, that all purely positive or absolute reality is a perfection; and that imperfection arises from limitation or particularity; for to limit is to refuse progress and object to any going beyond. Now God is the cause of all perfections, and hence of all realities, when we consider them as purely absolute. But the limitations or privations result from the imperfection of the creatures, whereby their receptivity is limited. It is just as in the case of a loaded boat, which the river causes to move more or less slowly according as it is more or less freighted. Its celerity comes from the river, but the retardation which limits this celerity comes from the cargo. Hence I have shown in my *Theodicy* how the creature, by causing sin, is a defective being; how errors and evil inclinations arise from privation; and how privation is efficient by accident. Hence I have also defended the opinion of St. Augustine,* who explains, for instance, how God hardens the hearts of the wicked, not by inculcating anything bad

* Lib. I. ad Simpl. q. 2.

in the soul, but because the effect of His limited impression is limited by the resistance of the soul and by the circumstances that contribute to this resistance; thus not giving, as it were, to the soul all the good which would be necessary to overcome its evil. He says: *Nec ab illo erogatur aliquid quo homo fit deterior, sed tantum quo fit melior non erogatur.* But if God had wanted to do more He would have had to make either other natures for His creatures, or other miracles to change their natures, which His best plan of a world could not admit of. It is as if the current of a river must be more rapid than its fall permitted; or the boats less loaded, if it were requisite to make these boats float with greater rapidity. Now the original limitation or imperfection of the created beings requires that the best plan of a universe cannot be exempt from certain evils, which, however, turn to great good in that world. These are, so to speak, certain disorders in the parts which marvellously relieve the beauty of the whole, just as certain dissonances, when correctly employed, make the harmony more beautiful. But all this is connected with what has already been advanced in answer to the first objection.

OBJECTION SIXTH.

Major—Whoever punishes those that have done as well as it was in their power to do is unjust.
Minor—God so punishes.
Conclusion—Hence God is unjust.

ANSWER.

I deny the minor of this argument. I believe that God always extends that aid and grace which suffices those who have a good will, that is, who do not reject His grace by a new sin. Thus I do not acknowledge the damnation of children who have died without baptism, or out of the Church; nor the damnation of adults who have acted according to the light given them by God. Nay, I believe that if anyone follows the light given to him, he will indubitably receive greater light, such as he needs, as the late Mr. Hulseman, a celebrated and profound theologian of Leipzig, has somewhere remarked; and if such a man has stood in want of it during his life-time, he will receive it at least on his death-bed.

OBJECTION SEVENTH.

Major—Whoever gives only to some, and not to all, the means which produces in them effectively a good will and salutary final faith, has not enough goodness.

Minor—God does so.

Conclusion—Hence God has not enough goodness.

ANSWER.

I deny the major. It is true that God might overcome the greatest resistance of the human heart, and He does so sometimes, be it by internal grace or by external circumstances that have a great effect upon the soul; but He does not do so at all times. Whence comes this distinction, some one might ask, and why does His goodness seem limited? It is because, as I have already remarked in my answer to the first objection, it would not be in order to act always extraordinarily and to reverse the connection of things. The reasons for this connection, whereby one man is placed in more favorable circumstances than the other one is, are concealed in the profundity of God's wisdom; they depend upon the universal harmony. The best plan of the universe, which God could not fail to choose, involved it. We judge from the event itself: because God made it, it was impossible to do better. Far from such conduct being contrary to goodness, it is His supreme goodness which led Him to do it. This objection with its solution might have been referred to what has been said on the subject of the first objection, but it seemed advisable to allude to it separately.

OBJECTION EIGHTH.

Major—Whoever cannot do otherwise than choose the best is not free.

Minor—God cannot do otherwise than choose the best.

Conclusion—Hence God is not free.

ANSWER.

I deny the major of this argument. On the contrary, it is true and most perfect freedom to be able to use one's free will for the best, and to use it always thus, without being deterred by external forces or internal passions, whereof the one makes us slaves of the body and the other slaves of the soul. There is nothing that is less servile than to be always

led towards the good, and always by one's own inclination and without any displeasure. To say that God must, therefore, have had need of external things is simply a sophism. He created them freely; but having proposed to Himself an end, which is to exercise His goodness, His wisdom determined Him to choose the means most proper to attain this end. To call this a *need* is to take that word in an unusual sense which purges it of all imperfection, somewhat as when we speak of God's wrath.

Seneca says somewhere, that God commanded only once, and ever after obeys, since He obeys the laws He prescribed unto Himself—*semel jussit, semper paret.* But he would have expressed himself better had he said, that God commands always, and is always obeyed; for in willing He always follows the inclination of His own nature; and all the rest of things always follow His will; and this will being always the same, we ought not to say that He obeys only the will He had at first.

Nevertheless, although His will is always immaculate and always tends towards the best, the evil, or the lesser good, which He checks, does not cease to be possible in itself; otherwise the necessity of the good would be a geometrical necessity, so to speak, or a metaphysical necessity, and altogether absolute; the contingency of things would be annihilated and there would be no choice. But the sort of necessity spoken of here, which does not do away with the possibility of the contrary, is called necessity only by analogy, and becomes effective, not by the mere essence of things, but by what is outside of or above them, namely, the will of God. We call this necessity moral necessity, since the sage considers necessity and what *ought* to be equivalent things; and when it is always accompanied by its effect as it is veritably in the perfect sage—that is, God—it may be said that it is a blessed necessity. The nearer created beings approach it, the nearer they approach perfect felicity. Hence this kind of a necessity is not one we try to avoid, or which destroys morality, reward, and praise. For that which it involves happens not whatever we may do or will, but simply because we will it well; and a will, the nature of which it is to choose well, merits, above all, to be

praised; hence it carries its own recompense with it, which is sovereign happiness. And as this constitution of the Divine Nature gives entire satisfaction to him who possesses it, it is the best and most desirable for all creatures that depend upon God. If the will of God had not the principle of the best for its rule, it would tend towards evil, which would be the worst, or it would be in some way indifferent to the good and the evil, and be guided by chance; but a will which allowed itself to be guided by chance would not be worth more for the government of the universe than the fortuitous concourse of atoms without the existence of any divinity at all.—Nay, even if God should not abandon Himself to chance in some cases—as He certainly would do if He did not always choose the best, and if he were capable of preferring a less good to a greater good (that is, an evil to a good, since that which prevents a greater good is an evil)—He would still be imperfect as well as the object of His choice. He would not deserve entire confidence. He would act, in such a case, without reason, and the government of the universe would be like some games: balancing between reason and fortune. All this tends to show that this last objection raised against the choice of the best perverts all conceptions of the free and the necessary, and represents even the best to us to be bad: to do which is either malicious or ridiculous.

OLD AND NEW SYSTEMS OF LOGIC.

Comparison of the English Conservative and Hegelian Methods as developed in Bowen's Logic and Everett's Science of Thought.

By F. P. Stearns.

There is no word which we hear more frequently than "logic"; we are told every day by lawyers, politicians, and the newspapers, what is logical and what is not; yet to tell us exactly what logic itself is would puzzle many a skilful manufacturer of arguments. There are not a few indeed who have been applied to lately, men who possess considerable scholarship, and yet were unable to supply the information required. One might have begun to suspect that the power

of defining logic was among the lost arts, had not the recent publication of a book, called "The Science of Thought," by Rev. C. C. Everett, arrived to convince us of the contrary. This octavo volume has now been before the public for about three years, and as yet only one edition of it has been sold; —a discouraging fact, when we consider its great value to American literature, and to the science of the world. Evidently, like many other works of art, it must wait its time for due appreciation. One alone, whose extensive scholarship and deep philosophical penetration ought to give weight to his opinion, declares it to be the most important work of its kind in English since the time of Bacon and his "Novum Organum." This is certainly a startling announcement. The development of modern science with all its wonderful results can be traced, it is said, directly back to Bacon's exposition of the inductive method of reasoning. Leibnitz, Newton, Herschel, and others, deserve credit for what each specially did, but it was Bacon who first pointed out the way for them to work in. When we consider the immense importance which modern science has for us—how, for instance, we depend upon it for our commercial prosperity—we may begin to measure the value of a theory, if only that theory be a true one. It would be hazardous to prophesy that Mr. Everett's theories were also to produce such remarkable effects. History does not usually repeat itself in that way. But that he has also, like Bacon, been instrumental in bringing somewhat out of darkness into daylight, I venture to say, will one day be admitted.

Take, to commence with, his definition of logic, which is also the title to his book—"the science of thought." What light that throws upon the subject at once! The indistinct impressions of those who have so long used the word without knowing what it meant, must now be cleared up. Statements are logical which are made according to those laws which govern the correct use of our minds; and the illogical is what results from mental perversion. Notice how this widens our horizon. The old theory was that logic had only to do with the truth or falsehood of arguments, but here we have it extended over every department of human activity; for there is nothing done but what mind directs the doing of it; and

to be done well and wisely, it must be done logically too. The most practical arts, and most abstract sciences as well, are then in direct dependence upon this new system of reasoning, which indeed has long been in use with the best reasoners, such as Shakespeare for instance, but for want of explanation has remained even to philosophers unknown.

From the time of Aristotle to the opening of the present century, logic had remained almost entirely unprogressive. What is now taught in the schools of England and America is Aristotle's theory of logic, invented by him twenty-two centuries ago, at a historic period of great intellectual brilliancy indeed, but at the same time one almost destitute of science and scholarship. Fortunately few ever undertake to use it in practice. During the middle ages, when people did use it, the result was such an enormous mass of tangled and twisted discussions, as modern times only look at to laugh over. To the great German Hegel belongs the honor of taking up again the thread where Aristotle had let it fall. He was the inventor, and Mr. Everett now the translator, although not without considerable invention, too, of his own. What Hegel in his effort for discovery stated in so difficult and obscure a manner that even in Germany his name has become a symbol for perplexity, Mr. Everett has been so fortunate as to explain in a style so clear and intelligible as English prose has rarely seen before. Schopenhauer and Stuart Mill have also stood behind Mr. Everett's work to a slight extent, but, for all that, there is such value in the superior form of his statement that we must still consider the entire book in the light of an original production.

To explain this new system of reasoning satisfactorily would require hardly less space than Mr. Everett himself has given to it. Where a subject is so vast as the domain of thought, it is not to be described or even more than hinted at in any such sketch as the present. If one or two principal points are seized upon and put forward in a clear light, something however will be gained, and public attention, it is to be hoped, attracted in the right direction.

One such point we find in the statement that logic is not and never can be an exact science. As far as Truth extends its path into the region of the unknown, Logic must march

with her, and be at the same time both guide and follower. As fast as human thought improves, the science of thought will have a chance to improve with it, in the same way that chemistry must be ready at any moment to accept the discovery of a new element or chemical principle. This is in direct contradiction of the old doctrine which teaches that logic is only concerned with the *form* of thought, not with *thought itself*, and therefore to be contained in certain rigid formulas, the complete mastery of which would enable the student to reason correctly under all circumstances. Instead of doing so, however, it rather tends to make him dogmatic and sophistical. The difference is like that between a progressive and a stationary civilization. Then, since the progress to be real must be unlimited, we feel ourselves enabled, with the prospect before us, not only of making infinite new discoveries, but infinite improvement of the means of discovery. The deficiencies of the old system in this respect are just what inclined Bacon to throw it aside altogether and adopt a new method of his own. In his day it stood in the way of physical science, but now with us in the way of metaphysical — although, what at first sight seems rather strange, not so much so as that very method which Bacon's genius established.

The most important difference however, the precise point where Hegel and Everett leave all predecessors behind them, is in this treatment of the syllogism. Every one is familiar with the old Aristotelic syllogism, its major premise, minor premise, and conclusion. One quite common example in the schools is—

> "No person deserving respect is a boaster; but
> Some heroes are boasters; and, therefore,
> Some heroes do not deserve respect."

By means of an A B C formula this was changed into four different figures, all of them amounting to pretty much the same thing, as, for instance, "No boaster deserves respect," in place of "No person deserving respect is a boaster." Each particular argument which came into the mind, or issued from the lips of man, was to be reduced to this form, and its truth or falsehood decided by simply ascertaining whether the minor premise was really included by the major or not. To make this reduction correctly, however, it was necessary

to use a contrivance of five Latin verses to assist the memory, a contrivance which Mr. DeMorgan, an English logician of the old school, has named "the magic words more full of meaning than any that were ever made," and they certainly are wonderful after their fashion. Here we have them:

Barbara, Celarent, Darii, Ferioque prioris,
Cesare, Camestres, Festino, Baroko secundæ,
Tertia Darapti, Disamis, Datisi, Felapton,
Bokardo, Ferison habet. Quarta insuper addit,
Bramantip, Camenes, Dimaris, Fesapo, Fresison.

Of course, it is evident to all practical persons that no effective thinking can be done while a man's brain is encumbered with such a load as that. In justice to Mr. DeMorgan's own writings, it should be said that he probably never used it himself. To explain the special significance of each of these magic words, and the way in which they can be made to work, would require many pages of difficult reading, and even then might not help us to a better understanding of the case. It is enough to have taken this bird's-eye view of the Aristotelic syllogism, and perceived in a rough general way what its special characteristics are. Now let us look at the Hegelian.

In the argument, "No person deserving respect is a boaster, and some heroes are boasters, and therefore some heroes do not deserve respect," the conclusion is undoubtedly correct if we can be sure, among other things, that the first clause is true. But this *if* is just what probably gave Hegel the key to his great discovery. How are we to know whether it is true or not? Evidently not by means of other syllogisms of this same kind. Where are we to find a major premise which will now and forever be absolutely true? The universal consent of the human race would not make one so as long as the possibility remained of one individual changing his mind. Some skeptics may even be found who will demand proof of the fact that all men are mortal; and how are you going to prove that they are? In the case of the example given above, any discriminating person acting upon common sense principles would declare at once that the major premise was false—not because boasters do deserve respect, but because a man may have many virtues, and be

a boaster besides. Common sense, however, works without explaining itself, and cannot be taken as a standard for us to judge by. Hegel knows better than the common sense of most men. He tells us that we must have two other forms of the syllogism to prove and correct the first, the three together forming a triad, mutually supporting each other. The one already given, the Aristotelic, is called Deduction; the second, the Baconian, Induction; and the third, belonging especially to Hegel, Identification. Mr. Everett represents them by the formulas

I P U, P I U, and I U P,

in which U represents the universal, P the particular, and I the Individual term; the important point in each form being, which of the three terms connects the two others. It makes no difference which stands first or last; we can have U P I as well as I P U. "*John is mortal because all men are mortal.*" The individual *John* is connected with the universal term *mortal* by means of the particular term *men.*

It is proved that John is mortal if we are sure at the same time that all men are mortal, and that John is a man. These facts are necessary to make the deduction of any value, and how are we to obtain them? The second form, the Inductive, gives us P I U, or "Man is mortal because John is mortal," only in this case it is not really John but our experience of all other men besides John that we insert for the individual term. Also the third form, that of Identification, ends the series, convincing us in the formula I U P that John is a man because he possesses those marks and peculiarities which distinguish mankind from brutes. In going through this process, however, and in the second step as well, we shall find ourselves continually falling back for support upon the two other forms of the syllogism. Thus do we arrive at a unity in the three, a sort of logical trinity, by means of which the separate results of the different forms may be combined together in a harmonious and substantial whole. Indeed no course of reasoning can be considered sound unless conducted by this method, and the results of deduction, induction and identification made to harmonize and combine with each other as naturally and perfectly as the elements in a chemical compound.

So far all seems sufficiently simple. But when we come to practical application, each form branches out into a science by itself. The pursuit of these different sciences becomes an unlimited study, although not on that account an indefinite or obscure one. This will best be seen when we consider that in Induction alone the materials to be used are co-extensive with the scientific knowledge of the world, and liable to increase with every future discovery. Full information in this regard, however, is not necessary for good reasoning. A certain amount of ignorance is inevitable in the best furnished minds, and every day we are all of us compelled to think and act according to the best light we have. A machinist may make good engines without knowing anything of the last invention in mechanics. He knows enough to be logical in his department. Common sense is the average logical power of the community. It has already been hinted that common sense and Hegelianism are not very different. It admits of progress, and becomes a better common sense as the community becomes more and more civilized. The best common sense for any individual must always be the amount of logical science which he was capable of putting to a practical application. It is necessary, however, that caution should be observed in this application, not to attempt to deal with problems more extensive than one's logical knowledge. The logic which will teach a man to get out of the way of a mad dog, though perfectly good and efficient for the occasion, is of a much lower degree than that a judge has need of to decide properly upon a case in court.

Mr. Everett sketches the outlines of these three sciences, Deduction, Induction, and Identification, in a most clear and interesting manner. First, under Deduction we have a consideration of those transcendental facts or truths through which alone experience becomes possible. Existence, or the universal, comes before the particular and individual; and the very idea which would induce one to learn the lesson which experience teaches, must be admitted before any experience can take place. In this direction we are led into the provinces of Theology, Philosophy, Ethics, and Æsthetics. Knowledge and progress in truth, beauty, and goodness, are requisite for sound deductive reasoning. This is certainly

the most abstruse and difficult branch of the subject. But it must be a great satisfaction to those who esteem the good and beautiful as well as cold truth, to find that these also are logical. The old system leaves no place for such an idea. In that, logic was an inflexible mathematical form, rigid as a railroad track—upon which, indeed, those who would educate their minds were to be dragged along at such a rate that no sight could be had of what the world and life was made of.

With Induction we come upon the extensive array of the natural sciences, and the correct course of pursuing them. A number of facts are collected together. On examination a certain similarity is detected among them, which leads to the suspicion that a natural law pervades the group. This law immediately has to be tested by application to other facts, and if it agrees with all the instances we know of, then its real existence may be inferred. Absolute certainty, however, is not assured until the rule thus obtained has been put into the other two forms of syllogism also, and found to answer for what they require of it. There is a distinction, however, to be drawn between rules which may be temporarily serviceable, as a sort of scaffolding of thought, and those which have their origin in the nature of things, existing as necessary laws. Both are requisite, but the last are much more important than the first. The peculiar art of inductive reasoning consists in judging how many facts ought to be collected before we proceed to generalize from them. Clearly it is impossible to collect all facts, and hasty generalization from an insufficient number is the most common of all sources of error. No exact regulations can be given in this direction; but much experience in thinking and testing the truth of one's thoughts, finally gives a sort of intuitive perception of when the right point has been reached. Practice also, and the sense of harmony which is innate in all good minds, give intuitively the power to reach true generalizations from very few instances, or even from only one. Drawing inferences from a single example, however, can only be done by the class we call geniuses, those wonderfully endowed minds, whose action, even in unconscious moments, is similar to that of the universal laws. Analogy, or what the phrenologists call

Comparison, is another variety of inductive reasoning. The old school admit it only in the way of a rhetorical finish to other and more solid arguments. They say, "Compare a man with a horse, if you like, for the sake of a figure of speech, but not for practical purposes." Mr. Everett, on the contrary, ‹ ns how all things in the world, physical and metaphysical, are related to each other as the parts of an organic whole, and are not to be justly considered except through this faculty of comparison. In truth, considering our present lack of facts sufficiently broad to serve for universal terms in deduction, Analogy, raised to this high rank, becomes at least as important as any other branch of reasoning. It might be called the poetic form of logic, because poets so much depend upon it; and on that account there is more correct reasoning in Homer's Iliad than in all the metaphysics written previous to the last century. A satisfactory explanation of how the science of thought is concerned with poetry as the highest form in which mind ever states itself, is yet among things of the future. We yet await the philosopher who shall tell us wherein the superiority of Homer, Dante, and Shakespeare, consists. Mr. Wasson in his Epic Philosophy* has opened the door-way in this direction, but the grandeur and beauty of a new unappropriated world is yet to be sought for in the subject.

In the third and last form of the syllogism another and quite different process must be followed. In order to identify the individual "John" with the particular "man," we have to observe and note down all the general characteristics which belong to John, then consider whether they agree with the special characteristics of man. For such an operation rules and theories are of little use; it is rather the field of the scientific investigator. A good example would be, the discovery of a new species of fish, and the discussion which would follow as to which of the numerous genera of fishes it should properly be classed with. As heretofore, we have to face and overcome an element of uncertainty. Different authorities give different systems of classification, improvements are continually appearing, and, above all, it is difficult

* North American Review for October, 1868.

to decide at what point to draw the line where subdivision of genera into species is to stop. The very example you have in hand may be the cause of changing the arrangements of whole groups. This uncertainty, however, is not illogical, as I have already tried to prove. Its right interpretation is that we should not consider our results too much as absolute facts, but as being the best to be had now, and to be acted on in the way a merchant invests his money where there is the greatest probability of gain. It also teaches a careful and studious investigation of the world as it is, and admonishes not to hurry on hastily to unripe conclusions.

In Identification, as already in Deduction and Induction, the other two forms of the syllogism play an important part. The naturalist reasons down from all the established facts in regard to fishes, and up from the peculiarities of the specimen before him. Thus is the unity and mutual dependence of the three established. To quote Mr. Everett's own words, "The first form is that of abstract deduction. The second that of comparison. The scattered objects of the world are taken in all their diversity and arranged over against each other. The third brings us to concrete individuality, and thus appropriately forms the climax and close of the series." The new system is indeed, compared with the old, what a living, active, thinking human being is to an Egyptian mummy. The last is an historical relic, valuable and interesting to the student; but the first is the real fact of to-day, on a mission of vital importance. and with all the great possibilities of the future before him.

MENDELSSOHN.

By Edward Sobolewski.

The beginning of this century boasted four distinguished composers: Felix Mendelssohn-Bartholdy, 1808; Robert Schumann, 1810; Franz Liszt, 1811; and Richard Wagner, 1812. At that time Beethoven was already in his glory, and consequently the idol of every student of the art of music. The four masters before named, although very different in their inner nature, made no exception in this respect, but looked upon Beethoven as their "beau-ideal" of composition.

They climbed on, like cypress-vine and morning-glory striving to excel each other, to that mighty tree which had grown in Haydn and Mozart's flower-garden, yet no one of them reached the top.

Beethoven, having brought the old fashion of instrumental music to the highest pitch, suddenly departed from this known track of his art, and, with his last string-quartettes and the *Missa solemnis*, vanished, for the majority of his contemporaries, into a nebular world.

Even some celebrated composers, like von Weber, could not comprehend him, as is proved by Weber's criticism of Beethoven's *A* major Symphony. Mendelssohn and Wagner shared in this want of comprehension, as they have scarcely climbed higher on that glorious tree than the roses clustering around it.

Beethoven was fully understood only by Schumann and Liszt, who, endowed with a very fine spirit and rich imagination, took Beethoven's last style as their model, regardless of all other considerations.

The present sketch, however, begins, not with Schumann or Liszt, but with Mendelssohn, the oldest in years and style of these four masters, nearer to Mozart than any of the others, and therefore, perhaps, the most favored among them.

Mendelssohn's teacher in composition was Professor Zelter, at that time Conductor of the Academy of Music at Berlin, composer of various pieces of sacred music, and especially celebrated for his quartettes for male voices. He, a man of the old school, who found in Handel and Bach the *ne plus ultra* of all musical art and science, had watched with great strictness over Mendelssohn's musical education, taking much pride in telling every one that Felix had composed a hundred fugues under his guidance before he gave him permission to write free compositions.

These counterpoint studies were really of great advantage to Mendelssohn for his overtures, symphonies, and concert-music; perhaps too much so for elegant salon-music, yet not enough for oratorios. His fugues are indeed superior to those of Spohr, Schneider, Loeve—yes, even Beethoven's—in their oratorios; but they cannot be ranged near Bach's, Handel's, Lotti's, and those of other old counterpointists.

That sublime and powerful theme, "Rise up, arise!" in the oratorio "St. Paul," loses all its beauty and clearness in the midst of the fugue through its harmonic and modulating overburdening. Fugues are deprived of their beauty by this kind of modulation. If we make use of this ancient form, we must do it in such pureness as did the great Italian and German masters.

Weaker yet than "Rise up, arise!" are the final fugues of the first and second part of the same oratorio; but the solos, chorals and free choruses elevate "St. Paul" above all works of this *genre* ever written by his contemporaries. I prefer Mendelssohn's harmonizing even to that of Sebastian Bach, who, in this respect, as well as in the entire counterpoint art, is considered the greatest master. There are too many passing-notes in the harmonizations of Bach; Mendelssohn's, however, always show exquisite taste. Some esteem his oratorio "Elijah" higher than that of "St. Paul." As a later production "Elijah" is indeed more powerful in its entire formation; but it is not so fresh, and for this reason "St. Paul" will always be more cherished by such as prefer vigor and spirit to knowledge and science.

Yet with these oratorios, and other sacred compositions of as good merit, Mendelssohn has neither commenced nor closed a new period in the art of music. Handel had done both before him. As Palestrina was the Alpha and Omega in his kind of sacred music, so was Handel in the oratorio. The artist belongs to the time wherein he lives. Genius is, in a certain manner, the outpouring of the general sentiment of the period in which it lives. An Ossian could not feel like a Byron, and neither he nor any other poet of modern times like the magnificent northern bard.

As an oratorio composer Mendelssohn cannot be placed above, or even equal with, his great predecessors, yet he was more successful in his concert-overtures than all older composers, Beethoven excepted. With these latter productions he introduced the new romantic school.

Some think they detect already in Weber's "Preciosa" and "Oberon" the beginning of this new departure; but Weber, although an original and tasteful composer of opera music, did not possess that thematical versatility which is attained only

by the study of counterpoint and fugues. His finest musical thought seldom contains more than four measures, and is then succeeded by another thought; his compositions are replete with harmonic and instrumental effects, and beautiful melodies appear between them like flashes of lightning; but the critic misses musical conformity. Hence von Weber could never have given such an impulse to the whole art, and to all its disciples, as did Mendelssohn by his composition of "Summer Night's Dream" and "Fingal's Cave." Truly the last work is a master-piece in every respect.

The "Overture to Summer Night's Dream," in its form, still reminds us somewhat of Weber's "Overture to Oberon." The different themes appear as if forced together. As we find in Weber's Oberon-overture first a little of the Elfs and their horn, then the Emperor's festival march, then in the allegro some of the quartettes and the airs of Huon and Rezia . . . so in like manner does Mendelssohn proceed in his Overture to the Summer Night's Dream. Elf and peasant dance hand in hand, the delicate Titania mingles with the huge Falstaff. But the picture of Fingal's Cave is all unison. The listener requires no previous knowledge in order to understand what is before him. Music tells him everything. He hears the water sing wondrous melodies in the cave, producing in its conjunctions beautiful harmonies like those of an Æolian harp.

As Mendelssohn owed to Zelter his thematical skill, so his instrumentation shows that here also the old Professor had worked, perhaps, less by instructing than by some well-timed sarcastic criticism. For instrumentation, like the melodic and harmonical part of music, is also an attribute of genius: it can be learned only to a certain degree, talent and genius must do the rest. To illustrate by an anecdote:—Zelter, on one occasion, said to one of his students, "Why do you put trumpets and kettle-drums in this *Kyrie eleison?* (!)" "I thought," answered the pupil, "they would have a good effect!" "What effect?" said Zelter angrily; "do you not know that *Kyrie eleison* means, 'O God, have pity on me!' and are you going to cry for mercy to God with trumpets and kettle-drums? Why do you not with the same propriety take big drums and small ones, piccolo flutes and cymbals? they surely make

some effect, too! But you can do as you like; music is a free art, and you probably think you can justify such instrumentation by saying to a critic like me, 'Heaven is far away above us, and God will better hear my prayer if I make a horrible noise in my *Kyrie.*' But, I repeat, you can please yourself; nay, you may put a large ink-blot on your score—or on your nose, if you please; they are both your own!"

Especially was it Spontini, the composer of the operas Vestalia, Cortes, Olympus, Nurmahal, etc., at that time principal director of music of the Court of Berlin, whose instrumentation Zelter abhorred. Once while walking home from one of Spontini's operas (Nurmahal), where not only all kinds of trumpets, drums, tympans and trombones, but also thirty iron anvils, tuned in different keys, had clashed and thundered,—and, in passing the royal castle and hearing the great *tattoo*, an *ensemble* of bands, trumpeters, drummers, pipers, and horners, of the whole garrison, Zelter exclaimed to his friends, "Heaven be praised! after all this opera-noise we hear at last a little sweet music."

Such a *bon-mot* sinks often deeper into a young composer's heart than a whole course of instruction. Spontini had found already many admirers among the youthful artists who would extend a musical theme in the same unskilled manner, who loved his long crescendos and mighty fortissimos; but such remarks as Zelter's would check many in this course.

Mendelssohn never was blinded by such show, for he, throughout his whole artist life, confirmed the truth that effect produced by massing oftener represents dross than gold. His instrumentation is always ingenuous and fine; even in the fortissimo no one instrument depresses the other. Melody predominates throughout. He resembles Mozart in many respects. Like this great composer, he shows the same happy calmness and serenity, the same elevation and clearness; but neither he nor Mozart ever felt that hurricane of passion which swayed through Beethoven's soul. For this reason he never was successful in the execution of such compositions as the *F* minor Sonata by Beethoven, although a fine pianist. Franz Liszt played this piece once with such mighty power and passion, such eloquence and truth, as I never heard before, probably never shall hear again.

The genius of man is like a filter; nothing can enter or escape which is greater than its calibre. Yet no blame can be attached to Mendelssohn for this lack of depth of passion; on the contrary, had he felt otherwise than he did, an Antigone would never have been produced. This latter work was composed by him at the request of Frederick William IV. of Prussia, a very distinguished critical judge of classic music, as well as friend and protector of all remarkable productions of art. This work stands isolated in its form and character, and some day will be acknowledged as the greatest of Mendelssohn's compositions. It should not be imitated, although a certain Mr. Taubert, Director of Music at Berlin, had the presumption to attempt it. He composed the "Medea of Euripides," and of course made a failure. A French philosopher said, "*Il faudrait que le hazard épuisait de myriades des chances avant de completer un insect!*" I believed that myriads more would never create a genius. Taubert has composed some very pretty children-songs; but God said to him as to the ocean, "So far, and no farther!"

More successful than Taubert was Kenselt in the imitation of Mendelssohn's "Song without Words." Kenselt's compositions of this character are not as classical as Mendelssohn's, yet more elegant and of later fashion. He is already forgotten, as he attempted to rise higher than his powers permitted: a concert for piano did not succeed, and nothing was heard of *his* thereafter.

I cannot speak with as much praise of Mendelssohn's disposition as of his composition. He hated Meyerbeer to the extent of envying him, and envied Schumann to the extent of hating him. "Why?" The reason I never learned, but that it was so I know. "Did he hate Meyerbeer because the musical productions of this composer met with more *furore* than his own?" He knew well enough the cause of such success. In "Robert le Diable" it was the resurrection of the nuns from their graves and their transformation into dancing Bayaderes; in "The Prophet," the rising of a magnificent oxyhydrogen sun, and the skating dance on the ice, which attracted the masses and elicited their applause. He also knew that Meyerbeer's Italian opera "The Knights of the Cross" had been menaced before being made public with

a *flasco*, but which the cleverness of his mother changed into a *furore*. It was managed in this way: Meyerbeer's mother invited the leader of the claquers to a splendid supper. Conversation soon turned upon her son's coming opera, and she exclaimed, "His Knights of the Cross will be no more victorious than those in the Holy Land; they will win no laurels, but produce a *flasco*." The principal claquer, being a gallant man, politely disagreed with her. A wager of 3,000 ducats was proposed. It was accepted, and the "Knights" won the battle, made *furore*.

I think Mendelssohn was aware of all this, and therefore I cannot understand his bitterness; but this I know, that his best friend could not utter Meyerbeer's name in his presence without feeling the consequence in some ill-treatment or bitterness. His feelings in regard to Robert Schumann were different. My opinion is that in Schumann he feared a rival.

As a composer Mendelssohn was a star of first magnitude in the firmament of art, one of those fixed lights which will never dim nor die.

ROSENKRANZ ON HEGEL'S PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION.

Translated from the German of Dr. K. Rosenkranz, by G. S. Hall.

If Hegel's delineation of the symbolic, classical, and romantic ideal, in the middle part of his Æsthetics, be duly considered, it will be understood how he could designate it, in the Encyclopedia, as the science of art-religion, for the motive for these distinctions of the ideal is chiefly taken from the religious stand-point. The entire development, in so far as it embraces at the same time the ideal of the oriental antique and modern world, is historico-philosophical even in the third part. In the doctrine of the system of special arts the historical physiognomy is predominant, because the particular ideal forms are retained as the ground of division. This is omitted only in music, in which department Hegel had not enough confidence in his own knowledge. It must not be thought that the logical definition of the essence of

the arts is too briefly treated, but the historical tint which often covers logical precision must be removed in order to grasp the idea in its purity. If religion had been treated before art many repetitions would have been rendered unnecessary. This he did not do because the stand-point of religion is higher. Art elaborates the content of religion; but its principle is not this content as such, but the form which appears to the senses, in which it is shaped for intuition, feeling, and imagination. Its productivity depends on casual individuality of talent. He who enjoys a work of art regards it as a beautiful phenomenon. It is said of certain painters, that, before they began a picture from sacred history, they consecrated themselves to their work by the most ardent prayer; yet, when they took up the brush, they must submit themselves to the laws of painting, and thus pass out of the religious into the æsthetic domain. So too, conversely, a believer may be incited to devotion by the view of a picture or a statue, and pass over from the starting-point of æsthetics to religious introversion, forgetting the work of art as such. Hegel recalls to mind the well-known experience that æsthetic perfection contributes nothing to the requirements of the religious process, and that very poor pictures of the Virgin Mary have had far greater fame in the Roman Church and have produced more wonderful effects than Raphael's Madonnas, none of which have wrought miracles. Art proposes to religion a problem of the very highest content; but, outside of this domain, it embraces all nature, the social life of man, his natural occupations and conditions, and the facts of his history. The female dancers whom we see hover with such infinite grace in the frescos of Pompeii; Alexander's battle upon the mosaic floor; the equestrian group which Lysippus made of Alexander and his generals; the cow of Myron on the pnyx at Athens, have no religious contents.

Religion is the direct relation of the temporal to the absolute mind, to God. This relation is the highest, the absolute, into which all else is cancelled, in whose mystic depth all else, even the splendor of beauty, vanishes. Hegel was a man who, in his impulsion toward substance, left all that was merely rhetorical behind, while the power of the content which occupied him breathed into his nervous words a pa-

thos of which the unsought and therefore startling language transports us with its irresistible power. At the beginning of his Philosophy of Religion he presented a poetic description of it which has justly been universally admired and often quoted. He sought at once to emancipate his readers from all that is finite, and fitly to prepare and dispose them for knowledge of the purely absolute. There is a certain charm which is diffused throughout the language of the Æsthetics which ceaselessly engages the phantasy with the metamorphoses of manifold phenomena The tone which pervades the Philosophy of Religion, however, is quite different. It becomes strict and formal A certain heaviness of style may be observed in the struggle of the philosopher with the ultimate mysteries of our being. The naïve good sense in Hegel's expressions reminds us of the old Strassburg mystic, Eckhart.

English skepticism, French atheism, and German deism, of the eighteenth century, had entirely disposed of religion. They had put morality in its place. If nature follows its own laws regardless of history, if history has no other causality than human freedom, what would then be left for God? The blind necessity of nature as well as the self-determination of human action excludes Him from their domain. Then Kant, who seemed to have destroyed theological scholasticism at the end of the century, published his "Religion within the bounds of Pure Reason," and, to the surprise of his contemporaries, took his position essentially upon the side of Christian orthodoxy by interpreting its dogmas as symbols of moral truths, and by affirming, in opposition to Rousseau, whom he greatly loved, that man has a root of evil dwelling within himself. Since Kant, German philosophers have, without an exception, treated of the science of religion. This was to be expected from Hegel all the more, because, during his residence in Switzerland and in Frankfurt, he had occupied himself with it so extensively, and in the Phenomenology had already given the outlines of a philosophy of religion.

He constructed these thoughts more elaborately and in more systematic form for the purposes of his academic lectures. They were published by Marheineke after his death.

As his revision was so defective, the second edition was given into the hands of Bruno Bauer, who edited it admirably, so that both in perfection of contents and in the finish of its form it takes rank second only to the excellently construed Æsthetics of Hotho.

Not one of Hegel's works has received more, and probably none more ill-founded, partizan, unjust or superficial criticism than the Philosophy of Religion, because in none did Hegel assume a more polemic attitude toward his age, and in none did he grapple with dominant prejudices with a stronger spirit of resentment. He attacked the deism of *éclaircissement* which hypothetized God as the highest essence, but affirmed that of the essence of this essence nothing could be known. He opposed the theology of feeling, or theology of the heart, which is conscious of feeling and anticipating God in his infinitude, but held knowledge of God to be impossible and a temptation to atheism. He opposed the learned supernaturalism which knows how to speak of God only historically, without having an independent or original conception of Him. He opposed also pantheism, or Spinozism, which apprehends God as one absolute substance, and not at the same time as the One, as absolute subject. He had a very distinct consciousness of his relation to all these parties in the same way in which, in the Philosophy of Right, he was conscious of his own antithesis to the various tendencies of the present. His extraordinary didactic skill is brilliantly exhibited in the introduction of the Philosophy of Religion, and none of the preliminary questions which could naturally arise concerning the relation of religion and philosophy, or concerning the attitude of the Philosophy of Religion to the System of Philosophy, remain unanswered. The course he has here followed may be summarized briefly as follows:

I. He treated the conception of religion in its universality as faith and as cultus.

II. The various religions which preceded the appearance of Christianity he regarded as specializations of the universal conception.

These are distinguished by the antithesis, 1. Natural religion, and 2. Religion of the spiritual individuality. Natural religion is (*a*) Immediate religion, or the religion of magic

and witchcraft of savage peoples; (*b*) The disruption of the religious consciousness in itself—as *α*. The religion of measure (temperate conduct of life), *β*. The religion of phantasy, *γ*. The religion of Being-in-itself—which have their historical phases in the Chinese, the Indian, and the Buddhistic religions respectively; (*c*) Religion in transition to spiritual individuality—*α*. as the antithesis of good and evil, *β*. as the religion of pain, and *γ*. the religion of enigma, with their historical phases in the Persian, the Semitic, and the Egyptian religions.

The religion of spiritual individuality rises above nature in the thought of a Final Cause—(*a*) of the absolute might and wisdom of the one God, who made nature, and consecrated from among the nations one to his exclusive service; (*b*) of the free cultivation of individual perfection; (*c*) of universal political dominion.

Sublimity, beauty, and prosaic conformity to an end, make up the distinctive character of these religions, the historical phases of which were Jewish, Grecian, and Roman. Their fall, and the absolute despair of the human mind which resulted therefrom, gave rise to a period of birth.

III. The absolute religion, in which the conception of religion attains its adequate reality. This religion is the truth of all which have preceded it. It does not pass over into another, for it is the last and the highest, because it reveals the intrinsic unity of the divine and the human nature in the person of a man who knows his essence to be the same as that of God, and in his life and death realizes only the consciousness of this inseparable unity.

The Christian is the manifestation of the absolute religion. It expresses the absolute content in forms which, psychologically considered, belong to imagination (representation), and in so far admit of being sublated into the non-sensuous form of pure conception by speculation, but in subject-matter can be surpassed by no other new religion.

The fundamental middle-point of these representations is that of God as tri-personal, as Father, Son, and Spirit, or as trinity. That which philosophy presents in its complete development is represented by the Christian faith as the eternal history of God. The problem of science, according to

Hegel, can here only consist in showing what is to be understood, philosophically speaking, by the kingdom (*a*) of the Father, (*b*) of the Son, (*c*) of the Holy Ghost.

Procreation—sonship—is a form of representation which is taken from natural relations, and corresponds only relatively to the conception of the idea, for under the comprehensive name of Son the entire process must be understood which pertains to the realization and incarnation of God and to the establishment of the religious community, in which, within humanity, God, through religious self-consciousness, *actu* really is, because here he is not only spirit in self as Father, or spirit for self as Son, but spirit for spirit, pure manifestation of his essence as theanthropic freedom. This for Hegel is the same as that which is usually designated as love. By the kingdom of the Son must be understood the principle of antithesis in God, his other-being, from which he eternally returns to absolute unity with himself. Hegel, therefore, subsumes (*α*) nature; (*β*) the world and the finite mind; (*γ*) Christ, under this category. Christ is the absolute man, who comprises the *prius* and the *posterius* of all history in himself in an absolutely unique manner. He not only taught the truth, not only died for the confession of it, but in all his existence manifested nothing but the inseparable unity of God as his Father with himself, as the Son in whom the Father is beheld. That by nature man is not what he should be; that the natural man is evil in his appetites and passions, and must be born again by knowing and willing freedom—all this is elucidated by Hegel in admirable words. He himself said at the conclusion of this labor, "This is now the profoundest depth." No less remarkable is his presentation of the necessity that God's essence should become manifest in an individual concrete form, in this man Jesus of Nazareth, in order to prove *ad hominem* that man in his self-consciousness is capable of taking up into himself the entire fulness of the divine. The absoluteness of this Man does not consist in his manifestation of an encyclopedic versatility as general, artist, philosopher, statesman, &c., but in the fact that, in spite of the destitutions of his nature, in spite of undeniable moral defects, in spite of the imperfection of his culture, he knew himself to be one with God in faith. What

is all virtuosity of culture, what all the weaknesses of our ascetic struggles, what all the fortune or disaster of our existence, when compared with the consciousness of this atonement!

The reproach has been made against Hegel, that, for the presentation of the Christian religion, he did not enter upon an exhaustive study of exegetical and dogmatic history, &c.; but, as a philosopher, he could not do this; and he has himself said very often in this regard, that that certainty with which philosophy has to deal cannot be mediated by history, but that conversely we are wont to test the reality of history by the conception of its truth. He did not, however, avoid the historical domain; he spoke of Jesus, of his miracles, of the all-conquering *parrhesia* of his words, of his death, and of the faith of the disciples in his resurrection. A critical history of his life, however, such as Paulus, Strauss, Neander, Lange, Hase, Renan, Schenkel, &c., have lately produced, would have transposed him out of the speculative domain to that of erudition and its endless strifes, and would have made him liable to the reproach of having become untrue to his own problem, viz., that of deducing the necessity of the Christian religion from the conception of the idea. It should be remarked that Hegel proceeded with the Christian precisely as with the other religions; first presenting its metaphysical conception, then its historical existence, and concluding with a description of its cultus. So too, when he arrived at the absolute religion, he brought forward the religious conception of God upon this high stand-point.

He distributed the proofs for the existence of God by ascribing the cosmological proof to the religion of nature, the teleological to the religion of spiritual individuality, and the ontological to Christianity as the absolute religion.

In order to recognize the magnitude of Hegel's labor, it need only be compared with that which had been done before in the same field. We find all that which Hegel collected into an organic totality, widely scattered. The elementary conceptions of religion had been treated by the followers of Kant and Jacobi, e.g. by Köpper; mythology and symbolics by Görres, Creuzer, Meiners, Benjamin Constant, &c.; and

the Christian religion by Herder, &c. A unification of all sides of religion, and a permeation of them by one principle and by one method, had never been attempted until Hegel. His work rose like a massive temple from the midst of the above endeavors. Warm religious feeling, immense erudition, a strict scientific earnestness, a diction simple yet not dry, enlivened rather by a rich intuition, all are blended in rare harmony. By affirming that man could attain to a knowledge of God he attacked the dread of knowledge which pietists and theologians often feel; by clinging fast to religion he repelled the atheistic tendency which desires to know only morality, and in all religion discerns nothing but an expression of human ignorance and incapacity, or even the designed hebetation of a venomous and despotic hierarchy; and finally because he polemicized strongly against Roman Catholicism, especially against its worship of relics and of saints, against monasticism and transubstantiation, he made himself inimical to Catholic theologians. The public at large believed that a true philosopher stood upon the heights of science only when he was a republican in politics, and an atheist, or at least a pantheist in religious philosophy. If, like Hegel, he declared himself opposed to atheism and to Spinozism, either he incurred the suspicion of being a hypocrite in case he otherwise exhibited energy of thought, or he was depised as immature and weak-minded. All these inculpations were suffered in turn by Hegel. It has even been charged that, out of love to the Prussian policy of restoration, his religious philosophy was moulded retrogressively upon the pattern of mediæval scholasticism, with Jesuitic calculation. What a monstrous slander! The Prussian government carried on the work of unification without debate, by the agency of force; the *agenda* of the cathedral at Berlin—a mosaic composition of Hebrew psalmody with very insipid prayers, which furnishes sad evidence of the sordid prepossessions of the then existing military-police-state—was to be imposed upon the religious communities; preachers of Lutheran congregations were either cast into prison or compelled to emigrate, and Hegel, who both from the professorial chair, and on the occasion of the celebration

of the Augsburg confession in an academic oration, publicly expressed his preference for Lutheranism, would he support this enormity?

A great part of the general disfavor with which Hegel's Philosophy of Religion was received was caused by the breach between himself and Schleiermacher. But as I was myself the first who attacked Schleiermacher's doctrine of faith from the stand-point of the Hegelian philosophy, I will not dwell upon this event.

It is often said that Hegel has never distinctly declared what he understood by the words "God," "immortality," "miracles." This declaration has no objective warrant. After the introduction to the Philosophy of Religion comes a chapter upon "God," in which he most unambiguously declares that He must be apprehended not merely as substance, but at the same time as subject. Only finally, in the result, can the conception of God be properly apprehended by scientific knowledge. That which is final in the system is in itself the first. The beginning of the system embraces, indeed, nothing more than the most abstract conception of being, but it presupposes the conclusion, viz. the conception of being as the absolute mind. The human mind for itself, even in its generic universality as humanity, is not the absolute mind. It becomes absolute, however, as far as, by thinking and willing, it exalts itself to God. If, conversely, God had over against himself only a nature which He has made, He would not be the Absolute Spirit. This he becomes, on the one hand, by relation, by objectivization in mankind.—Whether Hegel believed in immortality in a carnal sense, as family egoism wishes, cannot be doubtful. This he rejected, as well as belief in a God who is made only the obedient executor of terrestrial interests, which impose upon the heart the piety of eudaimonism. In two places he speaks of immortality, in treating of the Egyptian religion and of the resurrection of Christ. He extols the Egyptians for having conceived so profoundly the thought of immortality, and of the latter he remarks that immortality is a quality of mind which is already present, and need not first be mediated by death. We can form absolutely no conception of a condition after death; but since in thinking and willing, we sustain a

negative relation to nature, we cannot prove that our consciousness must be annihilated by the death of the organism. It is among the most unhappy errors of mankind that they have expected the truth of spirit, the so-called eternal life, as a Beyond, or something which begins after death. He everywhere inculcates that we are now and here in the midst of the absolute, and that we degrade the state and the church when we condemn ourselves to a state of religious tutelage, or of unhappiness, or admit the sentiment that we are in need of compassion.—The belief in miracles Hegel could very well understand. The origin of this belief is as little perplexing to philosophy as the origin of its decline. The miracle is the form in which man represents the independence of his freedom from the causal nexus of nature and history; but a miracle is impossible, since ethical organization, which is possible only in so far as natural and moral law becomes invested with an inviolable existence, would thereby be destroyed.

If I make myself a cause of something, I must have confidence in the presupposed effect. If this could not be avoided by a natural chance, but could be clandestinely attained by the arbitration of a God, all ethical freedom would be destroyed. That which should be religion must in content be absolute, eternal truth for the whole universe. Belief in the rectitude of a casual event is not religious. Changing water to wine, the withering of an accursed fig-tree, the resurrection of a dead man, the stilling of a tempest, walking upon water, &c., are things which have nothing whatever to do with religion. The reality ascribed to them was that of myth, and not of fact. In this sense Hegel rejected belief in miracles as superstition; but he rejected likewise the now prevalent disbelief of natural science in the existence of spirit, and in the might of freedom, as superstition. The true miracle of mind he believed to be reconciliation with God, the undoing of what has already taken place, by repentance, new birth, and the continual emancipation into freedom.

In the Philosophy of Religion Hegel often made use of the expression, that the content of religious feeling, that its intuitions and its representations, must be elevated to thoughts in order to be understood. It is especially the form of ima-

gination in which the content of religion becomes popular. The misunderstandings which have originated here would perhaps have been avoided if Hegel had separated the conception of the religious process from that of its phenomena in consciousness, and both from the morphological system of religion, in some way like the following:

I. The religious process. It contains the general elements of all religions: (1) as the subjective process of immediate unity, separation and reconciliation of man with God, which takes place entirely within the inner being; (2) from this it finds expression in the objective process of prayer, ceremonies, and sacrifices; (3) as absolute process it is organized into the faith and the cultus (worship) of the religious community.

II. Religious phenomenology. Religious consciousness is bound up in these forms through which mind, as theoretical intelligence, must pass from feeling, through imagination, to thought. The content of religion is felt, or imagined, or thought. Whence arises (1) the religion of feeling; (2) the religion of phantasy; (3) the religion of logical comprehension. The first appears in the religion of nature, the second in the religion of art, the third in the religion of reason, as its peculiar form. These distinctions must not be embarrassed by unnecessary limitations, but must be taken as quite general. Every religion may pass through these formative stages. The Jewish religion, e.g., is already principally one of pure thought. It has, however, contemplated the feeling of this thought in flame and fire. It has produced no plastic art, because this would have contradicted its own principle of formlessness; but in poesy, and in its companion, music, it enters the stage of the religion of phantasy, until, in the Talmud, it passes over to the form of thinking. Thought is the highest form of intelligence, the simple non-sensuousness of which it does not transcend; but in itself may still be distinguished as (*a*) understanding, (*b*) reflection, (*c*) reason. Understanding publishes the content of faith in the form of dogma. Reflection criticises the dogma as *éclaircissement*. Reason rises to concrete conception, which no longer has negativity external to it to criticise it, but embraces it as a moment in itself. The Greeks had no

catechism, but the dogmatic element was not wanting. When the sophists inaugurated their *éclaircissement*, it became at once evident that certain general representations were current concerning the gods and their labors. Popular tribunals condemned those philosophers who contradicted those forms of the popular faith which were held as canonical; e.g. Anaxagoras, because he declared the sun to be a body glowing with heat; Diagoras of Melos, because he doubted the justice and the foreknowledge of the gods; and Socrates, because he believed himself to be directed in all his actions by an in-dwelling "demon," &c., all of which would have been impossible without a dogmatic consciousness. The stoics sought to justify the dogmas of the popular faith precisely as the scholastics did the dogmas of the Christian religion, and as the neo-platonists strove, by the deduction of plurality from unity, for a gradation of the gods, and, by mystic allegory, to exalt polytheism to the religion of reason. Hegel applied the term art-religion exclusively to that of the Greek; but every religion is liable, as soon as it translates the content of feeling into intuitions, and intuitions into imaginations, to deck out the latter in beautiful forms, and thus to become art-religion. Especially if a religion lays obstacles in the way of the transfiguration into beauty, art encounters impassible limits, as e.g. the religion of India, in the many arms of the gods; or that of Egypt, in the animal heads of many gods. It can only temper and moderate, not annul, the ugliness of such forms. The Indian religion first attained a plastic character in Buddhism, because it made a purely human form its centre, as we still see among the ruins of many temples in Farther India.

Hegel rightly considered the thought of God as the soul of all religion. When, however, this is understood as an attempt to sacrifice feeling to understanding, it is forgotten that the forms of intelligence, in passing from the lower to the higher, are not thereby destroyed but preserved. When, from the stand-point of phantasy, I represent to myself a content of sensation, sensation does not therefore cease, but continues in the imagination; and in the same way feeling and imagination accompany, or rather are immanent in, thought. The philosopher who conceives God as the absolutely uni-

versal substance, as absolute subject, brings feeling and imagination into his thought, and becomes neither unfeeling nor unimaginative. When first the universal necessity of this course of the human mind is known, it is clearly seen that Philosophy is the divine priestess that reconciles and unites the various positive religions concentrically into the sanctuary of its own self, and therefore coördinates the feeling and the phantasy of comprehensible thought.

III. The system of religions. Hegel made the antithesis of natural religion and spiritual individuality the centre of his construction. This dichotomy of a divided middle term he described as peculiar only to nature. It is soon discovered that it was only the Jewish religion which induced him to leave the triad of the oriental, the antique, and the Christian world, which he had so admirably depicted as phases of the symbolic, classical, and romantic ideal in æsthetics. The constraint of the transitions from the Egyptian to the Jewish, and still more from the Jewish to the Christian religion, is also soon detected. Although the Jews were brought out of Egypt, and, at the behest of their Jehovah, took with them the gold and silver vessels of the Egyptians, their religion was not derived from Egypt. This Hegel does not mention, although it should be said at this point in his construction of these religions. According to the fundamental intuition of the entire Hegelian philosophy, the division of religions could only result from the antithesis of substantiality and subjectivity in God. All religions which proceed from the intuition of substantiality may be called natural religions, because in their cosmogony nature is first, and theogony follows. The Greeks conceived earth and heaven to be the First. The enlightened Roman, Ovid, went beyond earth and heaven to a still more barren abstraction, yet he allows nature to subsist as the First.

> "*Ante mare et tellus et quod tegit omnia cœlum,*
> *Unus erat tantum naturæ vultus in orbe.*"

All religions which proceed from the conception of the absolute subjectivity of one God who made heaven and earth, are theistic. Here there can properly be but one religion; the difference is not qualitative. Mohammed recognizes Abraham, Moses, and David. The absolute religion is the subla-

tion of the antithesis of substance and subject through the conception of spirit.

Hegel labored to apprehend the different religions in their characteristic distinctions and to designate them accordingly, as e.g. when he designates the Chinese religion as that of measure or moderation, the Indian as that of phantasy, the Egyptian as that of enigma, it cannot be disguised that his apprehension, though very profound, admits of much improvement.

All natural religions—or, as it is now customary to say, all ethnic religions — constitute a totality, the development of which cannot be separated from the process of universal history as we have previously regarded it. When Hegel determines the religions of Farther Asia as the sundering of the religious consciousness in itself, and those of Western Asia and of Egypt as transitional to spiritual individuality, it becomes clear that this process is erroneous, and that the category of a transition from one step to another is not sufficient to furnish a clear conception. Eastern and Western Asia should rather be contrasted as pantheistic and dualistic. The antithetic character of dualism reached its ultimate phase in the individualism of the Greek, Roman, and German religion, which, in principle, cannot be distinguished from ethnic religion. The historical element in general must be subordinated to that of the idea, under which therefore religions which are found in Africa, America, and Australia, may be subsumed. The conception, nevertheless, will even produce for itself historically a pregnant form which presents the conception as a phenomenon quite correctly, and which therefore may be used as a representative type. The first stage of the phenomena of religion, e.g., Hegel called the immediate, and specified witchcraft and sorcery as its peculiarity, which have ever prevailed most widely among the negro tribes of Africa. They may, therefore, be taken as the representatives of this stage, especially as they are the unhistoric races and typify the childhood of mankind. The conception of magic, however, is universal as the first naïve, and, for us, superstitious reaction of the freedom of the human consciousness against the might of natural necessity. In the enchanter, who conjures wind and weather, sickness, &c.—who, by the exertion

of his will and by his glance, brings sickness upon men and cattle, excites a sensation of the superiority of mind over nature. Magic is found also among all races who live in a state of nature outside of Africa. In the progress of mind to higher stages it ceases to constitute the centre of religion. It is reduced to a subordinate moment, but it does not vanish from the group of natural religions. The religions of abstract spirit declare expressly against them. Moses as well as Mohammed forbade magic, conjuration of the dead, the determination of days by lot, &c. It continued still in secret as an outlawed superstition, and thus maintains its subsistence even in Christianity. The Roman church formally readopted it into its system of dogmas as exorcism. Under the name of miracles it dragged in a superstitious belief in magic.

We employ the term "natural religion" in general for all religions of ethnicism. More strictly it should designate only the religion of magic and fetichism, which Hegel calls "immediate religion." In the Chinese religion the ethical element attains such prominence that the physical is more and more sublated in it. The following scheme of the ethnic religions may be presented: I. Pantheism: (*a*) religion of magic—the Chinese and races in a state of nature; (*b*) religion of metempsychosis—East Indians; (*c*) quietism—the Buddhists. II. Dualism: (*a*) astral religion—the Persians; (*b*) necrolatry—Egyptians; (*c*) the religion of orgies—Semites. III. Individualism: (*a*) the æsthetic—Greeks; (*b*) the practical—Romans; (*c*) the demonic—Germans.

These designations are more definite than those of Hegel. He termed the religion of Eastern Asia the sundering of the religious consciousness in itself. This is not proper. Sundering takes place in all religions; it takes place especially in dualistic religions because it is immanent in their very principle. This is the case with the religions of Western Asia, which Hegel apprehended too indeterminately only as religions of transition, while the word dualism designates them positively. The religions of Eastern Asia, on the other hand, are pantheistic. Individual existence here has the significance of absolute misfortune. Metempsychism is at the same time *metensomatism*, and the soul wandering from one incarnation to another longs for absorption into nothing. Quiet-

ism comes to its consequent end in nihilism. When Hegel called the Indian the religion of phantasy, he hit upon an ingenious characterization of one side of this religion, viz. its fantastic mythology; but the Greek might equally well be called the religion of phantasy, i.e. of the Beautiful, or of the Ideal. Metempsychosis expresses more correctly the peculiarity of this stage, for it reminds us at once that the soul determines its own fate by its actions in whatever caste or animal body it attains existence, and this is the point upon which all here turns.

As the antithesis to the Persian religion of light Hegel adduced that of Asia Minor under the category of pain, but this is erroneous. The antithesis of Persia should be sought in Egypt, where it became very manifest at the conquest of Cambyses. The Egyptian mythology with its thousands of statues of the gods, with its worship of animals, and its worship of the dead, was an abomination to the Persians. The latter worship was the specific centre of their religion; the judgment of the community concerning the dead was the chief factor of their entire ethical life. The Persians placed corpses naked in the open air, that the birds, as messengers of Ormuzd, might devour them. The Egyptians, in order to eternize the body, laid it away in rocky chambers and in coffins of stone, after it had been made lasting by embalming it with resin. Service for the dead plays a great part in all religions; even in natural religion, as in necromancy, and as the cultus of divination, especially among the Chinese; but Egypt lived, so to speak, for nothing but death. Its Pharaohs would have built no pyramids had they not desired to preserve their own bodies for a future resurrection. The religion of Egypt may therefore rightly be termed necrolatrous. Hegel, with ingenious reference to the sphinx, termed it the religion of enigma. It was a riddle, however, only to strangers, not to Egyptians themselves, who were by no means the gloomy, sad mortals they are often represented, but were lively and joyous, though earnest men, as, independently of Herodotus, the *genre* pictures of the catacombs show, in which their customs were so charmingly delineated. The transition from the Egyptians to the Greeks is made in the schools by these pictures. Creuzer made Egypt the basis of his symbolics,

and more recently Röth and Julius Braun have strenuously defended the dependence of the Grecian upon the Egyptian religion. Afterward, in the interval since Friedrich Schlegel's book upon the wisdom of the Indians, they held for a time the place of chief honor. But the transition from the Orient to Greece was mediated especially by the races of Asia Minor, whose religion, as Hegel said, was characterized not only by pain, but also by voluptuousness, by intoxication, and by freely giving vent to all the instincts that are in human nature. This we term orgiasticism, whose fermenting fulness the Greeks transfigured to a beautiful proportion. Orgiasticism may be (*a*) Sabæan—astrological, like that of the Chaldeans in Babylon; (*b*) androgynous, like that of the Syrians and Phrygians; (*c*) heroic-utilitarian, like that of the Phœnicians, whose Melkarth is the Semitic antetype of the Hellenic Hercules. All these religions were at the same time fatalistic.

Here, as elsewhere, Hegel concludes with the Romans, but, with them and the Greeks, the Germans are the third people with whom the principle of heart (*Gemüth*) enters universal history. Their deities were high and pure forms, which Plato would not have had to purify morally as the Greek gods for his Republic. The myth of Balder and Loki is deeper than that of Osiris and Typhon, or that of Prometheus and Pandora.

Monotheism stands opposed to ethnicism with its manifold forms. It was found originally only in one nation, the Jewish, concerning whom enough has been already said under the Philosophy of History. Islamism is not distinguished from Judaism in principle, but only in that, from the very first, it was not national, but rather cosmopolitan; while Judaism, although it hoped sometime to gather all people to its Jehovah, conceived of this as their unification with the people of Israel under its Messias.

Islamism is fanatical and fatalistic. It wages war with other nations to compel them, by the force of arms, to serve Allah. The Jews waged war, but only to conquer Canaan, and never to convert other people. They believe in a guidance of their nation by Jehovah, but not in an unconditional predestination, whence their feeling of sin is much deeper

and more vital. When, by the dispersion, the Jews were compelled to dwell among other nations, they must have reflected upon the concessions which they were called upon to make to the peculiarities of other nations without giving up those of their own. Hence originated the prefaces to the Talmud, which calls itself the hedge about the law. This tendency to compromise in the Talmud is the inner transition of national to cosmopolitan monotheism.

It is only when the antithesis of ethnicism and monotheism is held fast that Christianity can be rightly apprehended in its historic genesis. Christ sprang from the Jewish and not from the Roman race. All the elements of error in Christianity are a relapse either into abstract substance or abstract subject, into abstract naturalism or abstract spiritualism, into Gnosticism or Ebionism, into heathenism or Judaism. It is, therefore, quite conceivable that the phenomena of the Christian religion ever oscillate between two extremes, for these, in and for themselves, make up its higher unity, and by these, conversely, it first becomes perfectly understood.

It cannot be made a matter of reproach that, as a philosopher, Hegel did not enter upon the history of Christianity in the Philosophy of Religion, for this he did not do for other religions, because, before all else, it devolved upon him here to arrive at their conception. This, however, was amply done in the History of Philosophy and in the Philosophy of History.

SHAKSPEARE'S COMEDY "AS YOU LIKE IT."

By D. J. Snider.

In this drama we see placed in striking contrast the actual and the idyllic world. The former contains society, state, business, and their manifold interests and complications; the latter is the simple pastoral existence without care, struggle or occupation, and almost without want. The former is the world of Reason and exhibits man in his highest rational development, and for this very cause has within it the deep-

est and most terrific contradictions. The loftier the summit, the greater the fall; the more highly organized a society is, the mightier are the collisions slumbering or struggling in its bosom. But an idyllic existence is almost without contradiction, and hence it happens that men sometimes flee from a more concrete social life in order to get rid of its difficulties, and betake themselves to the simple state of the shepherd.

More commonly however they remain in society, but construct with the aid of imagination a world of their own, suited exactly to their notion of things, whither they can flee out of the rugged and disagreeable reality surrounding them. Such a realm may be called the ideal as distinguished from the idyllic, though both have the same fundamental principle, since they are abstractions from actual existence. An imaginary world of this kind has always been a favorite theme with a certain class of minds, particularly with the poets and theologians. But in some social conditions, especially in periods of revolution and disintegration, it is the resort to which all intelligence flees, and the construction of ideal societies becomes a phase of national consciousness. Such a state is generally thrown back into the distant past long antecedent to history, when man was absolutely innocent, and even the lower animals shared in his condition. That is, the negative side of man and nature is wholly eliminated, thought away. Of this character was the Paradise of the ancient Hebrews and the Golden Age of the ancient Greeks. It will be noticed that there is a great advantage in placing this world in the past, since we are thus continually receding from it, while, according to the well-known law of distance, it is increasing in enchantment to the spectator. But more hardy spirits have dared to project this world into the future, where it is in danger of being overtaken. Still the Millennium has thus far always kept a thousand years ahead, and it is likely to do so for an indefinite time to come.

Now this consciousness so general, so deeply grounded in human nature, the poet proposes to make the subject of a comedy. That it is capable of a comic treatment is manifest when we reflect that the very realization of the ideal world must be its annihilation, for then it is real and no longer

ideal. Thus the pursuit of such an end as absolute and final is contradictory and null in itself, since it must terminate in just the opposite of that which is sought. Now comedy exhibits the individual pursuing ends which are nugatory, and therefore destroy themselves in their realization. That the poet had this consciousness in mind is clear from his allusions to Robin Hood, the English ideal hero of the forest; and still more plainly does the same fact appear when he speaks of "those who fleet the time carelessly as they did in the golden world," an obvious reference to the Greek ideal realm. To this latter he likens the Forest of Arden, a comparison by which he lets us know what he means by that forest.

But it is through an analysis of the drama that the purpose of the poet can be best revealed. To its entire movement there belong three parts: first, the real world of wrong, in which the individual is assailed in his personal rights; secondly, the ideal world to which the individual flees in order to get rid of injustice; thirdly, the restoration of the individual to his existence in society, the real world of right. Yet these divisions, it must not be forgotten, are merely the phases of one and the same process.

We shall now glance at the incidents of the play and trace this movement through its various parts. The first act brings before us in completeness the real world of wrong. Orlando has been deprived of his share in the paternal estate by his brother Oliver, and, what is much worse, his education has been utterly neglected, in violation of the will of his father. Here is shown the wrong in the Family, but this is not all. The rightful Duke has been expelled from his government by his brother, and thus we see that the wrong extends into the State. The play does not unfold but rather presupposes these two great acts of injustice, and hence society is portrayed as in a condition of strife and contradiction. But Orlando has developed his physical nature, though his intellect may have been neglected; he exhibits his prowess first against his brother, and then at court he overcomes the Duke's wrestler. A curious result of this adventure is the love which springs up between himself and Rosalind, which however has received the most ample and beautiful motive

from the poet. Nowhere has he more successfully shown the budding, blooming, and ripening, of the tender passion.

But soon this world of injustice comes into full activity, and manifests its inherent character. The Duke, as the violator of all individual right, must naturally become jealous of all individuals; hence he has banished a number of lords who seemed dangerous to his power. And so this process must continue as long as anybody is left in the country, since the existence of one man must be a continual source of fear to such a tyrant. Hence Orlando, as the son of an old enemy, excites his suspicion, and has to leave the court with precipitation. The same suspicion is aroused against Rosalind, the daughter of the banished Duke, who is also driven off in the most wanton manner, but is accompanied by the daughter of the usurper, a just retribution upon his own family for the wrong done to his brother's. Here is introduced the disguise of the two ladies, which furnishes the occasion of the main comic situations of the play.

But the wrongs of Orlando do not end with his departure from court. He returns to his brother's estate only to find his life conspired against there, and his condition more hopeless than ever. Accompanied by his trusty servant Adam, a second time he betakes himself to flight. It is impossible to mistake the meaning of these scenes. The poet has here portrayed society in contradiction with its fundamental object; it has driven off those whom by every tie of blood and of right it was bound to protect; both State and Family have become instruments of the direst injustice; on all sides we behold the *world of wrong*. Such is the first part of the movement of the play.

But whither must these people go? Society has banished them, has wronged them, and hence their object is to find a place where the injustice of society does not exist, where there is no civil order. Such is the Forest of Arden, into which we are ushered in the beginning of the second act. Its nature has already been sufficiently indicated by the poet when he compared it with the Golden Age. Its logical character is determined by the fact that it is the negation of all social organization, that simple primitive state before society. Moreover we find already here the banished Duke and Lords,

those for whom the social contradictions were too strong, and hence have betaken themselves to a less complex existence. The Duke rejoices in the new situation; he makes a glowing contrast between their present life and that which they have abandoned; here is no flattery, no ambition, no crime; he can find quite all the advantages of society in the trees, the stones, and the brooks; nature, were she only looked into, can furnish all the content of reason. Nothing can surpass the freshness and the idyllic beauty with which he describes their life in the forest; the aroma of the country is in every line. Then comes Amiens, the lyrist of the company, who embodies these sentiments in the most ethereal song. The poetic representation of their abode is thus complete. But hold! a disagreeable contrast arises. The Duke feels that even in this new life he has not wholly avoided the old difficulty, for there still remains the struggle with the animal world, the burghers of the wood, for physical maintenance. Nay, there is one of these Lords who cannot find here any solution of the trouble, who declares that injustice is as rife in the Forest of Arden as in society; witness the slaughter of the innocent beasts of the field, and that same usurpation of their domains by the banished Duke and Lords, of which they themselves were the victims in society. This is Jaques, whose negative character can find repose nowhere; he even sees in Nature herself only discord and evil; the deer is as bad as man—it leaves its wounded neighbor to perish while it passes haughtily on. Thus is our idyllic world, from which we had thought to shut out all negation, disturbed by its reappearance, like a ghost among children. Indeed man can hardly get rid of the negative in this way; though he flee to the woods, he will find it there; in fact, his very existence depends upon destruction, upon swallowing a certain amount of vegetable and animal existence. Hence, in order to get rid of the negative, he must first get rid of life. Such is the logical result of abandoning state and society with the design of seeking a solution of their contradictions—namely, suicide—a result which men seldom insist upon practically realizing, though it is not unknown in the history of the human species that such has been the case.

These persons the play presupposes to have already gone

to the idyllic realm, but now behold the new arrivals. First, Rosalind and Celia, in their disguise, appear at its entrance. Their difficulties, weariness, and hunger, are specially noticed; they find the transition from the Real to the Ideal, from the luxury of the court and conveniences of society to the meagre life of the shepherd, by no means easy. Though they are in an ideal world, the Real makes itself very unpleasantly felt. But the nature of the place is soon made manifest. Two beings suddenly rise upon their view, natives of the land, whose appearance shows them to be shepherds. Moreover their language assumes a poetical form, and has for its theme the wail of unrequited love. Also their names sound quite familiar, are in fact some old stereotyped names of pastoral poetry. With one of them Rosalind enters into conversation, and the result is that the new-comers buy a shepherd's hut, and are firmly planted in the idyllic land. Strange to say, Orlando and his old, devoted servant Adam have arrived in another part of the same territory, a proceeding which seems at first somewhat arbitrary on the part of the poet. Yet whither else had they to go? They have fled society, and hence must proceed to a place where social order is unknown, which place has been identified as the Forest of Arden. We also find that they have the same difficulty on entering this realm which was experienced by the last party; Orlando even thinks of violence in order to obtain food, but he is soon changed by the gentle manner of the Duke, who of course could not do harm to any human being. With the end of the second act we find everybody fairly established in the new country.

The next question which arises is, what are they to do here? What is to be the content of their lives? We are not long left in ignorance, for soon we find Orlando wholly occupied with Love, carving the name of his fair one upon the bark of trees, making love-ditties and hanging them upon the bushes; in fine, consumed with the most intense passion. Nor is Rosalind much better off, though she preserves her disguise in his presence. Touchstone the clown, too, becomes infected with the prevailing frenzy, and the native shepherd Silvius, who is also heart-stricken, is again introduced together with the disdainful shepherdess Phebe, who in her turn falls in love

with the disguised Rosalind. The result of the third act is that we have three pair of lovers, native and foreign, to whom one pair is added in the following acts. Thus our ideal realm is for the new-comers transformed into a sort of love-land, where the young people seem wholly occupied with their passion, though the old-comers are not so affected. That such an existence should take this form is in the natural order of things. Let us analyze this remarkable transition. Man without society is without content to his life. Here society exists not, business is impossible, ambition in the state is cut off, the physical wants are reduced to the smallest compass and are satisfied with the smallest amount of exertion. Without occupation, without incentive, in general without content to his life, man is reduced to the *natural individual.* Thus left alone to himself, his finitude begins to show itself in every direction. For man, single, is one-sided, a half, as is manifest by reflecting a moment on the sexual diremption. He is thus the half, yet would be the whole, and his entire nature drives him to overcome the contradiction. For in truth he is not himself, his existence is in and through another, namely, one of the opposite sex. Such is the feeling of love, for it is here not conscious, not in reflection, but the impulse of the natural individual to cancel his own finitude. Now we have just seen that this natural individuality was quite the sum of pastoral life, and hence its chief content is love. Thus the poet is true to the character of this realm when he makes those who dwell in it totally occupied with the tender passion.

But there is another consequence of this life which the poet has not neglected. We see here the origin and the content of the idyl. Pastoral poetry in its native simplicity is mainly amatory, and allows but little reflection, which belongs to a more cultivated period. Moreover it is here that poetry begins as the simplest expression of the primitive human passion. The Imagination gains absolute control and paints the loved one in the fairest colors; the stricken shepherd sees in the bush, in the flower, in the clouds, her fleeting form; all nature is turned into the image of her shape, love is his whole being. When man thus transmutes his existence into forms of the Imagination and gives them expression, the result is

poetry. It does not seem a forced interpretation when it is said that Shakspeare meant to indicate the nature and the presence of the poetic element by the introduction of the native shepherds, Corin, Silvius, and Phebe. Their language falls at once into verse, their theme is some collision of love, and their names are taken from the pastoral poets. Moreover Shakspeare has introduced, perhaps, the most common theme of this species of poetry, the neglected lover and the disdainful shepherdess. In fact, it occurs twice; Phebe disdains Silvius, and is herself disdained by Ganymede. Certainly the greatest charm of pastoral poetry is this simple idyllic love, springing from nature direct, without a shadow of formality or conventionality. Description of rural scenery and of pastoral manners is quite subordinate to the amatory element; but when reflection enters, or allusions to a more complex social organization are brought in, the pastoral loses its native relish without attaining the higher forms of poetry. This play is not, therefore, a pastoral drama in the sense of the "Aminta" or the "Faithful Sheperdess," both of which do not get beyond the shepherd's life, while here the pastoral element is merely a transitory phase of both poetic and social development. Such is the second part of the movement of the play.

But what is the outcome of the drama? The complication, which rests wholly in the disguise of Rosalind, is solved by her appearance in woman's clothes, and the four pairs are united in the presence of the Duke. Hymen is thus the magician who reconciles these collisions of love-land, and the result of the pastoral world is Marriage, the Family, which again results directly in society. So viewed on this side, the ideal word cancels itself, passes over into a system of social order; the four pairs, who quite represent the various classes of people, make already a little state. But the banished Duke and Lords cannot thus return out of their idyllic existence, for it is supposed that they are too old for passion, or have previously entered the family relation. It is the State which has driven them off, and through the State they must be brought back. So the poet introduces a new, and of course the true, motive for their return. The world of wrong, of which the usurping Duke is the representative,

must continue its assaults upon the individual, since it is based upon the destruction of personal right; the result must be that soon a majority, or, if injustice be carried to its extreme logical end, all the people will be driven off to the Forest of Arden where the rightful Duke resides. In such case the idyllic realm is at once converted into the same state from which they have fled, lacking only the soil and the usurping Duke. But the return must be complete, must be to the old territory. Hence the usurper is made to repent when he sees that he is deserted, and the old ruler and his attendant lords are restored *peacefully*—an important point, for it would ill comport with their peaceful character and their simple, unoffending life in the woods to come back by violence. Thus the reconciliation is complete, harmony is restored, the world of wrong dissolves of its own accord, the world of right returns with the rightful Duke. The diremption with which the play begins is now healed over, the ideal world being the means whereby the regeneration takes place.

It will be noticed, however, that there is one of the company who does not return. Jaques is the completely negative character, who believes in society as little as in anything else. Even the Forest of Arden called forth in him only sneers; it was as bad as the court and possessed the same unjust features; hence it had no mediation for him. He finds a fool in the forest whose nonsensical moralizing calls forth in him the wildest delight; he thinks the fool is the only wise man, and he himself wants to turn fool to reform the world. Here we have a sample of not a few of our modern reformers, who of all people are themselves most in need of reform. He snarls at all reality, apparently for no other reason than that it is; the moment anything becomes actual, it becomes bad; mere existence is sufficient for condemnation. It does not surprise us, therefore, when it is hinted that this reformer has himself waded through the depths of sensuality, and travelled over the whole world in search of something positive, which of course he cannot find. He is hence wholly negative; man and even nature are to him worthless. He does not return, therefore, with the rest, but goes to the new convert, the Duke's brother, who has now "left the world" in

his turn, but whose career in the world was also negative. Jaques is one of those psychological characterizations of Shakspeare which are true to the most rigid logic, yet are so completely vitalized that we never feel the abstraction. Such is the third part of the movement of the play.

To sum up: this drama gives an exhaustive statement and solution of the problem of the Real and Ideal. First comes the struggle of the individual with the actual world, whereby he is trampled into the dust, his rights taken away, his life endangered. It becomes the real world of wrong and destroys that which it was called into existence to protect, and thus has the contradiction within itself which must bring about its destruction. Secondly, the individual therefore must flee, abandon state and society, which oppress and try to destroy him, and go—whither? Not to another state, for the thought in its universality is that the State as such assails him; hence he must find some spot quite out of its reach. The simple primitive life must, therefore, be sought; hence he betakes himself to the woods—the Forest of Arden—where only a few scattered shepherds eke out a scanty existence. Thus the individual is established in his ideal realm far away from the conventionalities and contradictions of society, in simple unity with nature and the beasts of the field. But, in the third place, this mode of life is found to be of very short duration, is hence not a true and permanent condition of the human race. There arises simultaneously a twofold movement for its dissolution. On the one hand, the members of this ideal land are still natural individuals, hence must love, and, what is more, must marry; thus the Family appears, which again in good time brings forth the State, and the ideal realm vanishes into thin air. On the other hand, the real world of wrong continues its warfare with the individual, until it drives all away into the Forest of Arden; for its principle is the destruction of the individual, who has of course to flee. The ideal land thereby is converted into the old state minus the tyrant, since the citizens of the one have become inhabitants of the other. So by a double process this realm cancels itself and passes into the higher form of civil and social organization. The poet, therefore, indicates that such an idyllic life is an irrational abstraction; that man's rational

existence is in the state and society, whose collisions he must endure, bitter though they be. The absurd notion that a pastoral, dreamy existence is the highest finds here no toleration. Such is the lesson for life; but the poet's work cuts deeper, since it includes the literary and artistic products of the same consciousness. All those ideal commonwealths of which literature is full may here obtain their final judgment. But particularly the nature, extent and limits of pastoral poetry, the art-form of such a life, are brought out with a hey-dey of laughter. For this species of poetry also must end with the entrance into society; it belongs only to the simple shepherd on his native hills; it is the first and least concrete, and hence least interesting of all poetry, being without the presupposition of society. The course of the drama, therefore, is the contradiction in the world of reality which results in the wrongs done to the individual; the mediation is through the ideal world, whereby a reconciliation is brought about and the individual is restored to the reality. The three steps may be generalized as the Diremption, the Mediation, and the Return. They exhibit a totality of society with its corresponding art and a hint of its literature.

Some have considered this play to be a mere caprice, a wild and irregular sport of fancy. But, if we have succeeded in our interpretation, we have shown it to be an inherent and necessary development out of one fundamental thought. Again, it has been taken for a pastoral drama. But its very aim, its comic germ, is to show the limits of pastoral poetry —in fact, of idyllic life generally—and consequently of the poetic form which springs from such a life. Still more frequently it is held to be an ordinary comedy of situation, of intrigue and love, as if the incidents connected with the disguise of Rosalind were alone to be considered. It has undoubtedly a pastoral element, it has also intrigue; but both are subordinate, are only means to bring forth the grand result. It is thus a comedy within a comedy, or rather two comedies within a comedy. The pursuit of an idyllic life calls forth the pastoral, the love gives the basis of the intrigue. But the third and highest comic element is to be found in the return to society, in the fact that these people of the ideal realm are in reality doing just the opposite of

what they think they are doing—they are trying to accomplish ends which are in themselves contradictory and null. In general this play may be called the comedy of the Imagination as against the Reason, or of the abstract Ideal as against the Actual, wherein the Imagination in pursuing an object is at the same time destroying it. Its content thus reaches deep into the history of the world. All visionary commonwealths, Plato's Republic, More's Utopia, Harrington's Oceana, Arcadias, Icarias, Atlantises, etc.; also, many of the so-called ideal lives, paradisiacal societies; in fine, the whole consciousness upon which such bodiless creations of fancy repose,—constitute the theme of this drama and are exhibited in their finitude.

NOTES AND DISCUSSIONS.

In the last number of this journal we introduced correspondence and discussion on the subject of proofs of immortality. We postpone until some future number a continuation of the discussion in order to make room for the following interesting matter. EDITOR.

The Causal Nexus.

[The following very able treatment of the psychological question involved in the subject of causality we have received from Dr. Brinton.—ED.]

AXIOM.

A cognition can only be known by a difference between itself and a related cognition.

SIGNS.

A B = a simple sequence, causal or not.
A .·. B = A is the cause of B.
— A .·. B = A is *not* the cause of B.

PROPOSITIONS.

THEOREM I.

In a simple sequence, without other cognitions, no causal idea can arise.

Let A B be a simple sequence, without other cognitions. Be it supposed, first, that D .·. B; hence — A .·. B. But the cognition of this relation cannot arise, as (*per axioma*) it requires the cognition D, and, *ex hypothesi*, D is unknown. Be it supposed, secondly, A .·. B; but, as (*per axioma*) this cognition can only be known by the cognition that any — D .·. B, and, *ex hypothesi*, this is unknown; hence, neither the idea A .·. B, nor —A .·. B, can arise.

THEOREM II.

In a simple sequence the relation of each factor to a third gives the causal idea.

Let A B be a simple sequence in which D ∴ B. Then that — A ∴ B can be known only by reference to D (*Prop.* I.) For as a simple sequence no causal idea can arise; but it is given; hence it must be by reference to this third cognition. And it must have a relation to each factor. For unless A is known in relation to B and D, then the causal sequence D ∴ B is also unknown (*per Prop.* I.) Secondly, suppose A ∴ B. But in the simple sequence A B this cannot be known (*Prop.* I.) But it is given; hence it must be in relation to D. (A ∴ B and — A ∴ D).

THEOREM III.

T relation of the third factor to a simple sequence is that of positive and negative.

Let A B be a simple sequence in which D ∴ B. Then — D ∴ A. For if D ∴ A also, then the difference in the cognitions A B disappears and they are not known (*per axioma*). But *ex hypothesi* they are known. Hence the relation must exist as — D ∴ A. *Q. E. D.*

Corollary.—In a simple sequence, with causal factors completed, the relations are D ∴ B, — D ∴ A, C ∴ A, — C ∴ B.

THEOREM IV.

The relation of the third factor of a simple sequence to its positive is that of a general to a particular.

In the simple sequence A B where D ∴ B, it is also implied — D ∴ A (*per Prop.* III.); so in any other sequence F B it is also true — D ∴ F; and in any such sequence D ∴ B, or the cognition becomes impossible. In all sequences F B, B is only known causally by these relations, D ∴ B and — D ∴ F, in which D is the positive invariable and F the negative variable.* But this relation of B to D is that of a particular to a general. Hence, &c.

From this we see that the "idea of cause," so called, is neither a mere repetition of sequences (according to Hume, Mill, Bain, &c.); nor a mysterious unknowable (Spencer, &c.); but an effort at generalization, or the forming of concepts, obscured by its expression between sequents only.

Philadelphia, Sept. 1, 1873. D. G. BRINTON.

[In a subsequent letter Dr. B. makes some remarks illustrative of the scope of the above demonstration, which we here quote:

"The line of illustration which could be adopted in giving a concrete exposition of these propositions would be three-fold. *First*, their correspondence to the physiological character of semi-perception, the latter being unable to rise to a subject for intellection unless two such perceptions stand in relation to a third of a different class.

"*Secondly*, the mathematical expression of the second law of thought, as determined by Professor Boole, being $x^2 = x$, or, more definitely,

* That is, D is the positive invariable *antecedent* and F the negative variable *antecedent*.—EDITOR.

$x(1-x)=0$, we see that it also assumes the necessity of three factors to any thought at all.

"*Thirdly*, the practical application of this formal law in the Dialectical method not only illustrates the general view, but, by developing the positive value of the privative expressed by Prof. Boole as $1-x$, and in my formula as $-D \therefore A$, leads to the only real speculative knowledge possible to us on transcendental subjects.

"This latter position might be historically exhibited by showing that upon it rests the theories of Pythagoras, Heraclitus, that contained in the Bhagavat Gita, and, later, those of Spinoza, Hegel, and Gioberti. On the ascertaining of the exact or even the approximate value of $1-x$ as a positive cognition must finally rest the whole superstructure of both religious and metaphysical thought; and the denial that it has a positive value at all by such writers as Prof. Boole and Prof. Thompson (of Oxford), is to me inexplicable. Certainly they could not have considered where it would lead them. I am not prepared to say we can assign formal laws for its development; but we can and must assign it a positive value within fixed limits. I believe an exhaustive analysis of it by the logical calculus would be the best answer to those who deny the validity of speculative thought; and would also warn speculative thinkers where those "limits of thought" are, about which of recent years there has been a good deal of indefinite and aimless discussion."

Pursuing the line of thought indicated in the above propositions, we might add, by way of illustrating the same from the stand-point taken hitherto in this journal, the following:

I. The simplest form of cognition knows things as isolated and independent, without mutual relation.

II. The next higher form of cognition is REFLECTION. It knows things as particularized and characterized or differentiated by properties, marks, characteristics, or attributes. These latter, it perceives, are in every instance, forms of relation to other things. Instead of independent things, Reflection therefore posits interdependent things. No one thing is a total, but its relation connects it with an outlying sphere of things, with which it forms a transcending totality (or totality transcending and including each particular thing). The outlying relations are from one point of view causal relations to the several properties of the thing. Hence Reflection regards every somewhat as existing in anothe or *alterum*, and hence as self-other or other to itself, and hence as finite. (If the being of A is in B and B be regarded as the other of A, then the being of A is other to itself, i.e. it is sundered into essence or cause which lies in B, and into appearance or form which lies in A. The dependent or phenomenal being, or "finite" being as Spinoza called it, contains this contradiction of being other to itself; whence its eternal process of *change;* inasmuch as its tension from itself draws it toward itself in a perpetual process. The universal gravitation of matter is an instance of a process arising through this sundering from itself. Hence in the above propositions the activity of Reflection finds the simple cognition of sequence (or accidental relation) inadequate for the explanation of the determinations of the thing. It transcends the same by an act of gen-

eralization which identifies one of the terms of the sequence with its cause and at the same time differentiates both cause and effect from other non-identical terms necessarily concomitant. EDITOR.]

Castelar's Republican Movement in Europe.

At intervals during the past year there have appeared in Harper's Magazine a series of extraordinary articles by the great Tribune of Spain, Emilio Castelar, written with all the brilliancy and eloquence that are so peculiarly his own, and yet so full of what is generally known as German metaphysics that the reader is puzzled what to admire most, the subject-matter or its setting. Though these articles are headed "*The Republican Movement in Europe,*" they rather deserve the heading, *The Philosophical Movement in Europe.* Señor Castelar describes this movement from the Kantian epoch to recent times in the various forms it has assumed among the different races of Europe: the Sclavonic, the Latin, and the Germanic. Though in these descriptions the political influence exercised by each philosophical system upon the various nations of Europe has been the chief theme as it were, the purely philosophical side has never been lost sight of, and is sometimes discussed with a knowledge and insight that show Señor Castelar to be something more than a general reader of the science.

We beg leave to call the attention of all readers to these most admirable papers. The articles on the Sclavonic races are full of that unutterable pathos and sadness which seems to tinge everything that is Russian; and it is with a melancholy smile the reader follows Señor Castelar's brilliant description of the influence exercised by the systems of Schelling and Hegel upon the young poets and scholars of Russia in the Moscow university—upon Young Russia, as it is named, and no name can be more pathetic.

The papers on the Latin races interest chiefly from the intimate acquaintance Señor Castelar displays with all their chief modern leaders and the principles that severally guide them, though in the articles on the Slavonic races there are also touching personal memorials.

But probably the most interesting to our readers will be his articles on the Germanic races that began in the July number of Harper's Magazine for this year, and are to be continued through the August and September numbers. It is encouraging and refreshing to find such reading in a publication like Harper's, and to know that it is read in 135,000 copies by probably some 500,000 persons.

The characteristics given by Señor Castelar of German philosophy in general, and of German philosophers too by-the-bye, as well as his exposition of the systems of Kant, Fichte and Jacobi, deserves the highest praise: and we once more commend the whole series of articles to the readers of this journal.

St. Louis, August, 1873. A. E. KROEGER.

[Since the above was written, two other articles from the pen of Señor Castelar have appeared in Harper, continuing his discussion of the Republican movement in Europe. In the August number, Article I., on the Germanic Peoples, treated of Fichte; Article II., in September, treated of Hegel; Article III., in October, treats of Schopenhauer and Herbart.

Señor Castelar thinks Hegel's to be the "true philosophy of progress." "The Hegelian metaphysics represent in the philosophical sciences the same that the system of Copernicus represents in astronomy." He knows the objections of the radicals who condemn Hegel as a defender of monarchy, but believes him to have been nevertheless the true philosopher of progress. "Although Hegel admits the monarchy, the reality of his logic, his system of innate ideas, his dialectic movement of being, his indefinite progress, are openly opposed to the narrow inconsistencies of the master, and tend to found a government in pure reason, to the advent of the absolute spirit, to one confederation of free peoples. The great master himself has said in a phrase which astonishes with its profoundness and simplicity, 'The history of the world is the history of liberty.'" He goes on to give, in his characteristic style, a picture of the system of Hegel in its entire compass. Coming to the doctrine of the State, he treats at length Hegel's "grave error in admitting as forms of government the pure monarchy or the pure democracy." "The monarchy looks only to unity, and suppresses liberty; democracy looks only to variety, individuality, and suppresses unity. Mixed governments, conventional governments, have been considered as the governments of reason and of nature." "In truth, even for those who would have it the most moderate, the monarchy always has something of apotheosis or deification either of the person or of the family; and this deification, this hereditary right to reign over a people, is of kin to the oriental caste, broken by so many years of progress. To suppose that a man, great as he may appear, can personify society, is like supposing that he can personify the universe." All who are interested in the question should read the whole article in Harper. In view of the recent action of the Spanish Cortes, placing Señor Castelar at the head of a Spanish republic with dictatorial powers, one has an extraordinary opportunity to test the philosopher's practice by his theory. Take in hand the articles on the "Republican movement" and make comparison with the progress of events in Spain.

The article on Schopenhauer opens with a sketch of Hegel's views of Art, Religion, and Philosophy. He then portrays the pessimism of Schopenhauer and his bitter sarcasms on Hegelianism. And yet "the more carefully and maturely Schopenhauer's system is studied, the more plainly do you see that he stigmatizes as sophists the very men he is copying, and as thieves those he is robbing. His philosophy should be called experimental metaphysics."

He goes on to sketch at length the outlines of his system of the Will. "His ideas about reason and thought are the same as those of the materialists, and the ministry which he concedes to the will and its force in the world are the same as those assigned by Hegel to the Idea." "The will shines out with all its vigor in man. To comprehend it well, it is necessary to distinguish it from intelligence. Thought is a product of the brain, and will is the energy of being. Thought is the phenomenon, will is the essence. Thought is the light, will the heat. Thought is in the intelligence, will in all the faculties, &c." "Leibnitz said that the quantity of force is invariable in the world, and Schopenhauer says that the quantity of will is invariable in human society." "Pessimism resumes his doctrine. It is, therefore,

useless to say how opposed in politics it must be to the idea of progress and human perfectability. Just causes rarely triumph in the world. The best are lost by their own errors. The dreams of democracy receive his profound contempt." From the picture of Schopenhauer he turns to Herbart, whose system he portrays as a reaction toward ordinary realism. "This movement led politics in the direction of liberty, but philosophy in that of materialism." He closes with a few words on the "harmonic philosophy" whose fundamental idea is the idea of humanity. EDITOR.]

The "Popular Science Monthly," which we are glad to learn is now circulating nearly a hundred thousand copies of each issue, is doing an essential service in furnishing for the people an education in all the valuable and interesting results of natural science.

In the October number (1873) of this periodical an epoch is made in its history by the commencement of a series of articles on "The Primary Concepts of Modern Physical Science, by J. B. Stallo." Those acquainted with the history of Speculative Philosophy in this country need not be told that this is Judge Stallo of Cincinnati, and that he is the ablest writer of our time on the subject named. Thoroughly acquainted with everything written by the thinkers and observers in the department of natural science, he is also well versed in the several systems of speculative thought that have appeared in the world. In his first article he treats of "The Theory of the Atomic Constitution of Matter." He believes in freeing physical science from the crude metaphysics which infests it, and attacks first the atomic theory. Some very remarkable scaffolding is demolished by this article. and its results on the current theory regarding light and colors are quite startling. We shall notice this and subsequent articles of Judge Stallo in future numbers of this journal. EDITOR.

BOOK NOTICES.

Grundzüge der Praktischen Philosophie, Naturrecht, Ethik und Aesthetik. Von Hermann Ulrici. Erster Band. Allgemeine grundlegende Einleitung. Das Naturrecht. Leipzig: T. O. Weigel. 1873.

This volume belongs to the second part of Professor Ulrici's great work *God and Man* (Gott und der Mensch). In 1866 appeared his *God and Nature* in a second edition, and the same year he put out the first part of *God and Man*, containing the "elements of a psychology of man," under the title of "Body and Soul." In the volume before us we have, first, a general introduction in which our author seeks to define and establish scientifically the ethical nature of man, and his freedom, and the origin of ethical ideas. Accordingly he investigates the nature and idea of the will, discriminating it from the various forms of impulse and desire as well as from all theoretical faculties. He defines its relation to the latter, and finally comes to the idea of Will as the *impulse of the soul to give to itself validity*, i.e. to realize and actualize itself. "The act of the will is an act of self-determination. and hence an act of self-diremption, although not an act of the intellect."

He next proceeds to consider the question of the freedom of the will, and discusses the consciousness which we have of this freedom, the objections urged against the existence of freedom. He finds that the causal-nexus which forms the necessity of Nature does not contradict the idea of freedom inasmuch as an efficient cause is to be found in the Will. After considering briefly the arguments against free-will drawn from the doctrine of an overruling Providence, from the logical necessity which determines rational conviction, from social statistics, he passes over to the ground and origin of our ethical ideas, and treats the topic under the heads—the idea of the true, that of the good, that of the beautiful.

After the Introduction we begin the elaboration of the several branches or "disciplines" of Practical Philosophy, the first of which is *Natural Right:* I. The idea of Right (or Justice); II. Immediate, unconditioned rights and duties; III. Mediated, conditioned rights and duties; IV. Laws of the State, or statute laws. Under II. are included—1. Right to existence and subsistence; 2. Right to hold property; 3. Right to make contracts; 4. Rights of person, (*a*) marriage, (*b*) family; 5. Rights based on personal honor. Under III. are embraced those regulations which arise from the growth of the family into a tribe and confederation of tribes, such as caste systems, &c. Under IV. we have—1. The right of self-preservation on the part of the state; 2. The right of legislation; 3. The right of executing laws, (*a*) the right of jurisdiction and administration of justice, (*b*) the right of government. In considering the last of these topics he enters into a very interesting discussion of the *form of government*, holding monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy—the old distinctions—to be mere empty abstractions. The main point, according to him, is the stage of development of the idea of justice in the consciousness of the people. With a low development of this, nothing but despotism can ensue even under a republican form. And with a high development of the idea of justice in the consciousness of a people, whether the form be monarchy as in Prussia or aristocracy as in England, there is a general realization of freedom for each and all individuals. Professor Ulrici considers the true distinction of governments to be founded on the basis developed in the ideas that underlie the unconditioned, immediate rights, namely: I. Property-state; 2. Contract-state; 3. Personal-rights-state. He traces the growth of the Roman State through the stage of the "consciousness of property-rights" (the XII tables) up to the full development of the consciousness of the rights of contracts (under the later judicial administration of the prætors). Corresponding with the contract-rights is the Republican form of government. Professor Ulrici discusses this form and its transition into a higher one, that of the personal-rights-state (which he finds in a constitutional monarchy) in a way to interest American thinkers. "A republican state," he says, "is defined in the general description of this contract-state, and it is indifferent to its essence and ideal structure whether the government be carried on immediately through the nation itself (through resolutions of popular assemblies) or through one or more elected representatives." "It remains republican whether it has a democratic or aristocratic constitution; politically this distinction is without significance, but historically they have for the most part originated in aristocracies and passed over into democracies (the former degenerating

into oligarchy and the latter into ochlocracy or mob-rule). All states, all governments—and, contrariwise, *only* those governments—whose substance and basis rest on the consciousness of contract-rights are republican. Only so long as the popular consciousness is in conformity with those obligatory determinations whose acceptation and execution lies at the basis of the government—only so long as this phase of the consciousness of rights is alive in the people, can its rulers rule in accordance with, or the governed allow themselves to submit to it, i.e. only so long will the state exist as republic. In other words, the republic is possible only so long as each citizen participates with his whole personality in the state and feels himself bound to the state, and at the same time perfectly justified and clothed with authority by the state, in turn [i.e. he gives his entire personality to the state, and in turn feels himself reinforced in his individuality by the entire might of the state]. Therefore a republican representative constitution in which the people do not participate immediately in the government, but only through a number of elected representatives—the only possible form of this participation in a great and mighty nation—is in truth not republican, but in contradiction with the essence and spirit of a republic. For although a party to a contract can appoint an attorney who as such is limited in power by his commission, yet he cannot appoint a representative who as such is perfectly free to act according to his own judgment. The most famous and important republic of the present day, and the only first-class power among republics, the American, is therefore substantially only a modified constitutional monarchy, and even as such possible only because composed of a number of smaller, relatively independent states." These remarks suggest the view of Hegel which has been so ofted scouted by republicans, not excepting even Mr. Castelar, the ardent admirer of the Hegelian Philosophy. It seems to us a mistake to interpret logical deductions with so great strictness as to prevent one from identifying under Hegel's definition of the constitutional monarchy the essential characteristics of our own republic. The complete organization and development of the three essential branches of government, their independence of each other and of the sudden changes of popular opinion, furnish a concrete realization of the ideal monarchy demanded by the Philosophy of Rights. What so-called monarchy, indeed, is there which has proved itself so strong against the danger of subversion through revolution as ours? and have we not proved that our government possesses in the highest degree the unity of rule specially claimed for monarchies?

In conclusion, we desire to say that the thought of Professor Ulrici to base his different national forms upon the distinction of stages of culture in the civil society which they represent, is a very fruitful thought. It would seem that the growth of freedom in modern times is directly conditioned through this development of civil society, and that the form of government is well-nigh indifferent compared with the stage of consciousness regarding rights. It is not so much that we call ourselves a republic, as that our society has risen to the basis of productive industry, which is the leading principle in the modern world, and is conquering WANT and NECESSITY, so that all people may ascend to the still higher stand-point of the personal-rights-state which Professor Ulrici has elaborated as the highest ideal of a state.